Con Prólogo de José Luis Pinillos, una especialista en Estética, Ana María Leyra, y otra en Filosofía de la Ciencia, Carmen Mataix, han publicado este libro, en el que pretenden aproximar e interrelacionar conceptualmente la ciencia y el arte. Su punto de partida consiste en considerar, citando a Prigogine, que “la ciencia es sobre todo un fenómeno cultural”. Superando la escisión entre ciencia y cultura, las autoras se proponen confrontar el recorrido experimentado por la Estética desde el siglo (...) XIX con las modificaciones habidas en la propia ciencia, sobre todo a partir de la aparición de la mecánica cuántica. Según las autoras, el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg ha introducido a la ciencia en la vía del fenomenismo, e incluso de un fenomenismo mucho más fuerte que el que en su día propusieron Berkeley o Mach. Las discusiones entre Bohr y Einstein son comparadas, siguiendo de nuevo a Prigogine, con las que mantuvieron Leibniz y Clarke a principios del siglo XVIII. La noción de “realidad” está en el centro del debate entre los científicos, habiéndose introducido nuevas variables, como el tiempo y el sujeto, que hasta el siglo XX habían quedado fuera del contexto científico. Por el contrario, tanto el tiempo como el sujeto “ocupaban con pleno derecho el mundo de la estética, del arte o de la literatura”, temas que ahora tiene que incorporar la reflexión científica. Frente al modelo mecanicista que imperó en la ciencia moderna, las autoras proponen un “modelo estético” para la ciencia contemporánea. (shrink)

Con Prólogo de José Luis Pinillos, una especialista en Estética, Ana María Leyra, y otra en Filosofía de la Ciencia, Carmen Mataix, han publicado este libro, en el que pretenden aproximar e interrelacionar conceptualmente la ciencia y el arte. Su punto de partida consiste en considerar, citando a Prigogine, que “la ciencia es sobre todo un fenómeno cultural”. Superando la escisión entre ciencia y cultura, las autoras se proponen confrontar el recorrido experimentado por la Estética desde el siglo (...) XIX con las modificaciones habidas en la propia ciencia, sobre todo a partir de la aparición de la mecánica cuántica. Según las autoras, el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg ha introducido a la ciencia en la vía del fenomenismo, e incluso de un fenomenismo mucho más fuerte que el que en su día propusieron Berkeley o Mach. Las discusiones entre Bohr y Einstein son comparadas, siguiendo de nuevo a Prigogine, con las que mantuvieron Leibniz y Clarke a principios del siglo XVIII. La noción de “realidad” está en el centro del debate entre los científicos, habiéndose introducido nuevas variables, como el tiempo y el sujeto, que hasta el siglo XX habían quedado fuera del contexto científico. Por el contrario, tanto el tiempo como el sujeto “ocupaban con pleno derecho el mundo de la estética, del arte o de la literatura”, temas que ahora tiene que incorporar la reflexión científica. Frente al modelo mecanicista que imperó en la ciencia moderna, las autoras proponen un “modelo estético” para la ciencia contemporánea. (shrink)

Con Prólogo de José Luis Pinillos, una especialista en Estética, Ana María Leyra, y otra en Filosofía de la Ciencia, Carmen Mataix, han publicado este libro, en el que pretenden aproximar e interrelacionar conceptualmente la ciencia y el arte. Su punto de partida consiste en considerar, citando a Prigogine, que “la ciencia es sobre todo un fenómeno cultural”. Superando la escisión entre ciencia y cultura, las autoras se proponen confrontar el recorrido experimentado por la Estética desde el siglo (...) XIX con las modificaciones habidas en la propia ciencia, sobre todo a partir de la aparición de la mecánica cuántica. Según las autoras, el principio de indeterminación de Heisenberg ha introducido a la ciencia en la vía del fenomenismo, e incluso de un fenomenismo mucho más fuerte que el que en su día propusieron Berkeley o Mach. Las discusiones entre Bohr y Einstein son comparadas, siguiendo de nuevo a Prigogine, con las que mantuvieron Leibniz y Clarke a principios del siglo XVIII. La noción de “realidad” está en el centro del debate entre los científicos, habiéndose introducido nuevas variables, como el tiempo y el sujeto, que hasta el siglo XX habían quedado fuera del contexto científico. Por el contrario, tanto el tiempo como el sujeto “ocupaban con pleno derecho el mundo de la estética, del arte o de la literatura”, temas que ahora tiene que incorporar la reflexión científica. Frente al modelo mecanicista que imperó en la ciencia moderna, las autoras proponen un “modelo estético” para la ciencia contemporánea. (shrink)

La traducción que al inglés hace el ilustre profesor norteamericano Harold Raley (cuya filosofía sigue a Ortega y a Marías) resulta excelente. El profesor Harold Cecil RALEY nació el año 1934 en el Estado de Alabama (USA), en cuya Universidad se doctoró en Lenguas y Literaturas Románicas, y quiso especializarse en la obra de José Ortega y Gasset. Casado y padre de varios hijos, ha sido catedrático de Lengua y Literatura españolas de la Universidad del Estado de Oklahoma desde (...) 1964; también catedrático y decano de Bellas Artes y Humanidades en la Houston Baptist University (nombrado por ella Distinguished Professor). Entre otros libros, es autor de los siguientes: "Ortega y Gasset, filósofo de la unidad europea" (Prólogo de Julián Marías. Revista de Occidente. Madrid, 1977; edición inglesa: "José Ortega y Gasset, the Philosopher of European Unity". The University of Alabama Press. USA, 1971); "La visión responsable. La filosofía de Julián Marías" (Prólogo de José Luis Pinillos. Espasa-Calpe. Madrid, 1977; edición inglesa: "Responsible Vision: The Philosophy of Julián Marías". The American Hispanist. Clear Creek, Indiana. USA, 1980); "Julián Marías. Una filosofía desde dentro" (Alianza Editorial. Madrid, 1997; edición inglesa: "A Watch over Mortality: the Philosophical Story of Julián Marías". The State University of New York Press. USA, 1997); "El espíritu de España" (Prólogo de Julián Marías. Alianza Editorial. Madrid, 2003; edición inglesa: "The Spirit of Spain". Halcyon Press. Houston. USA, 2002); "The Light of Eden. A Christian Worldview" (John M. Hardy Publishing. Houston. USA, 2008); "Language Oddities. Quirks and Curiosities of English and Other Languages" (Kingsle. Houston. USA, 2011); "Louisiana Rogue. The Life and Times of Pierre Prospère-Tourmoulin translated by Peter Tourmoulin" (Lamar University Press. Beaumont. USA, 2013); "The Unknown God: Mysteries of Deity, Time, Space, and Creation" (Charleston, SC, USA, 2011. También es autor de más de un centenar de estudios y artículos sobre temas filosóficos y literarios. Además ha traducido al inglés algunos de los libros de Julián Marías. (shrink)

Este texto se escribió y se publicó como parte de las celebraciones del 80 aniversario del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de México.

In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on (...) externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly, I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem. I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Replies to contributions to a symposium on the book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief.

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe (...) truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. (shrink)

Revised and enlarged edition. The first edition was in 1957.

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line (...) of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of folk psychology. (shrink)

Social sustainability is in its early stages in hospitality and tourism supply chains, especially in developing countries. This research draws on institutional and stakeholder theories to identify the adopted social sustainability practices in Egypt and to determine the factors affecting their implementation. A mixed-method research approach is followed involving interviews of hotel managers and a literature-based questionnaire answered by a total of 187 practitioners from hospitality and tourism supply chains in Egypt. The interviews revealed that social sustainability practices in the (...) two hotels' supply chains are adopted but limited to legal requirements and brand policies. Statistical analysis indicated that local suppliers boost the adoption of social practices. All the studied barriers show very weak correlation with the adoption of social sustainability practices; according to the interviews, this does not imply barriers inexistence, but rather reflects lack of awareness regarding social rights in a culture that tend to preserve social conservatism. The enablers explained significant variations in many social sustainability practices (53 out of 62). This study is unique since it offers a novel approach by linking institutional and stakeholder theories to recognize weaknesses in tourism supply chain social sustainability, thereby providing directions for the future design of sustainable tourism policies. (shrink)

This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory (...) adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations. (shrink)

The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe.

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing (...) free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation. (shrink)

This article analyses the nature of mental imagery in metaphoric thought as envisaged by the contemporary theory of metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics (Lakoff, Cambridge University Press, 1993). Our study of metaphor in the field of marine biology draws on two crucial aspects of mental imagery, namely dynamicity and pervasiveness. Image metaphors and behaviour-based metaphors have generally been regarded as two different types of resemblance metaphor. In our view, the dynamicity of certain mental images highlights inherent similarities between these two types (...) of metaphor, and makes the differences between them more apparent than real. For this reason, we propose a more refined description of resemblance metaphors in terms of the static or dynamic nature of the mental images underlying them. Our study also underlines the fact that mental images permeate all classes of metaphor, and that the pervasiveness and dynamicity of mental images affords insights into both resemblance metaphors and non-resemblance metaphors. (shrink)

The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...) these claims. I introduce my treatment of the principle by considering the analogous situation posed by the closure principle. (shrink)

This paper presents current trends in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience, with a special focus on neuroscientists dealing with some topics usually discussed by philosophers of mind. The aim is to detect the philosophical views of those scientists, such as Eccles, Gazzaniga, Damasio, Changeux, and others, which are not easy to classify according to the standard divisions of dualism, functionalism, emergentism, and others. As the variety of opinions in these fields is sometimes a source of confusion, it is (...) worth the effort to obtain an overall panorama of the topic. A general conclusion on epistemological and ontological issues, concerning the relationship between neurobiology and philosophy and the multi-level account of the embodied mind, is proposed. (shrink)

This article studies the differences between traditional financial intermediaries (commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks) and ethical banks based on property rights, in which the owner decides the ideology, principles, standards and objectives of the organisation. In ethical banking, affinity centres on positive social and ethical values. The article consequendy focuses on an index proposed both to differentiate ethical banks from other types of banks, and also to pinpoint the differences between the various ethical banks themselves.This is the Radical (...) Affinity Index (RAI), which groups banks together in terms of their stance on ethical commitment, concentrating on ethical ideology and principles (information transparency, placement of assets, guarantees and participation) and using a sample of 114 European banks. The evidence shows that transparency of information and placement of assets are factors that differentiate ethical banks from other financial intermediaries.Guarantees and participation are characteristics specific to ethical banks; these variables, however, do not offer clear evidence to our analysis. (shrink)

The publication of scientific papers has become increasingly problematic in the last decades. Even if we agree that a renewed model is needed for peer-reviewed scientific publication, we think the problem does not essentially lie in professional publishing—with economic incentives—but in the publish-or-perish culture that dominates the lives of researchers and academics.

Trata-se duma leitura do ensaio Experiência do Pensamento, em que Marilena Chaui analisa a maneira como Merleau-Ponty lê e se posiciona a respeito da tradição filosófica em que desenvolve o seu próprio pensamento. Unindo dois termos polarizados pela tradição como dois opostos irreconciliáveis, Chaui mostra como os dois termos se articulam no interior da reflexão de Merleau-Ponty. Nosso objetivo aqui é investigar como um pensamento filosófico se constitui enquanto diálogo, interrogação e combate entre sistemas e correntes de pensamento, confrontando a (...) ideia de que as grandes filosofias se comportariam como sistemas e correntes isolados. (shrink)