The axiomatic bases of Special Relativity Theory (SRT) are thoroughly re-examined from an operational point of view, with particular emphasis on the status of Einstein synchronization in the light of the possibility of arbitrary synchronization procedures in inertial reference frames. Once correctly and explicitly phrased, the principles of SRT allow for a wide range of “theories” that differ from the standard SRT only for the difference in the chosen synchronization procedures, but are wholly equivalent to SRT in predicting empirical facts. (...) This results in the introduction, in the full background of SRT, of a suitable synchronization gauge. A complete hierarchy of synchronization gauges is introduced and elucidated, ranging from the useful Selleri synchronization gauge (which should lead, according to Selleri, to a multiplicity of theories alternative to SRT) to the more general Mansouri–Sexl synchronization gauge and, finally, to the even more general Anderson–Vetharaniam–Stedman’s synchronization gauge. It is showed that all these gauges do not challenge the SRT, as claimed by Selleri, but simply lead to a number of formalisms which leave the geometrical structure of Minkowski spacetime unchanged. Several aspects of fundamental and applied interest related to the conventional aspect of the synchronization choice are discussed, encompassing the issue of the one-way velocity of light in inertial and rotating reference frames, the global positioning system (GPS)’s working, and the recasting of Maxwell equations in generic synchronizations. Finally, it is showed how the gauge freedom introduced in SRT can be exploited in order to give a clear explanation of the Sagnac effect for counter-propagating matter beams. (shrink)

We study the space geometry of a rotating disk both from a theoretical and operational approach; in particular we give a precise definition of the space of the disk, which is not clearly defined in the literature. To this end we define an extended 3-space, which we call “relative space:” it is recognized as the only space having an actual physical meaning from an operational point of view, and it is identified as the “physical space of the rotating platform.” Then, (...) the geometry of the space of the disk turns out to be non Euclidean, according to the early Einstein's intuition; in particular the Born metric is recovered, in a clear and self consistent context. Furthermore, the relativistic kinematics reveals to be self consistent, and able to solve the Ehrenfest's paradox without any need of dynamical considerations or ad hoc assumptions. (shrink)

Originally published in 1921, this volume represents De Ruggiero's first appearance in English, being the first time his philosophical works were translated. Modern Philosophy presents a positive philosophical position of great interest, avowedly in continuation of Croce and in close agreement with Gentile, which sums up the progress of Italian idealism down to the writing of this book. It is a remarkable piece of historical work, focusing on the development of European philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth (...) century and the beginning of the twentieth, and was the first volume to comprehensively handle this time period. (shrink)

A re-publication of the whole of the work of Marsilio Ficino, being an impossibility, Kristeller1has presented students with a monumentalSupplementum Ficinianum, in which he brings together everything that was not included in the Basle edition, which he takes for his basis, everything, that is to say, that he has been able to trace in the course of a very thorough search made in numerous Italian and foreign libraries. In a learned introduction there are prefixed to the edition three indexes, of (...) the codices, editions, and works of Ficino, and with each work is given a concise account of its origin, purpose, and fortune in the world. There follows the collection of Ficino's writings, some unpublished, and some having already been published sporadically, but omitted from the Basle edition. The final items are two indexes of proper names quoted in the Basle edition and in theSupplementumrespectively. (shrink)

After an interruption of seven years I take up once again my surveys of Italian philosophy. Many things have happened in the interval, but it is perhaps too soon for them to be susceptible of calm philosophical reflection. The problems that most interest the cultured public to-day are those of existentialism, of historicism and its limits, of German romanticism, and, more generally, of Germanic culture in relation to new spiritual orientations. The interest in existentialism is due, at least in part, (...) to the fact that it is the philosophy in fashion. But there is in it nevertheless a depth of seriousness that is not overlooked. The tragedies of recent years have placed in the foreground the problems of immediate existence, of human personality and its place in the world, which the preceding idealistic philosophy had too easily absorbed in an impersonal and trans-subjective view of the spirit and its universal values. And, as has often happened in the course of history, there has resulted a reaction of individuality, in its most irrational and vital expressions, against the pretensions of reason to dominate it from above, and imprison it in the net of its concepts. But if, in this regard, existentialism represents a just demand, which can exercise a beneficial influence on philosophical thought, yet to many its claim to represent a new era in philosophy seems excessive. Its value is only that of an episode. Hence some interpreters of contemporary thought have been drawn to limit the importance of the new movement. (shrink)

BenedettoCroce'sbook on history1is the ideal continuation of his earlier book published over a score of years ago on “La Teoria e Storia della storiografia” forming the final part of the “Filosofia dello spirito.” During this long period Croce has had the opportunity to enrich and extend his historiographical experiences with a series of volumes, of which those on the History of Naples, the History of Italy, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century are the most important and have (...) had the widest repercussions. In all this range of experience his fundamental theses on the character and value of history have not been substantially altered. They have actually developed in breadth and depth, so that in the present volume we find them with their characteristic lineaments, old and new together, rendered fuller and more vivid by the rich lymph of the concrete problems of historical life by which they are nourished. In the meantime a series of violent and tumultuous changes, provoking vehement opposing mental reactions, has brought into discussion grave doubts, raised on certain points which first appeared firmly established in the historical view of the world. The antithesis has moved Croce to reaffirm his thought with renewed polemic ardour, thereby throwing it into stronger relief, and giving it a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

In1920 Bignone published an Italian translation of the writings and fragments of Epicurus in Laterza's library of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophers which in many respects added to and improved upon Usener's classic collection, of Epicurea. He has since then zealously prosecuted these studies, and arrived at some very interesting conclusions which he has given out in two volumes published lately.1 His starting-point is the observation that the writings of Epicurus often have a polemical tone, and not only rebut the accusations (...) of adversaries who misinterpret the new doctrine, but are often directed also against those preceding philosophers who denied to pleasure a stable and certain nature on which a system of ethics could be based. Bignone has set himself the task of particularizing these anonymous predecessors, and thereby bringing the Epicurean polemic into more striking relief. I t was easy and safe to start from the standpoint that Epicurus in his rehabilitation of pleasure had to oppose Plato and the Platonists, but at what Platonists in particular did he take aim? In answering this question Bignone has been able to make use of recent Aristotelian studies, especially those of Jaeger, which have thrown much light on the first phase of the Stagirite's philosophy, of a purely Platonic inspiration. As is well known, some exoteric dialogues belong to this phase, such as the Eudemos, the Protrepticon, and On Philosophy, which have to a large extent disappeared, though it has been found possible to reconstruct a few scattered fragments of them. The great scholastic works which reveal the full independence and maturity of Aristotle's genius have eclipsed them in the memory of posterity. But originally there were only these dialogues, the only ones published, to make Aristotle's thought known to the public outside the peripatetic school. The scholastic writings on the other hand remained unknown until the time of Sulla. What wonder, then, if Epicurus, in combating Platonism, had in mind these dialogues, which give out the fundamental conceptions of Platonism in a more decisive and dogmatic form than that of the Platonic dialogues? (shrink)

BenedettoCroce'sbook on history1is the ideal continuation of his earlier book published over a score of years ago on “La Teoria e Storia della storiografia” forming the final part of the “Filosofia dello spirito.” During this long period Croce has had the opportunity to enrich and extend his historiographical experiences with a series of volumes, of which those on the History of Naples, the History of Italy, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century are the most important and have (...) had the widest repercussions. In all this range of experience his fundamental theses on the character and value of history have not been substantially altered. They have actually developed in breadth and depth, so that in the present volume we find them with their characteristic lineaments, old and new together, rendered fuller and more vivid by the rich lymph of the concrete problems of historical life by which they are nourished. In the meantime a series of violent and tumultuous changes, provoking vehement opposing mental reactions, has brought into discussion grave doubts, raised on certain points which first appeared firmly established in the historical view of the world. The antithesis has moved Croce to reaffirm his thought with renewed polemic ardour, thereby throwing it into stronger relief, and giving it a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

Of late years, even in Italy, no really new personalities or original orientations of thought have made their appearance in philosophy. The best that has been done in our studies consists in ample work consolidating the mental positions already gained during the prewar period, and in slow but unceasing efforts of philosophic thought to permeate the other strata of our culture. It is not paradoxical to affirm that to-day the best fruits of the renewed philosophic education are to be gathered (...) not in books of philosophy, but in books of literary and artistic criticism, of history, and of political and moral science. All this is not merely fortuitous, but proceeds directly and consciously from the trend of the new Italian philosophic thought, which shrinks from isolating itself in an intellectual and fictitious superworld, preferring on the contrary to be a living methodology of the sciences, and to give to its universals the relief and, I might almost say, the savour, of particular things. (shrink)

In a posthumous book by F. Meli 1 there are joined two interesting studies in the history of philosophy. The first discusses the religious and political doctrines of Fausto Socino and their developments in the thought of the seventeenth century, and the second the rationalistic mentality of Spinoza. The two themes are essentially related, for in the religious rationalism of Socino the author recognizes one of the currents of thought that were to meet later in Spinoza’s philosophy. The first essay (...) has the merit of greater novelty, because Socinian studies have been neglected up to the present and only touched on indirectly, in their repercussions rather than in their origins. For Meli the historical importance of Fausto Socino lies in the fact that he draws from the religious experience of the Reformation a new conception of religion, clearly affirming the principle that Holy Scripture does not aim at conveying abstract knowledge, a scientific doctrine, but on the contrary, as Galileo confirmed, it aims at increasing in us justice, charity, and the moral sense. (shrink)

There has lately been published a posthumous work on “pure realism” by an Italian philosopher who died a little while ago at an early age. He had been working on the book for some time with great concentration of energy, but did not live to finish it. In the form in which it has been edited for publication some parts of it have been developed almost to completion, while others are mere sketches and notes—though not wanting in interest, for they (...) reveal the author's method of working, and expose doubts and difficulties in the immediate form in which they presented themselves to his mind and found the way to a solution. The most complete section is one dealing with the critique of idealism, a critique which, while it is not devoid of ingenuity, is in the main stringent and vigorous, and deserves particularly the consideration of idealists. The principal thesis is that there are two possible solutions of the problem of consciousness. It admits the possibility either that consciousness itself creates its own world, endowing it, thanks to the action of the mind on its own images, with those physical attributes that make it appear external to the subject or independent of the activity by virtue of which it is formed ; or that consciousness is the immediate revelation of the world itself to itself, a revelation that can only consist in a unique act whereby the world establishes itself as identical with itself and as different from itself, as internal and external knowing and known, spirit and nature. At the basis of idealism, according to Ranzoli, is the implied presupposition that like is conscious only of like, and at the basis of realism is the Anaxagorean presupposition that opposite is conscious of opposite. (shrink)

Shaftesbury is one of those philosophers who are usually placed more or less in the margin of the history of thought because an insufficient idea of system and a certain looseness of conception make it difficult to grasp their ideas and to classify them. Yet when you are able to break down or to dismiss the mental figures in which you have been accustomed to consider the historical succession of doctrines and are prepared to revive their words with an open (...) mind, not only do they give you in their originality more than you had hoped, but also they help to render your representation of intellectual life as a whole more complex and more harmonious in its development. Bandini,1an Italian scholar, in making a zealous study of Shaftesbury, has succeeded in drawing out his rich personality, and at the same time in explaining the importance of his contribution to theperennis philosophia. We could hardly succeed in understanding the modern English mind in its genesis if we concentrated our attention exclusively on those empiristic currents which, although they preponderate in Anglo-Saxon speculation, do not contain all its originality. There is a deep fount of romance in the spirit of this people which wells up from time to time, and the drier and harder the surface earth the more strongly it gushes forth. Shaftesbury is just such a fount, isolated and inexplicable to all outward appearances, but far otherwise for anyone who knows how to penetrate below the surface. In his essay Bandini, while emphasizing the contrast between the philosophy of moral enthusiasm and feeling and the contemporaneous doctrines of Hobbes and Locke, examines with equal penetration the way in which the former becomes reattached to English speculative tradition and by what means it contributes in its turn to furnishing new trends in philosophy. (shrink)

Shaftesbury is one of those philosophers who are usually placed more or less in the margin of the history of thought because an insufficient idea of system and a certain looseness of conception make it difficult to grasp their ideas and to classify them. Yet when you are able to break down or to dismiss the mental figures in which you have been accustomed to consider the historical succession of doctrines and are prepared to revive their words with an open (...) mind, not only do they give you in their originality more than you had hoped, but also they help to render your representation of intellectual life as a whole more complex and more harmonious in its development. Bandini,1an Italian scholar, in making a zealous study of Shaftesbury, has succeeded in drawing out his rich personality, and at the same time in explaining the importance of his contribution to theperennis philosophia. We could hardly succeed in understanding the modern English mind in its genesis if we concentrated our attention exclusively on those empiristic currents which, although they preponderate in Anglo-Saxon speculation, do not contain all its originality. There is a deep fount of romance in the spirit of this people which wells up from time to time, and the drier and harder the surface earth the more strongly it gushes forth. Shaftesbury is just such a fount, isolated and inexplicable to all outward appearances, but far otherwise for anyone who knows how to penetrate below the surface. In his essay Bandini, while emphasizing the contrast between the philosophy of moral enthusiasm and feeling and the contemporaneous doctrines of Hobbes and Locke, examines with equal penetration the way in which the former becomes reattached to English speculative tradition and by what means it contributes in its turn to furnishing new trends in philosophy. (shrink)

F. Enriques and G. de Santillana have begun in collaboration the composition of a general history of scientific thought. The first volume of this work, which has been recently published, is concerned with the science of antiquity,1 and to a large extent covers the same ground as the history of ancient philosophy, as the frontiers of philosophy and natural science, at any rate until the time of Aristotle, were not yet clearly differentiated. But the two historians are interested in bringing (...) into prominence a great many problems and personalities that the history of philosophy generally leaves on one side, although they help to complete and vivify the picture of the mentality of the ancients. Mathematics, medicine, geography, astronomy, applied mechanics, and physics, in short all the particular scientific studies that were just beginning to detach themselves from the parent trunk of general philosophy are studied by the authors in their individual developments and through the personalities of their cultivators. The explanations are clear and simple and can be followed even by readers unversed in science; the information is at first hand and is supplemented by a careful discussion of sources. The scientific questions are not isolated from the historical setting of the civilization of antiquity, but are shown in relation to matters of philosophy, religion, art, and moral and political life. The bibliography, intended for the more purely scientific and technical departments of philosophy, forms a very useful and timely completion of the bibliography of philosophic thought in general. (shrink)

Among the studies on the history of philosophy recently published in Italy, one that may be of some interest to the English reader is by D R . Abbagnano , a young pupil of Aliotta , and is devoted to the new English idealism. 1 Truthfully speaking, the term ‘ new ’ is inappropriate, or partly so, because Abbagnano dedicates the greater part of his study to what we might call the ‘ old ’ idealism in England, represented by Stirling, (...) the two Cairds, Wallace, Green, and Bradley. However, he does also pass in review the more recent doctrines, particularly those of J. H. Muirhead, G. H. Howison, D. G. Richtie, J. E. Creighton, J. B. Baillie, J. S. Mackenzie, H. Jones, W. E. Hocking, A. S. Pringle Pattison, and G. P. Adams. Abbagnano regards as a distinctive trait of English idealism inspired by Hegel as opposed to Hegel himself, this, that “for Hegel the absolute is essentially process, change and becoming; it is thought which differentiates itself and becomes articulate in a life of its own, in the threefold rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which each moment passes into the next. For Green, Bradley, and Royce, the absolute is on the other hand immutability, completeness, static perfection, in which each process and becoming is overcome and resolved.” At any rate, Abbagnano is equally unsympathetic towards Hegel and towards his followers, against whom he opposes, not without scholastic ingenuity, his own irrationalistic views, set out in another book whose contents are sufficiently expressed in the title. 1. (shrink)

After an interruption of seven years I take up once again my surveys of Italian philosophy. Many things have happened in the interval, but it is perhaps too soon for them to be susceptible of calm philosophical reflection. The problems that most interest the cultured public to-day are those of existentialism, of historicism and its limits, of German romanticism, and, more generally, of Germanic culture in relation to new spiritual orientations. The interest in existentialism is due, at least in part, (...) to the fact that it is the philosophy in fashion. But there is in it nevertheless a depth of seriousness that is not overlooked. The tragedies of recent years have placed in the foreground the problems of immediate existence, of human personality and its place in the world, which the preceding idealistic philosophy had too easily absorbed in an impersonal and trans-subjective view of the spirit and its universal values. And, as has often happened in the course of history, there has resulted a reaction of individuality, in its most irrational and vital expressions, against the pretensions of reason to dominate it from above, and imprison it in the net of its concepts.But if, in this regard, existentialism represents a just demand, which can exercise a beneficial influence on philosophical thought, yet to many its claim to represent a new era in philosophy seems excessive. Its value is only that of an episode. Hence some interpreters of contemporary thought have been drawn to limit the importance of the new movement. (shrink)

Among the studies on the history of philosophy recently published in Italy, one that may be of some interest to the English reader is by D R . Abbagnano , a young pupil of Aliotta , and is devoted to the new English idealism. 1 Truthfully speaking, the term ‘ new ’ is inappropriate, or partly so, because Abbagnano dedicates the greater part of his study to what we might call the ‘ old ’ idealism in England, represented by Stirling, (...) the two Cairds, Wallace, Green, and Bradley. However, he does also pass in review the more recent doctrines, particularly those of J. H. Muirhead, G. H. Howison, D. G. Richtie, J. E. Creighton, J. B. Baillie, J. S. Mackenzie, H. Jones, W. E. Hocking, A. S. Pringle Pattison, and G. P. Adams. Abbagnano regards as a distinctive trait of English idealism inspired by Hegel as opposed to Hegel himself, this, that “for Hegel the absolute is essentially process, change and becoming; it is thought which differentiates itself and becomes articulate in a life of its own, in the threefold rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which each moment passes into the next. For Green, Bradley, and Royce, the absolute is on the other hand immutability, completeness, static perfection, in which each process and becoming is overcome and resolved.” At any rate, Abbagnano is equally unsympathetic towards Hegel and towards his followers, against whom he opposes, not without scholastic ingenuity, his own irrationalistic views, set out in another book whose contents are sufficiently expressed in the title. 1. (shrink)

In 1920 Bignone published an Italian translation of the writings and fragments of Epicurus in Laterza's library of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophers which in many respects added to and improved upon Usener's classic collection, of Epicurea. He has since then zealously prosecuted these studies, and arrived at some very interesting conclusions which he has given out in two volumes published lately.1 His starting-point is the observation that the writings of Epicurus often have a polemical tone, and not only rebut the (...) accusations of adversaries who misinterpret the new doctrine, but are often directed also against those preceding philosophers who denied to pleasure a stable and certain nature on which a system of ethics could be based. Bignone has set himself the task of particularizing these anonymous predecessors, and thereby bringing the Epicurean polemic into more striking relief. I t was easy and safe to start from the standpoint that Epicurus in his rehabilitation of pleasure had to oppose Plato and the Platonists, but at what Platonists in particular did he take aim? In answering this question Bignone has been able to make use of recent Aristotelian studies, especially those of Jaeger, which have thrown much light on the first phase of the Stagirite's philosophy, of a purely Platonic inspiration. As is well known, some exoteric dialogues belong to this phase, such as the Eudemos, the Protrepticon, and On Philosophy, which have to a large extent disappeared, though it has been found possible to reconstruct a few scattered fragments of them. The great scholastic works which reveal the full independence and maturity of Aristotle's genius have eclipsed them in the memory of posterity. But originally there were only these dialogues, the only ones published, to make Aristotle's thought known to the public outside the peripatetic school. The scholastic writings on the other hand remained unknown until the time of Sulla. What wonder, then, if Epicurus, in combating Platonism, had in mind these dialogues, which give out the fundamental conceptions of Platonism in a more decisive and dogmatic form than that of the Platonic dialogues? (shrink)

The changes and general alarm of the current COVID-19 pandemic have amplified the sense of precariousness and vulnerability for family members who, in addition to the emotional trauma of the cancer diagnosis, add the distress and fear of the risks associated with infection. The primary objectives of the present study were to investigate the psychological impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the parents of pediatric cancer patients, and the level of stress, anxiety, and the child’s quality of life perceived by (...) the parents during the COVID-19 epidemic. The parents of 45 consecutive children with solid and hematological tumors were enrolled. Four questionnaires were administered to the parents at the beginning of the pandemic lockdown. A 75% of parents exhibited remarkable levels of anxiety, with 60 subjects in state scale and 45 subjects in trait scale having scores that reached and exceeded the STAI-Y cut off. The bivariate matrix of correlation found a significant positive correlation between the IES-R and PSS scores. There was a positive correlation between the PSS and PedsQL scale and a negative correlation between IES-R and STAI-Y. The results confirm that parents of pediatric cancer patients have a high psychological risk for post-traumatic symptoms, high stress levels, and the presence of clinically significant levels of anxiety. (shrink)

Contacts between Italian and English thought of late years have been both frequent and effective.

PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION THIS work, which is now for the first time presented to the American public, was written when Existentialism had ...