Postpositivists have lately joined post‐Husserlians in arguing that the deepest problem with Descartes' legacy is that it fosters the objectivist illusion that philosophers might actually come to think “from Nowhere,” or at least that they can self‐consciously choose whatever presuppositions they do accept. Yet this argument is easier to express than to incorporate into one's own thinking. It is perfectly possible to oppose the View from Nowhere, and even to criticize others for failing to understand its impossibility, and still do (...) so … as if from Nowhere. This article is concerned with such compromised opposition—that is, with critics who reject, in ahistorical terms and from an ahistorical standpoint, an ahistorical conception of philosophy. It focuses on two figures from the empiricist‐positivist side of the Cartesian legacy, Rorty and Taylor, but their story is in important ways typical. Though their criticisms are certainly more radical and considerably more successful than those of many of their analytic colleagues, each retains in his own thinking more of the ahistorical or standpointless ideal than he realizes. (shrink)

State‐of‐the‐art surveys such as John H. Zammito has produced are usually read prior to engaging seriously upon some course of study. Yet his book will be even more helpful, perhaps, to those who can look retrospectively upon the field of science studies in order to consider how the field has changed and whether postmodernism remains the threat that Zammito thinks it. By explicitly including the history of the development of the philosophy of language in a history of science studies, he (...) makes an original, provocative claim that goes beyond the wealth of information on Quine and Kuhn’s supposed refutation of the Vienna Circle’s positivism, the creation of the Edinburgh School’s sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), and the debates that followed in the wake of each. Analytic philosophers from Quine to Rorty and Continental philosophers from Derrida to the postmoderns thus play a central role in the development of science studies, despite the fact that they focus on language in general rather than on science. (shrink)

New nursing researchers are faced with a smorgasbord of competing methodologies. Sometimes, they are encouraged to adopt the research paradigms beloved of their senior colleagues. This is a problem if those paradigms are no longer of contemporary methodological relevance. The aim of this paper was to provide clarity about current research paradigms. It seeks to interrogate the continuing viability of positivism as a guiding paradigm for nursing research. It does this by critically analysing the methodological literature. Five major paradigms are (...) addressed: the positivist; the interpretivist/constructivist; the transformative; the realist; and the postpositivist. Acceptance of interpretivist, transformative or realist approaches necessarily entails wholesale rejection of positivism, while acceptance of postpositivism involves its partial rejection. Postpositivism has superseded positivism as the guiding paradigm of the scientific method. The incorporation in randomized controlled trials of postpositivist assumptions indicates that even on the methodological territory that it once claimed as its own, positivism has been rendered redundant as an appropriate paradigm for contemporary nursing research. (shrink)

What paths are taken by post-posi tiv ist so - cial the ory?. Be yond the three ba sic types of contemporarty the o ries stud ied in this pa per, the pre sup po si tions of which com bine struc ture and agent, the study of so ci ety in which ac knowl - edge ment of the prop er ties of dis tinct..

The paper deals with Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s ideas related to the so-called “historical turn” and its application to the philosophy of mathematics. In the first part the meaning of the term “postpositivism” is specified. If we lack such a specification we can hardly discuss the philosophy of science that comes “after postpositivism”. With this end in view, the metaphor of “generations” in the philosophy of science is used. It is proposed that we restrict the use of the term “post-positivism” to (...) two and only two philosophical “generations”: the one to which Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend belong, and the previous “generation” to which Wittgenstein, Polanyi, Popper and Quine (as well as the major part of logical positivists) belong. From this point of view, Bloor, Latour, Pickering, Daston and Galison belong to the “third generation” which represents the philosophy of science “after post-positivism”. The characteristic feature of post-positivism is the combination of decisive impact of logical positivism and its severe criticism. This combination inevitably makes post-positivism a transitional form in the philosophy of science. In the second part the contribution of the “big four” of post-positivist philosophers (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend) to the radical change in the philosophy of mathematics in the second half of the 20th century is analyzed. Primarily, they shifted philosophical interest from the logical analysis of formal systems to the historical dynamics of informal mathematics. They also reconsidered the sharp opposition between mathematics and the physical sciences. However, the transitional character of their philosophy manifests itself both in their treatment of mathematics and their way of understanding history. On the one hand, their “heritage” is ambiguous, on the other hand, it opens new perspectives. Neither Kuhn, nor Lakatos, have eliminated completely the methodological barrier positing the fundamental heterogeneity of mathematics and natural science. Neither Lakatos, nor Kuhn, adhered to the viewpoint of relentless historicism. Nevertheless, it is their work that has made these options open for today’s historians and philosophers of science, even for philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

The article explores the contemporary philosophy of science in the context of the idea of eternal return. The problematization of the intellectual field “after postpositivism” runs through the renewed questions “what?”, “how?”, “who?” and “for what?” of scientific research. This questioning is a search for bearings in the historical space and time that determines “after what?” or “back to whom?” the thinking about science unfolds. Such a reflexive appeal to the origins leads to the ideas of the philosophy of science (...) of the first half of the twentieth century. It is then that the main differences within the research of science were formed: between sociological and methodological approaches, between philosophy and disciplines that study science, between the goals of forming a worldview and managing science. The philosophy of science “after postpositivism” expresses itself in the controversial interpretation of the subject matter and method of the study of science, in the division of labor between disciplines and approaches that lose the possibility of constructive interaction and reach the point of “science wars”. In conclusion, it is argued that philosophy as the "hard core” of scientific research, a historical appeal to the origins of scientific activity and the interpretation of the scientific revolution as a renewal of tradition can make such modernity valuable for return. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconsider the context of Barbara Carper's alternative ways of knowing, a prominent discourse in modern nursing theory in North America. We explore this relative to the concepts of realism, non‐realism and nominalism, and investigate the philosophical divisions behind the original typology, particularly in relationship to modern scientific enquiry. We examine forms of knowledge relative to realist and nominalist positions and make an argument ad absurdum against relativistic interpretations of knowledge using the example of Borge's Chinese Emporium (...) of Benevolent Knowledge. We propose a contentious postpositivist practical classification for nursing knowledge that demonstrates and supports the idea that knowledge has both individual and subjective components. This classification supports the practical application of nursing knowledge within the paradigm of realist postpositivist science. (shrink)

Reshaping ethnography: contemporary postpositivist possibilitiesFollowing Leinginger's introduction of ethnography into the field of nursing research, numerous descriptive and interpretive studies of health care beliefs and practices have been conducted. The resultant data have been translated into recommendations relative to the areas of nursing education, administration and clinical practice in an effort to ensure that the identified cultural needs are recognized and met. In this paper die discourses that inform such work are explored. Its practices and emergent dilemmas are reassessed in (...) die light of an emerging body of work that challenges its foundational assumptions. Linked under die umbrella of ‘postpositivist ethnography’, such work recognizes the research area as a social and political field of which the researcher is an integral part. Hence, as an informed subject, die researcher, like the informants, is seen to be implicated in the generation of data. She, or he, is not charged with occupying die opposing roles of objective researcher and subjective participant, nor with reporting ‘the truth’ as told by informants. This emergent tradition is not without its dilemmas and of particular concern is the issue of authority; that is, whose voice constructs the text? As nursing academics grapple with questions regarding die nature of die knowledge that informs their discipline, it is imperative that they critique potentially fruitful research practices before they appropriate them. Failure to do so may lead diem to unwittingly generate knowledge that is inimical to their particular quest. The lsquo;new edinographyrsquo; discussed in this paper, offers academics and odiers interested in the generation of knowledge, not only a mediodology that invites the possibility of opening up previously hidden areas of practice, but one that actively involves die researcher in challenging her taken‐for‐granted assumptions. (shrink)

The basic (negative and positive) methodological maxims of three currents of philosophy of science (logical empiricism, falsificationism, and postpositivism) are formulated. Many of these maxims (stratagems) are controversial, e.g., the stance about the nonsense of metaphysics, and that of its indispensability. The restricted validity of these maxims allows for their unification. Within the framework of most of them there may be a relationship of (synchronic, or diachronic) subordination of the contradicting desiderata. In this vein ten stratagems are formulated.

Although clinical interpretation originated with Freud, the latter's positivist preference for purely observational methods made him ambivalent toward interpretive methods. According to Rubovits-Seitz, the legacy of Freud's positivism still pervades clinical thinking and interferes with progress in investigating and improving interpretive methods. He reviews the paradigm shift in general science from positivism to postpositivism by way of demonstrating the compatibility of interpretive inquiry with a postpositivist approach. Post-Freudian models of clinical interpretation are evaluated, andclinical methods of interpretation are compared with (...) interpretive approachesin nonclinical fields. A detailed discussion of the neglected problem ofjustifying interpretations incorporates evaluations of specific justifyingprocedures and a case report illustrating applications of such methods. Thework concludes with a consideration of common but avoidable errors in clinicalinterpretation along with remedial strategies for dealing with them. Following _Depth-Psychological Understanding, _clinicians may no longer take for granted the interpretive process and the accuracy of their own interpretations. Rubovits-Seitz's scholarly survey marks a major advance in comprehending the methodology of clinical interpretation and in setting forth both the problems and promise of interpretive methods. (shrink)

Explaining people : theoretical psychology throughout the ages -- Ways of knowing : the scientific method and its alternatives -- From philosophy to laboratory : the arrival of empirical psychology -- The evolution of measurement : from physiognomy to psychometrics -- The behaviourist revolution : actions as data -- The cognitive revolution : the metaphor of computation -- Neuroscience and genetics : 21st century reductionism? -- Can psychology be scientific? -- Subjectivist approaches to psychology -- The problem of consciousness -- (...) Science since the 20th century : postpositivism and postmodernism -- Relativism, constructivism and their implications for psychology -- The future of psychology -- And finally, before the exam--. (shrink)

Explaining people : theoretical psychology throughout the ages -- Ways of knowing : the scientific method and its alternatives -- From philosophy to laboratory : the arrival of empirical psychology -- The evolution of measurement : from physiognomy to psychometrics -- The behaviourist revolution : actions as data -- The cognitive revolution : the metaphor of computation -- Neuroscience and genetics : 21st century reductionism? -- Can psychology be scientific? -- Subjectivist approaches to psychology -- The problem of consciousness -- (...) Science since the 20th century : postpositivism and postmodernism -- Relativism, constructivism and their implications for psychology -- The future of psychology -- And finally, before the exam--. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education When reliability and validity were introduced as validation criteria for empirical research in the human sciences, quantitative research methods prevailed, and theory of science relied on neopositivism (Vienna Circle) or postpositivism (scientific realism). Within this worldview, notions of reliability and validity as criteria of scientific goodness were introduced. Reliability and validity were associated with the correspondence theory of truth, which is mostly ill-suited to the needs of qualitative research. For that reason, qualitative research must look (...) for other kinds of validation criteria. The article elaborates the problems arising when the correspondence theory of truth is used as an ultimate criterion in evaluating qualitative research and proposes Heidegger's hermeneutical or alethetical idea of truth as a more suitable approach. (shrink)

Peirce’s response to the anti-metaphysical positivism of his day draws on Kant’s response to Hume, but moves beyond it, being thus a valuable resource, especially in our own post-Logical Positivist era. Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics need not be the hopelessly "airy science" Hume had pooh-poohed, but could and should become a legitimate and valuable area of investigation. Peirce's legacy to philosophy today is a distinctively plausible post-Kantian reconstruction of how this might be achieved.

Alf Ross propose une théorie juridique qu’il veut “véritablement” réaliste, c’est-à-dire susceptible de dissoudre les problèmes auxquels se heurtent la théorie normativiste de Kelsen et la théorie réaliste américaine et de reconstruire leur discours de manière scientifique. L’originalité de Ross réside dans son concept de norme de compétence que Ross analyse, avant d’autres et notamment Searle, comme des règles constitutives. Contrairement à ce que de nombreux commentateurs ont soutenu, ce concept de norme constitutive ne contredit pas la théorie réaliste de (...) Ross. Éclairées à la lumière des premiers écrits de Ross, les normes de compétence sont des rationalisations capables d’exprimer la prédisposition des destinataires des normes à reconnaître certains faits comme droit. Ross peut dès lors apparaître comme un précurseur du postpositivisme. (shrink)

Alf Ross je želel izoblikovati »pristno« realistično teorijo prava. To pomeni, da naj bi bila ta sposobna po eni strani razrešiti probleme, s katerimi sta se soočali tako Kelsnova normativistična teorija kot teorija ameriških realistov, po drugi strani pa poustvariti njihove razprave na znanstveni način. Rossova izvirnost tiči v njegovem pojmu pristojnostnih norm, ki jih je pred vsemi drugimi obravnaval kot »konstitutivna pravila«. V nasprotju s trditvami mnogih komentatorjev takšen pojem konstitutivnih norm ni neskladen z Rossovo realistično teorijo prava. V (...) luči njegovih zgodnjih zapisov je mogoče kompetenčne norme razumeti kot racionalizacije, ki lahko izrazijo nagnjenost naslovnikov norm, da določena dejstva prepoznajo kot pravo. Zato je mogoče Rossa šteti za prehodnika postpozitivizma. (shrink)