Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Viewing Spontaneity Ethnomethodologically.Nicolas J. Zaunbrecher - 2018 - Human Studies 41 (1):1-20.
    In this article, I identify “spontaneity” as a significant but poorly-analyzed term in social theory and description through an overview of tensions between varying technical accounts of spontaneity in research literature. In contrast to conceptually-slippery “realist” accounts of spontaneity, I argue for viewing spontaneity ethnomethodologically, i.e., as a contextually-emergent social practice. I suggest two directions for future applications of this approach: first, an ethnomethodological approach to rhetorical analysis of unanalyzed use of the term “spontaneity” in research literature, and second, observational (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Exploring the structure of mental action in directed thought.Johannes Wagemann - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):145-176.
    While the general topic of agency has been collaboratively explored in philosophy and psychology, mental action seems to resist such an interdisciplinary research agenda. Since it is difficult to empirically access mental agency beyond externally measurable behavior, the topic is mainly treated philosophically. However, this has not prevented philosophers from substantiating their arguments with psychological findings, but predominantly with those which allegedly limit the scope and conscious controllability of mental action in favor of automated subpersonal processes. By contrast, the call (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Attempts.Jonathan D. Payton - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):363-382.
    It’s generally assumed that, if an agent x acts by ϕ-ing, then there occurs an event which is x’s ϕ-ing. But what about when an agent tries to do something? Are there such things as attempts? The standard answer is ‘Yes’. But in a series of articles, and now a book, David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the answer is ‘No’: what happens when x tries to ϕ isn’t that an attempt occurs; rather, what happens is simply that a certain subjunctive (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Inference and the taking condition.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):294-302.
    It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule-following, or by finding (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • How to perform a nonbasic action.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1).
    Some actions we perform “just like that” without taking a means, e.g., raising your arm or wiggling your finger. Other actions—the nonbasic actions—we perform by taking a means, e.g., voting by raising your arm or illuminating a room by flipping a switch. A nearly ubiquitous view about nonbasic action is that one's means to a nonbasic action constitutes the nonbasic action, as raising your arm constitutes voting or flipping a switch constitutes illuminating a room. In this paper, I challenge this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reasoning and its limits.David Jenkins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9479-9495.
    Reasoning is naturally understood as something which we actively do—as a kind of action. However, reflection on the supposed limits to the extent to which it is up to us how our reasoning unfolds is often taken to cast doubt on this idea. I argue that, once articulated with care, challenges to the idea that reasoning is a kind of action can be seen to trade on problematic assumptions. In particular, they trade on assumptions which could be used to rule (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mental Actions and Mental Agency.Anika Fiebich & John Michael - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):683-693.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic agency may have for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
    Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.
    While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations