“April is the cruelest month, breeding Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing memory and desire… ” So, begins T.S. Eliot’s iconic poem, “The Wasteland,” challenging the memory of Chaucer’s April from Canterbury Tales, as being a delightful month to go on pilgrimage. Platonic teachings emphasize that you don’t create, you just remember. Might the inverse might also be true, “You don’t remember, you just create.” As the oneirocritic, Robert Bosnak, contends, you do not actually remember your dreams. You remember (...) your memory you recreate the dream in this time. Since the challenges of post-modernism, this is no longer a far-fetched idea. The eminent historian of immigration, Deborah Dash Moore, defines history in this regard, as “a search for a plausible narrative.” “History” is not a record of what happened, but rather, is a record of what we believe happened, or what we want to believe happened. This brings to the fore Foucault’s documenting the relationship of knowledge to power, as well as Freud’s assertion that material which is unacceptable to the ego, is disguised, in order to make them palatable. This places the notion of memory in a different light. There are incidents that occurred fifty years ago that seem as if they occurred five minutes ago. The depth psychologist and champion of the imagination, James Hillman, referred to this process as “soul-making.” Back to T.S. Eliot: when he studied Sanskrit at Harvard, he was certainly aware that the Sanskrit word for memory, smara (from which smrti “that which is remembered,” is derived) is also an epithet for Kama Deva, the Indian Cupid. Hence, the mixing of memory and desire. Perhaps, in this light, the study of history, which is a form of collective memory, is also a form of mass therapy, an effort to process the collective past. Hegel and Marx both believed classical India to be an inferior civilization because it had “no history,” but collections of mythologies. Maybe classical India, however, held an awareness that all memory is myth, a word which in its early Greek form literally translates as “plot.” Jesus declares (in the Gospel story) “Let the dead bury the dead.” As the Jesus narrative exemplifies, however, burying the dead is no easy task. Perhaps our ongoing, ever-morphing narratives, allow us an oblique opportunity to connect with and process our pain. And in this theatre of memory, the goal may not be to accumulate or catalogue what has been spoken (itihasa), but look a good miller, to process the grain into its essence: from what has passed, and is passing, and is to come, into what always is. Perhaps, the pilgrimage of the mind, on its endless perigination of story, is meant to ultimately take us to love, but that may be unspeakable. Keywords: memory, desire, narrative, history, myth, power. (shrink)

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s unique interpretation of smṛti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdarśan (1911), I argue that his interpretation of smṛti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of smṛti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on smṛti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipaṭṭhānasutta and Buddaghośa’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, (...) he also builds into his complex account of the practice of smṛti certain fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“īśvara”) and mental identification with the Puruṣa, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of smṛti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of smṛti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu straightforwardly identify smṛti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the aṣṭāṇgayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that smṛti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the aṣṭāṇgayoga. (shrink)

Ova studija predlaže nekoliko oslonaca za cjelovitu analizu razvoja problema smrti u Heideggerovoj misli nakon Sein und Zeit. Vodeće pitanje u našem istraživanju je kako fenomenologija smrti ostaje u središtu Heideggerovog interesa nakon analitike Daseina. Rasprava se usredotočuje na razdoblje od 1931. do 1935., prema kronološkom slijedu, s ciljem da istakne nekoliko različitih etapa u misli o smrti nakon Sein und Zeit. Počinjemo analizom reakcija samog Heideggera na recepciju problema smrti u prvo vrijeme nakon što je izdan Sein und Zeit. (...) Zatim analiziramo pojavu teme smrti u tri predavanja: zimskog semestra 1931.–1932. , u predavanju iz 1934./1935. o Hölderlinu , te u predavanju u ljeti 1935. – Uvod u metafiziku. (shrink)

V roce 2007 byla siru Terrymu Pratchettovi, proslulému autorovi fantastických románů, diagnostikovaná vzácná forma Alzheimerovy choroby. Terry Pratchett se rozhodl nečekat, až jej nemoc umoří se všemi neblahými průvodními jevy, a stal se jedním z nejvlivnějších proponentů eutanázie. V článku nabízím rekonstrukci Pratchettovy argumentace, kterou předložil roku 2010 v rámci přednáškového cyklu The Richard Dimbleby Lecture. Terry Pratchett se explicitně vyrovnává se třemi známými argumenty vůči asistované smrti – Care or Killing argumentem, argumentem z vynucené eutanázie a Božím argumentem. Po (...) odmítnutí každého z nich dospívá k závěru, že neexistuje rozumný důvod, proč by nemohl zemřít za okolností, které si zvolí, a přisvojuje si na asistovanou smrt právo. Toto chápání smrti jako něčeho, na co má člověk právo, mě inspiruje ke dvěma úvahám: Za prvé, pokud uznáme právo na asistovanou smrt, proč neexistuje stejně rozsáhlá diskuze hájit práva sebevrahů? Terry Pratchett důsledně odmítá mluvit o sebevraždě, ovšem jeho východiska pro přijetí asistované smrti jsou aplikovatelná i na případ vlastní terminace bez lékařské pomoci z jiných než zdravotních důvodů. Za druhé, jak by měla vypadat právní úprava praxe asistované smrti a z jakých odborníků by měl být složený orgán, posuzující jednotlivé případy? Závěry Terryho Pratchetta implikují, že v takovém orgánu by bylo místo pro uplatnění morálních filosofů. (shrink)

[A Defence of Assisted Death: Philosophical Arguments for Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide] Kniha Tomáše Hříbka je první monografií v českém jazyce, jež nabízí filozofickou obhajobu eutanazie a sebeusmrcení za asistence lékaře. Autor vysvětluje zdroje současné diskuse, definuje základní pojmy a analyzuje argumenty pro asistované sebeusmrcení a eutanazii i proti nim. Odpovídá mimo jiné na tyto zásadní otázky: Co je smrt, a jak poznáme, že nastala? Je smrt vždy újmou, nebo může i prospět? Může být rozhodnutí zabít se rozumné i morální? (...) Je apel k morální autonomii pacienta přesvědčivý? Má utrpení na konci života smysl? Pokud jsou eticky přijatelné nezahájení nebo ukončení léčby či paliativní péče, tak proč ne i eutanazie a asistovaná smrt? Lze ospravedlnit eutanazii pacientů, kteří s ní nemohou vyslovit souhlas? Je možné eutanazii a asistované sebeusmrcení odmítnout s odkazem na etiku medicíny nebo svědomí lékařů? Neocitneme se legalizací eutanazie na kluzkém svahu, po němž sklouzneme k nemorální praxi? A jsou podobné metody asistované smrti morálně přijatelné jen za předpokladu, že zůstanou výjimečné? (shrink)

V roce 2007 byla siru Terrymu Pratchettovi, proslulému autorovi fantastických románů, diagnostikovaná vzácná forma Alzheimerovy choroby. Terry Pratchett se rozhodl nečekat, až jej nemoc umoří se všemi neblahými průvodními jevy, a stal se jedním z nejvlivnějších proponentů eutanázie. V článku nabízím rekonstrukci Pratchettovy argumentace, kterou předložil roku 2010 v rámci přednáškového cyklu The Richard Dimbleby Lecture. Terry Pratchett se explicitně vyrovnává se třemi známými argumenty vůči asistované smrti – Care or Killing argumentem, argumentem z vynucené eutanázie a Božím argumentem. Po (...) odmítnutí každého z nich dospívá k závěru, že neexistuje rozumný důvod, proč by nemohl zemřít za okolností, které si zvolí, a přisvojuje si na asistovanou smrt právo. Toto chápání smrti jako něčeho, na co má člověk právo, mě inspiruje ke dvěma úvahám: Za prvé, pokud uznáme právo na asistovanou smrt, proč neexistuje stejně rozsáhlá diskuze hájit práva sebevrahů? Terry Pratchett důsledně odmítá mluvit o sebevraždě, ovšem jeho východiska pro přijetí asistované smrti jsou aplikovatelná i na případ vlastní terminace bez lékařské pomoci z jiných než zdravotních důvodů. Za druhé, jak by měla vypadat právní úprava praxe asistované smrti a z jakých odborníků by měl být složený orgán, posuzující jednotlivé případy? Závěry Terryho Pratchetta implikují, že v takovém orgánu by bylo místo pro uplatnění morálních filosofů. (shrink)

In this paper, I build on recent scholarship concerning the early semantic history of the word “smṛti,” which has been shown to denote “tradition” in the early dharmasūtra material. I seek to add nuance to this work by examining the meaning of smṛti in the early Sāmavedic technical literature. This corpus helps elucidate one of the processes whereby smṛti came to refer to something textual. This paper argues that smṛti’s earliest textualized referent may have been fixed (...) or semi-fixed individual statements rather than definite texts. (shrink)

[The discussion of Descartes’ death continues].

Zelo je utrujen – kaj naj zdaj počne s slavo? – dovolj je bilo. Dobro je spoznal sovražnike in prijatelje – domnevne prijatelje, kajti za občudovanjem in ljubeznijo so se skrivale njihove lastne koristi, njihove lastne sumljive sanje, pretkane in hkrati nedolžne.

Studie mapuje Patočkovu filosofickou koncepci rozpracovanou v dosud nevydaných válečných rukopisech. Člověk dle Patočky rozvrhuje svůj smysluplný svět díky základnímu úkolu, kterému může ve svém životě dostát, nebo jej zmařit. Jeho naplnění ovšem nesplývá s převzetím vlastní individuality a konečnosti, nýbrž Patočka jej vymezuje jako vztah k nekonečnému životu, který každou individuální existenci zakládá. K tomuto nekonečnu se ale nelze vrátit jednoduchým vytržením z vědomého života, nýbrž teprve duchovní proměnou, která ukazuje nepředmětný charakter světa a přitom zachovává lidské vědomí.

[The discussion of Descartes’ death continues].

Mednarodni simpozij ob 1600‐letnici Hieronimove smrti z naslovom Hieronymus noster se bo odvil v Ljubljani, 24.–26. oktobra 2019, v dvorani SAZU. Organizirajo ga Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti; univerze v Ljubljani, Zagrebu, Gradcu in Varšavi; Srednjeevropska univerza na Dunaju (CEU); mednarodna mreža Europa Renascens; projekt DANUBIUS (Université de Lille); in Institut des Sources chrétiennes.

We dwell in a world of physical things. When it comes to the environments that we live in, we usually become oriented to the place, and eventually feel at home in it. Facing death during war and pandemic are times of extreme disorientation, and we sometimes exhibit an impulse to flee. It is no wonder that in those desperate times, some with means and ability consider fleeing to a safer place. But are we morally obliged to act in ways that (...) would ask us to sacrifice our deepest personal commitments and projects for others to meet their commitments and projects? It is argued here that fleeing Bosnia and Herzegovina during wartime, like what happened in the 90s, and fleeing a city during a pandemic may be morally decent actions. However, it is also an issue of political decency and fractured friendships. In cases or war and pandemic, returning home to contribute to the well-being of those they left behind may be morally and politically decent, but the fractured friendships may contribute to normative ambiguity. Why would anyone trust them again and regard them as a loyal friend? Perhaps reestablishing those trusting friendships may require those who remained behind to do what is supererogatory, i.e., doing more than can reasonably be asked of them, which in this case amounts to forgiving those who fled and giving them a second chance by welcoming them back home. (shrink)

In the transdisciplinary field of ‘mindfulness,’ originally a Buddhist concept (Pāli sati; Sanskrit smṛti; Chinese nian 念; Tibetan dran pa), the two tendencies represented by Buddhist traditional a...

Ovidij je nedvomno med vsemi avgustejskimi pesniki eden najbolj izrazitih oporečnikov v odnosu do avtokratskega režima cesarja Oktavijana Avgusta. Medtem ko je na primer Vergilij na Avgustov ukaz spremenil zaključni del druge knjige Georgik, tako da je izbrisal iz nje laudes Galli, ki ga je zadela damnatio memoriae, pa se Ovidij niti v svoji mladostni zbirki Amores niti v žalostinkah iz izgnanstva (Tristia) ni bal proslavljati tragično preminulega pesnika, ki velja za začetnika rimske elegije. Zato se ne smemo čuditi, da (...) je tudi Ovidija zadela nekaka damnatio memoriae, saj so morale biti vse njegove pesniške zbirke, ne le spotakljiva Ars amatoria, odstranjene iz rimskih javnih knjižnic (Tristia, 3.1.63–80). Tudi v največjo umetnino, Metamorfoze, je Ovidij zasejal nekaj domiselnih in iskrivih protiavgustovskih bodic. Tako je na primer že v eni prvih epizod, v zgodbi o preobrazbi Likaona, še izraziteje pa v zadnji epizodi, kjer katasterizmu, tj. preobrazbi Julija Cezarja v zvezdo in podobni preobrazbi, ki po smrti čaka Avgusta, dodal za sklep še zaostreno poanto, da bo njegovo ime po smrti povzdignjeno še višje, visoko nad (super!) zvezde (torej še višje kot Cezarjeva in Avgustova zvezda): super alta perennis / astra ferar (Metamorfoze, 15.875–6). (shrink)

Flavij Klavdij Julijan, pogosto imenovan »Julijan Odpadnik«, je vladal rimskemu cesarstvu od začetka leta 360 do svoje smrti v bitki 26. junija leta 363. Kljub kratki vladavini je Julijan izpeljal vrsto pomembnih reform, usmerjenih v različne vidike javnega življenja, vključno z upravljanjem provinc. Članek se osredotoča na njegove upravne dejavnosti v Iliriku, kjer je leta 361 po Kr. bival med kampanjo proti Konstanciju II. Med­tem ko se je Julijan med kampanjo soočal z neposrednimi taktičnimi težavami, je v Iliriku opravljal cesarske (...) upravne naloge, kot poročata zgodovinar Amijan Marcelin in panegirist Klavdij Mamertin. Raziskava se osredotoči na Amijanovo poročilo in analizira Julijanove upravne dejavnosti v Iliriku ter v celotnem rimskem cesarstvu. (shrink)

Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill” — thus sarcastically remarks the Dvaitin commentator Jayatīrtha on Śaṅkarācārya’s sleight of hand to turn written saṃbhūti into asaṃbhūti at one of the many difficult turns the Īśa Upaniṣad has in store for his strictly monistic stance. But Jayatīrtha’s own master Madhva is renowned in his own right for his “unprecedented skill” in conjuring up whole unattested smṛti passages to corroborate his interpretations. Indeed, more specimens of (...) “unprecedented skill” are displayed in turn by each of the great bhāṣyakāras of the three conflicting schools — Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita — on this Upaniṣad, which on account of its extreme pithiness is singularly suited to demonstrate the length dārśanikas are willing to go to make an authoritative text square each with his own preconceived philosophical outlook. A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context. (shrink)

By analyzing discursive equalization of the categories of life and death in different spoken and written genres in the 1990s, the author uncovers a number of ideas and strategies around which the discourses guided by this phenomenon are structured. The first part of the paper is aimed at understanding the relation of these categories in Serbian folk culture and possible influences of the latter on recent articulations of the examined phenomenon. In the second part of the paper the central ideas (...) of the phenomenon are identified. These refer to the survival of the nation, "not betraying the ancestors", and ethnic territorialization. From the analysis of different spoken and written genres the conclusion may be derived that the "cancellation of boundaries" between the extremely opposed categories of life and death is made possible by the following discursive strategies: 1. "non-existification", 2. collective individualization, 3. vitalization, 4. mortification, and 5. various combination of the foregoing strategies.. Analizom diskursivnog izjednacavanja kategorija zivota i smrti u razlicitim govornim i pisanim zanrovima devedesetih godina XX veka, autorka iznalazi krug ideja i strategija oko kojih se struktuiraju diskursi usmereni ovim fenomenom. Prvi deo teksta posvecen je razumevanju odnosa ovih kategorija u srpskoj narodnoj kulturi i eventualnim uticajima ove kulture na novije aktualizovanje fenomena koji tematizuje. U drugom delu teksta identifikovane su nosece ideje ovog fenomena, koje se ticu opstanka nacije, "neizneveravanja predaka" i etnicke teritorijalizacije. Iz analize razlicitih govornih i pisanih zanrova proizlazi daje "ukidanje granica" izmedju ekstremno suprotstavljenih kategorija zivota i smrti omoguceno diskursivnim strategijama: 1. "onepostojanja", 2. kolektivne individualizacije, 3. vitalizacije, 4. mortifikacije i 5. razlicitim kombinacijama ovih strategija.. (shrink)

This paper argues that Śrī Swāminārāyaṇ espoused a position on the pramāṇa-s (means of knowing), and his theory was that among these it is śabdapramāṇa that is the important and authoritative pramāṇa. However, in delineating the precise sources and textual authority that fall within the ambit of śabdapramāṇa, he privileged mostly the Smṛti texts, along with Vedānta and Bhagavadgītā commentaries, to which was added later his own Gujarati text Vachanāmrut, as canonical texts of the particular Sampradāya. In so doing, (...) he would be seen to be departing somewhat from classical positions on authoritative scriptures, in particular of Śaṅkara and, to an extent, Rāmānuja, for whom Śruti (‘revealed’) and Smṛti (‘recollected’) scriptures respectively denote quite different genre of texts, and with graded degree (rather kind) of authority; the former could even be apauruṣeya, authorless scriptures. The paper analyses the precise reasons for Swāminārāyaṇ arriving at this qualified position and the arguments he garnishes towards this doctrinal hermeneutic, concluding with comments on his slight departure from the classically accepted understanding of śabdapramāṇa where scriptural sources are the preeminent concern with a somewhat different epistemological trajectory. (shrink)

Description: Based on primary sources this book presents a survey of development of Moral Philosophy in India and offers an authentic account of Indian ethics from the point of view of Vedas, Upanisads, Mimamsas, Smrtis, the Bhagavad-gita and the Paficaratras, Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-VaiSesika, Buddhism and Jainism. Indian ethics has taken a positive attitude towards life hi its concrete 'and varied aspects as is evident in die discussions of karma, rebirth, nirvana, and moksa. Life has to be lived for harmonious development (...) of our character for a spiritual end. Indian ethics has therefore a positive goal to achieve freedom of the self from its bondage of passions and desire this is the message of India and is the essence of all her moral thought The study will, no doubt, prove invaluable to the scholars and general readers as well. (shrink)

Autor se osvrće na knjigu Marine Gržinić i Šefika Tatlića Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism. Historicization of Biopolitics and Forensics of Politics, Art, and Life i pritom artikulira značenje koje nekropolitika, kao opsceni oblik politike svedene na proizvodnju i management smrti, te rasizacija, kao suvremeni oblik eurocentričnog, bijelog rasizma, imaju u povijesnom razvoju i modernizaciji globalnog kapitalizma kao imperijalne formacije. U tom smislu, naslov ovog eseja, »Neonecronomicon«, upućuje na tumačenje neoliberalizma kao modela primjene nekrokapitalizma, ali također evocira konstitutivnu vezu između (...) kapitalizma i kolonijalizma. (shrink)