After defining, for each many-sorted signature Σ = (S, Σ), the category Ter(Σ), of generalized terms for Σ (which is the dual of the Kleisli category for $${\mathbb {T}_{\bf \Sigma}}$$, the monad in Set S determined by the adjunction $${{\bf T}_{\bf \Sigma} \dashv {\rm G}_{\bf \Sigma}}$$ from Set S to Alg(Σ), the category of Σ-algebras), we assign, to a signature morphism d from Σ to Λ, the functor $${{\bf d}_\diamond}$$ from Ter(Σ) to Ter(Λ). Once defined the mappings that assign, respectively, (...) to a many-sorted signature the corresponding category of generalized terms and to a signature morphism the functor between the associated categories of generalized terms, we state that both mappings are actually the components of a pseudo-functor Ter from Sig to the 2-category Cat. Next we prove that there is a functor TrΣ, of realization of generalized terms as term operations, from Alg(Σ) × Ter(Σ) to Set, that simultaneously formalizes the procedure of realization of generalized terms and its naturalness (by taking into account the variation of the algebras through the homomorphisms between them). We remark that from this fact we will get the invariance of the relation of satisfaction under signature change. Moreover, we prove that, for each signature morphism d from Σ to Λ, there exists a natural isomorphism θ d from the functor $${{{\rm Tr}^{\bf {\bf \Lambda}} \circ ({\rm Id} \times {\bf d}_\diamond)}}$$ to the functor $${{\rm Tr}^{\bf \Sigma} \circ ({\bf d}^* \times {\rm Id})}$$, both from the category Alg(Λ) × Ter(Σ) to the category Set, where d* is the value at d of the arrow mapping of a contravariant functor Alg from Sig to Cat, that shows the invariant character of the procedure of realization of generalized terms under signature change. Finally, we construct the many-sorted term institution by combining adequately the above components (and, in a derived way, the many-sorted specification institution), but for a strict generalization of the standard notion of institution. (shrink)

We show that Dedekind, in his proof of the principle of definition by mathematical recursion, used implicitly both the concept of an inductive cone from an inductive system of sets and that of the inductive limit of an inductive system of sets. Moreover, we show that in Dedekind’s work on the foundations of mathematics one can also find specific occurrences of various profound mathematical ideas in the fields of universal algebra, category theory, the theory of primitive recursive mappings, and set (...) theory, which undoubtedly point towards the mathematics of twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (shrink)

The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake: The equation on page 34 was incorrect. The corrected equation is given below.

After defining, for each many-sorted signature Σ = (S, Σ), the category Ter ( Σ ), of generalized terms for Σ (which is the dual of the Kleisli category for , the monad in Set S determined by the adjunction from Set S to Alg ( Σ ), the category of Σ -algebras), we assign, to a signature morphism d from Σ to Λ , the functor from Ter ( Σ ) to Ter ( Λ ). Once defined the mappings (...) that assign, respectively, to a many-sorted signature the corresponding category of generalized terms and to a signature morphism the functor between the associated categories of generalized terms, we state that both mappings are actually the components of a pseudo-functor Ter from Sig to the 2-category Cat . Next we prove that there is a functor Tr Σ , of realization of generalized terms as term operations, from Alg ( Σ ) × Ter ( Σ ) to Set , that simultaneously formalizes the procedure of realization of generalized terms and its naturalness (by taking into account the variation of the algebras through the homomorphisms between them). We remark that from this fact we will get the invariance of the relation of satisfaction under signature change. Moreover, we prove that, for each signature morphism d from Σ to Λ , there exists a natural isomorphism θ d from the functor to the functor , both from the category Alg ( Λ ) × Ter ( Σ ) to the category Set , where d * is the value at d of the arrow mapping of a contravariant functor Alg from Sig to Cat , that shows the invariant character of the procedure of realization of generalized terms under signature change. Finally, we construct the many-sorted term institution by combining adequately the above components (and, in a derived way, the many-sorted specification institution), but for a strict generalization of the standard notion of institution. (shrink)

We prove, by using the concept of schematic interpretation, that the natural embedding from the category ISL, of intuitionistic sentential pretheories and i-congruence classes of morphisms, to the category CSL, of classical sentential pretheories and c-congruence classes of morphisms, has a left adjoint, which is related to the double negation interpretation of Gödel-Gentzen, and a right adjoint, which is related to the Law of Excluded Middle. Moreover, we prove that from the left to the right adjoint there is a pointwise (...) epimorphic natural transformation and that since the two endofunctors at CSL, obtained by adequately composing the aforementioned functors, are naturally isomorphic to the identity functor for CSL, the string of adjunctions constitutes an adjoint cylinder. On the other hand, we show that the operators of Lindenbaum-Tarski of formation of algebras from pretheories can be extended to equivalences of categories from the category CSL, respectively, ISL, to the category Bool, of Boolean algebras, respectively, Heyt, of Heyting algebras. Finally, we prove that the functor of regularization from Heyt to Bool has, in addition to its well-known right adjoint (that is, the canonical embedding of Bool into Heyt) a left adjoint, that from the left to the right adjoint there is a pointwise epimorphic natural transformation, and, finally, that such a string of adjunctions constitutes an adjoint cylinder. (shrink)

Variations in levels of apolipoprotein E have been tied to the risk and progression of Alzheimer's disease . Our group has previously compared and contrasted the promoters of the mouse and human ApoE gene promoter sequences and found notable similarities and significant differences that suggest the importance of the APOE promoter's role in the human disease. We examine here three specific single-nucleotide polymorphisms within the human APOE promoter region, specifically at -491 , -427 , and at -219 upstream from the (...) +1 transcription start site. The -219 and -491 polymorphic variations have significant association with instance of AD, and -491AA has significant risk even when stratified for the APOEepsilon4 allele. We also show significant effects on reporter gene expression in neuronal cell cultures, and, notably, these effects are modified by species origin of the cells. The -491 and -219 polymorphisms may have an interactive effect in addition to any independent activity. DNA-protein interactions differ between each polymorphic state. We propose SP1 and GATA as candidates for regulatory control of the -491 and -219 polymorphic sites. This work's significance lies in drawing connection among APOE promoter polymorphisms' associations with AD to functional promoter activity differences and specific changes in DNA-protein interactions in cell culture-based assays. Taken together, these results suggest that APOE expression levels are a risk factor for AD irrespective of APOEepsilon4 allele status. (shrink)

This book presents papers that deal with Hans Kelsen's legal philosophy, and includes contributions from Hedley Bull, J.W. Harris, Phillip Pettit, Joseph Raz, Jes Bjarup, and Stanley L. Paulson.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts (...) for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But wide-speared usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional, or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms. The same ambiguity occurs with the much-used (and abused) idea of ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is distinguished (...) from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm. If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as ‘normative positivism‘. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of ‘law‘. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action. (shrink)

Telling a patient that the outcome of his illness is not good, or even hopeless, requires sensitivity and the ability to communicate with him in the setting of a hospital which is an unnatural environment divorced from family and friends. It is a task which must be taught and learned by doctors and nurses.

The existential analysis -- The death of dasein -- The timeliness of dasein -- The derivation of time -- The time of being.

The achievements of the textile industry in Roman Britain are often underestimated as a result of the meagreness of our available evidence. The Edict on maximum prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301 shows that British capes commanded high prices on the markets of the Empire, and that in the late third century A.D. British rugs were the best in the world. In view of the competition from the traditional centres of rug manufacture in the East, this is an astonishing (...) achievement. (shrink)

The received translation and interpretation of many of the technical terms current in the textile industry of the Roman Empire are inaccurate, because lexicographers have either fought shy of being precise, or have thought that they recognized in the ancient world technical processes which originated at a much later date. The evidence is often equivocal or insufficient, but may still yield details that have been overlooked. The textile expression scutulatus, to take an example, deserves more attention than Blümner has devoted (...) to it. When it refers to the appearance of a garment, Lewis and Short, s.v. scutulatus, translate ‘diamond or lozenge-shaped, checkered’. It seems worth while to attempt a more precise translation, and, if possible, to estimate the significance in context of the goods so designated. (shrink)

Living out of silence, out of a fully functioning, lovingly attentive mind, and not just out of thought, out of a partially functioning mind, is requisite for depth or profundity in living or relating. A fully attentive, truly silent or meditative mind sees that there is real dualism of time and the timeless and that time and the timeless each has its own unique value. The timeless, or real silence, that which alone can make for depth in one's living and (...) relating, can be there only when, in one's awareness, time and all that is related to time, have come to an end. An examination of a wide variety of statements made by writers, both past and present, shows that these understandings are seldom there in contemporary writings, just as they were not there in writings that have come down to us from the past. 'Living beyond the One and the Many' invites readers to consider the possibility that what is presented in it can bring deep meaning to one's way of living in the world"--Publisher's description, back cover. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

The author suggests that law is best represented, understood, and taught in the form of open‐ended, defeasible, normative, conditional propositions. The meaning, role, and significance of defeasibility is explained by presenting three ‘canonical forms’ and by distinguishing exceptions and overrides. The role of equity in the law of contract, as understood by the author, is taken as an exemplar of override and parallels are drawn with policy in the English law of tort and with mercy in the criminal law of (...) England and Wales. The third and preferred canonical form is sequenced and internally differentiated and seeks a satisfactory middle way between all‐or‐nothing rules and wild‐card discretion and a reconciliation of the surface demands of legal rules and the deeper values embedded in law. The suggested approach therefore resists closure and seeks a conceptual restructuring of law which opens it up to the influence of notions such as justice and equity and locates them as open‐ended conditions of defeasance inhabiting the express or implied ‘unless…’ clause which is taken to be an element in every fully‐formed statement of law. This approach accommodates law as a locus not only of traditional rule‐based reasoning, but also of open‐ended internal moral reasoning invoking deeper values inherent in law and only imperfectly captured and implemented by formal legal rules. (shrink)

Jeffrey Collins’ new book aims to presents Locke’s views on religious toleration in the light of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. At first blush, Hobbes seems an unusual choice as a point of co...

Terror may have dire implications for the public’s behavior. According to Kirschenbaum :1–33, 2006), in order to minimize the expected impact of a terror incident the public has to adopt a “survival strategy”. According to the underlying research hypothesis of the study, the longer the terror incidents continue, the more the public accepts the possibility that it will be in this situation for the long term; therefore, the extent of its deviation from its ordinary consumer behavior steadily declines after each (...) terror incident. By using daily trade data and an Event Studies econometric methodology, we found the existence of an adaptation trend among the consumer public. Thus, over time, the Israeli public internalized the realization that if it wishes to sustain a reasonable standard of living, it must minimize the disparity between its consumer economic behavior before a terror event and its behavior afterwards. Announcing more assassinations of terrorists was found to calm the public’s fears, when fears are judged by a return to more normal consumption patterns. Another finding is the existence of variance in the pace of this adaptation as a dependency of the type of good consumed: consistently, the adaptation is faster in regard to non-durable goods than to durable goods. This outcome is subject to interpretation, since durable goods may be viewed as “half-consumption goods, half-capital goods,” it stands to reason that capital goods would be more strongly affected than consumption goods. (shrink)

Given statements like these about current developments in intellectualizing about law in America it is an exciting time to look at American legal philosophy. Given the ferment in the law schools and the volume of literature in the law journals it is also a difficult task confidently to extract the main lines of current thought and adequately to assess the significance of current intellectual movements. American lawyers are inclined to point out that there is no such thing as ‘American law’. (...) Rather, in addition to Federal law and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction there are some fifty jurisdictions each with its own Constitution, Legislature and Supreme Court and consequently diversity rather than uniformity is the rule. Equally, the very idea that there is some single, coherent and widely accepted theory of law deserving description as ‘American legal philosophy’ obviously begs all manner of significant questions. (shrink)

It must be considered that a man who only does what everyone of the society to which he belongs would do is not a dishonest man.A lack of confidence in the ability of a tribunal correctly to estimate evidence of states of mind and the like can never be sufficient ground for excluding from enquiry the most fundamental element in a rational and humane criminal code.

Those who campaign for law reform to permit “euthanasia” may seek different things and at least some of what they seek may already be permissible under the criminal law of England and Wales. In this paper I examine one means whereby the criminal law delivers outcomes acceptable to the euthanasia lobby, that is the curious notion of “causation” deployed by the law, which adds a value override to the more usual notion of factual causation such that, for example, if medical (...) treatment falls within the acceptable range as normal and proper, the pre–existing injury or illness is treated as exclusively the cause of death and the doctor escapes criminal liability, even where the medical treatment will shorten life to the certain knowledge, possibly even the wish, of the doctor. Thus the law may already be delivering a range of outcomes — euthanasia in a weak sense — acceptable to the euthanasia lobby. If so, it achieves this by stealth. That is inappropriate to the doctor–patient relationship, which is one of trust. So there is a strong case for greater transparency. Moreover, there are limits to the acceptable outcomes which an unreformed criminal law can deliver and in a range of cases the criminal law condemns the doctor to impotence and the patient to a prolonged, miserable and undignified death. So there is also a case for going beyond the current law and legalising euthanasia in a strong sense. (shrink)

I argue that the duty of confidentiality is relative, not absolute; and that it is primarily a matter for the professional judgment of the reflective health practitioner to determine in the particular case whether competing public interests (or other compelling reasons) override that duty. I have supported that account with an analysis of medical practice as a recourse role and with an account of law that emphasises not only its duty‐imposing character but also, and crucially, an embedded liberty to depart (...) from the plain requirements of a primary legal rule where in the conscientious judgment of the addressee of that law, there is ‘damn good reason’ to do so. This account of the moral nullification of law at the outer limits appears to be descriptively accurate over a wide range of law and normatively appealing not only to democratic citizens but also to professionals such as doctors and lawyers whose role involves testing the law on moral grounds and who should be ready to do so, if but only if, they believe in the good faith exercise of professional judgment that the outcome mandated by the literal application of the legal rule is inconsistent with the moral mission of their role. The argument is illustrated with cases from American and English courts which, perhaps, render plausible the otherwise paradoxical notion that the law itself admits of departures from the legal rules. (shrink)