How (not) to think about mental action

Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.
Galen Strawson on mental reality.Tim Crane - 1997 - Ratio 10 (1):82-90.
Mental activity.J. N. Wright - 1944 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.
A plea for mental acts.Joëlle Proust - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):105-128.
Consciousness in act and action.Keith Hossack - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
234 (#89,053)

6 months
15 (#184,405)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

View all 38 references / Add more references