En Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton presenta una nueva e interesante solución al mayor problema al que se enfrenta el co-ubicacionismo : el problema de la fundamentación. Sin embargo, si es correcto rechazar la tesis defendida por Sutton según la cual los trozos o pedazos de materia están extrínsecamente compuestos,entonces su respuesta al problema de la fundamentación resulta incompleta. Además, es difícil ver cómo podría completarse.

Let us consider a statue and the piece of clay out of which it is made, and let us suppose that they start to exist and cease to exist at exactly the same time. According to colocationism, the statue and the piece of clay are two different objects: they have different properties and, according to Leibniz’s Law, the same object cannot have different properties. One of the most difficult questions for colocationism is that of the grounding problem : given that (...) the statue and the piece of clay share many of their properties, what is it that grounds the fact that they have different sortal properties? Recently, Catherine Sutton has offered a very interesting answer to the question. However, as I will argue, it cannot be applied to all cases of colocated objects and therefore, it is not an adequate solution to the grounding problem. The main objective of this paper is to present a new solution to the grounding problem that integrates some of Sutton’s theses, but that allows us to give a complete answer to the question. To do this, the notion of a process of coming into existence will be crucial. After presenting the new proposal, I will compare it with the proposals by Kit Fine and Noël Saenz. (shrink)

Let us consider a statue and the piece of clay out of which it is made, and let us suppose that they start to exist and cease to exist at exactly the same time. According to colocationism, the statue and the piece of clay are two different objects: they have different properties and, according to Leibniz’s Law, the same object cannot have different properties. One of the most difficult questions for colocationism is that of the grounding problem: given that the (...) statue and the piece of clay share many of their properties, what is it that grounds the fact that they have different sortal properties? Recently, Catherine Sutton has offered a very interesting answer to the question. However, as I will argue, it cannot be applied to all cases of colocated objects and therefore, it is not an adequate solution to the grounding problem. The main objective of this paper is to present a new solution to the grounding problem that integrates some of Sutton’s theses, but that allows us to give a complete answer to the question. To do this, the notion of a process of coming into existence will be crucial. After presenting the new proposal, I will compare it with the proposals by Kit Fine and Noël Saenz. (shrink)

Sortal predicates have been associated with a counting process, which acts as a criterion of identity for the individuals they correctly apply to. We discuss in what sense certain types of predicates suggested by quantum physics deserve the title of ‘sortal’ as well, although they do not characterize either a process of counting or a criterion of identity for the entities that fall under them. We call such predicates ‘quantum-sortal predicates’ and, instead of a process of counting, (...) to them is associated a ‘criterion of cardinality’. After their general characterization, it is discussed how these predicates can be formally described. (shrink)

Advocates of sortal essentialism have argued that concepts like “thing” or “object” lack the unambiguous individuative criteria necessary to play the role of genuine sortals in reference. Instead, they function as “dummy sortals” which are placeholders or incomplete designations. In disqualifying apparent placeholder sortals, however, these philosophers have posed insuperable problems for accounts of childhood conceptual development. I argue that recent evidence in psychology demonstrates that children do possess simple or basic sortals of physical objects or things. I contend (...) that these concepts provide the genuine individuative criteria necessary for reference. As a consequence, sortalism can be made compatible with the developmental facts of conceptual development. (shrink)

: ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem (...) to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to classify at all. (shrink)

Sortal predicates have been associated with a counting process, which acts as a criterion of identity for the individuals they correctly apply to. We discuss in what sense certain types of predicates suggested by quantum physics deserve the title of 'sortal' as well, although they do not characterize either a process of counting or a criterion of identity for the entities that fall under them. We call such predicates 'quantum-sortal predicates' and, instead of a process of counting, (...) to them is associated a 'criterion of cardinality'. After their general characterization, it is discussed how these predicates can be formally described. (shrink)

It has long been debated whether objects are ‘sortally’ individuated. This paper begins by clarifying some of the key terms in play—in particular, ‘sortal’, ‘individuation’, and ‘object’. The term ‘individuation’ is taken to have both a cognitive and a metaphysical sense, in the former denoting the singling out of an object in thought and in the latter a determination relation between entities. ‘Sortalism’ is defined as the doctrine that only as falling under some specific sortal concept can an (...) object be successfully singled out in thought. It is argued that such a view is too strong, but that a weaker one, ‘categorialism’, can be defended, this implying that a thinker cannot successfully single out an object in thought without having at least an implicit grasp of the criterion of identity that the object satisfies. (shrink)

In a recent article, Harold Noonan argues that application conditions and criteria of identity are not distinct from one another. This seems to threaten the standard approach to distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I propose that his observation, while correct, does not have this consequence. I present a simple scheme for distinguishing sortals from adjectival terms. I also propose an amended version of the standard canonical form of criteria of identity.

Is it possible to characterize the sortal essence of Fs for a sortal concept F solely in terms of a criterion of identity C for F? That is, can the question ‘What sort of thing are Fs?’ be answered by saying that Fs are essentially those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of C? This paper presents a case study supporting a negative answer to these questions by critically examining the neo-Fregean suggestion that cardinal numbers can (...) be fully characterized as those things whose identity can be assessed in terms of one-one correspondence between concepts. (shrink)

Contemporary metaphysics is dominated by the view that every object belongs to a kind permanently in the sense that it cannot cease to belong to that kind without thereby ceasing to exist. For example, some philosophers think that a person is destroyed if they cease to be a person, a statue is destroyed if it ceases to be a statue, and so on. I believe that this standard view is false. Being a person, or a statue, or etc., is like (...) being a child: just as I did not cease to exist when I ceased to be a child, so people and statues need not cease to exist when they cease to be people and statues. Borrowing a term from Daniel Korman (who uses it in a similar but perhaps not identical way), I call this view phasalism because it entails that the kind-properties which ordinary objects instantiate are phase sortal properties, i.e., kind-properties that an object can instantiate for a temporary phase of its career. This dissertation is a partial defense of phasalism. I develop a phasalist metaphysics in detail, highlighting its virtues and rebutting objections along the way. After some stage-setting (Chapter 1), I defend a phasalist criterion of identity over time for ordinary objects (Chapter 2), as well as a phasalist account of the role that sortal properties play in the identity over time of ordinary objects (Chapter 3). Then I defend a phasalist-friendly approach to the identity over time of lumps, hunks, pieces, etc. of matter (Chapter 4). The material in these chapters amounts to a phasalist solution to certain material coincidence puzzles, such as the puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay. I go on to show that familiar puzzles about undetached parts (Chapter 5) and fission (Chapter 6) can be solved within the confines of my phasalist metaphysics as well. (shrink)

Spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity are not sufficient to trace the career or path of one and the same object through its history. One needs sortal continuity, guaranteed by the form-token of the object. In this paper I concentrate on the question of sortal continuity linked to the problem of the cohabitation of objects. I intend to test whether it is possible to stick to the belief in continuants or endurers as well as the sortal dependence of identity (...) and at the same time avoid an undesirable multiplication of spatially coinciding objects, i.e., avoid the thesis of cohabitation. I abandon the philosophical view – this is the price to be paid – that the set of the material constituents making up an object is an object proper. The basic units of reality are the objects falling under sortals and not the ultimate components thereof. That a determinate piece of copper is not identical with the statue made from it, therefore, does not imply that we have a cohabitation of two numerically different objects. (shrink)

The paper discusses sortal essentialism': the view that some sortal concepts represent essential properties of the things that fall under them. Although sortal essentialism is widely accepted, there is a dearth of theories purporting to explain why some sortals should have this characteristic. The paper examines two theories that do attempt this explanatory task, theories proposed by Baruch Brody and David Wiggins. It is argued that Brody's theory rests on an untenable principle about "de re" modality, while (...) Wiggins' theory appeals to a thesis about principles of individuation that is either unjustified, or vacuous and incapable of supporting sortal essentialism. (shrink)

In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token (...) identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal. (shrink)

The problem of the subject-predicte distinction has featured centrally in much of modern philosophy of language and philosophical logic. and the distinction is taken as basic or fundamental in modern philosophical logic. A sortal is a symbol which furnishes a principle of distinction and counting in its own right for particulars (objects).This book explores sortals and their relationship to the subject-predicate distinction; arguing that the nature of sortal symbols has been misconstrued in much modern writing in the philosophy (...) of logic by failing to clearly distinguish sortals from names and predicates; contending that this misconstruction has led to a failure to appreciate what makes the subject-predicate distinction possible; demonstrating logical difficulties which then follow; and expounding an account of sortal symbols which seeks to be immune from the difficulties. Exploring and challenging aspects of the work of Frege, Russell, Geach, Quine, Evans and Strawson, amongst others, Durrant also provides a new challenge to certain popular presuppositions employed in many areas of contemporary philosophical debate, and offers important insights for those studying across philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics and epistemology, in particular. (shrink)

It seems intuitive that in situations of perceptual recognition additional properties are represented. While much has been written about the significance of such properties for perceptual phenomenology, it is still unclear (a) what is the relation between recognition-based properties and lower-level perceptual properties, and (b) whether it is justified to classify them as kind-properties. Relying on results in cognitive psychology, I argue that recognition-based properties (I) are irreducible, high-level properties, (II) are kind properties by virtue of being sortal properties, (...) but (III) they supervene on lower-level properties and so are unlikely to be natural kind properties. (shrink)

John Locke y Jeremy Bentham son dos de los autores del liberalismo inglés más reconocidos en el ámbito filosófico. Entre sus teorías es posible apreciar diferencias respecto a la fundamentación de una temática tan importante para el liberalismo como lo es el derecho de propiedad privada, que es una cuestión clave tanto para la reflexión política como económica. Conviene tratar estas diferencias con el fin de extraer problemas teóricos de gran calado en la comprensión del liberalismo y en relación (...) con las argumentaciones sobre el origen del derecho de propiedad privada. (shrink)

This article offers a novel, conservative account of material constitution, one that incorporates sortal essentialism and features a theory of dominant sortals. It avoids coinciding objects, temporal parts, relativizations of identity, mereological essentialism, anti-essentialism, denials of the reality of the objects of our ordinary ontology, and other departures from the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. Defenses of the account against important objections are found in Burke 1997, 2003, and 2004, as well as in the often neglected six (...) paragraphs that conclude section V of this article. (shrink)

Among the philosophical accounts of reference, Quine’s The Roots of Reference stands out in offering an integrated account of the acquisition of linguistic reference and object individuation. Based on a non-referential ability to distinguish bodies, the acquisition of sortals and quantification are crucial steps in learning to refer to objects. In this article, we critically re-assess Quine’s account of reference. Our critique will proceed in three steps with the aim of showing that Quine effectively presupposes what he sets out to (...) explain, namely, reference to objects. We are going to argue that sortals do not individuate, that bodies are already objects, and that the acquisition of variables presupposes a notion of identity. The result is diagnostic of a central desideratum for any theory of reference: an explanation of spatiotemporal object individuation. (shrink)

Consideration of the counting and reidentification of particulars leads naturally enough to the orthodox doctrine that, “on pain of indefiniteness,” an identity statement in some way involves or presupposes a general term or “covering concept”: i.e., that the principium individuationis or criterion of identity implied depends upon the kind of thing in question. Thus it is said that an auditor understands the question whether A is the same as B only in so far as he knows, however informally or implicitly, (...) the answer to the supplementary question, “The same what?”. (shrink)

Nedelsky and Kelsen criticize the notion of subjective rights. While Nedelsky does so on the basis of a relational theory of rights founded on the Hegelian intersubjective recognition, Kelsen rejects Hegel’s theory of rights because property, the paradigmatic subjective right, appears to be constituted prior to intersubjectve recognition. This paper probes into Hegel’s conception of property to elucidate the root of the divergence between Nedelsky and Kelsen. Pierson v. Post is examined as an illustration of that divergence.

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a (...) la luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a (...) la luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de superveniencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demos-trado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties (i.e., reduction). According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory (see § 4), we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

Recent work in natural language semantics leads to some new observations on generalized quantifiers. In § 1 we show that English quantifiers of type $ $ are booleanly generated by their generalized universal and generalized existential members. These two classes also constitute the sortally reducible members of this type. Section 2 presents our main result--the Generalized Prefix Theorem (GPT). This theorem characterizes the conditions under which formulas of the form Q1x 1⋯ Qnx nRx 1⋯ xn and q1x 1⋯ qnx nRx (...) 1⋯ xn are logically equivalent for arbitrary generalized quantifiers Qi, qi. GPT generalizes, perhaps in an unexpectedly strong form, the Linear Prefix Theorem (appropriately modified) of Keisler & Walkoe (1973). (shrink)

El artículo indaga la legitimidad libertaria de las fronteras estatales para excluir inmigrantes. Se sostiene que en estas teorías la legitimidad de las fronteras se construye mediante la legitimidad de la propiedad. El artículo analiza las teorías libertarias de Nozick y Steiner y argumenta contra la idea de que el derecho de propiedad libertario permite excluir en las fronteras y sostiene que las condiciones de legitimidad de la propiedad implican una potestad estatal reducida para controlar fronteras. Si (...) bien en un mundo ideal las comunidades dispondrían del poder total para controlarlas, en nuestro mundo imperfecto los estados carecen de esa potestad. (shrink)

El artículo presenta y examina la teoría de la propiedad común de la tierra articulada y defendida por Mathias Risse, enfocándose en el caso de la inmigración, y arguye que la teoría tiene dificultades tanto inmanentes como con respecto a sus consecuencias, de modo que no puede hacerse cargo de los flujos migratorios que se retrotraen a la desigualdad económica en términos de justicia. Finalmente, en contraposición, se presenta una defensa de las fronteras abiertas en base a una concepción (...) igualitarista de la suerte global. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal‐weighted version of a change‐minimizing criterion first (...) discussed by Eli Hirsch. I present this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non‐phasalist rivals. (shrink)

A wealth of literature has been devoted to the problem of developing an adequate semantic analysis of sortally incorrect statements. The motivation is clear, albeit controversial: sortally incorrect statements appear to exhibit an unusual behavior when coupled with other statements in logically complex statements. For instance, two senses of negation are distinguishable when the operation is applied to sortally incorrect statements. In this paper, I shall reopen the question of the "correct" semantic analysis of sortally incorrect statements.

Saul Kripke ha presentado un conjunto de tesis esencialistas enmarcadas bajo la etiqueta«esencialismo aristotélico», esto es, la tesis que defiende la significatividad de la distinción entrepropiedades necesarias y accidentales de los objetos. Sin embargo, ¿es el «esencialismo aristotélico»acorde con el aristotelismo? Más aún, ¿puede alguna de las propiedades esenciales presentadas por Kripkeser interpretadas desde una perspectiva aristotélica? En este artículo pretendemos fundamentalmentedos cosas: 1) criticar la etiqueta «esencialismo aristotélico» a través de una hipótesis plausible acercade su elaboración; y 2) aportar (...) una explicación de las intuiciones que sustentan la metafísica kripkeanadesde la metafísica aristotélica, centrada en el paralelismo existente entre la necesidad del origenmaterial de los artefactos y la doctrina de la necesidad hipotética de la causa material desarrollada porel filósofo de Estagira. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente estudio fue analizar las propiedades psicométricas de la ENCAO en trabajadores de una empresa privada del sector de hidrocarburos en Lima Metropolitana. Para esto, se evaluó a una muestra de 384 participantes, 64 % mujeres y 36 % hombres, con edades entre los 19 y los 56 años. Como evidencias de validez de la estructura interna del instrumento, se realizó un análisis factorial exploratorio y un análisis factorial confirmatorio, donde se encontró una estructra de cuatro factores (...) relacionados con los 21 ítems de la escala, los cuales explicaron el 60.33 % de la varianza total y obtuvieron adecuados índices de bondad de ajuste. Como fuente de validez externa se obtuvieron correlaciones moderadas con la variable satisfacción laboral. Los coeficientes alfa de Cronbach de los cuatro factores oscilaron entre.60 y.84. Se concluye que la ENCAO y sus puntuaciones derivadas son una medida válida y fiable para medir el aprendizaje organizacional en el sector laboral evaluado.Palabras clave: aprendizaje organizacional; validez; confiabilidad; análisis factorial. Psychometric properties of the Organizational-Learning Levels and Conditions Scale in employees of a Peruvian private companyThe objective of the present study was to analyze the psychometric properties of the ENCAO in employees of a private company of the hydrocarbon sector in Metropolitan Lima. A sample of 384 participants was evaluated, of whom 64 % were women and 36% men, aged between 19 and 56 years. As evidences of validity related to the internal structure, an exploratory factorial analysis and a confirmatory factorial analysis were carried out, resulting in a structure of four related factors with the 21 items on the scale that explained 60.33 % of the total variance and with adequate goodness of fit indexes. As a source of external validity, moderate correlations were obtained with the variable Job Satisfaction. The Cronbach alpha coefficients of the four factors obtained ranged between.60 and.84. It is concluded that the ENCAO and its derived scores are a valid and reliable measure to measure organizational learning in the evaluated labor sector.Key words: organizational learning; validity; reliability; factorial analysis. Propriedades psicométricas da Escala de Níveis e Condições de Aprendizagem Organizacional em trabalhadores de uma empresa privada peruanaResumoO objetivo do presente estudo foi analisar as propriedades psicométricas da ENCAO em trabalhadores de uma empresa privada do setor de hidrocarbonetos na região metropolitana de Lima, no Peru. Para isso, avaliou-se uma amostra de 384 participantes, 64 % mulheres e 36 % homens, com idades compreendidas entre 19 e 56 anos. Como evidências de validade relacionada à estrutura interna, realizou-se uma análise fatorial exploratória e uma análise fatorial confirmatória com as quais foi encontrada uma estrutura de quatro fatores relacionados com os 21 itens da escala, os quais explicaram o 60.33 % da variância total e obtiveram adequados índices de bondade de ajuste. Como fonte de validade externa foram obtidas correlações moderadas com a variável satisfação laboral. Os coeficientes alfa de Cronbach dos quatro fatores oscilaram entre.60 e.84. Conclui-se que a ENCAO e suas pontuações derivadas são uma medida válida e fiável para medir a aprendizagem organizacional no setor laboral avaliado.Palavras-chave: aprendizagem organizacional; validade; confiabilidade; análise fatorial. (shrink)