José María Díez-Alegría (1911-2010) forma parte de la historia de España, como jesuita, intelectual y pensador que ha creado unos vínculos especiales entre la fe y la política, tomando conciencia de la explotación que sufrían los obreros y de su alejamiento de la Iglesia. Intentó durante más de medio siglo romper, desde la Filosofía, el Derecho, la Ética, la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia, la manera que tenía la Iglesia jerárquica de entender la libertad de conciencia, la opción preferencial (...) por los más pobres, las relaciones cristianismo/ marxismo. La afirmación fundamental es que los bienes de la tierra son comunes a todos los hombres. Es una tradición unánime desde el principio mismo de la era patrística. Los Santos Padres ven la institución de la propiedad privada, si ha de ser legítima desde el punto de vista ético, una función de administración solidaria por lo que el lujo es proscrito. A esta relación fundamental de dominio corresponde inseparablemente y en rigurosa correlación, de carácter ético y metafísico, el derecho fundamental de participar en el dominio de los bienes, con carácter personal y esto exige que estén al servicio de la dignidad y libertad. Por tanto, la ideología capitalista está en radical oposición al espíritu del cristianismo, ya que se funda en la negación de la autarkeia. (shrink)

RESUMEN: En la era de las tecnologías digitales, el Derecho se enfrenta al objetivo de afrontar la protección de los datos personales en un universo global donde las fronteras se diluyen y el principio de territorialidad ha dejado de tener aplicación. Este trabajo pretende plantear el reto que supone, para el ordenamiento jurídico español, la adaptación a la nueva regulación europea en esta materia.ABSTRACT: At the digital´s technologies age, Law faces with the aim to address the personal data (...) protection in a global universe where blurring the borders, and the territoriality principle has ceased to be applied. This paper aims to poset he challenge that supposes, to the Spanish legal system, the adaptation to the new European Union regulation on this matter.PALABRAS CLAVE: universo digital, protección de datos personales, reglamento europeo, constitución española, conflictos de competenciaKEYWORDS: digital universe, personal data protection, european regulation, spanish constitution, competence´s conflicts. (shrink)

La teoría tridimensional va más allá de la mera constatación de que la experiencia jurídica implica cierta correlación entre hechos, normas y valores, pues pretende deducir conclusiones de mayor alcance. La indagación acerca de la naturaleza de cada uno de esos elementos y la comprensión dialéctica de su relación son claves. Los valores son el elemento más complejo de la triada. Se diferencia de otros entes ideales porque son realizables, inagotables, trascendentales y polares, pues se comprenden en relación a sus (...) contrarios y definidos como intencionalidades históricamente objetivadas en el proceso de la cultural que implican siempre el sentido vectorial de un acción posible. Los hechos son actos o hechos en sentido estricto, esto es, independientes de la iniciativa humana y que adquieren significado “inter homines”. Las normas se sitúan entre ambos, como tomas de postura ante los hechos en una función tensional de valores. El derecho es concebido como una integración dialéctica de los tres elementos, como la integración normativa de hechos según valores, y sus normas como la forma positiva y calificación axiológica del hecho en una coyuntura dada. De otro lado, se analizan las relaciones entre el derecho y el mundo de vida en que está inmerso, como una realidad complementaria de la realidad del derecho y entre las que existen interrelaciones continuas. También son objeto de análisis desde ese triple punto de vista el Derecho Natural, como un conjunto normativo de exigencias trascendentales, el derecho positivo en el plano experiencial y los principios y categorías que gobiernan los procesos de interpretación de las normas. (shrink)

This essay answers the question: Which are the themes often considered as “Philosophy of Law” that are of concern to legal scholars? My answer seeks to sort out how the “thematic content” has become into what today is known as “Philosophy of Law” to legal scholars (against “Philosophy of Law” to philosophers). To deal with this question I will consider Norberto Bobbio’s point of view.Resumen:En este texto trato de responder a la pregunta: ¿cuáles son los temas calificados generalmente como “de (...) filosofía del derecho” que nos interesan a los juristas? Mi respuesta se dirige a desgranar cómo se ha ido construyendo el “contenido temático” más habitual que hoy identifica a la filosofía del derecho de los juristas (frente a la filosofía del derecho de los filósofos). Para tratar esta cuestión examino el punto de vista de Norberto Bobbio. En nuestro tiempo, dicha perspectiva constituye el punto de partida en la discusión de cuáles son los ámbitos problemáticos más habituales de la reflexión teórico-jurídica. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es sostener el carácter epocal de la tecnología, lo cual requirió la convergencia de transformaciones intelectuales como sociales. Las observaciones de Hans Blumenberg en torno a una historia espiritual de la tecnología, que desplaza las perspectivas antropológicas y cientificistas de esta, constituyen una piedra de toque fundamental para esta comprensión. La tecnología en tanto fenómeno histórico es un tema y signatura de una época particular la Modernidad. Así, Blumenberg sitúa la emergencia de la tecnología (...) en sus análisis del tránsito de la Edad Media a la Modernidad, subrayando como la preocupación por la teología de la creación de la escolástica tardía se pone en cuestión y se abre una nueva vía: la autoafirmación del ser humano. Es en este cambio de época que la tecnología adquiere un nuevo estatus, impensado anteriormente, como una vía de autoafirmación del ser humano. La historia espiritual de la tecnología desplaza la historia de los inventores y las invenciones, así como niega la posición de que la tecnología sea una mera aplicación de la ciencia. En contrario, la impronta “espiritual” remite a la investigación de los presupuestos históricos que hacen posible su emergencia, así como las recepciones/innovaciones que la tecnología ha producido. (shrink)

El texto analiza y sistematiza de un modo completo la doctrina quesustenta el deber de motivación de las sentencias judiciales en el Estadoconstitucional. Este deber se encuentra anclado al Estado de Derechoy a sus principios, valores y derechos recogidos por la Constitución,al sistema «político» de la Democracia y al sistema «jurídico» delEstado constitucional. Abordo las peculiaridades de la motivación judicialen cada una de estas dimensiones (Estado de Derecho y Constitución,sistema político y sistema jurídico), y en el ámbito del sistemajurídico, (...) me detengo especialmente en la problemática más habitual dela motivación judicial en relación a los principios de la decisión judicial(parte fáctica y parte normativa) en el ámbito de desarrollo de lapraxis jurídica. Finalmente, abordo las principales patologías de lamotivación judicial que surgen en la actividad profesional de los jueces,juezas y tribunales de justicia. (shrink)

Taking for granted that Marx’s economic theory enjoys a scientific status and, furthermore, that it installed a real Copernican revolution in sociology, the present paper explores the possibility of deriving a system of law deserving the name of “scientific” in so far as it would be in keeping with the theses of the latter scientific theory. In this context, the paper argues against a claim recently sustained by Fernández Liria and Alegre Zahonero, for whom a system of right compatible (...) with Marx’s theory would be compatible, too, with the classic juridical formulations conceived during the Enlightenment. The main reason why this paper testifies against such compatibility is that the enlightened concepts of “equality”, “liberty” and “autonomy” count with the individual as the realm for their juridical application. However, Marx’s subject matter being the social means of production (and not the individuals’ production of value), we conclude that the only juridical subject that could justifiably be derived from his economic investigation would be the “social class”. Finally, the paper suggests that the only way a scientific system of law could grant a juridical status to the individual would be by taking into account the other theory that also installed a Copernican revolution in the social sciences, though this time in the field of psychology: Freud’s psychoanalysis. Key words: Copernican revolution, science, scientific. (shrink)

Judges have a duty to decide judicial cases, however, judicial decision will vary and will have certain characteristics depending on the kind of case at hand: this article address three kinds of judicial cases: clear cases, borderline cases and pivotal cases. The purpose: discuss if relying on these classifications is useful or not in light of the unity in judicial adjudication principle.Resumen:Los jueces tienen el deber general de resolver los casos judiciales; sin embargo, la decisión judicial variará y tendrá ciertas (...) características dependiendo del tipo de caso; son tres los tipos de casos judiciales que este artículo estudia: clear cases, borderline cases y pivotal cases. El objetivo: intentar descubrir si adoptar una de las tipologías señaladas vulnera o reafirma el principio de unidad propio de la aplicación judicial. (shrink)

Taking regular walks when living with Parkinson’s disease has beneficial effects on movement and quality of life. Yet, patients usually show reduced physical activity compared to healthy older adults. Using auditory stimulation such as music can facilitate walking but patients vary significantly in their response. An individualized approach adapting musical tempo to patients’ gait cadence, and capitalizing on these individual differences, is likely to provide a rewarding experience, increasing motivation for walk-in PD. We aim to evaluate the observance, safety, tolerance, (...) usability, and enjoyment of a new smartphone application. It was coupled with wearable sensors and delivered individualized musical stimulation for gait auto-rehabilitation at home. Forty-five patients with PD underwent a 1-month, outdoor, uncontrolled gait rehabilitation program, using the BeatWalk application. The music tempo was being aligned in real-time to patients’ gait cadence in a way that could foster an increase up to +10% of their spontaneous cadence. Open-label evaluation was based on BeatWalk use measures, questionnaires, and a six-minute walk test. Patients used the application 78.8% of the prescribed duration and enjoyed it throughout the program. The application was considered “easy to use” by 75% of the patients. Pain, fatigue, and falls did not increase. Fear of falling decreased and quality of life improved. After the program, patients improved their gait parameters in the six-minute walk test without musical stimulation. BeatWalk is an easy to use, safe, and enjoyable musical application for individualized gait rehabilitation in PD. It increases “walk for exercise” duration thanks to high observance.Clinical Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02647242. (shrink)

El Psicoanálisis freudiano, ya se lo considere como un método para la investigación del inconsciente, una psicoterapia o una teoría psicológica, se sustenta en una concepción metafísica y antropológica. Dichos fundamentos filosóficos no fueron asumidos por S. Freud, lo cual no implica, sin embargo, que no estén en la base de esta cosmovisión que revolucionó la cultura del siglo XX. Se analizan sucesivamente: A. La relación personal de S. Freud con la filosofía. Asume un carácter paradójico y conflictivo, (...) ya que a veces ella aparece como su máxima aspiración y, en otras ocasiones, se considera a sí mismo constitucionalmente incapaz de comprenderla. B. Su actitud hacia los filósofos, francamente ambigua, en tanto entabla con ellos una polémica constante y, al mismo tiempo, admira la filosofía de Platón, Nietzsche y Schopenhauer, entre otros. C. La fundamentación psicoanalítica de la filosofía como institución cultural. Al igual que la religión, la moral y el derecho, es producto de la sublimación que sustituye el objeto y el fin del instinto, y logra su satisfacción en una función no sexual y más elevada desde el punto de vista social o ético. La metapsicología será el intento científico de reinterpretar la metafísica que es producto de las fuerzas inconscientes. D. Explicitación de algunas de las ideas filosóficas subyacentes en el Psicoanálisis, limitadas a sus conexiones con A. Schopenhauer. El Psicoanálisis se apoya en una concepción materialista y positivista de lo real y sostiene una antropología pandeterminista en la que afloran las ideas del filósofo de Danzig. A él debe la noción de represión, la valoración de los impulsos sexuales, la idea de inconsciente, el peso del instinto de muerte, el fatalismo y la convicción de que la esencia de las relaciones humanas es el conflicto. A pesar de su cosmovisión reduccionista, Freud sigue siendo cimiento y referencia obligada de todo planteo psicológico, psicopatológico o psicoterapéutico. (shrink)

El trabajo desarrolla una crítica y una propuesta sobre el uso de la calificación de vulnerable desde una perspectiva de género. A partir de un análisis crítico del concepto de autonomía clásica, se propone como científicamente más productiva la noción de autonomía relacional, que se considera más apta para explicar las acciones humanas reales, de personas no idealizadas, y se revela capaz de dar sentido al caso de las acciones relativamente constreñidas. Desde esta perspectiva se aborda el análisis de algunos (...) casos reales de aplicación del derecho donde la calificación de vulnerabilidad aplicada al contexto se muestra útil para identificar un espacio de derecho positivo perjudicial para las mujeres o las minorías. (shrink)

Este artículo describe y analiza la doctrina del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) sobre la identidad de género de las personas transexuales. En el Convenio Europeo sobre Derechos Humanos (CEDH), como en otros tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos, no existe un derecho que reconozca y proteja la situación del colectivo trans. Sin embargo, el Tribunal ha elaborado una doctrina propia a partir del artículo 8 del CEDH, el derecho al respeto a la vida privada y familiar, en (...) la que cobra especial importancia su análisis de las obligaciones negativas y positivas de los Estados y su aplicación a la protección de la autonomía personal, de la libertad y de la dignidad humana de las personas transexuales. (shrink)

El desafío actual de la posverdad que amenaza el funcionamiento de la democracia surge desde los límitesde nuestro conocimiento y la interferencia de las emociones y los valores. Dos corrientes comunes, la ética del discurso, y la política agonista, son insuficientes para resolver este desafío. En la comprensión de la política de Aristóteles estos dos elementos ya estaban presentes. Él presenta a la política como un campo de saber determinado no exclusivamente por el saber, sino al mismo tiempo por los (...) límites del saber y por el cargo emotivo.El objetivo de este artículo es proponer una concepción contemporánea de un discurso político phronético,incorporando las características clave de una phronesis aristotélica. La hipótesis es que un discurso políticophronético contemporáneo no se puede fundar en el bien, ya que la pluralidad de las concepciones del bien es lo que separa la política moderna de los tiempos aristotélicos. En su lugar, y siguiendo a los debates en la ética neo-aristotélica, se debería buscar el fundamento en el desarrollo del carácter de los (futuros) participantes en dicho discurso. Por consiguiente, la educación es el punto de partida esencial para reforzar las capacidades y los hábitos de los participantes del discurso a fin de mejor manejar, en la medida de lo posible, las limitaciones de nuestro conocimiento y nuestro compromiso personal con el campo político. (shrink)

El análisis interdisciplinar de la actual política de drogas brasileña, de carácter prohibicionista, lleva a la conclusión que ella ha frustrado las expectativas de aquellos que creían que la promulgación de la Ley 11.343/06 resultaría en un tratamiento distinto a los usuarios y a los traficantes de drogas. Es posible observar una dificultad en el acceso para uso médico a las sustancias que hoy son consideradas ilícitas, la ausencia de criterios legales objetivos para distinguir usuarios de traficantes, y el (...) foco de la persecución penal no está direccionada a los grandes traficantes de drogas, que siguen lucrando, sin que haya una reducción del consumo, ni del comercio. El modelo de seguridad pública está alejado de los principios y garantías previstos en la Constitución Federal, identificando personas pobres y negras como potencialmente criminales. Así, partiendo de la premisa de que la actual política de drogas está siendo regentada de manera irracional, violando los derechos humanos, y desde una perspectiva crítica, son propuestos caminos para la superación de los problemas identificados. (shrink)

What does it mean to live and build up the Kingdom of God? In this book, professor and priest Alberto de Mingo Kaminouchi introduces the contemporary reader to Christian ethics by examining the New Testament through the three key concepts of Aristotle’s ethics: happiness, virtue, and love. In turn, the three affirmations orient this reflection through the Gospel. First, when the triune God appears on the horizon, it becomes easier to understand that existence has a purpose: namely, participating with the (...) entire human family in this project of happiness called the Kingdom of God. Second, happiness is not something outside of us; it consists in the practice of the virtues that bring about a personal transformation. Third, the project of the Kingdom leads us to live in love with others. De Mingo Kaminouchi shows the reader a real model of this in the community we call the church, the “field hospital” for all those in need of hope. This book is accessibly written for readers not already well-versed in Christian ethics. (shrink)

St Joachim and St Anne Meeting at the Golden Gate, painted by Eugenio Cajés between 1604 and 1605, is the sole remnant of a major commission for the Cercito chapel in the church of San Felipe el Real in Madrid. The painting has been praised by modern critics, who have drawn attention to the painter’s emulation of Italian artistic precedents. Illuminating as this appraisal may be, such an approach does not explain why the patrons chose an iconographic subject that (...) had become increasingly rare, especially since the traditional association of the Meeting with the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin had been questioned in the late sixteenth century. Above all, focussing on the painting’s style fails to take into account the specific context for which this painting was conceived. As it happens, the Cercito family chapel was dedicated to a very particular cult, that of the Holy Child of La Guardia, the purported victim of one of the most notorious blood libels in late medieval Spain. The purpose of the present study is to redress the previous art-historical oversight with regard to this painting, through an in-depth study of the artistic, devotional and socio-cultural significance of the Meeting at the Golden Gate in seventeenth-century Madrid. An analysis of the extensive and to date unpublished archival documentation for the commission makes it possible to reconstruct key elements of the lost chapel. These sources, when read together with devotional texts that circulated at the time, reveal the personal motives that underpinned the foundation and decoration of the Cercito chapel. The reconstruction of the Cercito chapel proposed in this article offers a new perspective on the way in which religious art engaged with the tensions prompted by the issue of the purity of blood, as well as with anxieties related to family and procreation. (shrink)

Este trabajo parte de la concepción de la narrativa transmedia por parte de Henry Jenkins como el arte de making worlds, de construir mundos de ficción, para extender los fundamentos teóricos de esta definición al género documental. Si Bill Nichols indica que este género de no ficción tiene per se un gran poder persuasivo -por la naturaleza icónica de sus imágenes y sonidos y por el efecto psicológico de verosimilitud que suscita en el público-, aquí defendemos que este carácter (...) se potencia por medio de la narrativa transmedia. La inmersión, la extrabilidad y la performatividad de este tipo de narrativa lleva a la participación activa del usuario en el mundo transmedia, que coincide con su propio mundo, el real. Por esa razón numerosos proyectos activistas han visto en el documental transmedia una oportunidad tanto para el ejercicio del pensamiento crítico como para el cambio social. (shrink)

En este artículo analizamos los límites intrínsecos de nociones como la «dignidad humana» y otros análogos interculturales a la luz de la asimetría ineludible que imponen las reglas inherentes de inclusión, exclusión y jerarquía de todo lenguaje. En este marco, analizamos la excepcionalidad que supone la dignidad humana para el concepto mismo de los derechos humanos. Sobre esa base, sostenemos que es imperativo mantener diferenciados los privilegios que reconocemos a los animales humanos, de los derechos que reconocemos a otros animales (...) no humanos, sin que ello implique argumentar en desmedro de estos últimos. Finalmente, en el marco del análisis epistemológico y lingüístico, reconocemos el carácter paradójico e ineludible de los derechos humanos, que impone «violentamente» un orden de sentido que, en última instancia, parecen fundarse en la exclusiva voluntad del legislador. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Este trabajo considera la conceptualización y aplicación de la figura de los ajustes razonables en Qatar tras nueve años desde la ratificación de la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad (CDPD). En él se trata de analizar la situación de igualdad y no discriminación de las personas con discapacidad utilizando como medida de impacto la figura de ajustes razonables. El artículo destaca las principales fallas y virtudes del Estado de Qatar respecto a esta figura y traza (...) un camino a fin de poder avanzar en la inclusión de las personas con discapacidad a la luz de la CDPD. ABSTRACT: This paper considers the conceptualization and application of reasonable acommodation in Qatar after nine years since the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It analyzes the situation of equality and non-discrimination of people with disabilities using the figure of reasonable adjustments as an impact measure. The article highlights the main failures and virtues of the State of Qatar regarding reasonable accommodation and draws a path to move forward in the inclusion of people with disabilities in the light of the CRPD. PALABRAS CLAVE: ajustes razonables, igualdad, CDPD, Qatar. KEYWORDS: reasonable accommodation, equality, CRPD, Qatar. (shrink)

De revolución hemos derivado revolucionario; y esta palabra, con carácter general, se refiere a todo lo atinente a una revolución. Pero el término fue creado específicamente para aplicarse a la nuestra, para la revolución que ha transformado en pocos años a uno de los países en los que el despotismo prevalecía desde más antiguo, en la única república donde la libertad ha tenido alguna vez por base una total igualdad de derechos. Así, la palabra revolucionario se aplica solo a (...) las revoluciones que tienen por objeto la libertad. (shrink)

Il est communément porté au crédit de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’avoir renouvelé et enrichi la compréhension de la personne grâce à la notion jusqu’alors inédite de « relation subsistante ». Le présent article se propose de replacer cette découverte dans sa perspective propre, celle d’un théologien chrétien qui, sans prétendre épuiser conceptuellement un mystère reçu dans la foi, s’efforce néanmoins de rendre raison de la distinction réelle des personnes divines au sein de l’indivise Trinité. On examine d’abord comment saint Thomas (...) a su reprendre, éclairer et nouer par intégrations successives chacun des éléments de la célèbre définition de la personne léguée par Boèce. On est alors en mesure de suivre pas à pas la démarche d’analogie, aussi rigoureuse qu’audacieuse, qui permit à l’Aquinate de discerner, dans cette ratio commune et si humaine de la personne, l’éclat incomparable d’un nom divin. Mais, si l’on désire approcher de plus près le distinctif propre de la personne en Dieu, il n’est d’autre voie que de pénétrer dans la révélation trinitaire qui oblige et qui seule autorise à transcender la frontière du relatif et de l’absolu pour penser enfin, avec Thomas, la « relation comme subsistante », prérogative unique et bienheureux secret de la tripersonnalité divine.Thomas Aquinas is often given credit for having renewed and enriched the concept of personhood, thanks to the previously unheard of notion of « subsisting relation ». This paper proposes to place this discovery in its proper perspective, that of a Christian theologian who, without pretending to exhaust conceptually a mystery received in faith, endeavors nevertheless to provide an account of the real distinction between the divine persons of the undivided Trinity. We begin with an examination of how St. Thomas was able to take up, clarify and shape by successive integrations the famous definition of personhood left by Boethius. This places us in a position to follow step by step the analogical approach, as rigorous as it is audacious, that allows Aquinas to discern, in this common and so human ratio of « person », the incomparable radiance of a divine name. Yet if one desires to draw nearer to the distinctiveness of personhood in God, there is no other way than to penetrate divine revelation, which requires and which alone authorizes transcending the frontier between the relative and the absolute, to think finally, with Thomas, about « relation as subsistent », a unique prerogative and happy secret of the divine tri-personality. (shrink)

The modern idea of the right to freedom of each human being can be briefly described as follows: it is the right to personal judgment in matters of what is true and good and to selfdetermination of one’s life and actions in view of this judgment. Today this right is considered as the most basic, or one of the most basic, unquestionable rights of the individual. At the same time, our present situation is characterized by an undeniable pluralism. We (...) have practically given up the hope that individuals, through their own judgment, will come to an agreement as to what are the central values in life, as to what is the good life. On the contrary, too much unity and agreement immediately raises the suspicion of more or less hidden constraint or indoctrination.In a pluralistic, free society, every defense of what is the good can only be seen as the defense of a particular conception of the good, which is potentially threatening for the self-determination of other individuals. The combination of the stress on freedom and the fact of pluralism, leads to an extreme importance being given to tolerance. Tolerance, together with the multiplicity of life-styles, seems to be something positive in itself. Within this perspective, the real question does not seem to be whether tolerance is something positive in itself, but whether it has any limitations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs sniffing (...) one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

There are many real-world applications like healthcare systems, job monitoring, well-being and personal fitness tracking, monitoring of elderly and frail people, assessment of rehabilitation and follow-up treatments, affording Fall Detection (FD) and ADL (Activity of Daily Living) identification, separately or even at a time. However, the two main drawbacks of these solutions are that most of the times, the devices deployed are obtrusive (devices worn on not quite common parts of the body like neck, waist and ankle) and (...) the poor battery life. Thus, this work proposes a low-power classification algorithm based on an Ensemble of KNN and K-Means algorithms (EKMeans) to identify Falls and High-Intensity ADL events such as running, jogging and climbing up stairs. The input of EKMeans are triaxial accelerometer data gathered from wrist-wearable devices. The proposal will be validated on the Fall&ADL publicly available datasets UMAFall, UCIFall and FallAllD, considering two kinds of activity labelling: Two-Class and Multi-Class. An exhaustive comparative study between our proposal, and the baseline algorithms KNN and a feed-forward Neural Network (NN) is deployed, where EKMeans outperformed clearly the Specificity (ADL classification) of the KNN and NN for the three datasets. Finally, a comparative battery consumption study has been included deploying the analyzed algorithms in a WearOS smartwatch, where EKMeans drains the battery from 100% to 0% in 27.45 hours, saving 5% and 21% concerning KNN and NN, respectively. Keywords: Human Activity Recognition, ADL Identification, Fall Detection TS Clustering, TS Classification, Wearable Devices, Low-Power HAR. (shrink)

RESUMENEl argumento indirecto en favor de la salud y el bienestar de los animales considera la analogía entre derechos humanos y derechos de los no humanos. En tal sentido, los “derechos” de los animales pueden ser considerados “deberes” o responsabilidades de los seres humanos; el artículo defiende entonces una perspectiva antropocéntrica moderada sobre este tema. De hecho, los avances en material de protección de otras especies y del medio ambiente suelen estar relacionados con el interés por proteger la salud de (...) los consumidores. Un análisis de la regulación autonómica, nacional y europea puede mostrar hasta que punto varía la consideración del bienestar animal en áreas como la investigación científica con no humanos, los animales de granja y las normas que regulan el transporte. Por tanto, la situación real de los derechos de los animales demostraría las limitaciones prácticas de actitudes compasivas hacia otras especies que no vayan acompañadas de responsabilidades claras y de deberes de los humanos.PALABRAS CLAVEDERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES, BIENESTAR ANIMAL, éTICA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN, DERECHOS HUMANOSABSTRACTThe indirect argument in favour of animal health and welfare explores the analogy between human rights and animal rights. In that sense, the “rights” of non-humans could be considered “duties” or responsibilities of human beings; so, the article defends an anthropocentric point of view; a moderate anthropocentric perspective. Indeed, the protection of other species and the environment is usually connected with the interest in health and consumers’ protection. The analysis of the regional, national, and European regulation regarding these issues would prove how different the consideration of animal welfare could be in areas like research on non-humans for scientific purposes, animals for production, and transport norms. Therefore, the present situation of animal rights would demonstrate the practical limitations of compassion towards other species without clear responsibilities and duties on the part of humans.KEYWORDSANIMAL RIGHTS, ANIMAL WELFARE, RESEARCH ETHICS, HUMAN RIGHTS. (shrink)

RESUMENEl argumento indirecto en favor de la salud y el bienestar de los animales considera la analogía entre derechos humanos y derechos de los no humanos. En tal sentido, los “derechos” de los animales pueden ser considerados “deberes” o responsabilidades de los seres humanos; el artículo defiende entonces una perspectiva antropocéntrica moderada sobre este tema. De hecho, los avances en material de protección de otras especies y del medio ambiente suelen estar relacionados con el interés por proteger la salud de (...) los consumidores. Un análisis de la regulación autonómica, nacional y europea puede mostrar hasta que punto varía la consideración del bienestar animal en áreas como la investigación científica con no humanos, los animales de granja y las normas que regulan el transporte. Por tanto, la situación real de los derechos de los animales demostraría las limitaciones prácticas de actitudes compasivas hacia otras especies que no vayan acompañadas de responsabilidades claras y de deberes de los humanos.PALABRAS CLAVEDERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES, BIENESTAR ANIMAL, éTICA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN, DERECHOS HUMANOSABSTRACTThe indirect argument in favour of animal health and welfare explores the analogy between human rights and animal rights. In that sense, the “rights” of non-humans could be considered “duties” or responsibilities of human beings; so, the article defends an anthropocentric point of view; a moderate anthropocentric perspective. Indeed, the protection of other species and the environment is usually connected with the interest in health and consumers’ protection. The analysis of the regional, national, and European regulation regarding these issues would prove how different the consideration of animal welfare could be in areas like research on non-humans for scientific purposes, animals for production, and transport norms. Therefore, the present situation of animal rights would demonstrate the practical limitations of compassion towards other species without clear responsibilities and duties on the part of humans.KEYWORDSANIMAL RIGHTS, ANIMAL WELFARE, RESEARCH ETHICS, HUMAN RIGHTS. (shrink)

She has always existed and is more than a citizen of multiverses,‭ ‬most likely the ground of all.‭ ‬In the West she was introduced around C.570‭ ‬and since then many individuals have searched for her,‭ ‬tried to become familiar with her and created all sorts of,‭ ‬frequently ridiculous,‭ ‬things in her name. Once someone has a passion for her it cannot be extinguished but increases.‭ ‬Objectively this need for her is referred to as‭ ‘‬love of wisdom‭’‬,‭ ‬the need for wisdom,‭ (...) ‬while personally it is a need of some individuals. -/- This passion and need has become institutionalized and it has developed a discourse and became a socio-cultural practice of its own.‭ ‬Fairly recently it has even become a discipline at,‭ ‬mostly higher,‭ ‬institutions of learning.‭ ‬Previously those searching for and attempting to interact with her came from many walks of life and all kinds of professions,‭ ‬while in the last century or so many people began to live off her as they are remunerated for talking about,‭ ‬about the history of searching for and investigating her and saying all sorts of things about her. -/- Many things are done in her name and all sorts of neologisms are fabricated to label them,‭ ‬such as analytic,‭ ‬continental,‭ ‬idealism,‭ ‬rationalism,‭ ‬empiricism,‭ ‬and all these labels are again specified and specified ad infinitum with terms such as materialism,‭ ‬physicalism,‭ ‬weak naturalism,‭ ‬speculative and new realism,‭ ‬etc. -/- Individuals from many other disciplines and areas of life,‭ ‬such as sociology,‭ ‬the arts,‭ ‬humanities,‭ ‬cognitive sciences,‭ ‬sport,‭ ‬etc got on the bandwagon so that we now have a philosophy or love of wisdom,‭ ‬epistemologies,‭ ‬ontologies etc of everything under the sun.‭ ‬Even if you were to write some theses or do some study you will stipulate your epistemology,‭ ‬ontology,‭ ‬methodology,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬Just as those who live off philosophy become involved in every area of humanity and all its socio-cultural practices produce so-called peer reviewed publications,‭ ‬articles,‭ ‬essays and books on philosophy of art,‭ ‬sport,‭ ‬humanities,‭ ‬cognitive sciences,‭ ‬religion,‭ ‬gods,‭ ‬sex,‭ ‬rock‭ ‘‬n roll,‭ ‬language,‭ ‬words,‭ ‬ideas,‭ ‬how words and ideas and concepts do their thing,‭ ‬etc,‭ ‬etc.‭ -/- The way these subject-matter are treated will usually consists of some form of reasoning,‭ ‬the use of arguments or argumentation and some kind of logic and a process that resembles the features,‭ ‬steps,‭ ‬stages and processes of theorizing,‭ ‬the construction and development of models,‭ ‬short term,‭ ‬medium or large theories.‭ ‬The latter is often presented in the form of entire‭ ‘‬metaphysical‭’ ‬and speculative systems such as those of Plato,‭ ‬Aristotle,‭ ‬Kant,‭ ‬Hegel,‭ ‬Marx,‭ ‬Husserl,‭ ‬Habermas et al.‭ ‬While Socrates and to some extent the later Wittgenstein attempted to be more authentic to the original principles of trying to follow and developed the ideal of identifying,‭ ‬capturing by verbal interaction‭ (‬be it discourse,‭ ‬or dialogue‭) ‬and becoming one‭ (‬like mystics of all religions who are passionate about‭ ‘‬the one‭’‬,‭ ‬the Beloved,‭ ‬the one Real Self,‭ ‬etc and attempt to become one,‭ ‬united with or‭ ‘‬oned‭’ ‬with their object or subject of desire‭) ‬with Sophos‭ – ‬by exploring and investigating or applying and executing practical use of language,‭ ‬and thereby to uncover and capture her. -/- The effects of the institutionalization of the discipline are far-reaching and the professionalization of the role of philosopher as a‭ ‘‬profession‭’‬,‭ ‬an employee of an institution and a representative of the status quo are discussed in a number of articles being cited. -/- The methods of the philosophical discourse vary,‭ ‬first of all between the so-called Continental and Anglophone Analytic philosophies,‭ ‬its movements,‭ ‬schools and institutions,‭ ‬such as research universities,‭ ‬journals,‭ ‬communities and book publishers.‭ ‬It seems as if increasingly philosophizing employs some of the stages and steps of the processes of theorizing.‭ ‬Other aspects of her methods are heuristic devices,‭ ‬the use of metaphors and analogies,‭ ‬philosophical logic,‭ ‬informal and other types of logic,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation.‭ ‬This involves the creation of fallacies in thinking and reasoning and the causing of all sorts of fallacies or crooked thinking. -/- The nature and changes of philosophical subject-matter are discussed as the socio-cultural practice lost most of its traditional‭ ‘‬objects‭’ ‬with the social and cultural differentiation of other,‭ ‬specialized disciplines.‭ ‬In turn the discourse attempts to fabricate other subject-matter,‭ ‬for example the development of so-called Experimental Philosophy,‭ ‬inter-disciplinary studies such as cognitive sciences and philosophies or meta-level explorations of and speculations about other disciplines,‭ ‬professions and domains‭ (‬for example normative,‭ ‬instrumental and subjective aesthetic‭ – ‬this the terminology and distinctions according to the working class obsessive Critical Theory of the so-called Frankfurt Schule.‭ ‬One always wonders what degree of personal experience their educated,‭ ‬middle class academics have of‭ ‘‬the working class‭’‬,‭ ‬whatever that is meant to be‭?)) ‬of human activity.‭ ‬Such as philosophy of medicine,‭ ‬sport,‭ ‬art,‭ ‬religion,‭ ‬just name it and it is bound to exist.‭ -/- Another‭ ‘‬extension‭’ ‬of or interest in‭ ‘‬philosophy‭’ ‬is that of certain individuals,‭ ‬schools or movements in other disciplines,‭ ‬for example social‭ ‘‬sciences‭’ ‬such as sociology and supporters of the above mentioned‭ ‘‬Schule‭’‬.‭ ‬They frequently use philosophical words such as ontology,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬multi-dimensional,‭ ‬many-levels,‭ ‬contexts assumptions,‭ ‬pre-suppositions,‭ ‬immanent,‭ ‬transcendent,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬Is this intended to be an extension of philosophy and the doing of philosophizing or merely cognitive bias of the form‭ ‘‬authority bias‭’‬.‭ ‬In this case the authority being‭ ‘‬the discipline of philosophy‭’‬,‭ ‬as well as the‭ ’‬use of the word philosophy‭ ‬and terms from the philosophical discourse‭’‬.‭. 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En la intervención de las universidades, las humanidades y las ciencias sociales llevaron la peor parte. Algunas instituciones y facultades se convirtieron en refugio de profesores despedidos, que de otro modo, debían seguir al exilio: ser exonerado impedía, en la práctica, la recontratación. Algunos profesores de filosofía enseñaron en la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, otros en la Facultad de Ciencias Físicas y en la de Derecho de la Universidad de Chile. Esta universidad y la Universidad Técnica del Estado fueron (...) los blancos principales de la represión. La Academia de Humanismo no se constituía aún en universidad y dependía del Episcopado; las otras dos facultades, eran ‘profesionales’. La intervención significó, en efecto, una agudización del carácter profesional de la educación superior, en evidente desmedro de la formación humanística. En las dos Facultades antes indicadas, se formaron departamentos o centros de humanidades. Los Departamentos de Sociología, Lenguas Clásicas y varios otros del antiguo Pedagógico de la Universidad de Chile, fueron suprimidos. Las instituciones receptoras de estos académicos solían estar ligadas a organismos internacionales, o ellas mismas tener financiamiento externo. Me parece que ese era el caso de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) y el Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC), entre otros. (shrink)

En este volumen José de Faria ofrece una muestra de los fundamentos que brindan una forma propia de pensar en cuanto pensamiento pensado, pero también en tanto que pensamiento pensante, con todo lo que esto acarrea de frágil, de nuevo, e incluso de ruptura a la filosofía del derecho a partir de un étimo onto-antropológico. -- En esta perspectiva es donde el derecho, en cuanto orden sumergido en la historia, se concibe como un enorme y genuino pedazo de (...) lo real construido que pertenece a la galaxia de la razón práctica.No se trata simplemente de un (válido) deber-ser que es. -- En realidad, y sobre todo, se trata de un válido es que debe ser. -- A lo largo del texto, el lector podrá encontrar reflexiones actuales e importantes, no sólo sobre el problema de la obediencia al derecho, con la búsqueda de una respuesta posible de nuestro tiempo, sino que también podrá indagar sobre aspectos más analíticos de la normatividad jurídica, especialmente en lo referente a la dimensión del derecho como categoría del pensamiento, realizado en el horizonte de una lógica comprensiva.Todo eso sin perder de vista la necesidad de analizar una vertiente crucial para la fundamentación antropológica del Derecho: su dimensión temporal, críticamente reflejada en la temporalidad de lo justo. (shrink)

Being based on the Ernesto Garzon’s analysis of the authors from the cur- rent of the “nature of the things”, the goal of the present article is to demonstrate that the postulates of this current do not criticize and refute the legal positivism from the epoch but quite on the contrary, they support and even complement it. The similarities between the assumptions uphold by authors from the two currents lead to the conclusion that the theses of the legal positivism and (...) the “nature of the things” streams have never been in firm opposition as previously thought.Resumen:Basado en la exposición de Ernesto Garzón sobre los autores de la llamada “naturaleza de las cosas”, este artículo pretende hacernos ver que las tesis de esta corriente fuera de criticar o de refutar las bases del positivismo jurídico de la época, tal y como pretendían hacer, en realidad, lo soportan y hasta lo complementan. Las similitudes que hay entre las posturas de algunos autores pertenecientes a ambas corrientes, llevan a que el autor niegue que haya existido una disputa “real” entre ambas tesis. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by (...) contrasting attitudes. As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza el sentido e implicaciones del Artículo 12 de la Convención Internacional sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapadad a la luz de la Observación General Nº1 de su Comité y se centra en determinar su impacto en el régimen general de atribución de personalidad y capacidad jurídica y en el ámbito del Derecho Privado y de Familia del Estado de Qatar. ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the meaning and implications of Article 12 of the International (...) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the light of the General Comment No. 1 of its Committee. It focuses on determining the impact of this General Comment to the general regime of personality and capacity attribution in the field of Private law and Family law on Qatar. PALABRAS CLAVE: capacidad jurídica, CDPD, derecho privado, legislación qatarí. KEYWORDS: legal capacity – CRPD – private law – Qatari legislation. (shrink)

This paper deals with phenomenological distinctions concerning empathy with real persons and empathy with fictional characters. We will introduce both contemporary accounts of our perception of others and Edith Stein’s account of empathy. These theories will turn out to be fruitful in defending our main thesis, i.e. that the differences between empathy with real people and empathy with fictional characters are not structural but just qualitative. We will argue that in both cases empathy is a direct act of (...) perceiving others and their lived experience. However, stemming from Stein’s work, we will underline that empathy with real persons is in principio more vivid and intense than empathy with fictional characters. In order to identify similarities and differences between empathy de vivo and empathy in fiction, we will focus on the following issues: the quality of perception; the motivational context and the “life-world context”; the ontological status of persons vs. characters. (shrink)

This paper deals with Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco’s answer to the paradox of the normativity of law: How can autonomous self-legislating persons act, without compromising their autonomy and their will, following legal rules? Regarding Rodriguez-Blanco’s answer, I offer two main critiques. The first one is based on Rodriguez-Blanco’s comments to David Enoch’s paper in which I argue against the idea that a descriptive theoretical account of law can, and should, give an answer to general problems of normativity due to the fact that (...) a theoretical approach that engages in questions about the normativity of law cannot be purely descriptive, therefore against Rodriguez-Blanco I conclude that Enoch’s answer is the only response a descriptive account is able to offer. The second criticism focuses on Rodriguez-Blanco’s response to the paradox and argues that her solution is not, in fact, a descriptive one, but one that relies on strong normative premises, which as it turns out defend a perfectionist perspective towards the law.Resumen:Este trabajo analiza la respuesta que Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco propone para resolver la paradoja de la normatividad del derecho: ¿Cómo es posible que una persona autónoma actúe siguiendo los mandatos de normas jurídicas sin comprometer su autonomía ni su voluntad? El autor ofrece dos críticas a la respuesta de Rodriguez-Blanco. La primera de ellas está basada en los comentarios que Rodriguez-Blanco ha hecho sobre la propuesta de David Enoch. En este punto, el autor argumenta en contra de la idea según la cual una perspectiva descriptiva del derecho puede, y debe, tratar de responder a los problemas generales de la normatividad del derecho. De acuerdo con el autor, una perspectiva que pretenda dar respuesta a los problemas de la normatividad del derecho no puede ser una perspectiva puramente descriptiva. En este sentido, el autor sostiene que la respuesta que ofrece Enoch es la única respuesta que una perspectiva descriptiva del derecho puede dar. La segunda crítica está dirigida a la respuesta que Rodriguez-Blanco da sobre la paradoja de la normatividad. En este segundo punto el autor argumenta que la perspectiva de Rodriguez-Blanco no es una perspectiva descriptiva como ella presume, sino que adopta una perspectiva normativa la cual, además, está comprometida con una idea perfeccionista del derecho. (shrink)

Schuklenk and van de Vathorst's paper is a very welcome addition to the literature on the assisted dying debate and will be of great interest to clinicians working in the field of mental health.1 Many psychiatrists will have had patients who have asked them to allow them to die, to desist in their efforts to prevent their suicide, and one of us has had personal experience, outside of professional life, of being asked to aid in someone's attempt to end (...) their life in the context of an episode of mood disorder. The person with depression asking professionals, friends and family members to aid them in ending their life is a very real phenomenon. In their discussion, Schuklenk and van de Vathorst's paper uses two principles that we endorse and add weight to their argument: namely, the reality of suffering in depression and the parity of mental and physical illness. Indeed, the case Schuklenk and van de Vathorst make is a strong one and our commentary will focus on the premise of the argument around choosing death and some empirical clarification about competence in depression and the nature of treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and its prognosis. The conceptual concern we wish to discuss in relation to assisted dying, endorsed by the state and legislature, is not linked to any moral or religious concern, or even on grounds related to ‘slippery slope’ or ‘abuse’ arguments. Rather the worry is how one could operationalise decisions around assisted dying as based on competence and capacity and view such decisions as rational. I think this concern is not limited to depressive illness, but to all decisions regarding choosing non-existence. Schuklenk and van de Vathorst offer the following useful criteria to regulate assisted suicide:1. (shrink)

Traditionally, the question of how a person can be a unity throughout his life was answered by referring to the objective realm: the cartesian soul guaranteed our personal unity. But for Locke, the soul was considered irrelevant to the real question of personal identity, which was: how can I know that I am the same person throughout my life? For Locke that question was not answerable from an objective point of view, but only by a 'person', which (...) for Locke meant as much as 'consciousness' or the first-person perspective. For Locke, I am the same 'person', as long as I have the same consciousness. But how exactly should we understand this 'person'? No longer tied to the objective realm, does this mean that the term 'person' is totally autonomous? This is indeed what Locke's account sometimes seems to suggest. Inspired by these suggestions, people like Hume and eventually Parfit followed these very same lines of thought. By showing that these accounts in the end always entangle themselves in a version of Butler's circularity-objection, I will demonstrate that 'person' can never stand on its own but is always tied and interwoven, not with the objective realm, but with the third-person perspective - or what Locke calls 'man'. Finally I will give two reasons why Locke thought it was important to disconnect 'person' and 'man'. (shrink)

In 1927 at the fifth Solvay Council, that reunited all the aristocracy of theoretical physics, Einstein, regarding with solicitude the new-born “quantum mechanics” of Louis de Broglie, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Dirac, discerned with his usual sagacity an indelible mark that was destined to become, with time, a subject of passionate discussion among those whose vocation is to adulate this enigmatic and capricious personality.In 1926 Born had given the prophetic stroke to the portrait. Turning to probability as to the official factotum (...) of the reconciliation of the continuous and the discontinuous-here, the associated wave and particle-he transmuted the waves of de Broglie and Schr6dinger into an undulatory calculus o f probabilities, deducing, from a surprising principle, consequences that were even more surprising but always verified through experiment. Parting from the idea that the intensity of the wave is the probability of the detection of the particle at a given point and time, Born replaced the classic principle of addition of partial probabilities with his “principle of the addition of partial amplitudes” that are, as in classical optics, represented by “complex” dimensions, with one real part and one imaginary part. In general, the square of the module of the sum of amplitudes will be the probability. This expression contains, of course, the terms “square” and “rectangular.” The first, if they were alone, would give the former law; as for the second, they express the existence of phenomena of interference that are at the origin of the thousand and one well verified paradoxes of the “new mechanics “-the one thousand and first being the one under consideration here. (shrink)

El autor parte de la consideración de que el hilo conductor del cuerpo dispensa unidad a toda la combinación de fuerzas vivientes del individuo y de su entorno. Además, el sentimiento de estilo es una sensibilidad de carácter fisiológico que, a su vez, tiene que ver con el deseo de un cierto vagabundaje. La aspiración del arte es que suceda lo que en todo verdadero paseo: que nos devuelva al aprendizaje de la infancia, cuando las cosas se muestran por (...) primera vez, sin las presiones o perversiones que acarrean la rutina y la costumbre. Se trata de huir para producir lo real, para intensificar la experiencia de vida y la realidad. (shrink)

El presente de la Filosofía del Derecho es un libro concebido para mostrar la vitalidad actual de la Filosofía Jurídica. Está escrito en la madurez de su autora, y por lo mismo huye de cualquier extremismo más propio de la juventud. Como ella misma dice, no busca una sola respuesta correcta para las preguntas que en él se formulan, ni para las posiciones que en este libro se defienden. Muy al contrario, simplemente ofrece un punto de vista personal, (...) sobre los principales problemas que tiene planteados en la actualidad la Filosofía del Derecho. A través de sus páginas, se ofrece un relato, sobre el ser de la Filosofía del Derecho, la esencia del Derecho, y el pensamiento filosófico jurídico de los siglos XIX, XX y XXI visto con los ojos de algunos de sus principales protagonistas. También muestra un panorama de las relaciones entre el Derecho y la lógica, especialmente referidas a la interpretación, a la argumentación, y a la metodología jurídicas. Tampoco olvida la importancia del estudio de la relación del Derecho con los valores, especialmente con la justicia, que es el primero y más importante de todos ellos. Por último, reflexiona sobre la deontología profesional, estudiando de forma más concreta, las particularidades deontológicas de los principales operadores jurídicos. Los temas elegidos forman parte de algunos de los más debatidos dentro de la Filosofía del Derecho actual. Reflexionar sobre estos problemas es una labor propia de todo jurista, en realidad lo es, de todo ser humano preocupado por entender y mejorar si es posible, el mundo que le rodea. Este libro modestamente pretende ayudar en ese intento. Milagros Otero Parga, nació en Santiago de Compostela en 1960. Es doctora en Derecho (1987) por la misma Universidad. En la actualidad y desde 2011, es Catedrática de Filosofía del Derecho. Ha publicado 16 libros y 138 artículos en revistas nacionales e internacionales. Los temas a los que presta mayor atención son Axiología Jurídica, Derechos Humanos, Historia del pensamiento Jurídico, Argumentación Jurídica y Mediación. Es profesora invitada en algunas de las más prestigiosas universidades de Bue­nos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Sao Paulo y Montevideo. Asidua visitante de México ha sido conferenciante en las universidades Iberoamericana, Panamericana, Ana­huac, Intercontinental, Autónoma del Estado de México, Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey, Universidad Judicial de Durango y Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla. Es asesora académica de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Estado de México y de la Escuela Judicial del mismo Estado. Este último orga­nismo la nombró también Magister Honoris Causa. Es académica numeraria de la Real Academia Gallega de Jurisprudencia y Legislación. Fue decana de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Santiago de Com­postela y secretaria de la Comisión de Doctorado y Tercer Ciclo de la Universidad. Tiene en su poder la Medalla de Plata de Galicia, la Insignia de Oro de la Facultad de Derecho, y la Insignia de Oro de la Universidad de Santiago. Ha sido Valedora do Pobo de Galicia (2015-2019). (shrink)

En la atención médica y en la investigación en salud resulta indispensable favorecer la toma de decisiones de los pacientes y/o participantes bajo el principio de autonomía. En particular, esta capacidad, consignada en la Convención de los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad, se concreta mediante la detección de necesidades de asistencia, ajustes y apoyos que dan paso a una plena y efectiva capacidad de ejercicio. Las reflexiones bioéticas hechas desde la perspectiva principialista, personalista y de los Derechos Humanos ofrecen (...) elementos para potenciar la autonomía de las personas con discapacidad, promoviendo la figura de asistencia personal y enfatizando el interés superior, la gradualidad y la revisión judicial permanente como principios de figuras sustitutivas. (shrink)

El concubinato es una relación con consecuencias legales discutidas y reguladas por todas las escuelas jurídicas islámicas. Las relaciones entre un hombre y su concubina están limitadas por distintas normas de carácter jurídico-religioso, que tienen que ver con diferentes factores: tabúes sexuales y familiares, el estatus de esclava de la concubina, las obligaciones del hombre respecto a los individuos que hay bajo su guarda, etc. El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar cuáles son los límites del concubinato según los (...) establece la doctrina legal malikí, prestando especial atención a los casos en que las relaciones de matrimonio o concubinato se asemejan o difuminan. El estudio se lleva a cabo a través del tratado de derecho comparado de Ibn Ru¿d (Averroes), Bidayat al-muytahid. (shrink)

The thesis attempts to provide a real definition of religion and argues that this is less problematic than is often assumed. It begins with a brief introduction which outlines why it is attractive to subject the attempt to define religion to a philosophical investigation. It is argued that defining religion is interesting because it is something which appears difficult to do, which scholars of religion often oppose, and which has practical implications. In addition, defining religion provides an opportunity to (...) address fundamental philosophical issues (such as defining, social kinds, and theories of concepts) and theoretical questions concerning the study of religion. The introduction also mentions the difficulties these kinds of interdisciplinary enterprises are bound to meet because of differences in terminology and academic traditions. Part I is concerned with the philosophical, historical, and methodological issues in discussions necessary to pave the way for the attempt to provide a definition of religion. The first chapter addresses some fundamental philosophical issues concerning defining as a philosophical activity. It is argued that the traditional focus on natural kind concepts in discussions about defining needs to be supplemented with considerations about domain specificity and differences between social kinds. It is also argued that empirical findings from cognitive psychology are relevant to conceptual analysis and that two-dimensional semantics provides a productive approach to an analysis of the concept of religion. The chapter concludes with describing an approach to defining religion. The second chapter is also concerned with methodological questions and considers the potential contributions empirical studies of the concept of religion could make to the study. Some outlines of potentially useful studies are suggested, and pros and cons for including them in the present study are weighed up. The chapter concludes with drawing a distinction between essential and non-essential elements and assessing their relative importance in a definition. The third chapter offers, first, an overview of historical issues: the history of the term ‘religion’, the problem of determining the content of historical philosophical concepts of religion, and the history of the discussion about defining religion within the study of religion. The major conclusions of these sections are that the term ‘religion’ is likely to be a homonym and that several theoretical discussions have been intertwined in the historical debates about definitions of religion. The second part of the chapter discusses traditional fundamental issues in the study of religion in order to disentangle the discussion about definition from related discussions (about e.g. methods and religious (anti-)realism). It is concluded that an essentialist view on defining religion is not necessarily a return to apologetic approaches to religion. The fourth chapter offers an overview of positions for and against realism concerning religion and the possibility of providing a definition of religion. Important distinctions are drawn between two kinds of conceptual essentialism (related to definition) and two kinds of ontological essentialism (related to theories). A discussion of the various forms of essentialism concludes that a ‘soft essentialist’ approach to defining religion is preferable. It is also concluded that constructivist and other anti-realist objections to providing a real definition of religion are less obvious than is often assumed because they fail to offer a detailed account of the supposed ‘construction’ that is free of realist assumptions. They also appear to rely on controversial philosophical assumptions. The second part of the thesis is concerned with providing a definition of religion. It begins in chapter five with an overview of some multifactorial, or ‘soft essentialist’, approaches to defining religion. The purpose of this is to prepare the ground for the conceptual analysis, which opens with a discussion of various aspects of religion. Ten possible candidates for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for religion are discussed in order to determine their importance in a definition of religion. It is concluded that although many aspects are typical and/or relevant, only certain cognitive, normative, and practical aspects are necessary conditions for religion. It is also concluded that the necessary conditions for a religious cognitive aspect is supernatural and normative content of a certain scope combined with a certain attitudinal character. The chapter ends with a model of the working definition based on these intermediate conclusions. Chapter six contains the second step in the conceptual analysis. It confronts the working definition with various cases of more or less contested examples of religion or other systems of beliefs and practices in order to assess whether the definition needs revisions. The following discussions of special cases of beginning and ceasing of religious traditions, persons, and objects serve the same purpose. It is concluded that a revision of the working definition is unnecessary. Chapter seven concludes part II by tying up a few loose ends concerning the definition, some methodological aspects, and theories of concepts. The third and last part of the thesis contains, first, a brief discussion of practical implications of definitions of religion. Chapter eight illustrates the practical importance of a definition of religion by addressing the issue of the so-called ‘politics of defining religion’. It argues that scholars of religion as such are not unjustified in entering the debate about definitions, and it recommends efforts are made to separate discussions about defining religion from discussions about using definitions of religion as political tools. The final chapter of the thesis sums up important findings and insights of the study and points to some natural limitations. I warn that this study is only a rough outline of how a definition can be provided and which theoretical discussions lie behind such an attempt. Yet I also conclude that defining religion is a rewarding case study because it offers an opportunity to discuss fundamental questions in both philosophy and the study of religion while at the same addressing an interesting issue with immediate practical implications. (shrink)

The paper presents a framework to realise “meaningful human control” over Automated Driving Systems. The framework is based on an original synthesis of the results of the multidisciplinary research project “Meaningful Human Control over Automated Driving Systems” lead by a team of engineers, philosophers, and psychologists at Delft University of the Technology from 2017 to 2021. Meaningful human control aims at protecting safety and reducing responsibility gaps. The framework is based on the core assumption that human persons and institutions, not (...) hardware and software and their algorithms, should remain ultimately—though not necessarily directly—in control of, and thus morally responsible for, the potentially dangerous operation of driving in mixed traffic. We propose an Automated Driving System to be under meaningful human control if it behaves according to the relevant reasons of the relevant human actors (tracking), and that any potentially dangerous event can be related to a human actor (tracing). We operationalise the requirements for meaningful human control through multidisciplinary work in philosophy, behavioural psychology and traffic engineering. The tracking condition is operationalised via a proximal scale of reasons and the tracing condition via an evaluation cascade table. We review the implications and requirements for the behaviour and skills of human actors, in particular related to supervisory control and driver education. We show how the evaluation cascade table can be applied in concrete engineering use cases in combination with the definition of core components to expose deficiencies in traceability, thereby avoiding so-called responsibility gaps. Future research directions are proposed to expand the philosophical framework and use cases, supervisory control and driver education, real-world pilots and institutional embedding. (shrink)

Trust between transaction partners in cyberspace has come to be considered a distinct possibility. In this article the focus is on the conditions for its creation by way of assuming, not inferring trust. After a survey of its development over the years (in the writings of authors like Luhmann, Baier, Gambetta, and Pettit), this mechanism of trust is explored in a study of personal journal blogs. After a brief presentation of some technicalities of blogging and authors’ motives for writing (...) their diaries, I try to answer the question, ‘Why do the overwhelming majority of web diarists dare to expose the intimate details of their lives to the world at large?’ It is argued that the mechanism of assuming trust is at play: authors simply assume that future visitors to their blog will be sympathetic readers, worthy of their intimacies. This assumption then may create a self-fulfilling cycle of mutual admiration. Thereupon, this phenomenon of blogging about one’s intimacies is linked to Calvert’s theory of ‘mediated voyeurism’ and Mathiesen’s notion of ‘synopticism’. It is to be interpreted as a form of ‘empowering exhibitionism’ that reaffirms subjectivity. Various types of ‘synopticon’ are distinguished, each drawing the line between public and private differently. In the most ‘radical’ synopticon blogging proceeds in total transparency and the concept of privacy is declared obsolete; the societal gaze of surveillance is proudly returned and nullified. Finally it is shown that, in practice, these conceptions of blogging are put to a severe test, while authors often have to cope with known people from ‘real life’ complaining, and with ‘trolling’ strangers. (shrink)

Philippe Van Parijs’s ethical justification of basic income is based on the argument that job resources must be shared equally. Underlying this idea are two important claims: (1) all individuals in society hold an ex. ante entitlement in job resources and (2) job resources are tradable: First, I present the real-libertarian argument for sharing job resources. Next, I identify and critically review three different objections against this view: the liability objection, the cooperation objection and the parasitism objection. I believe (...) the parasitism objection poses a serious challenge to basic income, and argue that Van Parijs’s most plausible response-based on the idea that job resources are socially owned-is flawed. I provide the outline of an alternative normative basis for grounding a person's ex ante entitlement to job resources using an institutionalist approach. (shrink)