Linguistic and non-linguistic pattern learning have been studied separately, but we argue for a comparative approach. Analogous inductive problems arise in phonological and visual pattern learning. Evidence from three experiments shows that human learners can solve them in analogous ways, and that human performance in both cases can be captured by the same models. We test GMECCS, an implementation of the Configural Cue Model in a Maximum Entropy phonotactic-learning framework with a single free parameter, against the alternative (...) hypothesis that learners seek featurally simple algebraic rules. We study the full typology of patterns introduced by Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (), instantiated as both phonotactic patterns and visual analogs, using unsupervised training. Unlike SHJ, Experiments 1 and 2 found that both phonotactic and visual patterns that depended on fewer features could be more difficult than those that depended on more features, as predicted by GMECCS but not by rule-seeking. GMECCS also correctly predicted performance differences between stimulus subclasses within each pattern. A third experiment tried supervised training to elicit simple rule-seeking phonotactic learning, but cue-based behavior persisted. We conclude that similar cue-based cognitive processes are available for phonological and visual concept learning, and hence that studying either kind of learning can lead to significant insights about the other. (shrink)

Susan Carey's account of Quinean bootstrapping has been heavily criticized. While it purports to explain how important new concepts are learned, many commentators complain that it is unclear just what bootstrapping is supposed to be or how it is supposed to work. Others allege that bootstrapping falls prey to the circularity challenge: it cannot explain how new concepts are learned without presupposing that learners already have those very concepts. Drawing on discussions of concept learning from the (...) philosophical literature, this article develops a detailed interpretation of bootstrapping that can answer the circularity challenge. The key to this interpretation is the recognition of computational constraints, both internal and external to the mind, which can endow empty symbols with new conceptual roles and thus new contents. (shrink)

In contrast to symbolic or associationist representations, I advocate a third form of representing information that employs geometrical structures. I argue that this form is appropriate for modelling concept learning. By using the geometrical structures of what I call conceptual spaces, I define properties and concepts. A learning model that shows how properties and concepts can be learned in a simple but naturalistic way is then presented. I also discuss the advantages of the geometric approach over (...) the symbolic and associationist traditions. (shrink)

Where does a probabilistic language-of-thought (PLoT) come from? How can we learn new concepts based on probabilistic inferences operating on a PLoT? Here, I explore these questions, sketching a traditional circularity objection to LoT and canvassing various approaches to addressing it. I conclude that PLoT-based cognitive architectures can support genuine concept learning; but, currently, it is unclear that they enjoy more explanatory breadth in relation to concept learning than alternative architectures that do not posit any LoT.

In contrast to symbolic or associationist representations, I advocate a third form of representing information that employs geometrical structures. I argue that this form is appropriate for modelling concept learning. By using the geometrical structures of what I call conceptual spaces, I define properties and concepts. A learning model that shows how properties and concepts can be learned in a simple but naturalistic way is then presented. I also discuss the advantages of the geometric approach over (...) the symbolic and associationist traditions. (shrink)

Humans learn new concepts extremely fast. One or two examples of a new concept are often sufficient for us to grasp its meaning. Traditional theories of concept formation, such as symbolic or connectionist representations, have problems explaining the quick learning exhibited by humans. In contrast to these representations, I advocate a third form of representing categories, which employs geometric structures. I argue that this form is appropriate for modeling concept learning. By using the geometric structures of what (...) I call “conceptual spaces,” I define properties and concepts. A learning model that shows how properties and concepts can be learned in a simple but naturalistic way is then presented. This model accounts well for the role of similarity judgments in concept learning. Finally, as an application, the concept representations are used to give an analysis of nonmonotonic reasoning. (shrink)

A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin (...) to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged 2 to 3 years may categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is in the past or future is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around 4 to 5 years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system. (shrink)

Carey focuses her attention on a mechanism of concept learning called I argue that this form of bootstrapping is not dependent upon language or other public representations, and outline a place for language in concept learning generally. Language, perception, and causal reasoning are all sources of evidence that can guide learners toward discovering new and potentially useful categories.

While Tenenbaum and Griffiths impressively consolidate and extend Shepard's research in the areas of stimulus representation and generalization, there is a need for complexity measures to be developed to control the flexibility of their “hypothesis space” approach to representation. It may also be possible to extend their concept learning model to consider the fundamental issue of representational adaptation. [Tenenbaum & Griffiths].

The central focus of this article is the epistemological assumption that knowledge could be generated based on human beings’ experiences and over their conceptions of the world. Logical characterisation of human inductive learning over their produced conceptions within terminological systems and providing a logical background for theorising over the Human Concept Learning Problem (HCLP) in terminological systems are the main contributions of this research. In order to make a linkage between ‘Logic’ and ‘Cognition’, Description Logics (DLs) will be (...) employed to provide a logical description and analysis of actual human inductive reasoning (and learning). This research connects with the topics ‘logic & learning’, ‘cognitive modelling’, and ‘terminological knowledge representation’. (shrink)

This paper studies the learnability of natural concepts in the context of the conceptual spaces framework. Previous work proposed that natural concepts are represented by the cells of optimally partitioned similarity spaces, where optimality was defined in terms of a number of constraints. Among these is the constraint that optimally partitioned similarity spaces result in easily learnable concepts. While there is evidence that systems of concepts generally regarded as natural satisfy a number of the proposed optimality (...) constraints, the connection between naturalness and learnability has been less well studied. To fill this gap, we conduct a computational study employing two standard models of concept learning. Applying these models to the learning of color concepts, we examine whether natural color concepts are more readily learned than nonnatural ones. Our findings warrant a positive answer to this question for both models employed, thus lending empirical support to the notion that learnability is a distinctive characteristic of natural concepts. (shrink)

This research provides a contextual description concerning an existential and structural analysis of ‘Relations’ between human beings and machines. Subsequently, it will focus on the conceptual and epistemological analysis of (i) my own semantics-based framework [for human meaning construction] and of (ii) a well-structured machine concept learning framework. Accordingly, I will, semantically and epistemologically, focus on linking those two frameworks for logical analysis of concept learning in the context of human-machine interrelationships. It will be demonstrated that the proposed (...) framework provides a supportive structure over the described contextualisation of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines within concept learning processes. (shrink)