In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 1--20 (2006)

Authors
Tim Crane
Central European University
Abstract
Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher and his position in the history of philosophy. Good corrections have been made in the recent analytic literature by David Bell (1990), Dermot Moran (1996), and Barry Smith (1994) among others. But there is also another, more purely philosophical lesson to be learned from the proper understanding of Brentano’s views on this matter. This is that Brentano’s struggles with the concept of intentionality reveal a fundamental division between different ways of thinking about intentionality, an division which Brentano himself does not make fully clear. Making the nature of this division explicit is the aim of this paper
Keywords Intentionality  Existence
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Mental Representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness.Amie L. Thomasson - 2000 - European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210.

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Citations of this work BETA

Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15.
Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory.Andrea Marchesi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):343-367.

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