In response to earlier papers in Informal Logic by Robert Fogelin and Andrew Lugg, this paper explores the issue of whether disagreement could ever be so deep that it defied rational resolution. Contra Lugg, I agree with Fogelin that such unresolvable disagreement is possible and, contra Fogelin, I suggest that the focus of such disagreement can be quite Iimited-a single proposition rather than a whole system of beliefs. I also suggest that emphasising arguing as a human practice rather than arguments (...) as a structure of propositions is unhelpful to consideration of these issues. (shrink)

This book is aimed at those studying for entry into the various professions where ethical questions are commonly faced such as teaching or social work.

Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.

Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.

SummaryNone of the above should be viewed as a defence of the particular version of OOE currently popular. I have not advanced any proposals concerning what particular ends might be of such importance that they legitimately override her prima facie right to control the contents of her mind. I have suggested that an internal tension exists within CCE as sketched by Forster but even ‘empowerment’ was not assumed by me to successfully meet the onus; my point was merely that it (...) was to be more plausibly construed as an argument for a compulsory, outcome‐driven, rather than for a free, interest‐driven, curriculum. Whether it is right for Janey to be overruled or not is a matter for continuing discussion, a discussion that OOE challenges us to have. It is, however, a prospective dialogue that is pre‐empted by any assumption that, just because CCE is prevalent in primary schools, the task is to protect it from OOE's predatory threat. For all that Forster has provided argument to the contrary, OOE may be a reform; the enemy might not be ‘a narrow vision of the national good’ but a narrow conception of Janey's good; perhaps there are things more important about portions of learning than that Janey finds them to have ‘personal significance’. (shrink)

First published in 1998, this book is an investigation of the possibility of articulating a coherent thesis of truth relativism within first, a host correspondence theory of truth and second, a host coherence theory of truth. The type of relativism addressed in the book is what is sometimes called 'framework relativism' - that where truth is relativised to a framework of belief or conceptual scheme. A further restraint is that a global relativistic thesis is sought - one which is relativistic (...) about all truths. The book does not set itself the task of defending relativism but just that of seeking a coherent articulation of it. (shrink)

SummaryNone of the above should be viewed as a defence of the particular version of OOE currently popular. I have not advanced any proposals concerning what particular ends might be of such importance that they legitimately override her prima facie right to control the contents of her mind. I have suggested that an internal tension exists within CCE as sketched by Forster but even ‘empowerment’ was not assumed by me to successfully meet the onus; my point was merely that it (...) was to be more plausibly construed as an argument for a compulsory, outcome‐driven, rather than for a free, interest‐driven, curriculum. Whether it is right for Janey to be overruled or not is a matter for continuing discussion, a discussion that OOE challenges us to have. It is, however, a prospective dialogue that is pre‐empted by any assumption that, just because CCE is prevalent in primary schools, the task is to protect it from OOE's predatory threat. For all that Forster has provided argument to the contrary, OOE may be a reform; the enemy might not be ‘a narrow vision of the national good’ but a narrow conception of Janey's good; perhaps there are things more important about portions of learning than that Janey finds them to have ‘personal significance’. (shrink)