It is widely held that the Experience Machine is the basis of a serious objection to Hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that Desire Satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the Experience Machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the Experience Machine poses a serious problem for Hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for Desire Satisfactionism. We raise two objections to Desire Satisfactionism, each of which relies on the Experience Machine. (...) The first is very much like the well-known Experience Machine objection to Hedonism. The second asks whether someone who accepts Desire Satisfactionism should want to form a desire to plug into the Experience Machine. (shrink)

Insofar as South Africa underwent a rapid transformation from apartheid to democracy, it may provide a unique laboratory for investigating aspects of revenge and forgiveness. Here we suggest that observations and data from South Africa are partially consistent with the hypotheses generated by MCullough and colleagues. At the same time, the rich range of revenge and forgiveness phenomena in real-life settings is likely to require explanatory concepts other than specialized modules and their computational outputs.

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

Community engagement in research, including public health related research, is acknowledged as an ethical imperative. While medical care and public health action take priority over research during infectious disease outbreaks, research is still required in order to learn from epidemic responses. The World Health Organisation developed a guide for community engagement during infectious disease epidemics called the Good Participatory Practice for Trials of Emerging (and Re‐emerging) Pathogens that are Likely to Cause Severe Outbreaks in the Near Future and for which (...) Few or No Medical Counter‐Measures Exist (GPP‐EP). This paper identified priorities for community engagement for research conducted during infectious disease outbreaks drawing on discussions held with a purposive sample of bioethicists, social scientists, researchers, policy makers and laypersons who work with ethics committees in West Africa. These perspectives were considered in the light of the GPP‐EP, which adds further depth and dimension to discussions on community engagement frameworks. It concludes that there is no presumptive justification for the exclusion of communities in the design, implementation and monitoring of clinical trials conducted during an infectious disease outbreak. Engagement that facilitates collaboration rather than partnership between researchers and the community during epidemics is acceptable. (shrink)

Recent EEG studies on the early postmortem interval that suggest the persistence of electrophysiological coherence and connectivity in the brain of animals and humans reinforce the need for further investigation of the relationship between the brain’s activity and the dying process. Neuroscience is now in a position to empirically evaluate the extended process of dying and, more specifically, to investigate the possibility of brain activity following the cessation of cardiac and respiratory function. Under the direction of the Center for Healthy (...) Minds at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, research was conducted in India on a postmortem meditative state cultivated by some Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in which decomposition is putatively delayed. For all healthy baseline and postmortem subjects presented here, we collected resting state electroencephalographic data, mismatch negativity, and auditory brainstem response. In this study, we present HB data to demonstrate the feasibility of a sparse electrode EEG configuration to capture well-defined ERP waveforms from living subjects under very challenging field conditions. While living subjects displayed well-defined MMN and ABR responses, no recognizable EEG waveforms were discernable in any of the tukdam cases. (shrink)

EveryK-trivial set is computable from an incomplete Martin-Löf random set, i.e., a Martin-Löf random set that does not compute the halting problem.

Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.

SummaryThis article examines the role played by conceptions of friendship in the francophone Catholic world during the early-to-mid twentieth century, focusing particularly on the review La Relève, a significant French Canadian publication of the 1930s and 1940s. For many francophone Catholic intellectuals during this period, friendship signalled a shared commitment to common religious, social and political goals. These notions of community and friendship were especially central to Catholic thinkers such as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, who participated in the personalist (...) movement, an influential current of philosophy in mid-twentieth-century France. While the young writers at La Relève were initially a small and cliquish group of old schoolmates, their growing interest in personalism led them to conceive of their group in more inclusive and communitarian terms. Their personal ties to Maritain also allowed them to cultivate links with a broader, international network of francophone Catholic authors. These relationships would come to fruition during the Second World War, when the Relève group would act as publishers for many European anti-fascist intellectuals living in North American exile. The example of La Relève thus allows us to see how friendship served as both an idealised form of social relationship and a means for building up a larger community of like-minded Catholic intellectuals and social activists. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Se propose de : " [...] réfléchir critiquement sur les idées de foi et de révélation dans les religions monothéistes. Celles-ci en appellent par leur fondateur respectif à un même archétype ancestral de croyant : Abraham. Le judaïsme le revendique par Moïse, le christianisme par Jésus et l'islam par Mohammed. Ce raccourci historique pose, à celui qui ne s'enferme pas d'emblée dans les croyances de son groupe, de redoutables questions philosophiques sur l'unicité de Dieu et celle de l'idéal du croyant (...) ; la diversité des révélations : trois - avec de multiples ramifications antagonistes - touchant la nature de Dieu et l'existence humaine ; la prétention de chacune à l'universalité... " Et ainsi la réflexion se développe tant sur la foi que sur la révélation et l'universalité. (shrink)

Résumé En interrogeant le concept d’universalité des droits de l’homme, on constate qu’il est limité et non valide, pêche par excès d’utopie et irréel. La question n’est pas de nier une essence générique de l’homme, ni de critiquer les droits de l’homme d’un point de vue moral, mais de montrer que les « droits de l’homme » n’ont pas véritablement une base universelle. Ils s’inscrivent dans l’histoire et, comme tels, varient selon les sociétés et se déploient différemment à travers l’espace, (...) le temps et le moment. Les valeurs qui sous-tendent les droits de l’homme sont relatives et évolutives. Elles se déclinent distinctement selon les cultures et le contexte social, et sont susceptibles de modification selon les sociétés et les époques. Autrement dit, il n’existe pas en la matière un code sociétal et universel qui serait agréé et reconnu partout. Par conséquent, l’énoncé des droits ne peut qu’être empreint par leur contexte. Chaque civilisation a ses codes et ses mots-clés marqués par sa Weltanschauung. Ce travail cherche à insérer les textes des droits de l’homme dans leur contexte historique et géographique, et montrer par là qu’ils n’ont rien de constant. Ils sont tributaires des cultures et des imaginaires collectifs, des représentations nationales et des déterminants sociaux, et dépendent largement de leur instrumentalisation par les États. Aussi, faut-il repenser le rapport entre le particulier et l’universel pour élargir leur assise humaniste. (shrink)

On faith in Christianity and its implementation in Christian practices in Indonesia; collection of articles.

Some bioethicists have argued in favor of a sliding scale notion of competence, paternalistically requiring greater competence in relation to more significant risk. I argue against a sliding scale notion, taking issue with the positions of Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Ian Wilkes, and Joel Feinberg. Rejecting arguments that a sliding scale is supported by legal cases, by ordinary usage, and by fallible judgments about competence, I argue in favor of greater evidence of competence when risk is greater. (...) Two clinical cases are examined, both involving amputation, to show that my fixed concept of competence, with a requirement of clearer evidence of competence when risk is high, better accounts for good moral decisions in bioethics. (shrink)