The Nature of Aesthetic Value proposes that aesthetic goodness, the property in virtue of which works of art are valuable, is a matter of their capacity in appropriate circumstances to give satisfaction. It inquires into the nature of this satisfaction, arguing that it consists of the extension and clarification of consciousness. This provides a basis for treatment of the ancient problem of the relation between cultivation of the arts and the pursuit and maintenance of the true and the good. The (...) book summarizes critics' judgments and arguments on literature, the visual arts, and music, testing the author's theory about the nature of aesthetic opinion. (shrink)

TO BE A THEIST, THE AUTHOR ARGUES, IS TO CONSTRUE THE WORLD AS A WHOLE ON THE MODEL OF A RATIONAL AGENT’S ACTIVITIES. CHRISTIAN THEISM IS CHARACTERISED BY PARTICULAR CLAIMS AS TO MATTERS OF FACT: GOD IS (A) THAT WHICH IS SAID TO MAKE ALL THINGS, (B) THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, (C) THAT WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BRING ABOUT A STATE OF JUSTICE, (D) THAT WHICH BROUGHT IT ABOUT THAT JESUS LIVED, DIED AND ROSE FROM THE DEAD. MEYNELL CONTENDS (...) THAT THIS IS A LOGICALLY COHERENT IDEA AND SHOWS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEPENDENT CONCEPTS OF GRACE, EVIL, PRAYER, PROVIDENCE, MIRACLE AND THE AFTER-LIFE THAT THE CHRISTIAN FAITH HAS ESCHATOLOGICAL TRUTH-CONDITIONS. (BP). (shrink)

An English eccentric and an agitated dean -- Mr. McGregor's garden -- I banish you -- Vultures and ostriches -- Post mortem.

Focusing on the Aristotelian framework, the author defends 'Soft Utilitarianism' as combining the principle of happiness with the principle of fairness, being careful to note that these two features of a proper ethical theory cannot be reduced one to the other in the decision making process.

Some years ago, it was fashionable for philosophers not to take sceptica arguments seriously. Now, it seems no longer so.

I n my argument in this paper I shall assume rather than try to prove the proposition, surely not on the face of it an unreasonable one, that the question of what actions, dispositions and circumstances are such as to frustrate human beings, and what are such as to make them comparatively happy and fulfilled, has a great deal of bearing on the question of what actions and dispositions are good or bad. I shall also assume that the way in (...) which human persons or societies can achieve fulfilment, or fail to achieve it, is explicable largely on the basis of the way in which man as a species has evolved. Few people, except those strongly affected by philosophical fashion, will wish to deny the first of these propositions. What one might call the hard utilitarian thesis, that goodness is to be defined in terms of contribution to happiness or fulfilment, may involve the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, may be vulnerable to the arguments of Moore, Hare and others. But I shall not commit myself here to the hard utilitarian thesis, since I am not insisting that goodness may be defined in terms of contribution to human happiness or fulfilment, but only that the question of how far anything contributes to human happiness or fulfilment has a vital bearing on the question of whether and to what extent it is good. I do not think that many people really doubt the truth of this proposition, unless they confuse it with the hard utilitarian thesis. (shrink)

Hugo A Meynell; On the Aims of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 79–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

Hugo A Meynell; On the Aims of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 79–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.