Miss R. Meager; III.—The Uniqueness of a Work of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 49–70, https://doi.org/10.

In this paper, I give an account of how our hominin ancestors evolved a conscious ability I call scenario visualization that enabled them to manufacture novel tools so as to survive and flourish in the ever-changing and complex environments in which they lived. I first present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists that the mind evolved certain mental capacities as adaptive responses to environmental pressures. Specifically, Steven Mithen thinks that the mind has evolved cognitive fluidity, viz., an (...) ability to exchange information flexibly between and among mental modules. Showing the deficiency in Mithen’s view, I then argue that the flexible exchange of information between and among modules together with scenario visualization is what explains the ability to construct the novel tools needed to survive and flourish in the environments in which our hominin ancestors resided. Finally, I trace the development of the multi-purposed javelin, from its meager beginnings as a stick, in order to illustrate scenario visualization in novel tool manufacturing. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Aestheticism, Imagination and Schooling: a reply to Ruby Meager, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–42.

R K Elliott; Aestheticism, Imagination and Schooling: a reply to Ruby Meager, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–42.

We prove the following theorem: For a partially ordered set Q such that every countable subset of Q has a strict upper bound, there is a forcing notion satisfying the countable chain condition such that, in the forcing extension, there is a basis of the null ideal of the real line which is order-isomorphic to Q with respect to set-inclusion. This is a variation of Hechler’s classical result in the theory of forcing. The corresponding theorem for the meager ideal (...) was established by Bartoszyński and Kada. (shrink)

Business ethics educators have been encouraged to cultivate students’ character, but have received meager instructions for doing so. Additionally, there has been insufficient focus on equipping students with the tools they need to foster their ethical development after completing our courses. In this paper, it is argued that the Jewish spiritual practice of Mussar, whose premise is that individuals can become better versions of themselves by repairing their character traits, can inform business ethics instruction. After presenting the tenets and (...) historical background of Mussar, we provide specific information that will enable business ethics instructors to adapt its tools and techniques in order to put their students on a personalized path of lifelong character improvement. (shrink)

Addressing himself not only to an academic but to a generally educated public, Lamont introduces the perennial debate between determinism and freedom of choice with liberal and lively quotes from both sides down through history. He proceeds to argue with passionate conviction that both objective contingency and necessity exist as correlative cosmic ultimates, and that the world must therefore be viewed as essentially pluralistic. Moving from a consideration of contingency to the notion of potentiality, Lamont analyzes freedom of choice as (...) the actualization of one of a plurality of genuinely open alternatives which are made possible by contingency and potentiality. Following Hartshorne, he argues that the relation of universal to particular, of determinable to determinate, is one of indeterminate or contingent or potential to determinate or actual; on this ground he finds contingency or freedom inherent in the very act of rational deliberation. Moreover, scientific theories of probability are interpreted as confirming the existence of this sort of objective contingency. Determinism on the other hand, he maintains, not only rules out universals altogether but denies the dynamic character of time, undercuts the notion of ethical responsibility, and defies common sense and ordinary use of language. The book is highly readable--and highly provocative. A fair example of its provocative character is provided in the mileage Lamont gets out of his crucial chapter which seeks to establish the existence of objective contingency as a cosmic ultimate which "demolishes the case for a completely determined universe". On the one hand, contingency is taken to be "simply the opposite of determinism or necessity, meaning that an event, object, or state of affairs either may or may not be". On this interpretation it is not difficult to see why Lamont feels that "freedom of choice is obviously an impossibility unless contingency objectively exists in Nature". On the other hand, it turns out that what it means to say that a contingent event "may or may not be" is perhaps not after all so clearly incompatible with determinism. Thus contingency "does not imply that any event is causeless" but only that it is possible for causally determined factors to impinge on other factors--themselves in turn causally but independently determined. In the long run this seems to involve an act of faith that "the infinitely diverse world of Nature radiates from different centers... that if there ever was a beginning to the universe, which is most doubtful, it would have been beginnings, that is, a multitude of first causes all popping at once". Moreover, it is not wholly clear just how this sort of contingency--which seems to be non-teleological and by definition must operate from outside the causal sequence--is supposed to make possible or even provide a parallel to the exercise of free choice. To a believer in freedom, Lamont's account of contingency seems to offer a meager foundation for so important a theory.--R. D. (shrink)

By the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem, a subset X of the line has Borel’s strong measure zero if and only if $M+X\neq \mathbb {R}$ for each meager set M.A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if $M+X$ is meager for each meager set M. Recently a theorem on meager-additive sets that perfectly parallels the Galvin–Mycielski–Solovay theorem was proven: A set $X\subseteq \mathbb {R}$ is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero, a notion akin (...) to strong measure zero.We investigate the validity of this result in Polish groups. We prove, e.g., that a set in a locally compact Polish group admitting an invariant metric is meager-additive if and only if it has sharp measure zero. We derive some consequences and calculate some cardinal invariants. (shrink)

We prove that the cofinality of the smallest covering of R by meager sets is bigger than the additivity of measure.

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

This book offers a critical introduction to the work of American philosopher D. G. Leahy (1937-2014). Leahy's fundamental thinking can be characterized as an absolute creativity in which all creating is 'live' -- a happening occurring now that manifests a supersaturated polyontological actuality that is essentially created by the logic that characterizes it. Leahy leaves behind the categorial presuppositions of modern thought, eclipsing both Cartesian and Hegelian subjectivities and introducing instead an essentially new form of thinking founded in a nondual (...) logic of creation. The new thinking delineates the absolute unicity of existence as a creative interactivity beyond all traditional dichotomies (such as one vs. many, unity vs. plurality, identity vs. change): a fully "digitized" actuality that is nothing but newness, which inherently implies nothing but change. Through this new form of thinking, change itself is revealed to be the very essence of reality and mind. Any reader looking for a quantum leap beyond the thrall of modern and postmodern fixations is invited to hear and apprehend this new thinking that refuses to be conditioned by paradigms, categories, species, genera, walls, bridges, boundaries, or abstractions: an essentially free thinking that embodies creative novelty itself. (shrink)

Ruby Meager; The Dangers of Aestheticism in Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 23–30, https://doi.org/10.1111.

Ruby Meager; The Dangers of Aestheticism in Schooling, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 23–30, https://doi.org/10.1111.

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for (...) deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

Locke is the first English philosopher to be considered in this series, and that fact of itself is worthy of attention. Philosophy, of course, like science, knows no frontiers and no national boundaries. Yet it is true to say that Locke’s contribution to philosophy is typically and peculiarly English. His moderation, his emphasis upon experience, his tolerant spirit of compromise, his dislike of mystical extravagance and of metaphysical speculation, even that elusive quality of his which people call his “common sense”, (...) are English traits. His very defects, illogicality leading to inconsistency and an awkward disorderliness of thought so abhorrent to the. (shrink)