Brentano and Scholasticism

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59 (1):190-210 (2022)
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Abstract

The article deals with the problem of scholastic sources of Brentano’s concept of intentionality. The subject matter of the discussion is the so-called thesis on intentionality as formulated by Brentano in his 1874 book “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”. The search for Brentano's specific scholastic sources has been going on for decades, but even today the problem is still relevant. The objectives of the article are, firstly, to identify the main positions on the issue and to reveal the reasons for their failure, and, secondly, to suggest our own hypothesis providing arguments in its favor. On the basis of the existing publications the following positions are briefly formulated: 1) hypothesis of borrowing from Thomas Aquinas; 2) hypothesis of borrowing from Aristotle; 3) hypothesis of borrowing from the 14th century scholastics. The inconsistency of these hypotheses, each on its own grounds, is shown. The first hypothesis proceeds from false assumptions, the second one is obviously reductionist, the third one correctly identifies the points of similarity between Brentano and the scholastics, but underestimates the differences between them. The author’s hypothesis is that the most precise parallel to Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality is found in the early modern scholasticism. It is supported from two sides. First, on the basis of Brentano’s biographical and reading history, arguments are formulated in favor of the validity of this assumption. It is shown that Brentano was able to reach the scholastics of Descartes’ epoch through his reading of the works of German neoscholastics of the mid-nineteenth century. Brentano’s and baroque scholasticism’s main points about intentionality are then formulated: 1) distinction between intentional and physical phenomena as a core of intentional philosophy; 2) intentionality as a property of all, not only intellectual, mental acts; 3) notion of intentional object and its variations; 4) objective being; 5) reality of mental acts and irreality of their contents. The comparison shows that they are similar in both traditions not only substantively, but also functionally.

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