Adams offers a theistically-based framework for ethics, based upon the idea of a transcendent, infinite good, which is God, and its relation to the many finite examples of good in our experience. His account shows how philosophically unfashionable religious concepts can enrich ethical thought. "...one of the two most important books in moral philosophy of the last quarter century, the other being After Virtue."--Theology Today.

Legendary since his own time as a universal genius, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) contributed significantly to almost every branch of learning. One of the creators of modern mathematics, and probably the most sophisticated logician between the Middle Ages and Frege, as well as a pioneer of ecumenical theology, he also wrote extensively on such diverse subjects as history, geology, and physics. But the part of his work that is most studied today is probably his writings in metaphysics, which have been (...) the focus of particularly lively philosophical discussion in the last twenty years or so. The writings contain one of the great classic systems of modern philosophy, but the system must be pieced together from a vast and miscellaneous array of manuscripts, letters, articles, and books, in a way that makes especially strenuous demands on scholarship. This book presents an in-depth interpretation of three important parts of Leibniz's metaphysics, thoroughly grounded in the texts as well as in philosophical analysis and critique. The three areas discussed are the metaphysical part of Leibniz's philosophy of logic, his essentially theological treatment of the central issues of ontology, and his theory of substance (the famous theory of monads). (shrink)

Renowned scholar Robert Adams explores the relation between religion and ethics through a comprehensive philosophical account of a theistically-based framework for ethics. Adams' framework begins with the good rather than the right, and with excellence rather than usefulness. He argues that loving the excellent, of which adoring God is a clear example, is the most fundamental aspect of a life well lived. Developing his original and detailed theory, Adams contends that devotion, the sacred, grace, martyrdom, worship, vocation, faith, and other (...) concepts drawn from religious ethics have been sorely overlooked in moral philosophy and can enrich the texture of ethical thought. (shrink)

Leibniz often speaks of “corporeal substances.” According to many texts a monad and its organic body are both constituents of a single corporeal substance. This chapter explores the relations among them, and argues for an interpretation of Leibniz's corporeal substances as exhaustively constituted by relations of harmony among simple substances, and thus as consistent with his idealism. It argues also that after 1706, when it came to seem doubtful to both Leibniz and his contemporaries that such an interpretation could provide (...) adequately for the strong unity that all agreed a corporeal substance must have, he tended to back away from the notion of corporeal substance rather than abandon his view of the world as composed ultimately of monads. (shrink)

Argues that later developments in Leibniz's thinking about the relation between perfection and existence provide a more promising basis for a version of his ontological argument for theism – a version that is substantively metaphysical rather than purely logical in nature. These developments involve viewing existence not as one of the qualities into which an essence may be analyzed, but as entailing a higher‐order property or status that an essence may have. The revised argument rests on a strong form of (...) the principle of sufficient reason and on the thesis that a bias in favor of existence is built into the foundations of ontology. (shrink)

Influential interpreters have held that Leibniz's extensive use of ostensibly Aristotelian concepts of substantial form and primary matter during his “middle years” present a philosophy that is less purely a monadology or form of idealism than it later became. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that Leibniz's substantial forms are assimilated not only to forces but also to souls and that interesting arguments of the middle years, in which Leibniz criticizes Descartes's conception of corporeal substance, leave no room for “primary (...) matter” to be anything more than an aspect of perceiving substances. (shrink)

The fundamental principle of Leibniz's idealism is that “there is nothing in things except simple substances, and in them perception and appetite.” He held that bodies are not simple, and therefore must be constructed out of the simple, perceiving substances. He held indeed that bodies are aggregates of substances, and also that they are merely phenomena. Leibniz's consistency and constancy in holding these two theses are defended in this chapter against highly influential objections. It considers in what sense he regarded (...) bodies as phenomena, and why he thought their being aggregates of substances a reason for rather than against counting them as phenomena. (shrink)

Many interpreters have supposed that the root of contingency in Leibniz's thought is that it is contingent rather than necessary that God chooses to create the best possible world. It is far from clear, however, that Leibniz believed this. This chapter argues that Leibniz did believe two theories of contingency: one based on the notion of a thing's being possible in itself whether or not a perfectly wise and good God could choose it, and one based on an identification of (...) necessity with provability, where an infinite analysis does not count as a proof. It emerges that Leibniz's conception of possible worlds is not exactly the same as that now used in possible worlds semantics. (shrink)

The relation between primitive and derivative forces may be the hardest problem about the relation between Leibniz's physics and his metaphysics. He holds that derivative forces are modifications of primitive forces, but also that physical forces, which he classifies as derivative forces, belong to bodies, which are aggregates, whereas primitive forces belong to unextended perceiving substances and constitute their essence. This chapter addresses this problem, arguing that a major part of it can be solved on the supposition that physical events (...) are only phenomena, and hence ultimately determined by modifications of the primitive forces of perceiving substances. (shrink)

In confirmation of the conclusions of Ch. 11, examination of the principal relevant texts from the period 1685–1704 shows that Leibnizian primary matter is not an ultimate substratum or subject of properties, but only an aspect of, and abstraction from, such a subject or substance. Specifically it is the passive principle in the essence or primitive force of an unextended, perceiving substance, and all its operations are aspects of the perceptual operation of the substance.

Leibniz held that even if we had no proof of the possibility premise of the ontological argument, a presumption would justify accepting it. He had an extensive theory of presumptions, as a part of practical philosophy, originating in his jurisprudence. He even proposed a formal proof that presumption favors possibility. This chapter examines ways of trying to overcome the difficulty that in the case of a necessary being, where possibility of existence and possibility of nonexistence exclude each other, presumptions of (...) possibility seem to cancel each other out, but concludes that prospects of escape from the problem are not promising. (shrink)

Leibniz conceives of God as a “most perfect being.” That means a being whose essence is the conjunction of all perfections, where a perfection is a simple quality and a positive quality – so purely positive that it involves no limitation at all. He also holds that the attributes of all finite substances are derived by limitation from God's perfections. Among the issues examined here about these views is the relation between Leibniz's and Spinoza's conceptions of the relation between God (...) and finite things. The chapter concludes that the mature Leibniz has a solid conceptual basis for distinguishing his pluralism about substances from Spinoza's monism. (shrink)

Leibniz denied, famously, that any possible individual exists in more than one possible world, so that a man who in fact never marries could not have married and still been himself. He claimed that this follows from his thesis that the predicate of every true affirmative proposition is contained in some way in the concept of its subject and his associated thesis that the definitive concept of each individual substance is complete. This chapter argues that the purely formal aims of (...) logical theory involved in the predicate containment and complete concept theses do not in fact require the denial of counterfactual or transworld identity. (shrink)

Argues that Leibniz's denial of counterfactual or transworld identity is grounded in metaphysical considerations – specifically in his belief in a coalescence of conceptual connections and causal connections, which is marked by his revival and adaptation of the Scholastic Aristotelian notion of substantial form. Exploration of Leibniz's views about miracles and about perceptual relations leads to the conclusion that his denial of counterfactual identity does not claim intrinsic metaphysical necessity, but appeals to considerations of God's wisdom and goodness; and that (...) he can deny transworld identity only on the assumption that only aggregates of mutually harmonious substances count as worlds. (shrink)

Leibniz's version of the ontological argument, a modal argument for theism on which he worked most intensively in the 1670s, has two stages. The first, an “incomplete” proof, concludes that God can only be a necessary being, and therefore if God's existence is possible, then God exists. The second stage is an a priori argument that the existence of such a necessary God is indeed possible. Leibniz's fullest attempts at a possibility proof turn on his conception of a most perfect (...) being, and the chapter concludes that they are not likely to succeed, in part because of difficulties in connecting the concepts of perfection and necessary existence. (shrink)

Leibniz claims that the most satisfying, and correct, account of the ontological status of objects of logic is that their being consists in being objects of God's understanding; and that this provides an important argument for the existence of God. In this chapter these claims are examined, found plausible, and defended against charges of circularity.

Divine Motivation theory is a major contribution both to the philosophy of religion, particularly the philosophy of religious ethics, and to general ethical theory. It is demanding reading, because it is long and complex and about difficult issues. It is also rewarding, because it is suggestive and highly original, written and argued with philosophical intelligence and disciplined care, and rich in systematic connections and explanations of them.

The distinguished philosopher Robert M. Adams presents a major work on virtue, which is once again a central topic in ethical thought. A Theory of Virtue is a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character, proposing that virtue is chiefly a matter of being for what is good, and that virtues must be intrinsically excellent and not just beneficial or useful.

Adams presents an in-depth interpretation of three important parts of Leibniz's metaphysics, thoroughly grounded in the texts as well as in philosophical analysis and critique. The three areas discussed are the metaphysical part of Leibniz's philosophy of logic, his essentially theological treatment of the central issues of ontology, and his theory of substance. Adams' work helps make sense of one of the great classic systems of modern philosophy.

Robert Merrihew Adams has been a leader in renewing philosophical respect for the idea that moral obligation may be founded on the commands of God. This collection of Adams' essays, two of which are previously unpublished, draws from his extensive writings on philosophical theology that discuss metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical issues surrounding the concept of God--whether God exists or not, what God is or would be like, and how we ought to relate ourselves to such a being. Adams studies the (...) relation between religion and ethics, delving into an analysis of moral arguments for theistic belief. In several essays, he applies contemporary studies in the metaphysics of individuality, possibility and necessity, and counterfactual conditionals to issues surrounding the existence of God and problems of evil. (shrink)

The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and (...) even knowledge of the noumenal reality of a free will (Section 4). Section 5 defends Kant's conception of noumena as a good piece of philosophy, particularly with respect to its distinction between logical and real possibility. Are noumena numerically identical with experienced (phenomenal) objects? Kantian principles yield the answers that human selves are, God isn't, and it's harder to say about bodies (Section 6). (shrink)

This essay presents a version of divine command metaethics inspired by recent work of Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam on the relation between necessity and conceptual analysis. What we can discover a priori, by conceptual analysis, about the nature of ethical wrongness is that wrongness is the property of actions that best fills a certain role. What property that is cannot be discovered by conceptual analysis. But I suggest that theists should claim it is the property of being contrary to the (...) commands of a loving God. This claim, if true, is a necessary but not an a priori truth. It also is a claim, not about the way in which some believers use the word 'wrong,' but about the wrongness that virtually everyone talks about. This position is distinguished from the author's previous views, and from a holistic development of the latter proposed by Jeffrey Stout. (shrink)

This book presents an in-depth interpretation of three important parts of Leibniz's metaphysics: the metaphysical part of Leibniz's philosophy of logic, his essentially theological treatment of the central issues of ontology, and his theory of substance.

This book presents an in-depth interpretation of three important parts of Leibniz's metaphysics: the metaphysical part of Leibniz's philosophy of logic, his essentially theological treatment of the central issues of ontology, and his theory of substance.

The problem of evil is one of the most discussed topics in the philosophy of religion. For some time, however, there has been a need for a collection of readings that adequately represents recent and ongoing writing on the topic. This volume fills that need, offering the most up-to-date collection of recent scholarship on the problem of evil. The distinguished contributors include J.L. Mackie, Nelson Pike, Roderick M. Chisholm, Terence Penelhum, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Stephen J. Wykstra, John Hick, (...) and Diogenes Allen. Including an introductory essay and a selected bibliography, this comprehensive and completely up-to-date collection is an invaluable guide to current scholarship in this highly debated area of the philosophy of religion. Oxford Readings in Philosophy aims to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available. (shrink)

In one of his precritical works, Kant defends, as “the only possible” way of demonstrating the existence of God, an argument from the nature of possibility. Whereas Leibniz had argued that possibilities must be thought by God in order to obtain the ontological standing that they need, Kant argued that at least the most fundamental possibilities must be exemplified in God. Here Kant’s argument is critically examined in comparison with its Leibnizian predecessor, and it is suggested that an argument combining (...) the strengths of both of them has much to be said for it. (shrink)