Topoi 41 (1):143-158 (2021)

Authors
Hamid Taieb
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions, which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions.
Keywords Franz Brentano  Intentionality  Second intentions
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Reprint years 2022
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-021-09757-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).
Über Gegenstände Höherer Ordnung Und Deren Verhältnisse Zur Inneren Wahrnehmung.Alexius Meinong - 1899 - Zeitschrift für Psychologie Und Physiologie Der Sinnesorgane 21:182--272.

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