Topoi 40 (5):1205-1212 (2021)

Authors
Andrew Aberdein
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.
Keywords deep disagreement  intellectual courage  moral courage  prominence  virtue argumentation
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-019-09679-w
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
"Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology".Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27.

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Citations of this work BETA

Arrogance and Deep Disagreement.Andrew Aberdein - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London: Routledge. pp. 39-52.
Was Aristotle a Virtue Argumentation Theorist?Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-229.
Endoxa and Epistemology in Aristotle’s Topics.Joseph Bjelde - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 201-214.

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