É comum, em leituras sobre educação, encontrar-se reflexões a partir de perguntas como: "educar para quê?", "educar para quem?". As leituras colocam questionamentos históricos, políticos, ideológicos onde a concepção de luta de classes normalmente está presente. Nesta ótica processa-se uma dicotomia: de um lado as teorias educacionais críticas, de outro as teorias educacionais não críticas, como se fosse possível este nível de precisão conceituai e assim dividí-las "matematicamente". Sobre as teorias não críticas ressaltam-se o "pedagogismo", e o "psicologismo", dão-lhes a (...) pecha de conservadoras ou, na melhor das hipóteses, refonnistas. Quanto às teorias críticas, ressalta-se o caráter revolucionário, porém pela contundência acabam não tendo um "mundo possível" para aplicação. Assim, sua importância circunscreve-se na possibilidade de refletir a realidade educacional. Isto porque a ênfase do processo crítico está principalmente no pensamento por oposição. Em alguns casos há autores que chegam a afirmar que a educação escolar é hoje e o que foi o cristianismo para o período medieval. O que é um exagero crítico. [...] Palavras-chave: educação; construtivismo; política. (shrink)

O niilismo é um tema importante em Genealogia da moral (1887) e está estreitamente associado a seus conceitos principais. No entanto, no parágrafo 12 da II Dissertação dessa obra, e somente nele, aparece o termo “niilismo administrativo” (administrativen Nihilismus) sem nenhuma explicação de seu sentido, a não ser que se trata de uma censura que Thomas Huxley fez a Herbert Spencer. Nesse parágrafo, Nietzsche apresenta o principal pressuposto de seu procedimento genealógico: a função de uma estrutura, seja ela um organismo (...) vivo ou uma instituição cultural, que ocorre em um determinado momento, não nos diz nada sobre a origem dessa mesma estrutura. Esse pressuposto, somado à noção de vontade de potência, antagoniza-se à concepção spenceriana de adaptação. Nesse contexto, o objetivo deste artigo, por meio principalmente da análise do ensaio Administrative Nihilism (1871) de Huxley, é esclarecer o papel que a rápida menção ao niilismo administrativo exerce no parágrafo citado de Genealogia da moral, especificamente na crítica nietzschiana contra Spencer. (shrink)

Por meio de sua fisiopsicologia, isto é, da morfologia e doutrina do desenvolvimento da vontade de potência, Nietzsche avalia a condição impulsional de indivíduos e culturas. Assim, produções que afirmam a vida como um movimento contínuo de autossuperação são sintomas de uma dinâmica saudável; mórbidos são os organismos que procuram estratégias de conservação e paralisação das mudanças, como, por exemplo, a metafísica. Nesse contexto teórico, este artigo pretende investigar a reação de Nietzsche em face de um grande terremoto ocorrido em (...) Nice no ano de 1887, vivenciado pelo próprio filósofo. Nietzsche acredita ter a grande saúde, o que o habilita a rejeitar a busca, imposta por uma catástrofe à maioria dos seres humanos, de valores eternos em instâncias transcendentes. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is, in the context of the distinction between Nietzsche's notions of cultural philistine (Bildungsphilister) and free spirit (Freigeist), to discuss which of these two types we, professors at Brazilian higher education institutions, are more similar. The philistine is the opposite of the genuine man of culture and the artist. The free spirit, on the other hand, is the exception, he is one who is disconnected from the values and habits in force, he doesn't cling to (...) anything and walks freely. In this article, it is a matter of making some reflections, as we bring more questions than answers. (shrink)

The critiques against the concept of subject or the philosophy of subjectivity are very clear in the writings of Nietzsche. Despite these critiques, we can ask whether they result in overcoming the notion of subject or in a simple change of this conception, with the conservation of the general assumptions of a philosophy of subjectivity. In this article, which focuses on the aspect of multiplicity, we investigated whether the rejection of the unity of the subject is sufficient to reject also (...) the philosophy of subjectivity. We also showed that the Nietzschean critiques against the subject are very close to the criticism presented by the French philosopher and psychologist Théodule Ribot at his effort to the formation of an experimental psychology, without metaphysics. (shrink)

Resumo: Nas poucas referências explícitas de Nietzsche ao biólogo alemão Ernst Haeckel, há uma clara rejeição de seu pensamento biológico e cultural. O objetivo deste artigo é propor que, apesar da pequena quantidade de citações diretas, os ataques de Nietzsche a Haeckel constituem um intenso antagonismo entre eles e inserem-se no contexto das críticas nietzschianas contra a formação e a cultura alemãs e contra a condição metafísica da ciência. O texto apresenta quatro aspectos do antagonismo entre Nietzsche e Haeckel: das (...) Darwinismus de Haeckel; a influência de Haeckel sobre David Strauss; a inclusão do evolucionismo científico no currículo na Alemanha; e o conflito entre Ludwig Rütimeyer e Haeckel.: In Nietzsche's few explicit references to German biologist Ernst Haeckel, there is a clear rejection of his biological and cultural thinking. The aim of this article is to propose that, despite the small amount of direct mentions, Nietzsche's criticism of Haeckel constitute an intense antagonism between them and are part place of the context of Nietzschean censure against the German education and culture and against the metaphysical condition of science. The text presents four aspects of the antagonism between Nietzsche and Haeckel: Haeckel’s Das Darwinismus; Haeckel's influence on David Strauss; the inclusion of scientific evolutionism in the curriculum in Germany; and the conflict between Ludwig Rütimeyer and Haeckel. (shrink)

The paper investigates the kind of dependence relation that best portrays Machian frame-dragging in general relativity. The question is tricky because frame-dragging relates local inertial frames to distant distributions of matter in a time-independent way, thus establishing some sort of non-local link between the two. For this reason, a plain causal interpretation of frame-dragging faces huge challenges. The paper will shed light on the issue by using a generalized structural equation model analysis in terms of manipulationist counterfactuals recently applied in (...) the context of metaphysical enquiry by Schaffer (2016) and Wilson (2017). The verdict of the analysis will be that frame-dragging is best understood in terms of a novel type of dependence relation that is half-way between causation and grounding. (shrink)

Scientists are rapidly mapping the chemical and physical pathways that constitute biological systems, making the complexity of processes such as inheritance, development, evolution, and even the origin of life increasingly tractable. Through genetics and neuroscience, biological understanding is now being extended deeply into the human sciences and has begun to transform our understanding of behavior, mind, culture, and values. The idea of a science-driven unity of knowledge has reemerged in several forms in both reductionist and nonreductionist frameworks. This volume examines (...) some of the extraordinary empirical discoveries that have caused a revival of this idea and presents theories from thinkers in a variety of disciplines, including E. O. Wilson, Eric Kandel, and Elaine Scarry. (shrink)

Soto Calderón, Andrea (2022)Imaginación materialSantiago de Chile: Metales Pesados, 149 p.ISBN 978-9566048923.

This article deals with a deep and theoretical thought on post-photography from the point of view of image’s genealogical approach. It is our aim to problematize the current image’s Statute throughout the cultural pattern’s context, mediated by digital technology. There will be three main axes in our research, namely the image’s symbolical power: it must be taken connected with mortality and the religious side of image, according to the Max Weber concept’s Disenchantment. Around these conceptual axes, our article will try (...) to link the ontology traditional subjects on image with the current photography practices, into the contemporary framework of the so-called post-photography. Therefore, it is needed to articulate a conceptual background around the new forms of gaze, conditioned by fragmentation, saturation, and acceleration. The critical apparatus will be based on a multidisciplinary focus. The works of authors like Joan Fontcuberta on post-photography and Régis Debray on life and death of image will vertebrate our article. We will take an essayistic point of view problematizing the subjects developed in the article as an invitation to deep thoughts. El artículo traza una reflexión teórica de la post-fotografía desde la conceptualización genealógica de la imagen, con el objetivo de problematizar el actual estatuto de la imagen en el marco de los patrones culturales contemporáneos, condicionados por la tecnología digital. Serán tres los ejes principales de reflexión: el poder simbólico de la imagen, su relación con la mortalidad y el carácter religioso de la imagen en el sentido weberiano de encantamiento. En torno a tales ejes de discusión, el artículo tratará de vincular las problemáticas tradicionales de la ontología de la imagen y la fotografía con las derivas actuales, en el marco de prácticas post-fotográficas. Será preciso, pues, una contextualización de las nuevas formas de mirada condicionadas por la fragmentación, la saturación y la aceleración. El aparato crítico del texto partirá de un enfoque multidisciplinar, donde los trabajos de Joan Fontcuberta acerca de la post-fotografía y la reflexión sobre la imagen de Régis Debray, servirán de núcleo vertebrador en la ilación de ideas. El punto de vista será ensayístico, por lo que el artículo se plantea como una invitación a cuestionar la problemática abordada. (shrink)

1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

The physicalist thesis that all entities are nothing over and above physical entities is often interpreted as appealing to a supervenience-based account of "nothing over and aboveness”, where, schematically, the A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The main approaches to filling in this schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that the (...) resulting formulation of physicalism is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable. (shrink)

Note: this is the first published presentation and defense of the 'proper subset strategy' for making sense of non-reductive physicalism or the associated notion of realization; this is sometimes, inaccurately, called "Shoemaker's subset strategy"; if people could either call it the 'subset strategy' or better yet, add my name to the mix I would appreciate it. Horgan claims that physicalism requires "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base properties. I argue that Horgan's (...) account fails to rule out physically unacceptable emergence. I rather suggest that this and other unacceptable possibilities may be ruled out by requiring that each individual causal power in the set associated with a given supervenient property be numerically identical with a causal power in the set associated with its base property. I go on to show that a wide variety of physicalist accounts, both reductive and non-reductive, are implicitly or explicitly designed to meet this condition, and so are more similar than they seem. In particular, non-reductive physicalism accounts typically appeal to a relation plausibly ensuring that the powers of a higher-level property are a proper subset of those of its physical base property. (shrink)

How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, (...) especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. Ultimately, I motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components: The physics-based NFM account: An entity existing at a world w is physical iff (i) it is treated, approximately accurately, by current or future (in the limit of inquiry, ideal) versions of fundamental physics at w, and (ii) it is not fundamentally mental (that is, does not individually either possess or bestow mentality). (shrink)

This book engages with the writings of W.G. Sebald, mediated by perspectives drawn from curriculum and architecture, to explore the theme of unsettling complacency and confront difficult knowledge around trauma, discrimination and destruction. Moving beyond overly instrumentalist and reductive approaches, the authors combine disciplines in a scholarly fashion to encourage readers to stretch their understandings of currere. The chapters exemplify important, timely and complicated conversations centred on ethical response and responsibility, in order to imagine a more just and aesthetically experienced (...) world. In the analysis of bildung as human formation, the book illuminates the pertinent lessons to be learned from the works of Sebald and provokes further investigations into the questions of memory, grief, and limits of language. Through its juxtaposition of curriculum and architecture, and using the prose of Sebald as a prism, the book revitalizes questions about education and ethics, probes the unsettling of complacency, and enables conversation around difficult knowledge and ethical responsibility, as well as offering hope and resolve. An important intervention in standard approaches to understanding currere, this book provides essential context for scholars and educators with interests in the history of education, curriculum studies, cultural studies, memory studies, narrative research, Sebaldian studies, and educational philosophy. (shrink)

Escribir sobre ética —y en particular sobre ética médica— en los tiempos que corren comporta un cierto riesgo, no sólo por la posible incompetencia del autor, sino porque éste se encuentra algo desubicado en un entorno de crisis moral propiciada por el cientifismo como nueva religión laica y la voracidad de los mercados. La preocupación de los legos por la creciente dificultad en discernir aquello que es ético o bueno de lo que no lo es constituye en la actualidad un (...) dilema universal, al menos por cuanto respecta a nuestra civilización occidental. Dicha preocupación se encuentra plasmada en decenas de textos dedicados no ya a los aspectos más abstractos o filosóficos de la ética general, sino a las “éticas particulares” aplicables a las profesiones, las empresas o al ámbito político. Así, se habla de una ética periodística, del compliance industrial, de la investigación, de la banca, de las redes de sociales y, por supuesto de la medicina. (shrink)

While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory ‘‘goes beyond the individual’’ but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. (...) This paper reviews a sampling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency. (shrink)

"Amongst the human mind's proudest accomplishments is the invention of a science dedicated to understanding itself: cognitive science. ... This volume is an authoritative guide to this exhilarating new body of knowledge, written by the experts, edited with skill and good judment. If we were to leave a time capsule for the next millennium with records of the great achievements of civilization, this volume would have to be in it."--Steven Pinker.

This paper examines the standard view of realization operative incontemporary philosophy of mind, and proposes an alternative, generalperspective on realization. The standard view can be expressed, insummary form, as the conjunction of two theses, the sufficiency thesis andthe constitutivity thesis. Physicalists of both reductionist and anti-reductionist persuasions share a conception of realization wherebyrealizations are determinative of the properties they realize and physically constitutive of the individuals with those properties. Centralto the alternative view that I explore here is the idea that (...) the requisite,metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive. I shall argue that the sufficiency and constitutivity theses aretypically not jointly satisfied by any one candidate realizer, and that goingcontext-sensitive in one's metaphysics is preferable to the standard view.The context-sensitive views developed here are implicit in a range ofcommon views in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology,even if they have not been explicitly articulated, and even though theyundermine other views that are commonly endorsed. (shrink)

Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" - supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability - is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory,for on the usual understandings of causal power bestowal, it is trivially (...) satisfied or falsified. I offer a revision of CCP which incorporates the evident fact that causal powers are grounded in fundamental forces. (shrink)

This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in (...) completing it I distinguish _active _ _cognition_ from _cyborg fantasy arguments_ for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

This paper argues that the metarepresentational systems we posses are wide or extended, rather than individualistic. There are two basic ideas. The first is that metarepresentation inherits its width from the mental representation of its objects. The second is that mental processing often operates on internal and external symbols, and this suggests that cognitive systems extend beyond the heads that house them.

We introduce two notions–the shadows and the shallows of explanation–in opening up explanation to broader, interdisciplinary investigation. The shadows of explanation refer to past philosophical efforts to provide either a conceptual analysis of explanation or in some other way to pinpoint the essence of explanation. The shallows of explanation refer to the phenomenon of having surprisingly limited everyday, individual cognitive abilities when it comes to explanation. Explanations are ubiquitous, but they typically are not accompanied by the depth that we might, (...) prima facie, expect. We explain the existence of the shadows and shallows of explanation in terms of there being a theoretical abyss between explanation and richer, theoretical structures that are often attributed to people. We offer an account of the shallows, in particular, both in terms of shorn-down, internal, mental machinery, and in terms of an enriched, public symbolic environment, relative to the currently dominant ways of thinking about cognition and the world. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina como a obra historiográfica _Revoluções Cisplatinas_, de 1915, do político, diplomata e historiador Alfredo Augusto Varella, representa tanto disputa política como uma forma de escrita da história sobre a Farroupilha. A partir da hipótese de que na Primeira República, no Rio Grande do Sul, houve uma hegemonia social e política do PRR quer se investigar como a obra de Varella articulou-se com o seu contexto. Portanto, o objetivo é analisar como foi construída a narrativa sobre a (...) Farroupilha no contexto de disputas em torno do borgismo. Para atingir tal objetivo, usa-se o conceito de operação historiográfica de Michel de Certeau, isto é, como a partir de uma análise do lugar social, da prática científica e da escrita do texto pode-se perceber as transformações na escrita da história sobre a Farroupilha. Por fim, percebe-se que a obra analisada foi um objeto tanto de luta política como de virada interpretativa na escrita da Farroupilha. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of some ideas about narrow content owing to Horgan and Tienson and Brian Loar.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Tyranny of the BureaucratsSimon Wilson (bio) and Gwen Adshead (bio)Keywordsviolence, mental health, bureaucracyWe are grateful for the opportunity to respond to the two kind and thoughtful commentaries on our paper. Sadler suggests irrationality may be the key to distinguishing psychiatric from nonpsychiatric violence. We are not so sure that this is necessarily as helpful as it might at first seem. Who gets to decide what is rational? (...) Much “normal” violence, committed in the heat of the moment, impulsively, and drunkenly, may not appear that rational, even to the perpetrator, in the cold light of day. We are not sure one would wish to bring this sort of violence within the province of psychiatric explanations. Likewise, a point we made in our paper: Even delusionally driven violence often has its own internal coherence and rationality within an irrational framework.We found much to agree with in McCallum’s commentary, and perhaps his alternative approach is more helpful. He proposes a more sociological model of understanding what is going on in these complex cases, one that starts with societal dividing practices. Our present times have been described as the tyranny of the bureaucrats. Professional approaches are devalued. Diagnosis is only relevant in terms of its bureaucratic utility in moving people from one category to another. Since the writing of our paper, the criminal law has changed further in England and Wales. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 brought with it new sentences of indeterminate detention for public protection for those offenders categorized as “dangerous.” The presence or absence of psychiatric disorder being largely irrelevant for these purposes. This would seem to fit nicely with McCallum’s analysis, and in principle rather takes the wind out of our sails when we argued about the discrimination against psychiatric violence—now a diagnosis is not necessary for the state to intervene in a probabilistic fashion to prevent future violence. Deciding between what sort of violence counts as psychiatric and what does not, does not have quite the same drastic differential effect on the individual as perhaps it did. Its importance is now, as predicted by McCallum’s model, more to do with bureaucracy: Which government department will be paying for the individual’s preventive detention (Department of Health or Ministry of Justice)? [End Page 75]Related ArticlesFeature Article: When Violence Becomes a Psychiatric SymptomCommentary: The Contingent Object of PsychiatryCommentary: Reasons CountResponse: The Tyranny of the BureaucratsSimon Wilson Simon Wilson is a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at the Maudsley Hospital and an Honorary Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK. He qualified at Leeds University and trained in psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital. He was previously Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at HM Prison, Brixton, UK. He has particular interests in prisons, philosophical, and ethico-legal issues in psychiatry. He can be contacted via e-mail at:[email protected] Adshead Gwen Adshead is a Forensic Psychiatrist and Psychotherapist. She works as a psychotherapist in a high-security hospital. She is a group analyst and researcher in attachment theory as it relates to offenders. She has a Master’s degree in Medical Law and Ethics, and is a founder member of the Philosophy Special Interest Group of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. She can be contacted via e-mail at:[email protected] © 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on are causal depth and theoretical appropriateness. Reflection on the depth and appropriateness of other wide explanations of behavior, such as evolutionary explanations, clarifies why wide psychological explanations sometimes have more causal depth and theoretical appropriateness than narrow psychological explanations. I also argue for the rejection of eliminative materialism.

This paper examines a recent, influential argument for individualism in psychology defended by Jerry Fodor and others, what I call the argument from causal powers. I argue that this argument equivocates on the crucial notion of "causal powers", and that this equivocation constitutes a deep problem for arguments of this type. Relational and individualistic taxonomies are incompatible, and it does not seem in general to be possible to factor the former into the latter. The distinction between powers and properties plays (...) a central role in my argument. (shrink)