Knowing when disagreements are deep

Informal Logic 25 (1):65-77 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have reasons to act as if they can be rationally resolved even if they are deep. Fogelin's analysis is thus of limited value as regards the practical moral demand of addressing concrete moral dilemmas.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Law, pragmatism, and democracy: Reply to Somin.Richard A. Posner - 2004 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 16 (4):465-471.
Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):55-72.
The Problem of Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):7-25.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.
Pre-socratic quantum gravity.Gordon Belot & John Earman - 2001 - In Craig Callender & Nick Huggett (eds.), Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale. Cambridge University Press. pp. 213--55.
Knowing-that, knowing-how, and knowing philosophically.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
What our Rylean Ancestors Knew: More on Knowing How and Knowing That.Joseph Shieber - 2003 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 11:328-330.
Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Knowing.Michael David Roth - 1970 - New York,: Random House. Edited by Leon Galis.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-30

Downloads
120 (#153,152)

6 months
31 (#107,436)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.
The fundamental model of deep disagreements.Victoria Lavorerio - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):416-431.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

.J. Annas (ed.) - 1976
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.
Ethics consultation: from theory to practice.Mark P. Aulisio, Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner (eds.) - 2003 - Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

View all 6 references / Add more references