The Monist 100 (1):120-132 (2017)

Authors
Hamid Taieb
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position.
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DOI 10.1093/monist/onw022
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relationality of Intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.

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