Deep Disagreement in Mathematics

Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-27 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Disagreements that resist rational resolution, often termed “deep disagreements”, have been the focus of much work in epistemology and informal logic. In this paper, I argue that they also deserve the attention of philosophers of mathematics. I link the question of whether there can be deep disagreements in mathematics to a more familiar debate over whether there can be revolutions in mathematics. I propose an affirmative answer to both questions, using the controversy over Shinichi Mochizuki’s work on the abc conjecture as a potential example of both phenomena. I conclude by investigating the prospects for the resolution of mathematical deep disagreements in virtue-theoretic approaches to informal logic and mathematical practice.

Similar books and articles

Arrogance and deep disagreement.Andrew Aberdein - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London: Routledge. pp. 39-52.
Wittgenstein and the logic of deep disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-02

Downloads
203 (#94,222)

6 months
134 (#23,479)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew Aberdein
Florida Institute of Technology

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references