Baumrind provides a fifty-year updating of her pioneering, extraordinarily influential ethical critique of the Milgram obedience experiments. She essentially reaffirms her earlier objections. These include the extensive use of deception, particularly in the informed consent phase, the destructive obedience exhibited by Milgram’s research personnel, violations of the experimenter’s fiduciary role of trust and empathy, the likelihood of lasting psychological harm experienced by at least some participants, and unwarranted generalizations made to the Nazi Holocaust in World War II. I consider each (...) of these concerns, among others, and find areas of agreement and disagreement with Baumrind. Her argument against the use of deception in the informed consent phase is convincing, as is her cautionary stance on generalizations made to the Nazi genocide. I take issue with her views on lasting harm, the epistemological value of deception, and the experimenter as fiduciary. Regardless of one’s agreement with Baumrind, her ethical arguments, considered in historical context, remain integral to an understanding of the impact of the obedience experiments. Her views have been seminal in changing the ethical monitoring of research with human participants. (shrink)

As the title indicates, This paper represents an examination of the relationships obtaining among the concepts of foresight, Intention, And responsibility. It begins with a critical analysis of the legal and quasi-Moral principle of the resumption of intentionality (i.E., An agent is presumed to have intended the "foreseeable" consequences of her intentional actions). It is shown that, While legally indispensable, It will simply not withstand philosophical scrutiny for purposes of ascribing moral responsibility. I proceed eventually to an evaluation of a (...) proposal which would make foresight itself a sufficient--Though not a necessary--Condition for the ascription of responsibility. The strengths and weaknesses of such a proposal are assessed within both legal and moral contexts. Having distinguished between what I term the "hard-Liners" vs. The "soft-Liners" to the debate, I give my reasons for aligning myself with the hard-Liners (i.E., Those who might be sympathetically inclined to my alternate proposal). (shrink)

In order to speak in the voice of “the pervert,” psychoanalysis inevitably find itself performing the classic rhetorical act of prosopopoeia whereby an imagined, absent, or dead person is represented as speaking. To re-read Jacques-Alain Miller’s classic essay “On Perversion” (1996), for example, we find that the pervert is adjudged to be “unspeakable”—in every sense of that word—and so they can only be ventriloquized by the figure of the analyst. If the analyst seeks to speak on behalf of the pervert, (...) however, this essay argues that the perverse speech act is itself a form of prosopopoeia which can ventriloquize the subject position of the hysteric, the neurotic, the psychotic, and even the analyst themselves. In conclusion, the essay argues that Miller’s account of the relationship between the analyst and the pervert, where each are seen to ventriloquize the other, bespeaks of a certain prosopopophilia—a love of prosopopoeia—that is the condition of being a speaking subject in the first place: I am always speaking for and as the other—even or especially when I am speaking as “myself.”. (shrink)

ARTHUR PRIOR once wrote that "philosophical discussion of the notion of existence, or being, has centred on two main problems...." One of them was the problem of what to say about the existence of fictitious objects, and the other the problem of what to say about abstract objects. Historically, however, this claim is hardly correct; for the existence of individuals that are real rather than fictitious, and concrete rather than abstract, has been at least as central a topic as (...) those mentioned by Prior. It is with the existence of such individuals that I shall be concerned in this paper. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of David Rayfield's attempt to distinguish true from correct descriptions of human actions (Inquiry, Vol. 13 [1970], Nos. 1?2). It is argued that the analysis fails to do the job required of it for two reasons. First, the analysis of true descriptions is circular insofar as it turns on the notion of an ?unbound action?. Secondly, and independent of the charge of circularity, it is shown that the basis upon which Rayfield draws the true?correct (...) distinction leads to certain unacceptable consequences for action theory. (shrink)

This essay argues that the affective component inherent in the enthymeme is the essence of aristotle's concept of the enthymeme as practical reasoning. 'affective component' refers to emotions and feelings. The three proofs of the thesis are the etymology of 'enthymeme', Aristotle's works on human action and practical wisdom, And aristotle's rhetoric. These sources show the inherent relation between enthymemes and phronesis, Or practical reasoning, Not nous, Or abstract intellect.

ARTHUR PRIOR BEQUEATHED US the perceptive advice that "it is always a useful exercise, when told that something was possible, that is, could have happened, to ask 'When was it possible?' 'When could it have happened?'" Illustrating his point by considering whether it was possible for God to have "launched Julius Caesar into being, or arranged his coming into being, at a different time and under different circumstances," Prior's reply was "I doubt it." What God certainly could have done (...) was to launch into being some man with precisely those properties that Caesar did subsequently have; but what He could not have done, says Prior, was to "launch Caesar" or "create Caesar" in any sense "in which, He having said 'Let there be a man, with properties X to Z,' and there then starting to be a man with those properties, one could intelligibly ask 'But was this the man you wanted?' or intelligibly say 'This--and no other--was the man God intended.'". (shrink)

Arthur Miller is one of the most important and enduring playwrights of the last fifty years. This new edition of The Theater Essays has been expanded by nearly fifty percent to include his most significant articles and interviews since the book's initial publication in 1978. Within these pages Miller discusses the roots of modern drama, the nature of tragedy, and the state of contemporary theater; offers illuminating observations on Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, O'Neill, and Williams; probes the different approaches and (...) attitudes toward theater in Russia, China, and at home; and, of course, provides valuable insights into his own vast dramatic corpus. For this edition the literary chronology and cast and production information have been updated, and an extensive new bibliography has been added. The Theater Essays confirms Arthur Miller's standing as a brilliant, eloquent commentator on drama and culture. No one interested in theater should be without this definitive collection. (shrink)

It has been said that those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. It is important, therefore, to consider the parallels between the decimation of basic and applied biology by Trofim Denisovich Lysenko in the Soviet Union earlier in this century and the battering of present-day biotechnology by the Clinton administration. In both cases, we see the sacrifice of new science to old myth; heterodox, unscientific theories steering public policy; the abject failure of that public policy, (...) with dire outcomes for research and commerce; and glib, condescending, and exclusionary attitudes toward policymaking. (shrink)

We are often warned against stepping onto ‘slippery slopes’ — dangerously slick slides leading down to where the really bad stuff lies. But, as Arthur Miller here explains, these warnings often exaggerate the risk of a slip.

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a probabilistic framework that is adequate for the formulation of quantum theory and faithful to its applications. Contrary to claims, which are examined and rebutted, that quantum theory employs a nonclassical probability theory based on a nonclassical "logic," the probabilistic framework set out here is entirely classical and the "logic" used is Boolean. The framework consists of a set of states and a set of quantities that are interrelated in a (...) specified manner. Each state induces a classical probability space on the values of each quantity. The quantities, so considered, become statistical variables (not random variables). Such variables need not have a "joint distribution." For the quantum theoretic application, there is a uniform procedure that defines and determines the existence of such "joint distributions" for statistical variables. A general rule is provided and it is shown to lead to the usual compatibility-commutivity requirements of quantum theory. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of interference and the misunderstandings that are involved in the false move from interference to nonclassical probability. (shrink)

This paper discusses a problem arising from the way in which John Searle marks the distinction between intentional and unintentional action (Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 253?80), namely, that of adequately distinguishing those events which we regard as unintentional actions on the part of an agent from those other events occasioned by or brought about as a result of his action which we (correctly) do not countenance as actions of any sort ? unintentional or otherwise. Searle's attempt to distinguish them in (...) terms of the ?proximity of the contents of intentions? is examined and rejected, and an alternative account which exploits the anthropocentric character of our action vocabulary is proposed and defended. The discussion ends with a brief indication of some other difficulties engendered by Searle's analysis. (shrink)

This paper is a critical discussion of Robert T. Hall's recent attempt to construct a "minimal" definition of 'civil disobedience.' It is shown that the analysis, if applied consistently, results in a definition which is too minimal in including far too much under the rubric of 'civil disobedience.’ Furthermore, it is argued that Hall himself is not consistent in his treatment, the result being a definition which is too restrictive insofar as it excludes certain clear cases of civilly disobedient action. (...) It is shown that the inadequacies in Hall's minimal definition stem from an underlying confusion in his understanding of civil disobedience, the nature of which is indicated by examining his treatment of one of the features commonly held to be essential to acts of civil disobedience, namely, the publicity attending their performance. Finally, my argument is intended to demonstrate that any proposed definition of 'civil disobedience' which does not include reference to a publicity condition is bound to fail to do the job required of it. (shrink)

This paper represents an attempt to formulate an altemative naturalistic account of alleged, but well-documented, cases of medium telepathy to rival variants of the so-called Super-ESP hypothesis. The attempt proceeds by extrapolation from an analogy between contemporary criteria and methods for determining the point of death and those employed a century ago, a difference which is a matter of kind, and not one merely of degree. It is argued (1) that the suggested hypothesis of “diminished consciousness” is logically possible and (...) no more empirically improbable than Super-ESP, and (2) that there is a genuine sense in which its empirical standing is much better established insofar as it lends itself more readily than Super-ESP to the test of falsifiabiIity. In a way, this could be read as investing Kant’s metaphysical hypothesis of diminution of consciousness with empirical content. (shrink)

This paper represents an attempt to formulate an altemative naturalistic account of alleged, but well-documented, cases of medium telepathy to rival variants of the so-called Super-ESP hypothesis. The attempt proceeds by extrapolation from an analogy between contemporary criteria and methods for determining the point of death and those employed a century ago, a difference which is a matter of kind, and not one merely of degree. It is argued (1) that the suggested hypothesis of “diminished consciousness” is logically possible and (...) no more empirically improbable than Super-ESP, and (2) that there is a genuine sense in which its empirical standing is much better established insofar as it lends itself more readily than Super-ESP to the test of falsifiabiIity. In a way, this could be read as investing Kant’s metaphysical hypothesis of diminution of consciousness with empirical content. (shrink)

This compelling work brings together an array of distinguished scholars to explore key concepts, theories, and findings pertaining to some of the most fundamental issues in social life: the conditions under which people are kind and helpful to others or, conversely, under which they commit harmful, even murderous, acts. Covered are such topics as the complex interaction of individual, societal, and situational factors underpinning good or evil behavior; the role of guilt and the self-concept; and issues of responsibility and motivation, (...) including why good people do bad things. The volume also examines whether aggression and violence are inescapable aspects of human nature, and how cooperative interaction can break down stereotyping and discrimination. (shrink)