Philosophical counselors are now debating whether they should be licensed in the way psychiatrists, psychologists, and other similar helping professions are. The side favoring licensing claim it is a step on the way to making philosophical counseling “a profession.” In this paper I explain why licensing has nothing to do with making a profession of philosophical counseling—and what does. In particular, I offer a definition of profession, explain its application to philosophical counseling, and defend it (...) against competitors (especially various sociological definitions). I also explain the importance of licensing, registration, and certification—and its disadvantages for philosophical counseling. (shrink)

Being a relatively new practice started by Gerd Achenbach no more than 40 years ago, the methods and techniques implied in philosophical counseling, as well as the qualities a philosophical counsellor should possess are still up for debate. The theme of the current paper revolves around the traits of the philosophical counselor, starting from Roger Paden’s statement that the three characteristics identified by Carl Rogers as being essential for a counsellor are also suitable when it comes to (...) philosophical counsellors as well, with the mention that the approach should nonetheless be modified when it comes to unconditional positive regard, as he believes it to be incompatible with the nature of philosophical counselling. Our thesis is that the two are not incompatible and that, at least in the case of alienation, the philosophical counsellor should also grant the client unconditional positive regard. In support of our thesis, we will bring Rogers’ own ideas, Ran Lahav’s view of philosophical counselling as creating a link between philosophical discourse and everyday life, as well as the perspectives developed in the area of community philosophy. (shrink)

Till date most people still believe that compute grows exponentially in accordance with Moore’s law, meaning that computational capacity doubles approximately every 18 months. This, however, does not hold for Machine Learning. Since 2012, the computational capacity of Machine Learning has doubled every 3.4 months.1 Given this incredible growth rate we need to start considering whether Artificial Intelligence through the practice of Machine Learning will be able to automate the philosophical counseling profession. I will begin by giving an overview (...) of AI and of GPT3 the AI model used in the experiments run for this paper. Next, I will define a job description for the philosophical counselor. Using GPT3 I will reveal that a surprising number of activities that are performed by philosophical counselors already fall under the purview of AI. I will also dedicate a segment to reflecting on the limits of the AIs capabilities and how with a bit of fine tuning some of these limitations can be overcome. Finally, I will present those limitations which I doubt that the current version of GPT3 can overcome. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss my early career as a failed philosophical practitioner when the field of philosophical counseling was still in its infancy. I describe setting up a private practice and discuss various details from my field notes with regards to some of the earliest clients I received. I further depict experimenting with philosophical group therapy in an inpatient psychiatric unit of a general hospital, which by all objective standards turned out to be a disaster. Musings (...) on how philosophy may be successfully applied in the consulting room is considered through a phenomenological-existential approach to therapy. (shrink)

One promising form of philosophical practice is to conduct workshops on philosophical counseling for counselors. Since licensed professionals, such as Marriage and Family Counselors and Licensed Clinical Social Workers sometimes confront situations that raise philosophical issues and usually have a philosophical perspective that informs their practice, they could profit from a workshop on philosophical counseling; the workshop also qualifies for continuing education units (CEUs) that are typically required to renew their licenses. This paper (...) describes the principal purposes of a workshop for counselors, the structure of two such workshops, and suggestions for improvement of future workshops. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is an educational activity in which philosophers engage in dialogue with clients who wish to address questions or manage problems that arise during the course of everyday life. This chapter offers three contrasting perspectives on the question of what philosophical counselors do: first, an institutional scope of practice for philosophical counseling; second, an anecdotal list of common issues for which clients seek philosophical counseling; and third, a heterogeneous set of views by several pioneers (...) of philosophical counseling. From what we have seen thus far, it may already be clear that there exist both parallels and anti‐parallels between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. First and foremost, anyone who wants to become a philosophical counselor should earn an accredited graduate degree in philosophy in whichever area of specialization captures their interest. (shrink)

Many philosophical counselors seem to be counselors who use or point to phil­osophical texts or use abstract indeed logical or rational methods when working with a client. I want to introduce the idea of a counseling philosopher, who uses the client’s own concrete experiences as the basis for philosophizing with the client about the nature of the client’s dilemma - using ‘the between’ (Buber) as that special creative space where one em­ploys the art of philosophizing to the (...) unique situation. Otherwise, the particularity of that client gets subsumed under theory or methods, much like what has happened in psychology and which gave rise to Achenbach’s criticisms of psychology/psychiatry. The dialogical of which Buber and Friedman speak is the give and take between client and counseling philosopher of understanding and expanding perceptions confirmed through the actual relationship. Philosophy as an art (and not a method) helps us restore the trust Buber talks about which allows us to engage the world directly and not through categories of thought grounded in psychological or philosophical texts and theories. (shrink)

Counselor educators can utilize the ideas of philosopher Michel Foucault in preparing preservice school counselors for their work with K?12 students in public schools. The Foucaultian ideas of governmentality, technologies of domination, received truths, power/knowledge, discontinuity, and archaeology can contribute to students' understanding of the hidden power relations in the assumptions and techniques of counseling. Because most students enter counseling programs without a background in Foucault, it falls to counselor educators to incorporate his ideas into the curriculum. This article (...) describes areas in which Foucaultian ideas can be introduced into the counseling curriculum, in particular, in the practicum courses. (shrink)

In this paper I will move away from what has become the "traditional" approach to writing and thinking about philosophical counseling - I will not compare and contrast the virtues of the philosophical and psychological paradigms, nor will I attempt to defend philosophical counseling against its critics. Instead, I will use the methods and practices employed by philosophical counselors as a paradigm to inform and govern another philosophical practice, that is, clinical medical ethics. I (...) will show that clinical ethics and philosophical counseling share many common attributes, and argue that each discipline has much to offer to the other. (shrink)

This paper completes an argument that the problem of moral distress offers philosophical counselors an opportunity to do work that is both socially useful and philosophically interesting in its own right. A previous Philosophical Practice article answered the question, What's Philosophical About Moral Distress? by conceptualizing it as a phenomenon that arises within a moral worldview (Matchett 2018). The present paper investigates ways in which a philosophical counseling response to moral distress might differ from the (...) strategies deployed by the nursing profession to date. Though they are often quite subtle, the presence of some differences opens the possibility that philosophical counseling might be more effective than those strategies; in addition to helping individual nurses feel better, this could strengthen the nursing profession's efforts to mitigate nursing shortages and enhance quality of patient care. Though case studies are necessary to support these claims, there are reasons to think they are warranted. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of philosophical counseling and teaching. It is the outcome of my holding the tension of my practical and theoretical viewing points. Holding the tension is a term which Maurice Friedman coined to counter the idea of dichotomous either/or thinking and any attempt to synthesize thought into unity or fusion. ;This dissertation focuses on Buber's notion of the dialogical, which implies acknowledging the other's otherness. Buber's notion of other is diametrically opposed to the (...) post-modern notion of other. The difference lies in the fact that Buber's notion of the not-I is rooted in trust, whereas the post-modern notion of denial and exclusion is rooted in distrust. ;This difference is of great importance, especially as it affects fields like counseling and teaching. In both counseling and teaching, it is important to be able to acknowledge the other as other, and to be able to meet the other while holding one's own ground. Yet, one can only do so when one can trust the other's otherness through an act of implicitly understanding his otherness. In any field which affects learning and teaching, we deal with different styles of discourse. It is my contention that a topic-centered discourse style distrusts what is implicitly understood and requires that it be made explicit. It cannot be relied upon for any kind of accuracy or coherence. Topic-associating trusts and relies on what is implicitly understood. In my work as both philosophical counselor and teacher I try to restore the notion of working on the basis of understood trust, and on the basis of responding to people's otherness. ;In this dissertation I present illustrations of my work as philosophical counselor and as an instructor in the Upward Bound College Prep Academy at the University of Illinois. These are examples of actively bringing trust back into the interaction between teacher/student or counselor/counselee. (shrink)

Moral distress is a well-documented phenomenon in the nursing profession, and increasingly thought to be implicated in a nation-wide nursing shortage in the US. First identified by the philosopher Andrew Jameton in 1984, moral distress has also proven resistant to various attempts to prevent its occurrence or at least mitigate its effects. While this would seem to be bad news for nurses and their patients, it is potentially good news for philosophical counselors, for whom there is both socially (...) important and philosophically interesting work to be done. In an effort to encourage such work, this paper explicates the philosophical (as opposed to more purely psychological or institutional) contours of the problem. A subsequent paper, titled 'A Philosophical Counseling Approach to Moral Distress,' will highlight ways in which such a response would differ from the strategies so far deployed within the nursing profession. (shrink)

Reasoning can promote psychological development, so even if the role of philosophical counselor is defined strictly in terms of assisting the reasoning of the client, we can expect client-centered philosophical inquiry to yield psychological benefits. The practices of philosophical counseling and psychotherapy permeate one another to some degree while also diverging in characteristic focus. Philosophical counselors are particularly well suited to helping clients think through their situation in the world.

This paper examines the conceptual matrix of philosophical counseling, and philosophical practice generally, which distinguishes philosophical practice from mainstream theoretical philosophy. I argue that the essence of philosophical practice is the realization and radicalization of Pierre Hadot’s paradigmshifting view of ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life,’ through the projection of philosophical concepts and methods to the goal of attainment of the good life by moral education and character-building. The base-line concept of the good life that (...) the paper works with is the relatively uncontroversial concept of a life based on sustained reflected pleasures that are both socially desirable and individually fulfilling. I argue that this type of concept of the good life as qualified pleasure is inherent in any doctrinal account of what it is to lead a good life, including the ones that emphasise asceticism, such as Christian philosophy of life and ethics. Finally the paper concludes that projections of the good life by philosophical counselors are reflective on philosophical counselor themselves: philosophical counseling is a way of ‘the good life’ that aims to use the resources of philosophy as a whole to help others build the moral qualities and character required to reach their own good lives. By projecting philosophical concepts and methods to the applied conceptual matrix of moral education and the good life, philosophical counseling emancipates philosophy as a whole from its current remoteness and isolation into an active, and reflective, role in the real lives of ordinary people. This heralds a paradigm shift in philosophy, from the pseudo-science that much of mainstream philosophy painstakingly pretends to be to an intellectual powerhouse for the enhancement of the quality, clarity and integrity of life, which was the reason philosophy initially emerged for, both in the Western and in the Eastern philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (A). In (...) order to achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)

In a world described or experienced as unfair, what can philosophical practitioners propose in order to help individuals and communities strive for a meaningful life? One answer, empirically informed by the author’s practice as philosophical counselor in therapeutic, self-care and organizational contexts, is five principles for the cultivation of philosophical health, namely mental heroism, deep orientation, critical creativity, deep listening, and the “Creal” (the creative Real as ultimate possibility). In the light of Hadot’s rediscovery of philosophy as (...) a way of life and in dialogue with his reading of ancient philosophy, it is asserted that the embodied and socially embedded mind can, through these five principles or modalities, be prepared to maintain a pragmatic elevation of view and creative resilience in everyday events, especially in critical situations. This meta-analytic and meta-dialectic practice of philosophical health, termed “crealectics,” presupposes that we are of the same creative cosmological flesh (the Creal), and therefore we are bound to comprehend and care for each other philosophically. (shrink)

Philosophical practice or counseling has been described as a cluster of meth­ods for treating everyday problems and predicaments through philosophical means. Not­withstanding the variety of methods, philosophical counselors seem to share the following tenets: 1. The counselee is autonomous; 2. Philosophical counseling differs from psychological counseling and 3. Philosophical counseling is effective in solving predicaments. A critical examination shows these to be problematic at both theoretical and practical levels. As I believe that philosophical (...) practice is a valuable contribution both to philosophy and to psychology, though not devoid of potential dangers and misuses, I suggest that philosoph­ical counselors reconsider the theoretical and empirical validity of their tenets. Using my experience as a philosophical counselor, I attempt in this paper to contribute to this task while introducing the reader to what are, in my opinion, the main problems in the field. (shrink)

This paper articulates a dilemma posed by philosophical counseling literature that presupposes diagnostic recognition. In addition, guests often bring self-ascribed mental health diagnoses from their previous experience, and requests the philosophical counselor to de-diagnose or otherwise reinterpret their problems. Although philosophical counselors can do this, we cannot skirt philosophical diagnosis. The paper’s thesis is that it behooves philosophical counselors to differentiate these types of diagnosis and to know when we are doing one or (...) the other, including the utilization of diagnostic recognition. Anecdotes from the author’s philosophical counseling sessions are included to illustrate the discussion. The paper concludes that the space of philosophical diagnosis is neither incommensurate with, nor incompatible with clinical diagnosis. On the contrary, the space of philosophical diagnosis ought to harbor the possibility of clinical diagnostic recognition. The philosophical counselor’s repertoire of diagnostic intuitions should cultivate the intuitive recognition of clinical prototypes. (shrink)

This article explores the potential utility of the theory of Holism as developed by South African philosopher, British Commonwealth statesman and military leader, Jan Smuts, for philosophical counselling or practice. Central to the philosophical counseling process is philosophical counsellors or practitioners applying the work of philosophers to inspire, educate and guide their counselees in dealing with life problems. For example, Logic-Based Therapy, a method of philosophical counselling developed by Elliot Cohen, provides a rational framework for confronting (...) problems of living, where the counselor helps the counselee find an uplifting philosophy that promotes a guiding virtue that acts as an antidote to unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. We present the argument that Holism is one such uplifting philosophy which can be of utility to philosophical counselors or practitioners to help their counselees with confronting problems of living. Furthermore, we argue that Smuts’ articulation of freedom can act as a guiding virtue within this uplifting philosophy of Holism in accordance with the methodology of LBT. Smuts’ contribution to philosophy and psychology is arguably inadequately credited, and for this reason, and to the best of our knowledge, Smuts’ theory of Holism has yet to be discussed in the context of philosophical counseling or practice. Given these omissions, we begin this article with a discussion of his influence on 20th Century Anglo-American psychology. We then provide a brief historical context, and an introduction to the central argument of Smuts’ Holism, as well as a brief overview of the origins of Smut’s Holism and an introduction to his book Holism and Evolution. In the remainder of the article, we discuss several foundational concepts that underlie Smuts’ theory of Holism, as articulated and developed in his book Holism and Evolution, to substantiate our arguments. We conclude by highlighting the limitations of our article, limitations to Smuts’ model, and the challenges inherent in the use of a now largely antiquated theory, even by Smuts’ own admission nineteen years after its publication, for the purposes of contextualizing and substantiating the arguments and recommendations presented herein. (shrink)

This article discusses the ideas of philosophy. A question posed by Socrates to the young Hippocrates has its contemporary application in the case of all who consider themselves professionally competent to engage the human personality, whether they call the object of their engagement the mind, the soul, or the psyche. When an individual suffering an existential crisis seeks the counsel of psychiatrist, psychotherapist, counselor, or philosophic practitioner, he places himself into a relation of trust; entrusting mind, soul, and psyche to (...) the dialectical encounter. He expects that in so doing the practitioner represents something good and that the encounter will yield a good. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This paper presents a dialogue between a psychotherapist whom we will call Lilly, and Ross Channing Reed, Ph.D., a philosopher and philosophical counselor. Lilly begins by asking Ross a series of questions regarding philosophical counseling and his approach to working with her. Ross discusses his philosophy and approach to philosophical counseling, what it is like to provide counseling for a therapist, and the educational nature of philosophical counseling. Topics addressed include the nature of unarticulated trauma, the (...) repetition compulsion, moral evil, the narrative construction of a human life, the potentially debilitating effects of moralizing about feelings, the importance of humor, spirituality and philosophy, embodiment, the arts, and Alice Miller’s concept of the “Enlightened Witness.” Next, Ross asks Lilly a series of questions relating to her personal and professional journey prior to and during philosophical counseling. Lilly reveals that she spent significant time in therapy with a psychologist prior to philosophical counseling. She discusses why she sought counseling from a philosopher, how philosophical counseling has been beneficial in her personal and professional lives, and how philosophical counseling has been different from other forms of counseling. (shrink)

The title of this paper is deliberately ambiguous. It could refer either to the central val­ue that philosophical counseling has for philosophy in general, or else it could refer to something (such as personal autonomy, or personal well-being) that philosophical counselors believe to be of value, and that they are able to help their clients pursue. In fact, this paper will be addressing both of these topics in order to demonstrate the links that hold between them, and, (...) in so doing, will attempt to further elucidate the nature of philosophical counseling itself. (shrink)

Hume claims that judgment is the active device through which beliefs influence emotions. Without such a device, Hume reasons that beliefs and emotions would not in­teract at all, because beliefs are always about ideas while emotions are reactions to events in the world. Judgment is the link between the theoretical and the applied aspects of the human being, and is, if Hume is right, crucial for any system of philosophical counseling to be successful. No client would attempt to modify (...) his or her beliefs, or reflect on the thoughts of philosophers, without some expectation of an emotional payoff. The counseling process hinges on a link between reason and the emotions, but what is the nature of this link? Since judgment is itself (if we are lucky) a primarily rational process, the question of the connection between reason and the emotions seems to be left unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between reason and the emotions by taking judgment to be judgment of truth or falsity. Once a belief is deemed to be true by the client, an assessment is made as to how this truth will affect the client’s well being. I argue that this is true even if the client is severely depressed or believes that he/she does not deserve good treatment or good fortune, or seems otherwise unconcerned with his/her well being. If the truth is judged to be a threat to the well being of the client, an emotional reaction ensues. Likewise, if the truth is judged to be a benefit to the client, an emotional reaction will occur. I argue further that even though different truths will be taken as either benefits or threats depending on the client, the ultimate interpretation of the true statement as either benefit or threat will automatically generate an emotional response. If this ontology is correct, then the philosophical counselor will take as his/her primary role 1) a practitioner of epistemology (determining when beliefs are justified and true) and 2) a trainer in interpretation (determining when beliefs are to be interpreted as blessings or threats.). (shrink)

This paper introduces and examines the concept of permitted suicide in the context of philosophical counseling. It argues that clients suffering from serious, irremediable physical illnesses, such as Lou Gehrigs, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and HIV, should be free to philosophically explore the option of suicide with their philosophical counselors without undue fear of paternalistic intervention to thwart a rational suicide decision. Legal liability, professional duties, and qualifications of philosophical counselors who counsel such clients are explored. (...) It is argued that, within certain professional and legal limits, philosophical counselors are uniquely qualified to take on this professional challenge. (shrink)

This multi-faceted collection of women's perspectives on the renaissance in philosophical practices provides an international overview on the professional practice of philosophical counseling as rooted in the ancient philosophical discipline of life and its essential difference from modern mainstream philosophy.

This paper recounts experience from the author’s philosophical counseling supervision experience. The paper then gives an overview of the narrative turn in bioethics, showing how the bioethical narrative turn disputes the assumption that client case notes can provide reliable empirical information about what happens in philosophical counseling sessions. The paper concludes that interpretation by philosophical peer reviewers is an in-eliminable aspect of peer review. Accountability for our counseling practices and improvement in them requires that we avoid a (...) solipsistic stance and submit in some way to the interpretive interventions of other philosophical counselors. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical questions asked by counselees and the philosophical dilemmas faced by counselors in philosophical counseling. It illustrates the role of tacit philosophical assumptions in the creation and resolution of problems, as well as the contribution of philosophical dialogue in overcoming presuppositions.

The Tao Te Ching is a principal text of the ancient Spiritual tradition of Chinese Taoism. It is a compilation of wisdom sayings attributed to Lao Tzu, the old boy/philosopher/Master, recorded over two-thousand years ago and which has since undergone hundreds of translations, commentaries and adaptations. Tao Te Ching maxims are wise counsel given by sages to feudal rulers on how to harmoniously order their states and peacefully govern their peoples at a time in Chinese history of pervasive socio-political conflict (...) and upheaval. The wisdom sayings have become universally meaningful and perennially relevant guidelines for successful leadership as well as for optimal living. The present work is an original rendering of the 81 Tao Te Ching passages wherein identifying with the essential Reality of Tao and its dynamic-kinetic energetic characteristics, qualities and activities are considered to constitute the unique individuality, true integrity, innate wisdom and potent Virtuosity of our inner human nature. The psychotherapeutically-oriented commentaries given for each of the passages are not only useful for professionals engaged in the attending relationship/process of psychotherapy but also for anyone interested in wisely and Soulfully living a more Spiritually awakened, natural, contented and enjoyable human life."--Amazon.com. (shrink)

When philosophers cultivate a professional interest in philosophical practice as a form of counseling therapy, the implicit bias of their practice is likely to emulate the “helping profession” model of client engagement. The effort seems noble enough, but emulating the model of the helping professions might actually be incommensurate with the philos­pher’s calling. The philosophical temperament emulates a less constraining but more aggressive model of intervention than we find operating in the professional domain of therapeutic counseling practices. While (...) the philosophical temperament resolves to question and analyze its subject-matter without the encumbrances of social constraint or the promise of utility, it employs methods of philosophical questioning and analysis decidedly more agonistic than can be motivated under the auspices of the “helping profession” model of therapeutic intervention. The philosophical temperament is a challenging temperament, a probing, testing, exploring, engaging temperament whose only vested commitment is to further inquiry. After setting up this distinction between philosophical practice and the helping professions I pose some thoughts regarding the philosophical encounter within a counseling situation, with emphasis on the challenge of translating back and forth between the client’s subject matter and the philosopher’s frame of reference. In the course of negoti­ating these challenges, the philosophical temperament encounters two divergent paths we must learn to travel with equal facility: we must make room for beneficial critique in philosophical counseling while motivating effective critical perspective within the client’s own world-view. The challenge is to see such a philosophical encounter as a place of translation, in which the counselor’s philosophical temperament is exposed to the alterity of the client’s domain of experience without losing its critical facility. In this way, the philosophical encounter is exercised in a movement between worlds, as an interweaving dance of translation and innovation characteristic of a “place” of mutual engagement. The resulting tension in these dialogical encounters is a direct consequence of the philosophical intervention in a client’s personal life. The philosopher’s challenge is to negotiate carefully between two domains of translation (between the cognitive-emotive domain of lived-experience and the philosophical domain of conceptual thinking, reflective inquiry and critical analysis), and to establish connections between these domains to facilitate philosophical encounters in a space of shared listening. (shrink)

Is Agassi’s philosophy of practical affairs applicable in philosophical practice? Is it recommendable to philosophical practitioners, counselors, or counselees? A critical rational approach like his demands a prior awareness, which participants in practical philosophy programs often miss. That approach is necessary for counseling that is really philosophical, and some of his ideas are inspiring. Yet the problems that interested him and his way of solving or dissolving them on meta-levels, are not always relevant to the counselees’ (...) concerns. His attitude to the opinions, background, and concerns of others, though tolerant, is not recommendable to practitioners who have to take into account the perspectives of participants with other backgrounds, understand their “problem situations” and their “logic.”. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is a diverse and burgeoning type of mental health service delivery. Despite competing approaches to theory and practice, the field has largely strayed from an ethical critique of its methodology and counselor training requirements. This article outlines several ethical considerations and training recommendations that are proposed to bolster the quality and effectiveness of philosophical practice. As philosophical counseling gains increasing recognition in North America, recently established national organizations in philosophical practice may profit from revisiting (...) their interim codes for professional conduct Proposed training suggestions for counselor preparation may further assist institutions and board-regulated agencies in establishing competent and acceptable standards of client care. (shrink)

Originally developed by Alcoholics Anonymous, the Twelve Step program now provides life direction for the millions of people worldwide who are recovering from addiction and undergoing profound personal transformation. Yet thus far it has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers, despite the fact that, like philosophy, the program addresses all-important questions regarding how we ought to live. In Sobering Wisdom, Jerome A. Miller and Nicholas Plants offer a unique approach to the Twelve Step program by exploring its spirituality from a (...) philosophical point of view. Drawing on a variety of thinkers from Aristotle to William James and from Nietzsche to Foucault, as well as a diverse range of philosophical perspectives including naturalism, Buddhism, existentialism, Confucianism, pragmatism, and phenomenology, the contributors to this volume address such questions as the relation of personal responsibility to an acknowledgment of powerlessness, the existence of a "higher power," and the role of virtue in recovery. Ranging in tone from deeply scholarly to intensely personal, their essays are written in an accessible way for a broad audience that includes not only philosophers, theologians, and psychologists but also spiritual directors, health professionals, and addiction counselors. Perhaps most important, the book is also conceived for those involved in Twelve Step programs whose lives are being transformed by the experience. (shrink)

As disciplines, psychology and theology share an overlapping interest in the nature and functioning of human beings. This book provides an introduction to many of the worldview issues and philosophical foundations that frame the relationship of psychology and theology, includes scholarly reflection on the integration literature, and surveys five paradigms of possible relationships between psychology and Christianity. Questions at the end of each chapter are included to help readers evaluate both the material and their own burgeoning approach to integration. (...) This book is ideal as a textbook for students of psychology and other behavioral and social sciences (social work, sociology, theology, counseling, pastoral counseling) at both the graduate and undergraduate level. It is also written for the broader readership of psychologists, counselors, pastors, and others who are interested in integration" -- Publisher description. (shrink)

This paper presents a general framework for philosophical counseling founded upon the distinction between philosophical discourse and philosophy as a lived experience. Clients enter counseling, usually, philosophically unsophisticated, but with a set of perspectives and a predicament. I outline the two general processes of philosophical counseling that address such a reported predicament.The first process---critique---involves a critical examination of the client’s philosophical perspectives, as they are related to the reported predicament. Through the use of the Socratic method, (...) the counselor attempts to examine the relation, meaning, implications, etc., of such perspectives. This, I argue, leads to a destabilization of the client, where previously unquestioned beliefs and values become doubtful. As such, a second process---creation---is needed in order to overcome the destabilization of the initial process. For this process to succeed, I argue, philosophical counseling must avoid the problem of suggestion by not relying on any first-order philosophical assumptions. (shrink)

Philosophical counseling is a helping profession that relates to the ancient concept of philosophy as a discipline with therapeutic potential. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence supporting the claim of therapeutic effects philosophy is supposed to have. Philosophical counselors do not have any exclusive methods – distinctive from the procedures used in psychotherapy – that we could find as sources of therapeutic effects. Philosophical counselors often do not understand the processes that generate therapeutic effects and (...) mistakenly attribute these effects to the usage of their philosophical “methods”. Lack of knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychiatry that philosophical counselors show begs the question whether philosophical counseling is not harmful in some cases. There is no reason to solve the issue of relationship between philosophy and psychotherapy by establishing separate field of philosophical counseling. Instead, the aim should be to help psychologists and prospective psychotherapists acquire proper philosophical competences – in terms of philosophical skills and knowledge. (shrink)

Boethius’s short treatise On the Highest Good represents one of the remarkable and important variants of ethical aristotelianism, enriched in Boethius by neo-platonic and augustinian themes. The idea of the “philosophical way”, which exclusively can lead to blissfulness, encompassing theory as well as practice, was dismissed by theologians – counselors of Bishop Tempier. The result was an edict published in 1277, which among others condemned the ideas articulated in the treatise On the Highest Good. On closer view it (...) appears, however, that the “philosophical way” does not contradict the Christian way. Contrary to Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura Boethius as a “professional philosopher” did not manage to include philosophy into theology. However, this is not to conceive the two as two contradicting disciplines, but rather as two different perspectives on one and the same thing. Therefore they can not be in conflict. (shrink)

The article addresses a common difficulty of counselors in confronting clients with the problems in their thinking and behavior in a way that they could start benefiting from a constructive self-reflective state in the long run, a state that would replace the common tendency to hide oneself, to blame, to victimize or to repress aspects of their humanity connoted as negative in order to maintain a positive self image. The highlight is on the main characteristics of efficient confrontations with (...) oneself and others, so as to engender reasoning competence training without an unnecessary loss in the quality of the consultative relationship. Working in psychotherapy and having progressively integrated more philosophical work into this professional practice, the author puts together a few concepts and ideas that are likely to facilitate the processes in the psychotherapeutic and the philosophical approaches to intrapsychic and interpersonal dialogue. (shrink)

Can philosophy help ordinary people confront their personal or interpersonal problems of living? Can it help a couple whose marriage is on the rocks, or someone going through a midlife crisis, or someone depressed over the death of a significant other, or who suffers from anxiety about making a life change? These and many other behavioral and emotional problems are ordinarily referred to psychologists, psychiatrists, clinical social workers, or other mental health specialists. Less mainstream is the possibility of consulting a (...) philosophical counselor or practitioner. Yet, there is presently a steadily increasing, world-wide movement among individuals with postgraduate credentials in philosophy to harness their philosophical training and skills in helping others to address their life problems. But is this channeling of philosophy outside the classroom into the arena of life a good idea? Are philosophers, as such, competent to handle all or any of the myriad emotional and behavioral problems that arise in the context of life; or should these matters best be left to those trained in psychological counseling or psychotherapy? Through a diverse and contrasting set of readings authored by prominent philosophers, philosophical counselors, and psychologists, this volume carefully explores the nature of philosophical counseling or practice and its relationship to psychological counseling and psychotherapy. Digging deeply into this relational question, this volume aims to spark more rational reflection, and greater sensitivity and openness to the potential contributions of philosophical practice. It is, accordingly, intended for students, teachers, scholars, and practitioners of philosophy, counseling, or psychotherapy; as well as those interested in knowing more about philosophical counseling or practice. (shrink)

In this short essay, I recollect my memories of Dr. Shlomit C. Schuster. Dr. Schus­ter was a great philosopher and a philosophical counselor, and I am struggling to spell out now the significance of the time I spent with her. Dr. Schuster visited Korea twice (2010 and 2012) and left a very strong impression on the members of the Korean Society of Philosophical Practice and Humanities, especially the Therapy Group of Kangwon National University. Someday I might realize the (...) significance of her philosophical thoughts but I feel obligated to share something about the way in which we will remember her. (shrink)

From the inception of philosophical counseling an attempt was made to distinguish it from (psychological) therapy by insisting that therapy could not be more misleading. It is true that philosophical counselors should not pretend to be able to heal major mental illness; nevertheless they do contribute to positive health—health understood as something more than the absence of mental disease. This thesis is developed by critiquing Lou Marinoff’s book, Plato not Prozac!, but also by ranging more widely in (...) the literature on philosophical counseling. I also interpret philosophical counseling as a form of philosophical ethics. (shrink)

From my point of view, the pandemic worsened the rigidity of epistemic injustices. I work as a philosophical counselor, and I research bioethics. For me, bioethics, in line with what Potter wrote, is a discipline that cannot be separated from individual problems. I believe that we cannot think of a sustainable life on this planet if we first do not learn how to live a sustainable one.During this pandemic, my work as a philosophical counselor consisted mostly of helping (...) my clients to live sustainable lives by not buying into rigid categories that underlined heavy social injustices. I supported them in holding on to their narratives against, more or less implied, guidelines that would have made their world... (shrink)

Sarah Waller proposes that cognitive therapists and philosophical counselors ought to consider the feelings of the client of paramount importance in belief system change rather than the rationality of the belief system. I offer an alternative strategy of counseling that reinstates the place of rational belief revision while still respecting the importance of emotions. Waller claims that, because of the problem of under-determination, the counseling goal of rational belief revision can be trumped by the goal of improved client (...) affect. I suggest that, if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one whose objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision. I then note some limitations of the new proposal and the possibility of incommensurability in the comparison of our different views. (shrink)

This article traces the rise of philosophical counseling in the United States, from its roots in the applied philosophy movement to the establishment of the National Philosophical Counseling Association, including a code of ethical standards for practitioners and a program for certification of philosophical counselors. The article demonstrates, through a brief discussion of the philosophical counseling modality of Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), how individuals who have Masters or Ph.D.’s in philosophy can become certified members of this (...) burgeoning new profession. (shrink)

In The Virtuous Therapist, authors Elliot D. Cohen and Gale Spieler Cohen provide a systematic, philosophical approach to mental health ethics. Their comprehensive model of ethical decision making is developed to a number of difficult ethical problems counselors will experience. The issues raised in the book are timely, ethically engaging, and of practical importance to those working in the field.

Genetic counselors are on the front lines of the genetic revolution, presented with tests of varying predictive values and reliability, unfair testing distribution mechanisms, tests for conditions where no treatment exists, and companies that oversell the usefulness of their tests to physicians and nurses. Many scholars, both genetic testing task forces as well as the newly formed National Bioethics Advisory Commission, have all noted that genetic counseling programs and services are critical for adequate genetic testing. At the same time, (...) in our own work at the University of Pennsylvania we have encountered many requests for new materials for training genetic counselors in ethics and providing ethics resources for genetic counseling. One of us has noted elsewhere that it is crucial that resources from the Human Genome Project, the Centers for Disease Control, and other public agencies be devoted to providing better resources for genetic counselors facing difficult ethical issues. Although the American Board of Genetic Counseling requires that training programs include some formal coursework in ethics, many wonder whether enough is being done to prepare genetic counselors for an ever-tougher job, and in particular there has been much concern expressed about whether is an outmoded ideal that hampers this profession as it attempts to grow and identify the value of its practice. On the basis of many comments to us by genetic counselors and on the basis of our review of the current literature, we hypothesized that accredited genetic counseling training programs are poised at the turn of the century to begin planning a new approach toteaching the philosophy of genetic counseling, one that integrates philosophical, theoretical, and ethical training throughout thecurriculum in genetic counseling. (shrink)

This fascinating and thought-provoking book provides much-needed philosophical background for counselors, therapists, and healthcare workers looking for broader, deeper foundations in the struggle to help and make sense of others. While examining the best among 20th century philosophy it shows the wealth of inspiration of earlier centuries, and demonstrates with remarkable clarity the way in which the ideas of, and the relations between, these philosophers can inspire, inform, and underpin much of counseling and psychotherapy.

COMMISSIONER KLAUS VERSEN: Counselors, I want to remind you both of two matters. First, this commission is not bound by the statutes or legal precedents of ...

Though a recent phenomenon, philosophical counseling has a long history. Secularization and the remaining influence of the Enlightenment motto 'think for yourself' are only two of the factors that facilitate the current revival of the ancient Greek view of philosophy as a way of life. Despite its worldwide success, philosophical counseling lacks a clear profile. There is surprisingly little consensus among counselors about the aim or method of their practice. The authors of this article claim that the (...) ambiguous relation to psychotherapy and the one-dimensional relation to academic philosophy jeopardize the future of philosophical counseling. After providing a historical background and a critical description of current practices within philosophical counseling, they suggest a way out of its identity crisis. (shrink)

Experts discuss the economic, legal, and social issues surrounding the use of genetic testing in determining eligibility for life insurance. Insurance companies routinely use an individual's medical history and family medical history in determining eligibility for life insurance; this is part of the process of medical underwriting. Insurers have also long used genetic information, often derived from family history, in underwriting. But rapid advances in gene identification and genetic testing are changing the way we look at genetic information. Should the (...) results of genetic testing (which might identify a predisposition toward disease not related to medical history) be available to life insurance medical underwriters? Few if any life insurers currently require genetic testing, but there are no laws or regulations prohibiting its use. Genetics and Life Insurance examines the complex economic, legal, and social issues surrounding the use of genetic information in life insurance underwriting. The contributors are legal scholars, representatives of the life insurance industry (including an actuary and an insurance physician), a geneticist, a genetic counselor, a philosopher, and a consumer advocate. They explore all aspects of an issue that has only recently drawn the attention of policymakers and the public. The book opens with a report on the results of a public opinion poll on genetics and life insurance. Succeeding chapters present the insurer perspective, a discussion of the economics of risk selection in life insurance, background information on the process of underwriting, a scientific analysis of genetic risks and mortality rates, a philosophical discussion of fairness and genetic underwriting, the viewpoints of consumers and genetics counselors, a comparison of different international policy approaches to the issue, and a legal analysis of antitrust implications when insurers collaborate in setting standards for medical underwriting. In the final chapter the editor addresses various policy options, examining the pros and cons of each one and assessing their political feasibility. (shrink)