1. Pitʻŭgenstʻain kwa ŏnŏ -- 2. Hyŏndae ŏnŏ chʻŏrhak.

Che 1-kwŏn. Kodae-kŭndae sasang -- che 2-kwŏn. Hyŏndae sasang.

Philosophers have talked to each other about moral issues concerning technology, but few of them have talked about issues of technology and the good life, and even fewer have talked about technology and the good life with the public in the form of recommendation. In effect, recommendations for various technologies are often left to technologists and gurus. Given the potential benefits of informing the public on their impacts on the good life, however, this is a curious state of affairs. In (...) the present paper, I will examine why philosophers are seemingly reluctant to offer recommendations to the public. While there are many reasons for philosophers to refrain from offering recommendations, I shall focus on a specific normative reason. More specifically, it appears that, according to a particular definition, offering recommendations can be viewed as paternalistic, and therefore is prima facie wrong to do so. I will provide an argument to show that the worry about paternalism is unfounded, because a form of paternalism engendered by technology is inevitable. Given the inevitability of paternalism, I note that philosophers should accept the duty to offer recommendations to the public. I will then briefly turn to design ethics, which has reconceptualised the role of philosophers and, in my mind, fitted well with the inevitability of paternalism. Finally, I shall argue that design ethics has to be supplemented by the practice of recommendation if it is to sustain its objective. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on the ethical issues raised by climate engineering has explored various normative questions associated with the research and deployment of climate engineering, and has examined a number of responses to them. While researchers have noted the ethical issues from climate engineering are global in nature, much of the discussion proceeds predominately with ethical framework in the Anglo-American and European traditions, which presume particular normative standpoints and understandings of human–nature relationship. The current discussion on the ethical issues, therefore, (...) is far from being a genuine global dialogue. The aim of this article is to address the lack of intercultural exchange by exploring the ethics of climate engineering from a perspective of Confucian environmental ethics. Drawing from the existing discussion on Confucian environmental ethics and Confucian ethics of technology, I discuss what Confucian ethics can contribute to the ethical debate on climate engineering. (shrink)

Researchers have explored questions concerning public participation and consent in geoengineering governance. Yet, the notion of consent has received little attention from researchers, and it is rarely discussed explicitly, despite being prescribed as a normative requirement for geoengineering research and being used in rejecting some geoengineering options. As it is noted in the leading geoengineering governance principles, i.e. the Oxford Principles, there are different conceptions of consent; the idea of consent ought to be unpacked more carefully if, and when, we (...) invoke it in the discussion. This article offers a theoretical reflection on different conceptions of consent and their place in geoengineering governance. More specifically, I discuss three models of consent, i.e. explicit consent, implied consent and hypothetical consent, and assess their applicability to geoengineering governance. Although there are different models of consent, much discussion of geoengineering governance has committed only to explicit consent. I note that such a commitment springs from a specific ideal political order. Accordingly, we should be wary of any naïve commitment to it so long as the political order we hope for remains open to debate. Finally, I illustrate two approaches to introduce consent into a geoengineering governance framework. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)

The article aims at expanding the horizon of phenomenological psychopathology of depression from a social theoretical perspective. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology, in the first section, depression is reinterpreted as a disruption of chiasm: it is not merely the illness of the body, the disorder of the mind, or a specific form of social suffering, but the interrelated distortion of time consciousness, agency, and interaffectivity. The phenomenological clarification of these components provides opportunity for connecting sociological and psychopathological insight. In the (...) second part, contemporary critical theories of acceleration, globalization, biopolitics, and system colonization are reinterpreted to highlight the structural and cultural context of late modern time consciousness, agency, and interaffectivity. In the third section, it is analyzed, how these social constituents shape the space of contemporary socialization processes, including the emergence of those intersubjective distortions, which potentially affect the entirety of chiasm in a depressive way. In the final section, the conclusions for therapy are explored, including the potentials for expanding the epistemological, substantive, and emancipatory horizon of phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

In response to the Royal Society report’s claim that “the acceptability of geo­engineering will be determined as much by social, legal, and political issues as by scientific and technical factors” (Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty [London: Royal Society, 2009], ix), a number of authors have suggested the key to this challenge is to engage the public in geoengineering decision-making. In effect, some have argued that inclusion of the public in geoengineering decision-making is necessary for any geoengineering project to (...) be morally permissible. Yet, while public engagement on geoengineering comes in various forms, the discussion in geoengineering governance and the ethics of geoengineering have too often conceptualized it exclusively in terms of public participation in decision-making, and supported it by various liberal democratic values. However, if the predominant understanding of public engagement on—or, the role of the public in—geoengineering decision-making is indeed only grounded on liberal democratic values, then its normative relevance could be challenged by and in other ethical-political traditions that do not share those values. In this paper, I shall explore these questions from a Confucian perspective. I argue that the liberal democratic values invoked in support of the normative importance of public participation are, at least, foreign to Confucian political philosophy. This presents a prima facie challenge to view public participation in geoengineering decision-making as a universal moral requirement, and invites us to reconsider the normative significance of this form of public engagement in Confucian societies. Yet, I contend that the role of the public remains normatively significant in geoengineering governance and the ethics of geoengineering from a Confucian perspective. Drawing from recent work on Confucian political philosophy, I illustrate the potential normative foundation for public engagement on geoengineering decision-making. (shrink)

Late modern existence is built around ambivalences: subjects experience the structural paradoxes of global capitalism or information society as social suffering; yet they follow behaviour patterns reinforcing the unsustainable trajectories. The article explores the discourses justifying such structural paradoxes, while normalizing the related suffering. First, the pragmatic theory of justification (Boltanski, Thévenot) is reinterpreted from a modernization theoretical perspective: a distinction is drawn between traditional, classic and late modern ‘tests’, ‘critique’ and ‘cités’. In the second and third sections, the gradual (...) emptying of critique is analysed: as disillusionment reaches the sphere of subjective experiences, not even personal suffering can ground critique any more (Berlant), thus the impossibility of critique is demonstrated in a cynical manner (Sloterdijk). In the fourth section, the various cynical modalities of justification fitting the ambivalent contemporary existence are overviewed. Finally, a way out from the naturalized, quotidian cynicism is sketched: by turning cynicism’s logic against itself, the dialectics of justification can move forward. (shrink)

Technology has been at the centre of existentialist (e.g. Heidegger) and sociological (e.g. Marcuse) critique for a long time. The latest versions of criticism rely on the results of “science and technology studies”: they argue that essentialist conceptualisations of technology should be replaced while aiming at “democratizing technology” (e.g. Feenberg). However, even these approaches are characterised by a shortcoming when it comes to providing a normative basis: as contemporary technology intermeshes with the elementary levels of existence (such as perception or (...) cognition), it remains in the blind spot of those users, who could “democratize” it through their critique. Accordingly, the formal normative bases (e.g. the one provided by Feenberg, who relies on Habermas’ democracy principle), need to be complemented with substantive claims. For this purpose, a phenomenological-existentialist framework is elaborated with the help of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. It is argued that due to the ongoing expansion of social systems relying on various forms of technology (Luhmann), the “mediated flesh” becomes rigid. By losing the plasticity of the chiasm, subjects are exposed to existential crises unmanageable by mere technology (e.g. mental disorders). Such experience of technologically induced social suffering could serve as a normative basis for criticising the over-expansion of technology. (shrink)

This book presents a rich collection of research studies on the theory and practice of CSR in Asia. It includes valuable contributions of practice-oriented researchers from various Asian countries such as Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, and from several non-Asian countries, such as Australia, Canada and the USA. The book presents a comprehensive overview of the practice of CSR in Asia. Normally CSR is seen in the Western angles, but here, in this book, Asian philosophies and (...) thoughts are also examined. Touted as the first of its kind, the book also compares Western and Asian perspectives on CSR and presents them in the light of Asian philosophies and thoughts, such as Confucian, Islamic (Koranic), Indian (Vedantic) and other Asian ways of looking at CSR in their own rights and perspectives. (shrink)

There is an inevitable interaction between Arabic and Turkish as word transitions occur in every language. One of the common examples of this exchange between Arabic and Turkish is the word ikhtilāf (conflict).However, it is not possible to say that the bilingual partnership about this word is meaningful. Because this word expresses the meaning of opposition, contradiction, diversity, separation of opinion between two persons or groups, opposing attitude and contradictory attitude in Arabic, all of these meanings are not transferred into (...) Turkish.In other words, the word ikhtilāf’s meaning is narrowed during its transition into Turkish. In fact, the word is almost fixed in Turkish as “the separation of opinion between two persons or groups”. This difference in the meaning of the language between the two languages ​​of the contradiction must not be construed and interpreted as “controversy” or “disagreeing” at every passing moment of the word. Because in some verses this situation can be a wrong choice.Differences in interpretation in tafsir and translation errors are the most obvious indication of this possibility. Therefore, it should be considered that the use and meaning of the word may be changed according to the text. SummaryWords and concepts are the most important tools for people to share with their interlocutors both in oral communication and in writing. Because the meaning of the preferred word and concept directly affects the increase or decrease of the power of the message to be given. So, the choice of word and concept are important in the spoken word and the used word. However, despite this importance, people are not entirely free in word selection. This is because there is no vocabulary to express everything separately. So, the words are limited, and the objects named through them are unlimited. This led people use some words that have more than one meaning, which also explains the emergence of the concept of polysemy.Polysemy is a phenomenon seen in Arabic as well as in many languages. Since the Qur'ān, which contains the messages of Allah to humanity, is in Arabic, there are many words that have two or more meanings. This situation should be taken into account to understand the Qur'ān and its context when determining the meaning of such words. Revealing all potential meanings of qur’ānic expressions is important to convey the intended meaning. In other words, the inability to detect the correct meaning of the word or to ignore the fact that it is very meaningful makes some comprehension problems inevitable.One of the words in this context that have the problem of understanding is the concept ikhtilāf(Conflict). This concept, which is used 51 times in 45 verses in different ways, does not mean the same meaning wherever it is used. It is used in more than one meaning depending on the context in which it is located. The change and diversity that points to the power of Allah, the conflict, the separation of thought and behaviour between the two groups, and the unilateral opposition attitude of a person or group are the meanings of this concept. There is no significant difference in the tafsirs of these meanings regarding the meanings of change, diversity, and contradiction. The differences seen in the exegesis (tafsīr) are in the way that the same meaning is mostly stated in a different way. This situation in the tafsirs was reflected to Turkish translations of the Qur'ān on the meaning of the concept and it was translated correctly in general. This shows that the context of determining the meaning of the concept is taken into account and that the polysemy of the concept is not an important problem in the meaning of “change,” “diversity” and “contradiction.”One of the most important meanings of the concept of ikhtilāf(Conflict) is the difference of thought and behaviour between two people or groups. In this sense, the concept has two subjects and refers to the situation of these two subjects against each other. This meaning, which we see more in the use of the concept as verb, refers to the conflict and contradiction of the different thoughts and attitudes that people have to against others they face because of their personal characteristics and ideology. In this sense, ikhtilāf(Conflict) among the sides reflects a negative situation without the possibility of finding the ground and the middle way. In the verses where the concept is used in this sense, there are also elements that indicate the difference of opinion between the two subjects, such as bayna(between) preposition, the believing-disbeliever comparison. The concept has been translated into Turkish with this sense in the Qur'ān. Its meanings of conflict, conflict and conflict are also used in Turkish. Therefore, it is possible to say that this meaning has a common meaning between Arabic and Turkish. Therefore, meanings of the concept such as conflict, disagreement, etc. in Turkish translations of the Qur'an are enough to reflect the meaning of the verses in this context. So, it is possible to say that in meaning of the concept does not have a problem of understanding and interpreting in general.The concept of ikhtilāf(Conflict) is also used to counter and oppose to a thought or belief in the Qur’an except for the general meaning of the above. With this meaning we encounter in the usage of ikhtalafaand mukhtalifin this sense, it is not only the mutual attitude of the two sides but the dissident, against and opposing attitude of one side towards the other. As such, the concept reflects an action of "one subject". As in the case of conflict between the two sides, there is a negative and undesirable situation in this usage. Because in the verses where the concept is used in this sense, the contradictions, and attitudes of the unbelievers about the faith revealed by Allah, religion, the book, and the prophet are generally explained. However, this meaning of the concept has not been translated into Turkish. In other words, there is no meaning in the word ikhtilāf(Conflict) used in Turkish. Therefore, there is no exact equivalence between Turkish and Arabic regarding this meaning of the word. For this reason, translations in the form of “conflict,” “dispute” for use in this sense are insufficient to reflect the meaning of it. Because, in these translations, the contraction of the concept which was experienced in the transition from Arabic to Turkish was not observed. This causes the misunderstandings of the verses in which this concept exists.The concept of ikhtilāf(Conflict) refers to the differences of tafsir in the verses that express the opposing attitude of a person or group as with other polysemy concepts, this concept also points to the need to be careful. Instead of giving the same meaning in every passage of such polysemy concepts, it is necessary to determine the correct meaning according to the context of the unity of the verse and its context. The same sensitivity should be taken into consideration in translating the concept into Turkish. So, while translating the concept passed in Turkish by narrowing, that accepting it is true in both languages and transferring to Turkish according to it is insufficient to reflect the meaning referred in the verse. (shrink)

The article aims at reconstructing how pain is used in contemporary societies in the process of engraving power. Firstly, a social phenomenological analysis of pain is conducted: Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are used for clarifying the experience of pain itself; Elaine Scarry’s analyses are overviewed in order to reconstruct how pain contributes to the establishing of power. Secondly, this complex approach is applied in early modern context: the parallel processes of the decline of a transcendental and the emergence of a (...) medical interpretation of pain is introduced, along with the marginalization of violence. Thirdly, the era characterized by the triumph of medical pain management is analysed: it is argued that the constitutive role of pain in establishing power does not cease to exist with the emergence of technologies of discursive governance ; it is an open question, what sort of power is engraved through pain understood in strictly medical frames. (shrink)

The ethics of geoengineering has gained momentum in recent academic debate. The current debates, however, is typically framed in terms of (i) the first-order question about the moral permissibility of geoengineering, and (ii) the second-order question about the distributive and compensatory issues associated with geoengineering. Both (i) and (ii) are central to decision-making about geoengineering, but they have not cover all ethical issues related to geoengineering. I argue that a preoccupation with (i) and (ii) may lead to an oversight of (...) post-implementation scenarios (PISs), which introduce different ethical issues relevant to decision-making on geoengineering. More specifically, I use the requirement of maintenance for geoengineering as an example to draw attention to PISs, and to illustrate the limit of the existing discussion in the ethics of geoengineering. (shrink)

Due to the ‘civilizing process’ (Elias), the overall level of violence is decreasing; yet its transforming patterns persist. The article aims at examining the contemporary structures and mechanisms responsible for violence control, while also exploring the newly emerging, naturalized patterns of cruelty. Firstly, René Girard’s mimetic theory is overviewed: while in archaic societies, mimetic crisis is controlled by sacrificial rites, modernization reconfigures this paradigm. Secondly, these transformations are mapped: mimetic desire is channelled into the market processes, while mimetic crisis is (...) managed by the state monopolizing violence. Thirdly, the structural transformations of late modernity upsetting the fragile balance of state and market are analysed: secular scapegoating becomes part of the political toolset, while the private sphere is overwhelmed by undetectable new forms of hurting and self-harming. As a culture of cruelty is naturalized, mimetic crisis becomes a continuous threat, which generates a need for the functional equivalents of sacrificial violence control. (shrink)

Social contract theories serve a twofold purpose: by addressing acute crises, they elaborate solutions to long-standing social paradoxes. The article reinterprets the stakes of the Covid pandemic from this perspective. Firstly, the long-lasting structural paradoxes of late modernity are linked to the acute crisis of the pandemic with the help of critical theories of late modernity. It is argued that the pandemic provides opportunity for revaluating those social contracts, which are based on universalist principles of justice. Secondly, two paradigmatic historical (...) examples (Hobbes, Rawls) are overviewed in a meta-theoretical fashion, so that the dimensions of revaluation could be highlighted. Thirdly, the foundations of a post-pandemic social contract are outlined. As the pandemic is inseparable from the structural paradoxes caused by unconstrained systems based on universal principles of justice, the post-pandemic social contract aims at preventing the system paradoxes by revaluating their universal principles in a ‘trial of particularity’ (Derrida, Levinas). (shrink)

The article aims at elaborating a non-speculative concept of social pathology. In the first section, various conceptualizations (e.g. Habermas, Honneth) are critically revaluated. It is argued that (a) applying the originally medical concept of ‘pathology’ on social entities has untenable connotations (due to the lacking social equivalent of death); (b) grounding social pathology on the level of ‘social suffering’ is not in accordance with the actors’ horizon shaped by biomedical- and psy-discourses. To avoid these dead-ends, social pathologies are reinterpreted as (...) structural distortions causing diseases or mental disorders. To refine this initial definition, in the second section, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm is used as an ontological framework translating between medical and social diagnoses. The proposed concept of social pathology refers to those patterns of disrupted pre-intentional, intentional and mediated intertwining, which manifest as ill or psychopathological chiasm. In the third section, two case studies are elaborated: the intersubjective structures of depressed and asthmatic chiasm. Finally, the implications for critical theory and praxis are overviewed. (shrink)