The paper offers an account of how the meaning of the concept of “invention” and “inventorship” is not stable and predefined but rather constructed during patent disputes. In particular, I look at how that construction takes place in adversarial settings like the courts of law. I argue that key notions of intellectual property law like invention and inventorship are as constructed as technoscientific claims are in laboratories. Courts should thus be seen as sites of construction through processes framed by specific (...) discursive and evidentiary technologies like bureaucratic paperwork, literary technologies, historiographic accounts of inventorship, and models of artifacts and devices. I draw my examples from the British disputes of the Marconi Company concerning the patenting of wireless telegraph and radio communication technologies in the first half of the twentieth century. The paper tracks Marconi’s circulation of publications, models, historical reconstruction of inventions, and expert witnessing. It unravels the material, discursive, textual, and evidentiary constructions of legality. (shrink)

This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has `excess structure' over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic structural realism that it lacks the resources to accommodate causation within (...) its structuralist slogan. (shrink)

This paper offers an intellectual history of the scientific realism debate during the twentieth century. The telling of the tale will explain the philosophical significance and the prospects of the scientific realism debate, through the major turns it went through. The emphasis will be on the relations between empiricism and scientific realism and on the swing from metaphysics-hostile to metaphysics-friendly versions of realism.

ABSTRACT I discuss Nadia Urbinati's argument by highlighting an alternative dimension of populism, one that departs from the same assumptions but reaches a different understanding: populism as an antisystem electoralist strategy, one that is part of the technology of democratic competition.

A great deal of violence in civil wars is informed by the logic of terrorism: violence tends to be used by political actors against civilians in order to shape their political behavior. I focus on indiscriminate violence in the context of civil war: this is a type of violence that selects its victims on the basis of their membership in some group and irrespective of their individual actions. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that indiscriminate violence in civil war is informed by (...) the logic of terrorism. I argue that under certain conditions, that tend to be quite common, such violence is counter productive. I specify these conditions and address the following paradox: why do we sometimes observe instances of indiscriminate violence evenunder conditions that make this strategy counterproductive? I review four possible reasons: truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints. I argue that indiscriminate violence emerges because it is much cheaper than its main alternative – selective violence. It is more likely under a steep imbalance of power between the competing actors, and where and when resources and information are low; however, most political actors eventually switch to selective violence. Thus, given a balance of power between competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages of the conflict. Overall, the paper suggests that even extreme forms of violence are used strategically. (shrink)

Scientific Realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it to be. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study, which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and modern skeptical empiricism. Scientific Realism explains that (...) the history of science does not undermine the notion of scientific realism, and instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and to modern sceptical empiricism. _Scientific Realism_ explains that the (...) history of science does not undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book. (shrink)

This indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science contains fifty-five specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences. The _Companion_ covers everything students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including: a section on the individual (...) sciences, including chapters on the philosophy of biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter. (shrink)

The theoretical problem Bensaïd tries to confront from the 1990s onwards is the problem of the categories that are necessary to account for the traumatically new experience of history opened up by the defeat of the revolutionary experiments of the twentieth century. Hence the necessity of new answers to these fundamental and inexhaustible questions: How are we to understand history in its relation to human practice and to politics? Can we talk of ‘necessity’ in history, of ‘laws of history’, of (...) ‘determination’, or ‘determinism’, or of modes of causality operating within it? How are we to conceive the notions of ‘historical possibility’, of ‘conflict’ and ‘struggle’? Bensaïd’s contribution will focus on a dialectical notion of temporality that implies a primacy of politics over history and a break with the traditional Marxist notions of a historical subject as an internally homogeneous and fully-sovereign collective force. (shrink)

Cornelius Castoriadis's theory of sublimation is not only innovative within the Freudian tradition, but opens up the domain of inquiry as to society's process of radical social institution. Sublimation is indeed socialization, not merely aesthetic cathexis. A specific sort of sublimation that may be said to mobilize the project of autonomy is linked to philosophy both because it is implicated in a process of interminable interrogation, and because it involves the psyche's practical and poetic engagement with the creation of new (...) imaginary forms. Philosophy's task, in this sense, is to consider thought from the standpoint of the unthought, a daring task that cannot ultimately take place without one's fully-fledged acceptance of one's own finitude. (shrink)

This article deals with a question of a most general, comprehensive and profound content as it is the nature of mathematical–logical objects insofar as these are considered objects of knowledge and more specifically objects of formal mathematical theories. As objects of formal theories they are dealt with in the sense they have acquired primarily from the beginnings of the systematic study of mathematical foundations in connection with logic dating from the works of G. Cantor and G. Frege in the last (...) decades of the nineteenth century. Largely motivated by a phenomenologically founded view of mathematical objects/states-of-affairs, I try to consistently argue for their character as objects shaped to a certain extent by intentional forms exhibited by consciousness and the modes of constitution of inner temporality and at the same time as constrained in the form of immanent ‘appearances’ by what stands as their non-eliminable reference, that is, the world as primitive soil of experience and the mathematical intuitions developed in relations of reciprocity within-the-world. In this perspective and relative to my intentions I enter, in the last section, into a brief review of certain positions of G. Sher’s foundational holism and R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, among others, respectively presented in Sher and Tieszen. (shrink)

This article attempts a subjectively based approach, in fact one phenomenologically motivated, toward some key concepts of forcing theory, primarily the concepts of a generic set and its global properties and the absoluteness of certain fundamental relations in the extension to a forcing model M[G]. By virtue of this motivation and referring both to the original and current formulation of forcing I revisit certain set-theoretical notions serving as underpinnings of the theory and try to establish their deeper subjectively founded content (...) and also their influence in reaching relative consistency results by the forcing method. In this perspective, the present approach may be seen as offering an alternative view of the consistency results of K. Gödel and P. Cohen in mathematical foundations reaching a subjective level that may be taken as ultimately conditioning the non-decidability of key infinity statements on the level of formal theory. (shrink)

In this article my primary intention is to engage in a discussion on the inherent constraints of models, taken as models of theories, that reaches beyond the epistemological level. Naturally the paper takes into account the ongoing debate between proponents of the syntactic and the semantic view of theories and that between proponents of the various versions of scientific realism, reaching down to the most fundamental, subjective level of discourse. In this approach, while allowing for a limited discussion of physical (...) and positive science models, I am primarily focused on the structure and ontology of mathematical models, in particular Cohen’s forcing models and to a lesser extent Gödel’s constructible universe, to the extent that these were designed to answer questions bearing on the scope, the capacity and ultimately the ontology of models themselves, therefore influencing in one or the other way the status of models in general. This status, it is argued, is largely defined by the way models subsume a set-theoretical structure whose constraints, reducible to an extra-linguistic level of discourse, may implicitly condition the epistemic status of models as representations of axiomatic theories. In the last section I deal extensively with the inner constraints of theories as subjectively originated in a less technical philosophically oriented discussion with certain prompts from phenomenology. (shrink)

Enlightenment thought is widely considered to consist of four key features--atheism, democracy, humanism, and modernity. Common to all is an explicit process of desacralization. Yet the intellectual history of these concepts reveals that in the process of desacralization new sacred spaces arose in their name. The aim of Nothing Sacred is to question this second-order sacralization and consider, in a form of negative dialectics, whether (and how) these domains can argue against themselves in order to once again desacralize their own (...) self-sacralization. Secular critique is not simply an attack on religion but rather on the range of society's unavowed self-occlusions. Its object is to elucidate the politics and practices of knowledge that animate them. In the field of religion critique challenges the alleged permanence of political theology and transforms the epistemologies of both sacred and secular. For Stathis Gourgouris the state of nature that he terms political animality critiques political theology much as the anarchy of democracy, inhabited by it, critiques sovereignty. He takes aim at the desacralizing capacity of these historical formations, which produce their own historical conditions for self-sacralization, in order to demonstrate their dynamic subversive power against deeply ensconced conditions of disempowerment and incapacitation and to understand how societies and individuals are driven to self-subversion and self-disempowerment. These forces are alive today in the form of discursive "posts"--posthumanism, postdemocracy, post-truth, postracial--which are just as self-sacralizing. Exposing them is not a nostalgic liberal return to an idealized past but an expansive anarchic ontological affirmation of the political dimensions of human animality on a planetary scale and of a radical politics in which democracy has severed its bind to capitalism. Nothing Sacred thinks across orders, obstacles, and intersectional spaces in a world of warring multipolar oligarchies and psychotic rage. (shrink)

Transformation, not transcendence -- The lesson of Pierre Clastres -- On self-alteration -- Realism -- Paul's Greek -- Every religion is idolatry.

Stathis Psillos divides his account into three sections: causation, laws of nature, and explanation. He begins the causation section with Hume's classic "reductive" account and then focuses on the subsequent division between Humean and non-Humean accounts, examining topics such as regularities and singular causation, causation and counterfactuals, and causation and mechanism.

A debated issue in the mathematical foundations in at least the last two decades is whether one can plausibly argue for the merits of treating undecidable questions of mathematics, e.g., the Continuum Hypothesis, by relying on the existence of a plurality of set-theoretical universes except for a single one, i.e., the well-known set-theoretical universe V associated with the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The multiverse approach has some varying versions of the general concept of multiverse yet my intention is to primarily (...) address ontological multiversism as advocated, for instance, by Hamkins or Väätänen, precisely for the reason that they proclaim, to the one or the other extent, ontological preoccupations for the introduction of respective multiverse theories. Taking also into account Woodin’s and Steel’s multiverse versions, I take up an argumentation against multiversism, and in a certain sense against platonism in mathematical foundations, mainly on subjectively founded grounds, while keeping an eye on Clarke-Doane’s concern with Benacerraf’s challenge. I note that even though the paper is rather technically constructed in arguing against multiversism, the non-negligible philosophical part is influenced to a certain extent by a phenomenologically motivated view of the matter. (shrink)

Phenomenology can be roughly described as the theory of the pure essences of phenomena. Yet the meaning of essence and of concepts traditionally tied to it are far from settled. This is especially true given the impact modern science has had on established philosophical views and the need for revisiting certain core notions of philosophy. In this paper I intend to review Husserl’s view on thingness-essence and his conception of the essence of individuals, based mainly in his writings from the (...) time of Logical Investigations, Ideas, and later of Experience and Judgment. Taking account of the work of Lothar Eley in Die Krise des Apriori, among others, I will inquire into the ways in which phenomenology may undermine the view of essences as non-factual, as well as undermine their ontological priority. Doing so may help to shape a conception of material or formal individual essences and generally of essences as concrete objects of experience in virtue of well-defined epistemic ones. (shrink)

In this article, as implied by the title, I intend to argue for the unattainability of Cantor’s Absolute at least in terms of the proof-theoretical means of set-theory and of the theory of large cardinals. For this reason a significant part of the article is a critical review of the progress of set-theory and of mathematical foundations toward resolving problems which to the one or the other degree are associated with the concept of infinity especially the one beyond that of (...) the natural intuition of natural numbers. Naturally the review includes the foundation and development of the theory of large cardinals, especially after Cohen’s revolutionary introduction of the forcing method, insofar as it paved the way toward a transcendence of the delimitative character of Gödel’s constructible universe L and further toward ever stronger infinity assumptions. Given that Cantor in his theory of transfinite numbers defined the mathematical absolute in ontological rather than concrete mathematical terms, I proceed in the last section to a philosophical discussion with certain prompts from phenomenology regarding the transposability of the formal conception of the infinite to the level of subjective constitution and argue in these terms on the infeasibility of acceding to an ‘absolute’ infinite cardinality. Of course the argumentation is strongly based on a view of the set-theoretical universe V of von Neumann’s cumulative hierarchy as a formal representative of the essential traits one would seek from a model of Cantor’s Absolute. It is also based on the conclusions reached from the whole discussion within the context of formal-theoretical structures as such. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis of methodological mechanism, the claim that to be committed to mechanism is to adopt a certain methodological postulate, i.e. to look for causal pathways for the phenomena of interest. We argue that methodological mechanism incorporates a minimal account of understanding mechanisms, according to which a mechanism just is a causal pathway described in the language of theory. In order to argue for this position we discuss a central example of a biological mechanism, the mechanism of (...) cell death, known as apoptosis. We argue that this example shows that our philosophically deflationary account is sufficient in order to have an illuminating account of mechanisms as the concept is used in biology. (shrink)

It is well known that in his later years Gödel turned to a systematic reading of phenomenology, whose founder, Edmund Husserl, was highly esteem as a philosopher who sought to elevate philosophy to the standards of a rigorous science. For reasons purportedly related to his earlier attraction to Leibnizian monadology, Gödel was particularly interested in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and the way it may shape the discussion on the nature of mathematical‐logical objects and the meaning and internal coherence of primitive terms (...) in mathematics. This article, which is less interested in historical facts that are amply presented in other scholars’ accounts, rather tries to point to the mostly indirect influence that the ideas of transcendental phenomenology, including Gödel's reported reference to the notion of (inner) time, had on his philosophy of mathematics, especially with a view to key independent questions of mathematical foundations. A main source for Gödel's philosophical‐epistemological views (of course in addition to his own published material) will be his recorded discussions with H. Wang and S. Toledo, as well as various articles and drafts found in his Nachlass. (shrink)

What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? And can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of this book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity view of laws and laws as relations among universals, as well as recent alternative (...) approaches to laws. Part 3 examines the issues arising from deductive-nomological explanation, statistical explanation, the explanation of laws and the metaphysics of explanation. Accessible to readers of all levels, this book provides an excellent introduction to one of the most enduring problems of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I deal with the notion of observation, from a phenomenologically motivated point of view, and its representation mainly by means of the formal language of quantum mechanics. In doing so, I have taken the notion of observation in two diverse contexts. In one context as a notion related with objects of a logical-mathematical theory taken as registered facts of phenomenological perception ( Wahrnehmung ) inasmuch as this phenomenological idea can also be linked with a process of measurement (...) on the quantum-mechanical level. In another context I have taken it as connected with a notion of temporal constitution basically as it is described in E. Husserl’s texts on the phenomenology of temporal consciousness. Given that mathematical objects as formal-ontological objects can be thought of as abstractions of perceptual objects by means of categorial intuition, the question is whether and under what theoretical assumptions we can, in principle, include quantum objects in abstraction in the class of formal-ontological objects and thus inquire on the limits of their description within a formal-axiomatical theory. On the one hand, I derive an irreducibility on the level of individuals taken in formal representation as syntactical atoms-substrates without any further content and on the other hand a transcendental subjectivity of consciousness objectified as a self-constituted temporal unity upon which it is ultimately grounded the possibility of generation of an abstract predicative universe of discourse. (shrink)

In this article I am going to argue for the possibility of a transcendental source of logic based on a phenomenologically motivated approach. My aim will be essentially carried out in two succeeding steps of reduction: the first one will be the indication of existence of an inherent temporal factor conditioning formal predicative discourse and the second one, based on a supplementary reduction of objective temporality, will be a recourse to a time-constituting origin which has to be assumed as a (...) non-temporal, transcendental subjectivity and for that reason as possibly the ultimate transcendental root of pure logic. In the development of the argumentation and taking into account W.V. Quine’s views in his well-known Word and Object, a special emphasis will be given to the fundamentally temporal character of universal and existential predicative forms, to their status in logical theories in general, and to their underlying role in generating an inherently non-finitistic character reflected, for instance, in the undecidability of certain infinity statements in formal mathematical theories. This is shown also to concern metatheorems of such vital importance as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in mathematical foundations. Moreover in the course of the discussion the quest for the ultimate limits of predication will lead to the notions of separation and intentional correlation between an ‘observing’ subject and the object of ‘observation’ as well as to the notion of syntactical individuals taken as the irreducible non-analytic nuclei-forms within analytical discourse. (shrink)

As implied by the title this article deals with a key question running through the history of philosophy virtually since antiquity. This is the question of the relationship, on ontological grounds, of the transcendental and the mundane “universes” to the extent that the nature of transcendence, even as detached from the metaphysical sphere and recalibrated in terms of immanence in the broadly conceived subjectivist tradition, it is still a highly controversial issue primarily in continental philosophy. This is especially true in (...) view of the obvious incompatibility, at least in a naive sense, of the transcendental and the mundane contexts for which the philosophical discussion on phenomenological grounds is still open. My own arguments on the issue are mainly based on the Husserlian and Heideggerian narratives and also on E. Fink’s approach to the transcendence versus mundanity ontological problematic. On these prompts I set out to defend the position that there are serious reasons to regard the realm of transcendence as ineluctably constrained by mundanity concerns. More concretely I will try to show that there is no way, at least in the context of the phenomenological discourse, to do away with a kind of mundanity influence even in the most pure transcendental level involving the cornerstone of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology which is the concept of absolute ego. My overall approach, more than an attempt at vindicating Fink’s objections as to the purely transcendental level reached after the radical phenomenological reduction, is a demonstration of the conceptual pitfalls or even circularities involved along the way in trying to establish a sound foundation for a purely transcendental ontological level. (shrink)

This article is primarily concerned with the articulation of a defensible position on the relevance of phenomenological analysis with the current epistemological edifice as this latter has evolved since the rupture with the classical scientific paradigm pointing to the Newtonian-Leibnizian tradition which took place around the beginning of 20th century. My approach is generally based on the reduction of the objects-contents of natural sciences, abstracted in the form of ideal objectivities in the corresponding logical-mathematical theories, to the content of meaning-acts (...) ultimately referring to a specific being-within-the-world experience. This is a position that finds itself in line with Husserl’s gradual departure from the psychologistic interpretations of his earlier works on the philosophy of logic and mathematics and culminates in a properly meant phenomenological foundation of natural sciences in his last major published work, namely the Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology. Further this article tries to set up a context of discourse in which to found both physical and formal objects in parallel terms as essentially temporal-noematic objects to the extent that they may be considered as invariants of the constitutional modes of a temporal consciousness. (shrink)

Many philosophers claimed that there might be fertile ground for collaboration between IBE and the objective end of the Bayesian methodology. Recent literature is investigated in this chapter, to highlight the latest developments about the possibility of such a collaboration. The merits of the convergence of the two methods are presented. It is argued that arriving on this end is not an easy goal as there are four ways by which subjective considerations may overshadow the objective picture. The existence of (...) subjective virtues, the vagueness of the mapping, the absence of an accurate weighting, and the existence of partial virtues allow the generation of infinitely many different initializations of priors and likelihoods, thus keeping the explanationist away from the objective extreme. Hence, either the explanationist successfully faces up with each one of the four problems so as to converge to the objective end or she ends up in a semi-objective position, whereby the explanatory restrictions allow a bunch of equally good probability distributions. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue “The Meta-Inductive Approach to Hume’s Problem”. The introduction includes introductory remarks and brief comments on each of the papers appearing in the special issue.

This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, (...) French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive-and viable-realist thesis. (shrink)