Samuel Shirley's splendid new translation, with critical annotation reflecting research of the last half-century, is the only edition of the complete text of Spinoza's correspondence available in English. An historical-philosophical Introduction, detailed annotation, a chronology, and a bibliography are also included.

In this paper I wish to examine in detail the arguments which Spinoza uses in a very brief section of the Ethics, the lemmas following Proposition 13 of Part II. My aim in this analysis will be twofold: to attempt a preliminary sketch of the nature of a physical system in Spinoza’s view, and to clarify what Spinoza means by speaking of certain items as “individuals.” At least a partial fulfillment of the first aim is a necessary condition for the (...) second, since most of what Spinoza has to say about individuation in the Ethics and elsewhere is expressed in terms of individual bodies. His own solution of the mind-body problem entails that there will be correlative statements true at the ideational level; but, unfortunately, he usually leaves such correlations to his reader. I use the term “ideational” herein in preference to “mental” to avoid any dualistic connotation. Ideational and extensional levels for Spinoza refer to a dualism of denoting complexes, but not to a dualism of objects denoted by these. (shrink)

Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement nominaliste lorsqu'il discue des notions universelles dans l'Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que le système spinoziste est d'inspiration platoniste, et qu'il faut réinterpréter les passages d'apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec le platonisme ou l'essentialisme. J'argumente qu'un tel procédé n'est justifié ni par le texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L'interprétation du spinozisme (...) que je propose le place dans le cadre logique du nominalisme contemporain, à l'instar du système de Nelson Goodman, par exemple. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de proposer une analyse de deux conceptions distinctes de la causalité chez Spinoza. Selon la première la nature-dieu serait la cause directe de toute action qui a lieu au niveau des choses finies; tandis que, selon la seconde toute action finie ferait partie d’une chaîne infinie de causes qui est répandue dans la durée. Je montre que cette causalité-ci n’est ni illusoire ni simplement derivative, contre les suggestions de plusieurs travaux récents sur Spinoza. En deuxième (...) lieu nous proposons un modèle pour la causalité consécutive qui assure la possibilité que les êtres finis puissent fonctionner comme des causes adéquates au sens spinoziste dans le champ physique. Ici l’analyse s’oppose à plusieurs chercheurs qui soutiennent qu’il existe une rupture entre les attributs de la pensée et de l’étendue dans le système spinoziste.This study addresses the problem of analyzing two distinct conceptions of causality in Spinoza. According to the first god-nature is the direct cause of every action which occurs at the level of finite things; while, according to the second , every finite action would be part of an infinite chain of causes extended into duration. I show that sequential causality is neither illusory nor simply derivative, contrary to the suggestions made by several recent studies of Spinoza. Secondly, I offer a model for sequential causality which assures the possibility that finite beings may function as adequate causes within the physical field. Here my analysis is opposed to those commentators who argue for a rupture in Spinoza between the attributes of thought and extension. (shrink)

With meticulous scholarship and an accurate, highly readable translation, this volume sheds light not only on Spinoza's debt to Descartes but also on the development of Spinoza's own thought. Appearing for the first time in English translation, Lodewijk Meyer's inaugural dissertation on matter --relevant for its comments on Descartes, Spinoza, and other thinkers of the time--is appended with notes and a short commentary. Cross-references to Descartes's _Principles of Philosophy_ are provided in an index, and there is an extensive bibliography.

Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement norninaliste lorsqu’il discue des notions universelles dans l’Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que Ie système spinoziste est d’inspiration platoniste, et qu’il faut réinterpréter les passages d’apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec Ie platonisme ou l’essentialisme. J’argurnente qu’un tel procédé n’est justifié ni par Ie texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L’interprétation du spinozisme (...) que je propose Ie place dans Ie cadre logique du nominalisme contemporain, à I’instar du système de Nelson Goodman, par exemple. (shrink)

Despite the considerable attention given to Spinoza’s account of affectivity, especially in recent years, scant attention has been paid to the distinction between action and passion, or to the problems which it presents internally and externally. This essay offers a clarification and defense of Spinoza’s account of action and passion. A second theme is the behavioristic nature of Spinoza’s account of human affectivity. Despite the bad press which behaviorism is receiving these days, I argue that the behavioristic aspects of Spinoza’s (...) account are defensible. (shrink)

I ARGUE THAT SPINOZA’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ’CONATION’ IS A CONSISTENT ANALYSIS BASED UPON HIS CLAIM THAT TELEOLOGICAL OR FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION IS EITHER REDUCIBLE TO CAUSAL EXPLANATION (IN TERMS OF DRIVES) OR IS NOT GENUINELY EXPLANATORY. SEVERAL IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF THIS FOR SPINOZA’S ACCOUNT OF HUMAN APPETITION ARE PURSUED, AND SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR HIS POLITICAL THEORY ARE MENTIONED IN CLOSING.

Samuel Shirley's translations of Baruch Spinoza's Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts along with commentary, introduction, and analytic tables.

I argue that Spinoza’s account of appetition, and its application to human sexuality, is more original than many commentators suggest; and that it offers resolutions to several puzzles in the philosophy of sex. The paper first situates these puzzles in contemporary debates, offers a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s remarks on love in general and sexual love in particular, and concludes with some of the normative consequences which Spinoza attempts to derive from these.

I examine the new analysis of gay community and liberation offered by Dennis Altman in The Homosexualization of America. Three distinctive theoretical constructs are analyzed and criticized: (1) a new view of psychosocial development; (2) a new concept of gay identity; and (3) A set of causal hypotheses designed to explain the new direction of the gay subculture.