Based on cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT), this book provides a new theoretical framework for understanding the collective formation of concepts that can guide the course of development in different activities and organizations. It is essential reading for researchers, advanced students and practitioners across human and social sciences.

It is commonly accepted that thewestern view of humanity's place in nature isdominated by a dualistic opposition between nature andculture. Historically this has arisen fromexternalization of nature in both productive andcognitive practices; instances of such externalizationhave become generalized. I think the dualism can bedecomposed by identifying dominant elements in eachparticular instantiation and showing that their strictseparation evaporates under close scrutiny. The philosophical challenge this perspective presents isto substitute concrete socioecological analysis forfoundational metaphysics. A review of majorinterpretations of the history of (...) the dualism inWestern thought indicates that the legacy is moremultistranded than is usually admitted. Modern scienceis often assumed to lie squarely within the dualism,but this is unfounded. In contrast, science providestools for contextual analysis on how human activitiesand natural processes merge. The dualism thusevaporates in actual research practice. Nevertheless,the foundational metaphysics needs to be challenged,primarily because of its paralyzing effect onenvironmental philosophy. (shrink)

I see two important turning points in environmental aesthetics. In a definitive article, 'Contemporary aesthetics and the neglect of natural beauty', R.W. Hepburn in 1966 laid out the field and its tasks; Harold Osborne demonstrated the problem of externality and its solution in his 1979 paper 'An intellectual crisis in aesthetics '. Within this framework, a dynamic and innovative field of research has developed and grown, the future of which lies in the interaction between theory and practice and co-operation between (...) the various parties involved. (shrink)

Ecology has had a lower profile in Biology & Philosophy than one might expect on the basis of the attention ecology is given in public discussions in relation to environmental issues. Our tentative explanation is that ecology appears theoretically redundant within biology and, consequently, philosophically challenging problemsrelated to biology are commonly supposed to be somewhere else, particularly in the molecular sphere. Richard Levins has recognized the genuine challenges posed by ecology for theoretical and philosophical thinking in biology. This essay sets (...) the stage for appreciating his work; it was preceded by four articles published in Biology & Philosophy 15(2),and is followed by a personal reminiscent. (shrink)

This book challenges standard notions of expertise. In today's world, truly effective expertise is built on fluid collaboration between practitioners from multiple backgrounds. Such collaborative expertise must also be transformative, must be able to tackle emerging new problems and changes in its organizational framework. Engeström argues that the transition toward collaborative and transformative expertise is based on three pillars: expertise needs to be understood and cultivated as a collective activity; expertise needs to be built on flexible knot-working among diverse (...) practitioners; and expertise needs to be fostered as the expansive learning of models and patterns of activity that are in progress. In this book, Engeström recasts expertise as fluid collaboration on complex tasks that requires envisioning the future and mastering change. (shrink)

This chapter deals with medieval logic from the time when it first had full resources for systematic creative contributions onward. It focuses on the era when the ancient heritage was available and medieval logic was able to add something substantial to it, even to surpass it in some respects. The chapter explains that characterization such as this cannot be adequately expressed with years or by conventional period denominations; however, it is hoped that the grounds for drawing boundaries will become clearer (...) during the course of the story. (shrink)

Aesthetics is about sensations, experiences and emotions – but also about the rational mind that guides them. At the centre lies the feeling, sensing and thinking individual. The world unfolds from within oneself. No matter how remote a spot one chooses, it becomes the centre of the world; everyone travels with his own centre of the world, inevitably. He is, I am, the centrepoint.

The core question in aesthetics now and in the future is, how to combine philosophical theory with practice. Though reference is made to applied philosophy, and particularly to applied ethics, it is seldom made to applied aesthetics, even though we have a social need for it. The function of applied environmental aesthetics is to lay a foundation for practical actions. The goal is to connect the theoretical side closely to everyday problem solving. This means proceeding from a "passive" outsider aesthetics (...) to an "active", influencing and participating insider aesthetics. The process begins with a theory of applicability, after which actual problem cases follow. The aesthetic point of view is united with ethical, social, and cultural discussions, as well as with the expertise of environmental professionals in education, administration, design and planning, business, etc. The theoreticians and the practitioners form two teams, which should meet and co-operate with each other. In stepping from being a bystander to becoming a participant, the aestheticians will link their work to a network of specialists and professionals. (shrink)

Auf dem Gebiete des Gesichtssinnes gelten an der phänomenalen, absoluten Schwelle die begrifflichen, linearen ReizausdrückeL. t = Konstante bzw.L. f = Konstante, in denenL die physikalische Lichtintensität,t die Reizzeitdauer undf die Reizfläche bedeuten . Der zeitliche Gültigkeitsbereich des erstgenannten Ausdrucks erstreckt sich von ganz kurzen bis zu Zeitdauern von etwa 100σ, d.h. bis zu Zeitdauern die phänomenal eben noch als momentan empfunden werden. Entsprechend scheint sich der Gültigkeitsbereich des zweitgenannten Ausdrucks nur bis zu solchen Flächengrössen zu erstrecken, die phänomenal eben (...) noch als punktuell erscheinen. Bei phänomenal momentanen, punktuellen und minimalintensiven Gesichtserlebnissen, also bei in allen Hinsichten differentieller Phänomenalität gilt der trilineare ReizausdruckL. f. t = Konstante. Für überschwellige Lichtempfindungen gelten keine linearen Ausdrücke; alle aufgestellten sind kompliziert und ziemlich undurchsichtig . Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass auf dem Gebiete des Gehörssinnes ähnliche Verhältnisse wie auf dem Gebiete des Gesichtes vorliegen.Die einflache Linearität der begrifflichen Reizausdrücke einerseits, wenn sie differentielle, in allen Hinsichten phänomenal minimale Erlebnisse wiedergeben, und andererseits die komplizierte Struktur der Ausdrücke, wenn sie überschwellige Phänomenalitäten wiedergeben, bezeugen, dass hier ein Strukturproblem vorliegt, welches im Zusammenhang mit dem gegenseitigen Verhältnis vom Phänomenalen und Begrifflichen steht. Dieser Problemkomplex wird in dieser Abhandlung zu behandeln versucht.In the field of vision the absolute phenomenal threshold may be expressed by the conceptual linear stimulus equation:L. t = const., respectivelyL. f = const., in whichL denotes the physical brightness intensity of light,t the stimulus duration andf the stimulus area . For the former expression the temporal limits of validity extend from quite short durations up to 100σ i.e. up to duration of apparent momentariness. Correspondingly the validity of the second equation seems to extend barely to area values that appear phenomenally punctual . In case of phenomenally momentary and punctual visual perceptions and of those being phenomenally of minimal brightness,i.e. in case of an in every point differential phenomenality the trilinear equation holds true:L. f. t = const. Concerning the supraliminal visual perceptions no such linear expression is valid. If, however, it would be possible to construct an equation representing the phenomenality of supraliminal visual perceptions, it would be very complicated and of little clarity . It is pointed out, that in the field of audition there exist similar relations as in the field of visual perceptions.The simple linearity of conceptual stimulus equations, when they denote differential, in every respect phenomenally minimal perceptions and on the other hand the complicated structure of expressions corresponding to supraliminal phenomenalities, show, that there exists a structural problem connected with the phenomenal and conceptual field.An attempt is made to settle this complex of problems.Dans le domaine du sens visuel on peut appliquer au seuil phénoménal absolu les expressions d'excitation linéairesL. t = constante, respectivementL. f = constante. Dans ces expressionsL signifie l'intensité lumineuse physique,t le temps de l'excitation etf la surface de l'excitation . Le domaine de la validité du temps de la première expression s'étend d'un temps très court jusqu'à un espace de temps d'env. 100σ c'est-à-dire jusqu'à des périodes de temps qu'on peut encore percevoir comme phénoménalement momentanées. En analogie avec ceci le domaine de validité de la deuxième expression mentionnée semble s'étendre seulement jusqu'à de telles surfaces qui apparaissent encore phénoménalement ponctuelles. Dans les perceptions visuelles phénoménalement momentanées, ponctuelles et d'un minimum d'intensité, par conséquent dans une phénoménalité sous tous les rapports différentielle, on peut appliquer l'expression d'excitation trilinéaireL. f. t = constante. En ce qui concerne les sensations lumineuses dépassant le seuil il n′y a aucunes expressions linéaires pour les rendre; dans le cas oú l'on pourrait en établir, elles sont compliquées . Il est indiqué que dans le domaine du sens de l'ouïe il se présente des conditions analogues que dans le domaine du sens visuel.La linéarité simple des expressions d'excitation applicable aux cas des sensations différentielles, c'est-à-dire des sensations sous tous les rapports phénoménalement minimes, et de l'autre côté, la structure compliquée des expressions, correspondant à des phénoménalités dépassant le seuil, montrent, qu'il est question ici d'un problème de structure qui est associé à la relation réciproque des phénoménalités et des fonctionalités. Dans cet article l'auteur essaie d'élucider ce complexe de problèmes. (shrink)

The Macarthur-Wilson equilibrium theory of island biogeography has had a contradictory role in ecology. As a lasting contribution, the theory has created a new way of viewing insular environments as dynamical systems. On the other hand, many of the applications of the theory have reduced to mere unimaginative curve-fitting. I analyze this paradox in semiotic terms: the theory was mainly equated with the simple species-area relationship which became a signifier of interesting island ecology. The theory is, however, better viewed as (...) a theoretical framework that suggests specific hypotheses on the ecology of colonization of insular environments. This paradox is inherent in the use of simplifying analytic models. Analytic models are necessary and fruitful in the work of ecologists, but they ought to be supplemented with a broader, pluralistic appreciation of the role of theories in general. (shrink)

Activity theory is an interdisciplinary approach to human sciences that originates in the cultural-historical psychology school, initiated by Vygotsky, Leont'ev, and Luria. It takes the object-oriented, artifact-mediated collective activity system as its unit of analysis, thus bridging the gulf between the individual subject and the societal structure. This volume is the first comprehensive presentation of contemporary work in activity theory, with 26 original chapters by authors from ten countries. In Part I of the book, central theoretical issues are discussed from (...) different points of view. Some topics addressed in this part are epistemology, methodology, and the relationship between biological and cultural factors. Part II is devoted to the acquisition and development of language - a theme that played a central role in the work of Vygotsky and Luria. This part includes a chapter that analyzes writing activity in Japanese classrooms, and an original case study of literacy skills of a man with cerebral palsy. Part III contains chapters on play, learning, and education, and part IV addresses the meaning of new technology and the development of work activities. The final part covers issues of therapy and addiction. (shrink)

FOREWORD Yrjö Engeström is one of the most self-directed but certainly also most interesting representatives of contemporary activity theory. ...

A key challenge in conceptualizing ecological complexity is to allow simultaneously for particularity, contingency, and structure, and for such structure to be internally differentiated,dynamically tied to its context, and subject torestructuring. Because all organisms live insuch dynamic ecological circumstances, philosophy of ecology could become the leading site for addressing difficult conceptual questions concerning the situatedness or positionality of organisms –humans included – in their changing and intersecting worlds.

The aim of the present work is to show the roots of the conception of perception as an active process, tracing the history of its development from Plato to modern philosophy. The contributors inquire into what activity is taken to mean in different theories, challenging traditional historical accounts of perception that stress the passivity of percipients in coming to know the external world. Special attention is paid to the psychological and physiological mechanisms of perception, rational and non-rational perception and the (...) role of awareness in the perceptual process. Perception has often been conceived as a process in which the passive aspects - such as the reception of sensory stimuli - were stressed and the active ones overlooked. However, during recent decades research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind has emphasized the activity of the subject in the process of sense perception, often associating this activity to the notions of attention and intentionality. Although it is recognized that there are ancient roots to the view that perception is fundamentally active, the history remains largely unexplored. The book is directed to all those interested in contemporary debates in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology who would like to become acquainted with the historical background of active perception, but for historical reliability the aim is to make no compromises. (shrink)