The Bentham Project is delighted to announce a call for papers for “Bentham and Australia: Convicts, Utility, and Empire”, a conference to be held at University College London on 11-12 April 2019 to mark the forthcoming publication of Writings on Australia, a volume of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. The conference will explore themes such as the influence and impact of Bentham’s ideas on the theory and practice of punishment in convict Australia, on advocates and (...) opponents of co... (shrink)

Bentham scholarship has concentrated on certain aspects of his thought: this collection reflects that bias. Most of the articles are published since 1950, but those of his contemporaries show how his ideas became politically influential. This is an important new contribtion that will be of great use to scholars with an interest in this key thinker.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This article argues that Bentham’s metaphysics has until recently been unfairly belittled, and that it in fact built on and surpassed that of David Hume, of whom Bentham was both an attentive student and a fierce critic. Bentham’s logic is metaphysically based, multi-levelled, and comprehensive. First, taking Hume’s empiricism as a starting point, Bentham developed the additional mechanism of “reflection” to facilitate a utilitarian pragmatic resolution to Hume’s skepticism. Second, unlike Hume, Bentham aspired to encyclopedic (...) knowledge, especially of the human mind, which he believed allowed him to place his thought on a more solid and broader foundation. Third, whereas Hume focused on the passive understanding, Bentham captured the interaction between understanding and volition. Fourth, in relation to moral approbation, Hume adopted an approach which highlighted benevolence, whereas Bentham sought to reconcile self-preference with benevolence. Fifth, Hume’s common sense moral philosophy pushed him to associate justice with social convention, and helped to make him a conservative. Bentham developed the principle of utility to direct and push forward social reform for a better world. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham was a British philosopher, jurist, and social reformer. He is regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism.

This book describes the adventures in Russia of Samuel Bentham, the brother of the famous law-reformer, Jeremy Bentham. Shipbuilder, technical expert and inventor, his talents were employed for several years in serving the government of Catherine II, involving him in activities both in peace and war, and in extensive travel through the Russian Empire. The Russian court, war against the Turks, commercial enterprise in Siberia, are a few of the themes illuminated by his correspondence which forms the basis (...) for this book. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Jeremy Bentham is often thought to have set the groundwork for the modern ‘animal liberation’ movement, but in fact he wrote little on the subject. A full examination of his work reveals a less radical position than that commonly attributed to him. Bentham was the first Western philosopher to grant animals equal consideration from within a comprehensive, non-religious moral theory, and he was a staunch defender of animal welfare laws. But he also approved of killing and using (...) animals, as long as pointless cruelty could be avoided. The nuances of his position are best brought out by comparing it to that of Peter Singer, who draws considerably more radical practical conclusions. This is not primarily explained by competing formulations of utilitarianism, however, but by different empirical background assumptions about the lives of animals. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide an overview of surveillance theories and concepts that can help to understand and debate surveillance in its many forms. As scholars from an increasingly wide range of disciplines are discussing surveillance, this literature review can offer much-needed common ground for the debate. We structure surveillance theory in three roughly chronological/thematic phases. The first two conceptualise surveillance through comprehensive theoretical frameworks which are elaborated in the third phase. The first phase, featuring Bentham and Foucault, offers (...) architectural theories of surveillance, where surveillance is often physical and spatial, involving centralised mechanisms of watching over subjects. Panoptic structures function as architectures of power, not only directly but also through disciplining of the watched subjects. The second phase offers infrastructural theories of surveillance, where surveillance is networked and relies primarily on digital rather than physical technologies. It involves distributed forms of watching over people, with increasing distance to the watched and often dealing with data doubles rather than physical persons. Deleuze, Haggerty and Ericson, and Zuboff develop different theoretical frameworks than panopticism to conceptualise the power play involved in networked surveillance. The third phase of scholarship refines, combines or extends the main conceptual frameworks developed earlier. Surveillance theory branches out to conceptualise surveillance through concepts such as dataveillance, access control, social sorting, peer-to-peer surveillance and resistance. With the datafication of society, surveillance combines the physical with the digital, government with corporate surveillance and top-down with self-surveillance. (shrink)

According to Bentham's utilitarian mode of reasoning, the legitimacy of an intervention was not to be valued on the grounds of the underlying intentions or the means employed, but rather in light of its (expected) consequences. What at first would seem as incoherent, arbitrary or ambivalent attitudes towards intervention were in fact consistent with his situational and pragmatic mode of reasoning. Rather than a disjuncture between ideal theory and practical reasoning, his positions on intervention reflected the inevitably local nature (...) of his principled 'moral casuistry', characterised by the attempt to reconcile self-regarding interests with extra-regarding interests. The key to this move resided in Bentham's concept of 'effective benevolence'. The 'business of the Deontologist' - and the essence of his principled moral casuistry - was that of exposing the dictates of 'effective benevolence' wherever possible, and Bentham himself took up this challenge in his writings on Tripoli and... (shrink)

There is large, imposing-looking box in a wing of University College, London, that contains the lifelike remains of the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. Bentham requested that upon his death, which occurred in 1832, his body should first be used for purposes of a medical lecture and then be place on display. His request was entirely utilitarian in character. For as a famous individual, Bentham could argue that it made less sense to be buried and then have a (...) statue constructed of his likeness than to eliminate the burial by having himself made into a statue. He called the latter an auto-icon. (shrink)

Most accounts of Jeremy Bentham deal with him as a prophet of either utilitarianism or of liberal democracy. This book discusses a less familiar but very important aspect of his political thought: his theory of how government institutions should be organised in order to function as efficient and yet responsive guardians of the community's interests. It thus focuses on his programme for he executive and judicial branches of government rather than for the legislature and the electorate. Dr Hume suggests (...) that eighteenth-century political thought was richer in ideas about government that has usually been allowed, but that Bentham's special qualities of mind enabled him to widen and deepen those ideas much further than his contemporaries could have foreseen. (shrink)

Si Hobbes est très peu cité explicitement par Bentham, l’œuvre du premier accompagne pourtant constamment l’œuvre du second. Sans doute Bentham n’est-il pas contractualiste et l’idée qu’il se fait de la république deviendra, au fil de sa réflexion, plus démocratique que celle que s’en fait Hobbes. Toutefois, on trouve, chez l’un comme chez l’autre, une conception de la loi qui, si elle est l’expression de la souveraineté, n’exclut pas la diversité des appartenances des citoyens à la société civile. (...) Ce point est visible dans la définition même de la loi que nous donnent les deux auteurs en des moments stratégiques de leur œuvre. Mais l’un comme l’autre dira que la souveraineté ne saurait, sans encourir un immense danger, se laisser dépasser par une loi qui se voudrait naturelle ou qui se donnerait comme une émanation de Dieu ; quand bien même le souverain croirait pouvoir se renforcer par là. Nous le montrons sur deux points cruciaux : d’une part, l’analyse de la promesse et du serment ; d’autre part, la question de la punition, qui est un moment que les deux auteurs estiment dangereux, pour le condamné certes, mais aussi pour l’État qui le condamne. La proximité des deux auteurs est très étroite sur ces deux points, encore que Bentham ne dise rien de Hobbes en leur endroit. (shrink)

At the end of the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham devised a scheme for a prison that he called the panopticon. It soon became an obsession. For twenty years he tried to build it; in the end he failed, but the story of his attempt offers fascinating insights into both Bentham's complex character and the ideas of the period. Basing her analysis on hitherto unexamined manuscripts, Janet Semple chronicles Bentham's dealings with the politicians as he tried to put (...) his plans into practice. She assesses the panopticon in the context of penal philosophy and eighteenth-century punishment and discusses it as an instrument of the modern technology of subjection as revealed and analysed by Foucault. Her entertainingly written study is full of drama: at times it is hilariously funny, at others it approaches tragedy. It illuminates a subject of immense historical importance and which is particularly relevant to modern controversies about penal policy. (shrink)

This paper (i) offers an interpretation of some central aspects of Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy of language, (ii) challenges the received view of its relation to analytic philosophy, and (iii) seeks to show that this investigation into the prehistory of analytic philosophy sheds light on its history proper. It has been often maintained, most notably by Quine, that Bentham anticipated Frege’s context principle and the use of contextual definition. On these bases, Bentham has been presented as one of (...) the initiators of a tradition that shares a common commitment to the “semantic priority of sentences” and that includes authors as otherwise diverse as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. In opposition to this narrative, I argue that Bentham did indeed anticipate the use of contextual definition, but was not a forerunner of Frege’s context principle. The two issues should be sharply distinguished. I show that Bentham’s philosophy of language is informed by a set of empiricist assumptions that Frege’s contextualism was centrally meant to oppose. I conclude that with respect to the question of the relation between propositional and sub-propositional meaning, we should distinguish two opposed strands in the history of analytic philosophy: an empiricist strand anticipated by Bentham, represented most notably by Russell, and an anti-empiricist strand, represented most notably by Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self‐preference and thus adopted a self‐preference (...) and artificial means‐based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self‐preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction‐of‐interests‐prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self‐preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, made a powerful impact on several major areas of thought and policy: ethics, jurisprudence, political and constitutional theory, and social and administrative reform. Yet from the start his ideas have been subject to misunderstanding and caricature. John Dinwiddy's Bentham is regarded as the best introduction to this important jurist and reformer. Dinwiddy examines the various components of Bentham's philosophy and shows how each was shaped by the radical rethinking entailed by the (...) utilitarian approach. He also discusses interpretations of Benthamism and its contemporary significance and the controversial question of Bentham's influence on reform. Bentham is reproduced here in full together with three classic essays that deal with key issues in understanding Bentham: his conversion to political radicalism, the relations between private and public ethics, and his theory of adjudication. A new introduction and select bibliography by William Twining set the context and survey the developments in Bentham studies since the book's original publication in 1989. (shrink)

Mill, J. S. Bentham.--Whewell, W. Bentham.--Watson, J. Bentham.--Hart, H. L. A. Bentham.--Parekh, B. Bentham's justification of the principle of utility.--Peardon, T. Bentham's ideal republic.--Hart, H. L. A. Bentham on sovereignty.--Burns, J. H. Bentham's critique of political fallacies.--Mitchell, W. C. Bentham's felicific calculus.--Roberts, D. Jeremy Bentham and the Victorian administrative state.

This sketch of his life and work has been published in the hope that it may induce some readers to seek a closer acquaintance with his writings.

Jeremy Bentham is often interpreted as defending a satisficing, rather than maximizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Bentham’s maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against the satisficing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a maximizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to those of not performing the act. I show that following (...) this version of utilitarianism requires that one realizes the greatest happiness for all affected individuals. (shrink)

Bentham argues that Nature has placed mankind under the governance of pain and pleasure. They determine what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do. Bentham tries to answer two different questions. The first is whether people are actually looking for pleasure. It is a cognitive question about human nature, formulated at a meta-ethical level. The second is whether people ought to look for pleasure. The question is formulated on the ethical level and Bentham (...) asserts that people ought to look for pleasure. In the first case, Bentham is a partner in a non-normative meta-ethical discussion about the character of human values. In the second case, he is not a partner and he is not making statements about facts. Is Bentham aware that the answer to one question does not necessarily imply the answer to the other? (shrink)

In Introduction Bentham considers a difficulty. If the immediate aim of punishment is to deter agents considering breaking the law, then the severity of the threat of punishment must increase if they are strongly tempted to offend. But it seems intuitively that some people who were strongly tempted to offend should be punished leniently. Bentham argues in response that all potential offenders capable of being deterred must be deterred. He makes three mistakes. It is possible that it would (...) produce the most happiness at t2 to punish an offender who could have been deterred at t1, but was not. The Principle of Utility might condemn the threats that would be needed to deter all potential offenders who can be deterred. Given the dispositions to reoffend of some strongly tempted offenders, their punishments should be relatively lenient. There is more room for leniency in Bentham's theory than he realized. (shrink)

Bentham is a severe critic of common law, denouncing it as ‘sham law’. Bentham’s denunciation of common law as ‘sham law’ is, however, an evaluative censure, not a descriptive account. A realistic account of the nature of common law can be constructed from his writings. According to this account, first, common law is a collection of authoritative mandates. Second, judicial decisions do not evidence common law; on the contrary, judges, through their decisions, create common law by means of (...) legalizing both customs and single actions. Common law is not, therefore, immemorial, nor did it originate in the people’s consent. Third, stare decisis is necessary for common law to fulfil the function of law, but it has no independent value: it is the principle of utility alone that explains, justifies, and decides the use of stare decisis. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, made a powerful impact on several major areas of thought and policy: ethics, jurisprudence, political and constitutional theory, and social and administrative reform. Yet from the start his ideas have been subject to misunderstanding and caricature. John Dinwiddy's Bentham is regarded as the best introduction to this important jurist and reformer. Dinwiddy examines the various components of Bentham's philosophy and shows how each was shaped by the radical rethinking entailed by the (...) utilitarian approach. He also discusses interpretations of Benthamism and its contemporary significance and the controversial question of Bentham's influence on reform. Bentham is reproduced here in full together with three classic essays that deal with key issues in understanding Bentham: his conversion to political radicalism, the relations between private and public ethics, and his theory of adjudication. A new introduction and select bibliography by William Twining set the context and survey the developments in Bentham studies since the book's original publication in 1989. (shrink)

The present article draws attention to some specific similarities between Helvétius and Bentham in their treatments of the morality of the desire for esteem. These similarities can be observed in three fields: (1) Helvétius and Bentham integrate the desire for esteem into more general accounts of how sensible interest motivates human action; (2) they analyse various everyday situations in which the desire for esteems has consequences that are detrimental for social life; and (3) they emphasize republican constitution building (...) as an instrument for making the desire for esteem virtue-supporting. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophical interpretation of the historical debate between Bentham and classical Common Law Theory, a debate that is fundamental to philosophical thought and has shaped contemporary conceptions of nature, tasks, and limits of law and adjudication. The author explores the philosophical foundations of Common Law theory, focusing particularly on the writings of Sir Mathew Hale and David Hume.

This article examines Bentham's contribution to anti-colonial thought in the context of the development of the British radical movement that attacked colonialism on the grounds that it advantaged what Bentham called the at the expense of the . It shows that Bentham was influenced as much by Josiah Tucker and James Anderson as by Adam Smith. Bentham's early economic critique is examined, and the sharp changes in his arguments after 1800 assessed, in the context of the (...) American and French Revolutions and the effects of British industrialization. The article also highlights the importance of Bentham's writings inspired by the Spanish colonial crisis of the early 1820s. They show developments in his economic analysis and include some very acute discussions of the psychological satisfactions that elites could gain from colonialism. The article ends with a brief comparison between Bentham and later radical thinkers to put his ideas in context. (shrink)

Bentham's critical statements on the Declaration of Human Rights of the French revolutionaries are supposed to be merely of historical value, as directed against a dated formulation. Against this, it is argued that the essential point of Bentham's argument is valid against any intuitivist interpretation of human rights (that is, against interpretations that take human rights as ultimate, absolute data) but are agreeable with an interpretation that takes Human Rights to be preferred lines of action that are normally (...) conducive to the greatest general hapiness. (shrink)

Se trata de averiguar la compatibilidad entre utilitarismo y religión. La incompatibilidad sería la de una teoría cientificista conspicua y la creencia en lo ultraterreno vinculado a la salvación. Bentham escribió, solo o en colaboración, unas pocas pero importantes obras sobre religión. Consideró dos versiones, el deísmo y el anglicanismo y, dentro de éste, consideró la posibilidad de centrarse en un presunto mensaje original de Cristo que habría sido desvirtuado por Pablo de Tarso. Bentham apuesta claramente por la (...) reducción de lo religioso al ámbito de lo privado. Pero esta propuesta no habría acabado con todos los problemas que plantean las relaciones entre religión y felicidad. (shrink)

In _Nonsense upon Stilts¸_ first published in 1987, Waldron includes and discusses extracts from three classic critiques of the idea of natural rights embodied in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Each text is prefaced by an historical introduction and an analysis of its main themes. The collection as a whole in introduced with an essay tracing the philosophical background to the three critiques as well as the eighteenth-century idea of natural rights which they attacked. (...) But the point of reproducing these works is not merely historical. Modern attacks on ‘rights-based’ political philosophy mirror the concerns of Bentham, Burke and Marx. Jeremy Waldron has therefore added an extensive concluding essay which relates these classic texts to the modern discussion of rights and re-examines the idea of rights in the light of contemporary critiques. This text provides an invaluable teaching tool for courses in politics and philosophy. (shrink)

SUMMARYJeremy Bentham has two very strong commitments in his thought: one is to the principle of utility, or the greatest happiness principle, as the fundamental principle of morality; the other is to truth, as indicated, for instance, in his opposition to falsehood and fiction in the law. How, then, did Bentham view the relationship between utility and truth? Did he think that utility and truth simply coincided, and hence that falsehood necessarily led to a diminution in happiness, and (...) conversely truth led to an increase in happiness? This article addresses this issue through two bodies of material: the first consists of Bentham's writings on religion under the heading of ‘Juggernaut’ and dating from 1811 to 1821; the second consists of the writings on judicial evidence dating from 1803 to 1812 and which appeared in Rationale of Judicial Evidence. (shrink)

Abstract Bentham favored a free press as an instrument of public control of the state, in the interest of the general happiness. Kant favored free public discussion as an instrument for the development and expression of autonomous rationality. But a free press embodied in the property rights of the owners of the press may well fail to achieve either Benthamite or Kantian goals. Such goals lead to a personal right to communicate rather than to a corporate right to press (...) freedom. (shrink)

One of the most neglected aspects of Bentham's thought is his opposition to war. His views on this subject have been sketched out in a number of studies, but they have never been examined in any detail. Interested scholars have tended to base their assessments on a narrow range of sources. Most have relied on the four brief essays, collectively entitled ‘Principles of International Law’, which were published in John Bowring's edition of Bentham's Works. More particularly, they have (...) leaned heavily on just one of these essays, ‘A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace’. The aim of this paper is to present a much fuller picture of Bentham's views by supplementing relevant material in the international law essays with ideas drawn from Bentham's other works and unpublished papers. (shrink)

Un philosophe anglais en France : Lumières et Révolution (1770-1795) -- Bentham et Dumont : les premières traductions françaises -- Utilitarisme, socialisme et libéralisme : Bentham en France au XIXe siècle -- Bentham en France au XXe siècle : perspectives critiques.

John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are often said to have held opposed views concerning the way “the value” of different pleasures should be estimated. Mill is accused of being an inconsistent utilitarian because he thought that, when comparing the value of two pleasures, we should not forget to take their “quality” into account. Bentham, on the other hand, is said to have believed that we should take “only quantity” into consideration. By verifying what they actually wrote, and (...) reflecting on what they meant by words like “value”, “quantity”, and “quality”, we find that these allegations are largely imaginary and that the difference between Mill and Bentham on this question has (at least) been exaggerated. Bentham, for example, did not write that "quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry", as is so often reported. In his Principles of Morals and Legislation he clearly tells us why he rejects the inaccurate word “quantity”, when speaking of “the value of (a lot of) pain or pleasure”, and he explicitly introduces “quality” – both the word and the concept – in his analysis of rewards and punishments. These clarifications allow us to sort-out a few other confusions concerning utilitarianism. We explain, for example, why authors like Amartya Sen and Michael Sandel are mistaken in believing that rights and freedoms have “no intrinsic value” (only instrumental value) in utilitarian ethics. (shrink)

This collection represents the latest research from leading scholars whose work has helped to frame our understanding of Bentham since the publication of H. L. A. Hart's Essays on Bentham. The authors explore fundamental areas of Bentham's thought, including the relationship between the rule of law and public opinion; law and popular prejudices or manipulated tastes; Bentham's methodology versus Hart's; sovereignty and codification; and the language of natural rights. Drawing on original manuscripts and volumes in The (...) Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, the chapters combine philosophical and historical approaches and offer new and more faithful interpretations of Bentham's legal philosophy and its development. As a coherent whole, the book challenges the dominant understandings of Bentham among legal philosophers and rescues him from some famous mischaracterizations. (shrink)

The full range of Bentham's engagement with Blackstone's view of law is beyond the scope of a single article. Yet it is important to recognize at the outset, even in a more restricted enquiry into the matter, that the engagement, begun when Bentham, not quite sixteen years of age, started to attend Blackstone's Oxford lectures, was indeed a lifelong affair. Whatever Bentham had in mind when, at the age of eighty, in 1828, he began to write a (...) work entitled ‘A familar view of Blackstone: or say Blackstone familiarized’, the manuscripts at least suffice to prove that ‘Our Author’ was still in the forefront of his mind at that octogenarian but still indefatigably active stage of his career. Every aspect of Bentham's multifarious intellectual activity over the intervening decades had been touched in some measure by his response to Blackstone's ideas. It still seems true to say what was said a dozen years ago: It would be an exaggeration to say that Bentham elaborated his own conception of law by way of a constant and conscious dialectic with the views of Blackstone. But it would be an exaggeration for which the evidence would afford some excuse. (shrink)

Alors que plus d’un siècle sépare Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) et Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), leurs philosophies respectives entretiennent des rapports étroits qui, bien qu’ils aient souvent retenu l’attention des historiens de la philosophie et commentateurs, n’ont jamais été étudiés spécifiquement. On cherche ici à pallier ce manque par une étude des rapports entre Hobbes et Bentham dans le champ de la philosophie politique, juridique et morale. On espère ainsi expliquer les points communs, influences, réappropriations, différences et oppositions existant entre (...) ces deux pensées et contribuer par là à faire mieux comprendre leur rôle dans l’histoire de la philosophie moderne anglaise. (shrink)

This article argues that Bentham was committed to attempting to measure the outcomes of rules by calculating the values of the pains and pleasures to which they gave rise. That pleasure was preferable to pain, and greater pleasure to less, were, for Bentham, foundational premises of rationality, whilst to abjure calculation was to abjure rationality. However, Bentham knew that the experience of pleasure and pain, the entities which provided his objective moral standard, was not only subjective, and (...) only indirectly accessible to the legislator, but also typically dependent on a complex of socially mediated beliefs and attitudes. All moral reasoning involved a process of inference from contingent which was littered with possibilities for error. The Bentham who emerges is a more vulpine hedgehog than is usually allowed, whose core insistence is that, despite its imperfections, consequentialist analysis and decision-making remains the only viable route to a rational morality. (shrink)

This article argues that Bentham was committed to attempting to measure the outcomes of rules by calculating the values of the pains and pleasures to which they gave rise. That pleasure was preferable to pain, and greater pleasure to less, were, for Bentham, foundational premises of rationality, whilst to abjure calculation was to abjure rationality. However, Bentham knew that the experience of pleasure and pain, the ‘simple’ entities which provided his objective moral standard, was not only subjective, (...) and only indirectly accessible to the legislator, but also typically dependent on a complex of socially mediated beliefs and attitudes. All moral reasoning involved a process of inference from contingent ‘facts’ which was littered with possibilities for error. The Bentham who emerges is a more vulpine hedgehog than is usually allowed, whose core insistence is that, despite its imperfections, consequentialist analysis and decision-making remains the only viable route to a rational morality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe goal of this paper is to locate indirect legislation within Bentham’s art of legislation, and to distinguish it, as far as possible, from direct legislation. Along the way, some parallels are drawn between indirect legislation on the one hand, and the Nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein on the other. It will be argued that many expedients categorized by Bentham as indirect legislation are simultaneously exercises of direct legislation. Another set of indirect expedients act on knowledge, and (...) involve efforts to eliminate asymmetries of information between potential offender and potential victim by providing official standards and disseminating a plethora of factual information. Other forms of indirect legislation threaten the coherence of Bentham’s theory of law, firstly by regarding all government actions as exercises in legislation, and secondly by turning the formers of public opinion into legislators. Insofar as some forms of indirect legislation operate by sleight of hand, they conflict with Bentham’s commitment to transparency in the exercise of public power, reflecting a tension between reality and appearance which runs through his thought. (shrink)