L'utilitarisme té com a criteri bàsic aconseguir el màxim bé per al màxim nombre possible de persones. L'utilitarisme dóna molta importància a la recerca de la felicitat personal. Aquest llibre en descriu les tesis bàsiques i respon a les principals acusacions que ha rebut.

Ser modern és ser racionalista. Aquest llibre repassa amb detall les tesis de Descartes, la seva relació amb els contemporanis i les conseqüències de les seves teories.

Computer simulations have conventionally been understood to be either extensions of formal methods such as mathematical models or as special cases of empirical practices such as experiments. Here, I argue that computer simulations are best understood as instruments. Understanding them as such can better elucidate their actual role as well as their potential epistemic standing in relation to science and other scientific methods, practices and devices.

In this paper I argue that Artificial Intelligence and the many data science methods associated with it, such as machine learning and large language models, are first and foremost epistemic technologies. In order to establish this claim, I first argue that epistemic technologies can be conceptually and practically distinguished from other technologies in virtue of what they are designed for, what they do and how they do it. I then proceed to show that unlike other kinds of technology (_including_ other (...) epistemic technologies) AI can be uniquely positioned as an epistemic technology in that it is primarily designed, developed and deployed to be used in _epistemic contexts_ such as inquiry, it is specifically designed, developed and deployed to manipulate _epistemic content_ such as data, _and_ it is designed, developed and deployed to do so particularly through _epistemic operations_ such as prediction and analysis. As has been shown in recent work in the philosophy and ethics of AI (Alvarado, AI and Ethics, 2022a), understanding AI as an epistemic technology will also have significant implications for important debates regarding our relationship to AI technologies. This paper includes a brief overview of such implications, particularly those pertaining to explainability, opacity, trust and even epistemic harms related to AI technologies. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 121-133, February 2022.

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of computational tools and of data science methods in healthcare has, undoubtedly, raised a whole new set of bioethical challenges. As Laacke and colleagues rightly note,...

Within the climate justice debate, the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle holds that those who benefit from greenhouse emissions associated with industrialization ought to pay for the costs of mitigating and adapting to their adverse effects. This principle constitutes a claim of inter-generational justice, and it is widely believed that the non-identity problem raises serious difficulties for any such claim. After briefly sketching the rationale behind ‘beneficiary pays,’ this paper offers a new way of understanding the claim that persons in developed societies (...) have benefited from industrialization. It argues that when we think of the claim in this new way, it evades the non-identity problem entirely. Some objections to this approach are then considered and rebutted. The paper concludes by comparing the present, relatively modest solution to the nonidentity problem with a much more ambitious attempt from the recent literature. (shrink)

Siempre se ha reconocido en Pirrón de Élide el inicio puntual del escepticismo griego. Sabemos ya hoy que esta información, sesgada, proviene más de la necesidad de Enesidemo de refundar el movimiento, que de la realidad filosófica. En este artículo demostramos que Pirrón, ni tuvo consciencia de ser un escéptico, ni, en rigor, inició ninguna nueva corriente. Su deslizamiento, y posterior reconocimiento, hacia el escepticismo, debe más bien encuadrarse en el natural desarrollo de la filosofía abderita, a través de Metrodoro (...) de Quíos, discípulo de Demócrito, Anaxarco maestro de Pirrón y Nausífanes su discípulo. Y todo debido al afán aventurero del personaje de Élide al enrolarse en el séquito de Alejandro Magno. (shrink)

The rapid development of large language models (LLM’s) and of their associated interfaces such as ChatGPT has brought forth a wave of epistemic and moral concerns in a variety of domains of inquiry...

En este artículo se exponen las principales ideas de Hans Kelsen y Carl Schmitt en torno a la guerra y la paz en las relaciones internacionales a partir de la idea de ‘pacif is- mo jurídico’ y se valora su sentido a la luz del debate contemporáneo sobre las lamadas “guerra humanitaria” y “guerra contra el terrorismo”.

A logic in a finite language is said to be finitely presentable if it is axiomatized by finitely many finite rules. It is proved that binary non-indexed products of logics that are both finitely presentable and finitely equivalential are essentially finitely presentable. This result does not extend to binary non-indexed products of arbitrary finitely presentable logics, as shown by a counterexample. Finitely presentable logics are then exploited to introduce finitely presentable Leibniz classes, and to draw a parallel between the Leibniz (...) and the Maltsev hierarchies. (shrink)

Carnéades es un escéptico académico y un pragmático que quiere fundamentar la ética no en la idea de Bien o Valor, sino en la noción de bien útil, convincente y conveniente. Una noción basada no tanto en hacer algo grande que merezca la admiración o el elogio de las personas, sino en no hacer mal a nadie y extender el bienestar personal a la mayoría. Para ello creó una norma o guía, una regla de conducta probable o persuasiva que invitaba (...) a actuar sin pretensiones ni orgullo, decidiendo en cada momento lo que parece más probable o persuasivo en cada ocasión para evitar la apraxia en la acción moral. Además, fue el primero en distinguir entre seguir una acción moral con la pauta de la probabilidad, y la imposibilidad de asentir a ella con seguridad de no equivocarnos. (shrink)

A logic is selfextensional if its interderivability (or mutual consequence) relation is a congruence relation on the algebra of formulas. In the paper we characterize the selfextensional logics with a conjunction as the logics that can be defined using the semilattice order induced by the interpretation of the conjunction in the algebras of their algebraic counterpart. Using the charactrization we provide simpler proofs of several results on selfextensional logics with a conjunction obtained in [13] using Gentzen systems. We also obtain (...) some results on Fregean logics with conjunction. (shrink)

La crítica de los valores ejercida por Nietzsche problematiza el origen de los valores. La filosofía tradicional considera que éstos tienen un origen privilegiado, ya sea de naturaleza teológica o metafísica. Este origen supremo es lo que les otorga una validez incuestionable. El pensador alemán se opone a esta convicción y propone la tesis contraria: los valores provienen, no de una región plena de realidad, sino de un ámbito sujeto al cambio, al azar y a la contingencia. Esto posibilita concebir (...) los valores sumos como creaciones humanas susceptibles de examen. La crítica de los valores suscita así un extrañamiento ante lo familiar, pues los valores heredados se tornan ajenos. De igual forma, conlleva un ejercicio de remoción de máscaras encubridoras que busca exhibir aquello que se oculta en los valores heredados, a saber, el carácter nihilista de los principios fundamentales de la cultura occidental. (shrink)

Book Information World Poverty and Human Rights. World Poverty and Human Rights Thomas Pogge Cambridge Polity Press 2002 vii + 284 Paperback US$28, £18 By Thomas Pogge. Polity Press. Cambridge. Pp. vii + 284. Paperback:US$28, £18.

El tratamiento dispensado al hecho religioso en nuestro país y en general en las sociedades avanzadas es discriminatorio respecto a otros colectivos y grupos sociales. Discriminatorio en una dimensión interna y externa. Internamente, porque no todos los grupos religiosos reciben el mismo trato jurídico. Externamente, porque otros grupos sociales distintos a los religiosos, que buscan otros fines, no reciben el mismo trato que los grupos religiosos, sino más desfavorable. Junto a una primera discriminación en el ámbito extraeclesial -el de las (...) confesiones religiosas en su relación con las demás asociaciones del país-, hay otros dos supuestos en el ámbito intraeclesial -el de las relaciones de los grupos religiosos entre sí-, el contraste de las opciones fideístas y las no fideístas críticas y el de las confesiones religiosas mayoritarias y minoritarias. En uno y otro caso, interna y externamente, el hecho religioso se convierte en un criterio de discriminación, sin que en mi opinión existan razones objetivas suficientes. (shrink)

E l auto r de f iend e un a democraci a a r mónica , qu e n o e s u n model o nu ev o d e democracia sin o l a relació n equilibrad a d e la s do s modalidade s clásica s d e democracia , l a representat iv a y l a directa , a la s qu e s e añadirí a l a democraci a pa r ticipat iv (...) a prom o vid a po r lo s ciudadanos, ind i vidualment e o e n gr upo , a l ma r ge n d e lo s pa r tido s políticos . L a resultant e serí a un nu evo marc o polític o co n meno s democraci a representat iva (l a d e lo s pa r tido s político s y lo s representante s electos) , q u e actualment e e s l a democraci a e xclus iva y e xclu y ent e en la s sociedade s política s a v anzadas , má s democraci a direct a (l a d e lo s ciudadano s qu e sin inte r mediario s v otaría n política s y n o sól o a su s representantes ) y u n nu evo espaci o polític o ocupad o po r lo s ciudadanos-actore s político s si n militanci a pa r tidista . E n cad a uno d e esto s tre s modelo s democrático s s e analiz a l a de f inició n de l modelo , e l escenari o que actualment e atr a vies a y la s propuesta s concreta s d e cambio. (shrink)