Deep Disagreement in Mathematics

Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-27 (2023)
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Abstract

Disagreements that resist rational resolution, often termed “deep disagreements”, have been the focus of much work in epistemology and informal logic. In this paper, I argue that they also deserve the attention of philosophers of mathematics. I link the question of whether there can be deep disagreements in mathematics to a more familiar debate over whether there can be revolutions in mathematics. I propose an affirmative answer to both questions, using the controversy over Shinichi Mochizuki’s work on the abc conjecture as a potential example of both phenomena. I conclude by investigating the prospects for the resolution of mathematical deep disagreements in virtue-theoretic approaches to informal logic and mathematical practice.

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Andrew Aberdein
Florida Institute of Technology

References found in this work

The mathematical experience.Philip J. Davis - 1995 - Boston: Birkhäuser. Edited by Reuben Hersh & Elena Marchisotto.
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.

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