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  1. Lambert on Moral Certainty and the Justification of Induction.Aaron Wells - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I reconstruct J. H. Lambert’s views on how practical grounds relate to epistemic features, such as certainty. I argue, first, that Lambert’s account of moral certainty does not involve any distinctively practical influence on theoretical belief. However, it does present an interesting form of fallibilism about justification as well as a denial of a tight link between knowledge and action. Second, I argue that for Lambert, the persistence principle that underwrites induction is supported by practical reasons to believe; this indicates (...)
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  • On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - unknown - Cambridge University Press | Under Contract.
    Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...)
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  • Can Metaphysics Become a Science for Kant?Gabriele Gava - 2023 - In Robb Dunphy & Toby Lovat (eds.), Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 150-166.
    In this chapter, I investigate a problem for Kant’s claim that metaphysics can reach the status of science. The problem arises when one considers Kant’s account of the “architectonic unity” of metaphysics in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Attaining architectonic unity is a condition for becoming a science for any body of cognitions that purports to be such. This is achieved when the cognitions belonging to a science are systematically organized according to the “idea of reason” which lies at the (...)
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  • Induction and Certainty in the Physics of Wolff and Crusius.Hein van den Berg & Boris Demarest - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-22.
    In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics. We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff’s ideal of certain science. Against interpretations that take Wolff’s proofs in physics to (...)
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