Results for 'Intentionality'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Chapter seven Sartre, intentionality and praxis1 Roy Elveton.Intentionality Sartre - 2009 - In B. P. O'Donohoe & R. O. Elveton (eds.), Sartre's Second Century. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 18--86.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   996 citations  
  3. Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  4. Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - Argumenta.
    This dialogue explores the question of whether intentionality—the “ofness”, “aboutness”, or “directedness” of mental states—is a relation. We explore three views: the Naive View, on which intentionality is a relation to ordinary, everyday objects, facts, and other such items; the Abstract Contents View, on which intentionality is a relation to mind-independent abstract entities that are our contents; and the Aspect View, on which intentionality is a matter of having intentional states with particular (non-relational) aspects that are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  97
    Intentionality and the Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology.Carl B. Sachs - 2014 - Brookfield, Vermont: Routledge.
    Intentionality is one of the central problems of modern philosophy. How can a thought, action or belief be about something? Sachs draws on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, C. I. Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to build a new theory of intentionality that solves many of the problems faced by traditional conceptions. In doing so, he sheds new light on Sellars’s influential arguments concerning the ‘Myth of the Given’ and shows how we can build a productive discourse between American (...)
  6. Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  7. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1265 citations  
  8. Intentionality.Pierre Jacob - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  9. Intentionality as the mark of the mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  10. Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  11.  33
    Sensorimotor Intentionality.Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt & Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2013 - Developmental Review 33 (4):399-425.
    Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  12. Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal (...) theories over tracking theories. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  13.  62
    Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism: Noema and Object.John J. DRUMMOND - 1990 - Springer.
    The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  14. Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context.Erik Rietveld - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. !e role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins.
    There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  15. Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 229--258.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   139 citations  
  16. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York: Routledge. pp. 167-183.
    One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states’ intentional directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and cognition. In (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17.  20
    Intentionality and semiotics: a story of mutual fecundation.John Deely - 2007 - Scranton: University of Scranton Press.
    How can philosophy or science claim to discover objective truth when their arguments originate from subjective beings? In _Intentionality and Semiotics_, John Deely offers a controversial solution to the problem of subjectivity in inquiry. He creates an interface between semiotics and the concept of intentionality, as it appears in Aquinas’s work, to demonstrate that every sign is irrevocably linked to the reality of relations. In the process, Deely builds a bridge between classical thinkers such as Aristotle and modernists such (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  18. Intentionality and the non-psychological.C. B. Martin & Karl Pfeifer - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):531-54.
    IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  19. Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness.Ori Simchen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  20. The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem.David Leech Anderson - 2012 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  23. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation.Walter Ott - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. Intentionality and Experience.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):299-318.
    Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind, it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  25. The intentionality of memory.Jordi Fernández - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  26.  57
    Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.Ullin T. Place - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (2):91-120.
    summaryMartin and Pfeifer have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's inexistence of the intentional object, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  27. The intentionality of human action.George M. Wilson - 1980 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Introduction Twenty-five years ago it was pretty widely held among Anglo- American philosophers that it was sheer confusion to suppose that an ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  28. Intentionality, social play, and definition.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74.
    Social play is naturally characterized in intentional terms. An evolutionary account of social play could help scientists to understand the evolution of cognition and intentionality. Alexander Rosenberg (1990) has argued that if play is characterized intentionally or functionally, it is not a behavioral phenotype suitable for evolutionary explanation. If he is right, his arguments would threaten many projects in cognitive ethology. We argue that Rosenberg's arguments are unsound and that intentionally and functionally characterized phenotypes are a proper domain for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29.  12
    Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.
    One of Mark Textor’s main aims in Brentano’s Mind is to refute Brentano’s claim that intentionality – the capacity our mental acts have for being of, about, or directed on something – is the mark of the mental. I defend the view that Brentano analysed intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence (and so wasn’t an intentionality primitivist as Textor suggests). And I argue that we can regard intentionality as being the mark of the mental, but only (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. Intentionality.Jane Howarth - 1976
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Affective intentionality and the feeling body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  32. Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents.Raimo Tuomela - 2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   128 citations  
  33. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  34. Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
    Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  35. What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  36. Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism.Philip Woodward - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):606-627.
    This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or "phenomenal intentionality"). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37.  45
    Intentionality Lite or Analog Content?: A Response to Hutto and Satne.Gerard O’Brien & Jon Opie - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):723-729.
    In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  38.  85
    Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action.Steven Sverdlik - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.
    The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  39. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  40. Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  41. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science.Hubert L. Dreyfus (ed.) - 1984 - MIT Press.
    This new anthology will serve as an ideal introduction to phenomenology for analytic philosophers, both as a text and as the single most useful source book on Husserl for cognitive scientists.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  42. Intentionality and Mental Events.P. J. Sheehan - 1968
  43. Intentionality "de re".John McDowell - 1991 - In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 215--25.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  44. Structure, Intentionality and the Given.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 95-118.
    The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology—one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception—requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1965 - In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy, Second Series. Blackwell. pp. 158-80.
  46. Collective Intentionality.Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - In Lee McIntyre & Alex Rosenberg (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Social Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 214-227.
    In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, status functions, norms, institutions, and shared attitudes more generally. Collective action and shared intention play a foundational role in our understanding of the social. -/- The three central questions in the study of collective intentionality are: -/- (1) What is the ontology of collective intentionality? In particular, are groups per se intentional agents, as opposed to just their individual members? (2) What is the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
    This is an introduction to a special issue on the history of phenomenal intentionality.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. Perceptual intentionality, attention and consciousness.Naomi M. Eilan - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  49. Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
    This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  50. Real Intentionality V.2: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness.Galen Strawson - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):279-297.
    Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything has intentionality—all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it—perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is a realistic (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000