Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement

David Godden
Michigan State University
In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin’s claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, and sometimes does, play in the resolution of deep disagreements. In doing this we discuss a series of cases, mainly drawn from Wittgenstein, which we take to illustrate the resolution of deep disagreements through the use of what we call “rational persuasion.” We conclude that, while the role of argumentation in “normal” versus “deep” disagreements is characteristically different, it plays a crucial role in the resolution of both.
Keywords deep disagreement  Robert Fogelin  Ludwig Wittgenstein  form of life  Weltbild  reason  disagreement  rational
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What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.

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