Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75 (1994)

Authors
Robert A. Wilson
University of Western Australia
Abstract
Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on are causal depth and theoretical appropriateness. Reflection on the depth and appropriateness of other wide explanations of behavior, such as evolutionary explanations, clarifies why wide psychological explanations sometimes have more causal depth and theoretical appropriateness than narrow psychological explanations. I also argue for the rejection of eliminative materialism
Keywords Causation  Individualism  Materialism  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289780
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):640-642.
Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.

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Citations of this work BETA

Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation.Harjit Bhogal - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):677-694.
Explanatory Depth.Brad Weslake - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.
Ten Questions Concerning Extended Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):19-33.
Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.
The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation.Robert A. Wilson & Frank Keil - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (1):137-159.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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