Going back at least to Duhem, there is a tradition of thinking that crucial experiments are impossible in science. I analyse Duhem's arguments and show that they are based on the excessively strong assumption that only deductive reasoning is permissible in experimental science. This opens the possibility that some principle of inductive inference could provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses on the basis of an appropriately controlled experiment. To be sure, there are analogues to (...) Duhem's problems that pertain to inductive inference. Using a famous experiment from the history of molecular biology as an example, I show that an experimentalist version of inference to the best explanation (IBE) does a better job in handling these problems than other accounts of scientific inference. Furthermore, I introduce a concept of experimental mechanism and show that it can guide inferences from data within an IBE-based framework for induction. 1. Introduction2. Duhem on the Logic of Crucial Experiments3. ‘The Most Beautiful Experiment in Biology’4. Why Not Simple Elimination?5. Severe Testing6. An Experimentalist Version of IBE 6.1. Physiological and experimental mechanisms6.2. Explaining the data6.3. IBE and the problem of untested auxiliaries6.4. IBE-turtles all the way down7. Van Fraassen's ‘Bad Lot’ Argument8. IBE and Bayesianism9. Conclusions. (shrink)

The argumentum of contr. 2. 4 reads as follows : Abdicavit quidam filium. Abdicatus se contulit ad meretricem. Ex ilia sustulit filium. Aeger ad patrem misit; cum venisset, commendavit ei filium suum et decessit. Adoptavit puerum . Ab altero [pater] filio accusatur dementiae.

The argumentum of contr. 2. 4 reads as follows :Abdicavit quidam filium. Abdicatus se contulit ad meretricem. Ex ilia sustulit filium. Aeger ad patrem misit; cum venisset, commendavit ei filium suum et decessit. Adoptavit puerum. Ab altero [pater] filio accusatur dementiae.

ZusammenfassungDer Text versucht in Auseinandersetzung mit den Ansätzen von Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz und Odo Marquard und im Anschluss an lutherische Theologie zu einer Verhältnisbestimmung von Theodizeefrage und Kreuzestheologie zu gelangen. Dabei wird Luthers Einsicht fruchtbar gemacht, dass Gott verborgen im Leiden wirkt, das Leiden aber nicht zu seiner Wesenseigenschaft wird. Vielmehr eröffnet sich in der Klage des leidenden Menschen die Möglichkeit, das Leiden an Gott zu beenden und gegen Gott zu Gott zu fliehen. Von Luthers Kreuzestheologie her ist (...) eine gegenseitige Durchdringung von Theodizeefrage, Hamartiologie, Kreuzestheologie und Eschatologie anzumahnen. Gleichzeitig verhelfen Klage und Anklage dazu, sich aufgrund von erfahrenen Leiden nicht in sich selbst zu verschließen, sondern kontrafaktisch an Gott festzuhalten.SummaryDiscussing the thoughts of J. Moltmann, J. B. Metz and O. Marquard the essay attempts – whilst following Martin Luther's theologia crucis – to find a relation between the theodicy-question and the theology of the cross. For this concern it refers to the aspect that God acts in suffering in a hidden way but does not posses suffering as an intrinsic characteristic. Rather, the lament of suffering people address to God, as we find it in the Psalms, gives the opportunity of bringing suffering from God's hiddenness to an end and to “flee from God to God”. Returning to Luther's theologia crucis should lead to further reflections on theodicy, sin, theology of the cross and eschatology. At the same time, lamentation as bringing human suffering before God provides an aid for suffering people not to lock their suffering in themselves, but to maintain the relationship to God – even against the supposedly factual evidence of the experience of suffering. (shrink)

uenena magnum fas nefasque, non ualent conuertere humanam uicem. In his article entitled ‘Two Horatian Problems’ Dr. Guiseppe Giangrande argues persuasively on palaeographical and other grounds for the reading miscent in place of magnum. ‘In conclusion,’ he summarizes, ‘the emendation proposed here solves all the difficulties which have puzzled scholars so far and at the same time is capable of a palaeographical explanation’.

I defend the view that single experiments can provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses against the widely held belief that “crucial experiments” are impossible. My argument is based on the examination of a historical case from molecular biology, namely the Meselson-Stahl experiment. “The most beautiful experiment in biology”, as it is known, provided the first experimental evidence for the operation of a semi-conservative mechanism of DNA replication, as predicted by Watson and Crick in 1953. (...) I use a mechanistic account of explanation to show that this case is best construed as an inference to the best explanation (IBE). Furthermore, I show how such an account can deal with Duhem's well-known arguments against crucial experiments as well as Van Fraassen's “bad lot” argument against IBE. (shrink)

At the beginning of the Poetics Aristotle has these words: έποιìα δn` καì τσ τραγωιδίασ ποίησισ τι δ κωμωιδία καì διθυραμβοποιητικ καì τσ αλητικσ πλίστη καì κιθαριστικσ πσαι τυγχάνουσιν οσαι μιμήσισ τò σνολον. διαøρουσι δ άλλήλων τρισίν. ρ τι ' ν τέροισ μιμίσθαι τι τρα τι τέρωσ καì μ τòν ατòν τρόπον. Then, expounding ν τέροισ: ᾰπασαι μν ποιονται τν μίμησιν ν p'υθμι καì λόγωι καì ρμονίαι, τοτοισ ' η χωρìσ μμιγμένοισ οον ρμονίαι μν καì p'υθμι χρμναι μόνον τ αλητικ (...) καì κιθαριστική … ατι δ τ'υθμι χωρìσ ρμονίασ τν ρχηστν. Here I omit the crucial sentence; he proceeds: οδν γρ ν χοιμν νομάσαι κοινòν τ σ σøρονος καì Ξνάρχον μίμουσ καì τοσ σωκρατικοσ λόσουσ, οδ τισ δι τριμέτρων λγiων τν λλων τινν τν τοιοτων ποιοτο τν μiμησιπλν ο νθρωποi γσυνπτοντσ τι μτρωι τò ποιν λγιοποιοσ τοσ δ ποποιοσ νομζουσιν. He develops this point about the use of the word ποιητσ to denote all writers who write in verse and finally, before ending his exposition of ν τροισ, says: ισ δ τινσ ο πσι χρνται τοσ ρημνοισ, λγω δ οον p'υθμι κα μλι καi μτρωι, ὢσπρ τ τν διθυραμβικν ποiησισ κα τν νჲμων κα τ τραγωιδiα κα κωμωιδiα. (shrink)

A stream of conscious experience is extremely contextual; it is impacted by sensory stimuli, drives and emotions, and the web of associations that link, directly or indirectly, the subject of experience to other elements of the individual's worldview. The contextuality of one's conscious experience both enhances and constrains the contextuality of one's behavior. Since we cannot know first-hand the conscious experience of another, it is by way of behavioral contextuality that we make judgements about whether or not, and to what (...) extent, a system is conscious. Thus we believe that a deep understanding of contextuality is vital to the study of consciousness. Methods have been developed for handling contextuality in the microworld of quantum particles. Our goal has been to investigate the extent to which these methods can be used to analyze contextuality in conscious experience. (shrink)

Hull et al. make a direct connection between selection and replication. My view is that selection, at its causal crux, is not inherently connected to replication. I make plain the causal crux of selection, distinguishing it from replication. I discuss implications of my results for Hull et al.'s critique of Darden and Cain (1989).

Mercy is the defining characteristic of Pope Francis’s leadership. Francis’s words and actions have made visible a discipline of mercy, which does more than illuminate God’s character and purpose; it offers an expansive imaginative framework to spark new possibilities for moral agency and growth. Before Francis, mercy received limited attention in the canon of Catholic social thought. Francis’s signature message of mercy retrieves a central moral duty in Scripture, provides a focal lens for Catholic social thought, and aims to inspire (...) a “revolution of tenderness” capable of inspiring personal conversion and social change. This essay moves forward in three steps. It first unpacks the rich and diverse meaning of the word mercy and explores its undervalued role in CST; it then analyzes how mercy functions as the crux of Francis’s moral imagination; and finally, it explores how mercy expands possibilities for living the principles of Catholic social thought. (shrink)

A question opens up a space between self and other in the very act of expecting a response. As such, it can be a form of world-building. Posing a question might reveal what is or it might push interlocutors to revise what is. Levinas counsels us to question the first attitude toward questioning in order to open ourselves up to the second. Using questions and answers from a trial of a former child soldier at the International Criminal Court, this paper (...) explores the ethical ramifications of the choices we make when we pose and respond to questions. (shrink)

The Critical Process unleashed by the Enlightenment and endlessly resharpening itself to this day has mortally wounded the God of Deism, maybe also of theism, even of Christianity. A temptation of Christian theology is to retreat in denial into an updated version of Deism, seemingly granting full license to modern science but only so long as it does not impugn God's love. The alternative here proposed is to ride out The Critical Process, in fact to encourage it, all the way (...) into modernity's crux: How can a design that is not benign still be divine? The Christian reply is: through a real death of God and of ourselves as well, and through resurrections beginning now, thus freeing The Critical Process from the illusion of insuring our survival and, instead, for the honest Enlightenment task of merely telling the truth. (shrink)

Jacobi held a position of unparalleled importance in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectual history. This includes his role in bringing about the close of the Enlightenment, his central part in shaping the reception of Kant's philosophy and German idealism, and his influence on the development of Romanticism and existentialism.

In Giorgio Agamben’s eyes, Immanuel Kant’s work is the modern philosophical harbinger of the catastrophic ‘state of exception’. By focusing on the latter’s ‘author/subject corrective’, I make the connection between Agamben and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason more apparent. In doing so, I show how Kant’s corrective instrumentalises autonomy in such a way that it compromises the validity it seeks to rationalise; it does so by separating the individual from actuality, by ostracising law from political challenge, and by conflating individual (...) and state interests. Taken together, these three undercurrents are defining features of Agamben’s ‘Homo Sacer’ series. (shrink)

In Giorgio Agamben’s eyes, Immanuel Kant’s work is the modern philosophical harbinger of the catastrophic ‘state of exception’. By focusing on the latter’s ‘author/subject corrective’, I make the connection between Agamben and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason more apparent. In doing so, I show how Kant’s corrective instrumentalises autonomy in such a way that it compromises the validity it seeks to rationalise; it does so by separating the individual from actuality, by ostracising law from political challenge, and by conflating individual (...) and state interests. Taken together, these three undercurrents are defining features of Agamben’s ‘Homo Sacer’ series. (shrink)