That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...) to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success. (shrink)

Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.

Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...) account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.

Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and life plans that are guided by respect for (...) self and others. In contrast, the psychological concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches. (shrink)

C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...) particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having (...) already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse. (shrink)

This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments.

According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf (...) of DeRose appears to be equally available to his primary rival (viz., the sensitivity theorist). (shrink)

Duncan Pritchard has argued that his basis-relative anti-luck construal of a safety condition on knowing avoids the problem with necessary truths that safety conditions are often thought to have, viz., that beliefs the contents of which are necessarily true are trivially safe. He has further argued that adding an ability condition to truth, belief, and his anti-luck safety conditions yields an adequate account of knowledge. In this paper, we argue that not only does Pritchard’s anti-luck safety condition have a problem (...) with necessary truths, adding an ability condition is of no help. Indeed, the same sort of case that precipitates Pritchard’s introduction of an ability condition shows the inadequacy of his completed anti-luck account of knowledge. Moreover, reconstruing safety as an anti-risk condition as Pritchard has recently done does not fix the problem we’ve identified. We conclude by entertaining a radical suggestion to the effect that the failures of safety-based accounts of modal knowledge are due to failures of doxastic success rather than failures to satisfy an anti-luck (or anti-risk) condition. Accepting this radical suggestion makes available the view that there is, after all, no special problem between safety and necessary truths. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.

Le statut des corps dans la metaphysique de Leibniz continue de resister a tout effort de reconstitution. Qu'il n'y ait au monde que les substances simples et leurs modifications ne presente plus l'evidence d'une position philosophique achevee. Dans le meilleur des mondes possibles, les ames ne sont jamais sans corps et la moindre portion de matiere renferme un univers de creatures vivantes. Au moment meme ou Leibniz semble embrasser une position idealiste en peuplant le monde d'une infinite d'entites psychiques, ne (...) developpe-t-il pas le concept d'organisme comme en marge de cette metaphysique? Deja, dans les annees ou la celebre theorie de la notion complete servait a penser la substance individuelle, la realite du corps organique imposait l'idee d'une substantialite proprement corporelle. Composition infinie irreductible aux modalites de l'etendue, le corps organique, machine de la nature, force a repenser les conditions d'existence de l'individualite vivante, dont l'ego cartesien n'est plus qu'une problematique modele. La question n'est plus tant de savoir si Leibniz a admis l'existence de substances corporelles en sus des monades, que de comprendre en quoi la realite organique devient le modele pour penser la connexion de toutes les substances, des simples aux composees, des brutes aux raisonnables. Du moi a la monade, comment la necessaire inscription corporelle de l'individualite s'opere-t-elle? De quelles modifications du concept de substance cette exigence s'accompagne-t-elle? (shrink)

Researchers have iterated that the future of synthetic biology and biotechnology lies in novel consumer applications of crossing biology with engineering. However, if the new biology’s future is to be sustainable, early and serious efforts must be made towards social sustainability. Therefore, the crux of new applications of synthetic biology and biotechnology is public understanding and acceptance. The RASVaccine is a novel recombinant design not found in nature that re-engineers a common bacteria to produce a strong immune response in humans. (...) Synthesis of the RASVaccine has the potential to improve public health as an inexpensive, non-injectable product. But how can scientists move forward to create a dialogue of creating a ‘common sense’ of this new technology in order to promote social sustainability? This paper delves into public issues raised around these novel technologies and uses the RASVaccine as an example of meeting the public with a common sense of its possibilities and limitations. (shrink)

Researchers have iterated that the future of synthetic biology and biotechnology lies in novel consumer applications of crossing biology with engineering. However, if the new biology’s future is to be sustainable, early and serious efforts must be made towards social sustainability. Therefore, the crux of new applications of synthetic biology and biotechnology is public understanding and acceptance. The RASVaccine is a novel recombinant design not found in nature that re-engineers a common bacteria to produce a strong immune response in humans. (...) Synthesis of the RASVaccine has the potential to improve public health as an inexpensive, non-injectable product. But how can scientists move forward to create a dialogue of creating a ‘common sense’ of this new technology in order to promote social sustainability? This paper delves into public issues raised around these novel technologies and uses the RASVaccine as an example of meeting the public with a common sense of its possibilities and limitations. (shrink)

Within the sporting landscape much has changed from the proliferation and integration of new technologies, for example, the practice of mixed martial arts (MMA) has developed on the fringes of modern sport. It combines several martial arts, is practised in a cage, and allows ground strikes. MMA is presented here within a framework inspired by Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing of aggressive impulses through sport. We reviewed more than 20 years of literature, with 785 international references and a triple analysis (...) of the discipline, those being physical violence, symbolism, the play impulse. (shrink)

Drawing upon author's long-term psychoanalytical practice, research, and actual clinical data, this book examines the psychological ramifications of transnational immigration to Western countries and the continued influence of indigenous cultures on South Asian Diaspora. It explores new ways of understanding the psyche of migrants from the diverse cultures of South Asia and the universal norms applied in Western practice. To this end it embraces and critiques the categories that are more specific to this region, such as the magic-cosmic world of (...) private destiny, reincarnation, astrology, and palmistry. By using more informed ways of understanding this exodus of people, the book attempts to find a new paradigm fusing spirituality with psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has argued against the apriority of mathematical knowledge in a number of places. His arguments rely on a conception of mathematical knowledge as embedded in a historical tradition and the claim that this sort of embedding compromises apriority. In this paper, I argue that tradition dependence of mathematical knowledge does not compromise its apriority. I further identify the factors which appear to lead Kitcher to argue as he does.

In this chapter, I consider some problems with naturalizing mathematics. More specifically, I consider how the two leading kinds of approach to naturalizing mathematics, to wit, Quinean indispensability‐based approaches and Maddy's Second Philosophical approach, seem to run afoul of constraints that any satisfactory naturalistic mathematics must meet. I then suggest that the failure of these kinds of approach to meet the relevant constraints indicates a general problem with naturalistic mathematics meeting these constraints, and thus with the project of naturalizing mathematics (...) itself. (shrink)

The present research is about the study of Psalm 139 which goals are to provide the liberator face of God revealed in this poem and to investigate the parallelisms that the Psalm 139 in it theological reflection about God, remember the experience of the Exodus. These pages want to be both a grant to boost daily experience of faith as to motivate for a greater commitment to the issues of liberation, justice, evangelization and human promotion.