A comprehensive collection of essays by the philosopher Lewis White Beck.

This comprehensive history of German philosophy from its medieval beginnings to near the end of the eighteenth century explores the spirit of German intellectual life and its distinctiveness from that of other countries. Beck devotes whole chapters to four great philosophers -- Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz, Lessing, and Kant -- and extensively examines many others, including Albertus Magnus, Meister Eckhart, Paracelsus, Kepler, Mendelssohn, Wolff, and Herder. Questioning explanations of philosophy by the racial or ethnic character of its exponents, (...) class='Hi'>Beck's conclusion is that German philosophy developed as a series of diverse responses to the historical experiences of the German people. The peculiarities of German philosophy must be viewed in the light of German political problems and educational structures. In particular he stresses the importance of the connections between philosophy and Germany's intellectual, literary, religious, and political history. (shrink)

When this work was first published in 1960, it immediately filled a void in Kantian scholarship.

Three of the papers included here have not previously appeared in English, and five have not been published at all.

Can a machine think? More pointedly, if I am a machine, can I think? Beck answers these questions by analyzing two clusters of metaphors -- one of which dramatizes human beings as spontaneous agents (actors), and the other sees them as observers attempting to explain causally their own behavior and that of the actor (spectators). Using a hypothetical scene with two spectators, each explaining an action, and each representing a different way of viewing the world, Beck points up (...) the central philosophical problems raised by the varieties of ways in which we explain our own actions and those of others. (shrink)

The papers in this volume examine Kant's legacy by addressing issues concerning creativity in all aspects of human experience.

In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition . However, for Kant –first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions–many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic (...) judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn’t believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge. (shrink)

A collection of Lewis Beck's writings on the philosophy and interpretation of Immanuel Kant.

A collection of Lewis White Beck's most important essays on Immanuel Kant's philosophy.

DIE KANTLITERATUR 1965-1969 I. STATISTISCHE ÜBERSICHT Zu Beginn meiner Ausführungen möchte ich Ihnen einen kurzen Überblick über den Umfang und die ...

1. Terminological Considerations. Since Russell enunciated the principle, “Wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities,” or “Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities,” the terminological situation has become confused. Russell defined neither “construction” nor “inferred entity.” “Construct” soon came to be used for “construction,” perhaps to avoid the ambiguity whereby the latter term was used to refer to both a process and a result. But many writers now use “construction” or (...) “construct” to refer to what Russell called the “inferred entity.” This seems to be the usage of Margenau, Ramsperger, Benjamin, Bures, and many others. Again, some of the same writers in other places remain closer to Russell's usage. And I find it difficult to determine exactly the relation of the usage of some writers to that of Russell because of the differences between their contexts and Russell's. I experience this difficulty in reading, for instance, both Miss Stebbing and Werkmeister. The terminological difficulties have been evaded by some other writers who have formulated new terms to refer to Russell's inferred entities. Thus Northrop speaks of the “theoretic component” and Miller has coined the word, “interphenomena.” The terms reflecting Russell's rule in psychology have become so confused that a set of explicit definitions has recently been proposed. (shrink)

The philosophy of the history of philosophy seems to be a neglected discipline. A large number of the relatively few writings devoted to the subject begin with such a complaint. If it is correct that there has been this neglect, it is astonishing. For with all the present-day concern with the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, and especially the reflexive interest of philosophers in the nature and functions of their own discipline, one would have expected that such a (...) domestic concern of philosophers would be flourishing. (shrink)

There are a number of things which I cannot correctly say about myself but which another person can correctly say about me. For example, ‘I am now lying’, ‘I am trying to do something that cannot be done’, and ‘My action is materially wrong but it is formally right ’. By making appropriate changes from ‘I’ to ‘he’ or by changing the tense, straightforward true or false sentences result.