Que faire des idéaux que sont l'internationalisme, le dépérissement de l'Etat et l'horizontalité radicale? Les penser. Non pas sur le mode de la psalmodie mais selon leurs conditions de possibilité. Ou d'impossibilité? C'est plutôt la thèse que ce livre défend, mais sous une modalité décisive : voir l'impossible sans désarmer de désirer l'impossible. C'est-à-dire, non pas renoncer, comme le commande le conservatisme empressé, mais faire obstinément du chemin. En sachant qu'on n'en verra pas le bout. Les hommes s'assemblent sous l'effet (...) de forces passionnelles collectives dont Spinoza donne le principe le plus général : l'imperium - "ce droit que définit la puissance de la multitude". Cet ouvrage entreprend de déplier méthodiquement le sens et les conséquences de cet énoncé. Pour établir que la servitude passionnelle, qui est notre condition, nous voue à la fragmentation du monde en ensembles finis distincts, à la verticalité d'où ils tirent le principe de leur consistance, et à la capture du pouvoir. Il ne s'en suit nullement que l'émancipation ait à s'effacer de notre paysage mental - au contraire! Mais elle doit y retrouver son juste statut : celui d'une idée régulatrice, dont l'horizon est le communisme de la raison. (shrink)

What should we do with the ideals of internationalism, the withering away of state and horizontality? Probably start by thinking seriously about them. That is to say, about their conditions of possibility (or impossibility), rather than sticking to the wishful thinking which asserts that for them to happen it is enough to want them. Humanity exists neither as a dust cloud of separate individuals nor as a unified world political community. It exists fragmented into distinct finite wholes, the forms of (...) which have varied considerably throughout history--the nation-state being only one among many, and certainly not the last. What are the forces that produce this fragmentation, engender such groupings and prevent them from being perfectly horizontal, but also lead them to disappear, merge, or change form? It is questions such as these that this book explores, drawing on Spinoza's political philosophy and especially his two central concepts of multitudo and imperium. (shrink)

One of the important functions of national history is to discover the origins of the unity and nationhood of a particular people. The kingdom of England emerged only in the mid-tenth century, when the kings of Wessex conquered the Danelaw and brought all of England into a single kingdom. The concept of the “Empire of Britain” was one expression of this sense of English unity in the tenth and eleventh centuries. This was a very different situation from that of the (...) earlier Anglo-Saxon period, when there were as many as a dozen kingdoms of the English. Yet even before the tenth-century unification under Wessex, the English did experience a degree of political unity under powerful kings who were able to dominate all or most of the other English kingdoms. In the eighth century, the dominant Mercian kings Aethelbald, Offa, and Ceonwulf were overlords of the other English kings, and their hegemonial position was expressed in charters by the grand titles that were applied to them — rex Britanniae, rex Anglorum, rex totius Anglorum patriae, and even imperator. (shrink)

El artículo analiza las nociones y términos en relación con potestas, vis y virtus, en particular con imperium, la tipificación del mismo y las magistraturas que lo detentaban; respecto del dictator, subraya las limitaciones y extralimitaciones en el ejercicio del imperium y su desarrollo histórico; señala también la crisis de las magistraturas, destacando la del consulado al final de la República; examina la propuesta de Cicerón para la salida de la crisis: el unicato con un princeps, y las (...) semejanzas y diferencias entre el consul, el proconsul, el dictator, el dux y el princeps. Por último, da tratamiento a un problema clave: vitium y virtus en la política de la época. We analyze the concepts and terms regarding potestas, vis an virtus, particularly those of imperium, its definition and the magistracy that supported it; regarding the dictator, we highlight the limitations and excesses in the exercise of imperium and its historical development; we noted the crisis of the magistracy, emphasizing the consulate at the end of the Republic. We examined the Cicero's proposal for ending the crisis: the autocracy with a princeps; similarities and differences between the consul, the proconsul, the dictator, the dux and the princeps. It treats a key problem: vitium and virtus in politics and in the politics of the period. (shrink)

Peter Weber-Schäfer will mit seiner Arbeit der Theorie der Politik dienen. Er möchte die Untersuchung nicht als den Versuch einer Darstellung geistesgeschichtlicher oder sonstiger historischer Phänomene im chinesischen Kulturkreis nach dem Muster positivistischer Historiographie oder Philosophiegeschichte verstanden wissen, sondern als einen Beitrag zur Klärung des Phänomens der oikumenischen Reiche, also jener ihrer Intention nach weltumspannenden politischen Organisationsformen, durch deren Auftreten ein etwa zweieinhalb Jahrtausende umfassender Abschnitt der Geschichte gekennzeichnet wird. Das chinesische Kaiserreich scheint als instruktives Beispiel für Funktionsweise und Ziviltheologie (...) eines oikumenischen Reichs besonders geeignet, weil für die Erforschung seiner Gründungsgeschichte und der politischen Spekulationen, die seiner Gründung parallel liefen, eine Fülle von literarischem und epigraphischem Material zur Verfügung steht, die in kaum einem anderen Kulturbereich ihresgleichen findet. (shrink)

Tekst Žižka zawiera analizę argumentów Antonia Negriego i Michaela Hardta przede wszystkim z punktu widzenia ich związków z teorią Marksa. Autorzy przenoszą Marksowską fascynację XIX-wiecznym kapitalizmem przemysłowym, w którym "wszystko, co stałe, wyparowuje", na dzisiejszy "wirtualny" kapitalizm, całkowicie już oderwany od materialnej rzeczywistości. I, dodaje Žižek, popełniają ten sam błąd co Marks, upatrując w sprzeczności między energią kapitalizmu a jego logiką zawłaszczania źródła nowego, bardziej sprawiedliwego porządku, w którym twórcza energia będzie służyć wszystkim. Tymczasem likwidacja sprzeczności spowoduje raczej utratę energii (...) niż jej bardziej altruistyczne wykorzystanie. Negri i Hardt, idąc wiernie śladami Marksa, wplątują się w "polityczny klincz". Ich emancypacyjna logika zakłada, że "wielość" działa spontanicznie i nie posiada jednego ośrodka władzy. To jednak zaledwie retoryczna iluzja. Mimo ambicji stworzenia nowego dyskursu rewolucyjnego Negri i Hardt pozostają niewolnikami starych kategorii - mogą jedynie tworzyć ich trawestacje. (shrink)

ExcerptIn 2021, in the pages of this journal, I contended that a coalition of interests in the United States had coalesced in opposition to the presidency of Donald Trump and duly taken power through the vehicle of Joe Biden.1 This coalition includes the Democratic Party, corporate elites, the media, academia, and—the subject of the present article—the national security (natsec) state. In that earlier piece, I focused on particular components of this coalition: legacy and social media. I went on in a (...) subsequent Telos piece to examine another of its elements: the academy.2 These fractions all appear, however, to be relatively minor players. While I argue that the legacy media have staged a counterrevolution to seize back control of the public sphere, this exhausts their parochial, pecuniary agenda; beyond this, they are simply part of a wider activist liberal cause. Contemporary liberal activism is in turn ideologically rooted in ideas propagated by sectors of the academy and hegemonic within it, but this has not, on my analysis, empowered the academy so much as the forces that make it increasingly redundant. (shrink)

This article argues that Cicero laid down his imperium in Brundisium in September 47 after Caesar had, in a meeting between the two men, granted Cicero permission to retain his imperium and title of imperator for as long as Cicero wished to do so. Instead of accepting Caesar’s offer, Cicero instead immediately repudiated it, laid down his imperium in the city of Brundisium, and went immediately to Tusculum to begin a second period of political retirement. Caesar’s offer (...) and his return to Italy in the autumn of 47 gave Cicero an excuse to consider expired the SCU of 7 January 49 and, by immediately renouncing his imperium, perform, under the cover of his now-fulfilled obligation to the Pompeians, a calculated personal statement of political independence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Global Empires and The Roman ImperiumBrent D. ShawP. Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel, eds. The Oxford World History of Empire. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021; xxviii + 552 pp.; xxxiv + 1,318 pp.The volumes under review are an impressive if unequal diptych. The first, the slimmer of the two, entitled "The Imperial Experience," comprises a series of analytical studies on the creation, management, and (...) ideologies of empires, and forms of resistance to them. The second, "The History of Empires," is a forbidding tome of forty-four specific studies of individual empires and imperial ventures, from Ur III and Middle Kingdom Egypt to the Mongols and the British, ending, naturally, with America's "global imperium." In the analytics, the usual suspects, including Michael Doyle, Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, are on display; and the conceptual approaches of Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner are favorite points d'appui. For premodern empires, the ideas of the Maghribi thinker Ibn Khaldūn provide a different focus, so it is heartening to see Bang and others applying them more consistently (e.g., 1:13, 40, 326–9; 2:162, 246–8, 253). Especially for premodern empires, these volumes can be seen as an extension of earlier handbooks devoted to the state, one devoted to the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean state and another on ancient empires.1 As an aspect of world history, the endeavor is the culmination of a decades-long project on the history of empires fronted by Peter Bang.2 He has usefully produced detailed historical introductions not only to both volumes, but also to the subsections in each of them. Perhaps not surprisingly, empire turns out to be a virile enterprise. As Ian Morris notes, "the story of empire... is so strongly gendered that it [End Page 505] seems reasonable to call rulers and commanders 'he' throughout" (1:162 n. 14). The muscular subject is mirrored by its principal actors and by its students. All the editors are men. Reflecting the same balance, out of the forty-five authors of individual studies in the large history of empires volume, there are five (lonely) female voices. In both volumes, women as subjects of empire are, for all intents and purposes, absent.3From the perspective of an historian who has actually worked on the history of an empire, it must be plainly stated that almost all of the theories, adequately reviewed by Bang (1:20–48), are worth about as much as the paper or pixilated screens on which they have been written. Obvious and serious exceptions to every one of the definitions and hypotheticals abound. In fact, a fair number of the exemplary histories in the second volume do not obey the strictures of most of the theories advanced in the first. So it is with a sense of relief that one turns from theory to the hard quantities offered by Walter Scheidel (1:chap. 2). To a considerable degree, his analysis depends on the well-known measurements made by Rein Taagepera. Rather alarmingly, Taagepera counted as an empire "any large sovereign political entity whose components are not sovereign," say, like the well-known empires of Algeria, Finland, or Canada.4 What an analysis of these global entities confirms is that size or orders of magnitude mattered, and that the first entities to count as empires emerged in the 7th to 5th centuries bce in southwestern Asia (1:53; 2:161, 245). The neo-Assyrian empire was the first super-large territorial state and its successor, the Achaemenid empire, was the first "hyper-power without rival" (1:172; 2:83, 111, 161). Subsequent premodern empires were able to reach higher levels of millions of square kilometers of territory and larger populations of dozens of millions of subjects nominally under their aegis. The magnitudes reached by a given generation of super-states set base-lines above which a successor might be able to reach greater sophistication of rule, numbers of subjects, and extent of territory. In some cases, being able to piggy-back on existing empires, they were able to skip early developmental stages and to advance quickly to imperial status, as a succession... (shrink)

Sutton Elbert Griggs wrote the first major African-American political novel, Imperium in Imperio. Imperium is a utopian novel and the first novel to represent the New Negro, a figure that Alain Locke popularized a quarter of a century later. Griggs used the term New Negro to refer to a generation of educated black Americans born after emancipation, a multiplicity of voices that demanded equality at the turn of the twentieth century. The 1890s are often described as the nadir (...) of race relations in the United States, for blacks were disfranchised, legally segregated, and subject to terrorist mob violence in the form of lynching and burning alive. Race war was in the air.Sutton Griggs was born... (shrink)

This article explores Albert Stephanus Geyser’s understanding and application of the Christ-hymn, focusing especially on the use of the words μορφή θεοῦ. The tension between a literary-critical approach to the text versus a dogmatic understanding is exposed, as well as the challenge of a political ideology of power. Geyser’s understanding and application are measured in terms of the current state of New Testament exegetical research. In the footsteps of Stendahl and contemporary New Testament scholars, legitimacy is given to a socio-political (...) reading of the text. Geyser is appreciated as a public theologian with a deep consideration for the text as the source for theological and socio-political reflection and practice. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a new philosophical interpretation of Virgil’s Aeneid, dually centered on the queens of Olympus and Carthage. More specifically, I show how the philosopher-poet Virgil deploys Dido’s Junonian furor as the Aristotelian matter of the unjust Roman imperium, the feminist counterforce to the patriarchal force disguised as peaceful order. The first section explores Virgil’s political and biographical background for the raw materials for a feminist, anti-imperial political philosophy. The second section, following Marilynn Desmond, situates the (...) continuing misogynist condemnation of Virgil’s two goddess-queens in the context of their honored centrality in Roman and Carthaginian culture. The third section reinterprets Virgil’s goddess-queens as agents of furor as (apparently mad) feminist counterforce to the (actually mad) unjust force of the Roman empire and its agents Jupiter and Aeneas. The fourth section translates these poetic philosophical interpretations into prose, arguing that Dido’s Junonian furor is the Aristotelian matter constituting the unjust forms of Roman imperium. And the conclusion applies the latter analysis to Hardt and Negri’s Empire, suggesting Dido as a model for the “multitude” in the fight against the imperial injustice of today’s globalized empire. (shrink)

En este ensayo se examina de manera crítica el desarrollo de la filosofía analítica y, en particular, de la filosofía analítica latinoamericana. Se propone que esta última adopte un giro político y uno pedagógico con el fin de recuperar su espíritu original y reconectarse con la tradición intelectual latinoamericana. This essay is a critical examination of the development of analytic philosophy and, in particular, of Latin American analytic philosophy. It is argued that the latter ought to adopt a political and (...) pedagogical turn in order to recover its original spirit and to be reconnected to Latin American intelectual tradition. (shrink)