How is language acquired when infants are exposed to multiple language input from birth and when adults are required to learn a second language after early childhood? How do adult bilinguals comprehend and produce words and sentences when their two languages are potentially always active and in competition with one another? What are the neural mechanisms that underlie proficient bilingualism? What are the general consequences of bilingualism for cognition and for language and thought? This handbook will be essential reading for (...) cognitive psychologists, linguists, applied linguists, and educators who wish to better understand the cognitive basis of bilingualism and the logic of experimental and formal approaches to language science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.2 (2002) 159-160 [Access article in PDF] The Nine Lives of the Dynamic Unconscious Jerome Kroll IN THEIR PROVOCATIVE ARTICLE "Dispensing with the Dynamic Unconscious," O'Brien and Jureidini offer two basic arguments against the existence or, more accurately, because we are dealing here with constructs, the plausibility, of the dynamic unconscious. First, they assert, in contradistinction to the psychoanalytic claim that evidence of a (...) cognitive unconscious supports the claim for a dynamic unconscious, that the notion of a cognitive unconscious is incompatible with that of a dynamic unconscious. Second, they argue on the grounds of parsimony that the phenomena explained by a dynamic unconscious can be better explained (accounted for) by other mechanisms.I would argue that neither of their contentions is correct. O'Brien and Jureidini have essentially taken data and evidence from cognitive science, issued a new vocabulary, and then asserted that their vocabulary is superior and constitutes better explanations for the phenomena and observations under question. They have failed to show any incompatibility between the two explanatory constructs. O'Brien and Jureidini agree with the basic Freudian tenet that most mental activity is unconscious, that is, out of consciousness, and that much of what is out of consciousness can be brought into consciousness with proper cueing. No problem so far.The problem with the dynamic unconscious, as O'Brien and Jureidini see it, is that the cognitive unconscious is modular, best described as a series of subpersonal systems akin to a set of narrowly focused computational specialists, whereas the dynamic unconscious contains fully formed repressed memories. What O'Brien and Jureidini have now given us are multiple homunculi rather than just one CEO or executive homunculus. How literally do we want to take these subpersons? Are subpersonal mental states more satisfactory scientifically than personal-level mental states? Second, O'Brien and Jureidini unfairly attribute to the psychoanalytic position the claim that the dynamic unconscious "is presumed to contain fully formed repressed memories." With the compelling evidence from psychology and neuroscience that all memory is a reconstruction, I do not think that any contemporary psychodynamicist makes a case for fully formed repressed memories, nor is this notion essential to a theory of a dynamic unconscious. O'Brien and Jureidini invoke Occam's razor by invoking a straw horse argument. Their description of the action of subpersonal parts doing sufficient specific cuing sounds suspiciously like the work done in the dynamic unconscious. In the next section, an emotional response is described as pushing images out of mind before they can be reported on (assumedly, before they become conscious). What is doing the pushing here? Upon what principles or priorities are images pushed out of mind?The authors explain that mental "representations are inaccessible to consciousness by virtue [End Page 159] of architectural constraints rather than the operation of a repressive force." But architectural constraints sounds like another way of describing neural facilitation and inhibition. Certainly most neural activity, perhaps all, involves facilitation and inhibition of signals at multiple synapses. Repression is just a psychological construct to describe what the processes of facilitation and inhibition bring about in terms of meaningful mental activity. While we are on the topic of choice of words, the repeated description of the dynamic unconscious as subterranean is an inflammatory locution designed to rally opposition to the notion. The cognitive unconscious is equally subterranean.To look further into the supposed superiority of explanation via the cognitive unconscious, we see that O'Brien and Jureidini attribute the following processes to the cognitive unconscious: evaluation, decision making, editing out, filling in, reconstruction, and reconfiguration. But what are the bases of these processes? What guides or influences the way ideas, images, and emotions are reconstructed and reconfigured? It does not appear to be done randomly. When the reconstructive narrative becomes "significantly distorted" because the memory to be retrieved is fraught with distress, what accounts for the shape of the distortion and what (dare we say who?) recognizes that a memory is about to be distressing? We may all be unhappy with the notion of a dynamic unconscious... (shrink)

This paper examines the theoretical background and actual behavior in a gaming tournament with endogenous timing where a person has more incentive, structure, and time to form a strategy. The baseline treatment suggests that subgame perfection is a reasonable predictor of behavior –- subjects made 170 of 208 theoretically predicted choices of best actions, with the majority of mistakes made in timing choices by the players who did not survive the cut to the second round. Four sensitivity treatments established that (...) the design feature that lead to more predictable behavior was time to think –- 745 of 960 correctly predicted decisions with more time versus 595 of 960 with less time. A random effects Probit model suggests that the key design feature that closed the gap between predicted and observed behavior was not necessarily the non-linear payoffs created by the tournament design, but rather that the key was providing people with more time to think about their strategy. (shrink)

Ziel des PVS Sonderheftes ist es, die seit einiger Zeit boomende Konjunktur des Verantwortungsbegriffs zu reflektieren, die Relevanz dieses Begriffes zu analysieren und seinen Wandel angesichts gesellschaftlicher und technischer Veranderungen zu erfassen. Eines der wichtigsten Kriterien zur Beurteilung politischer Entscheidungen ist deren Verantwortlichkeit. Der Begriff der Verantwortung bezieht sich auf einen Rahmen normativer Erwartungen, die je nach Politikfeld starker rechtlich oder moralisch ausgepragt sind. Verantwortung bedeutet insbesondere, einem Akteur die Folgen seines Handels zuschreiben zu konnen. Ein Kernproblem aktueller Verantwortungskonzeptionen besteht (...) in der Diffusion von Verantwortung. Einerseits sind immer mehr Akteure an immer mehr Handlungszusammenhangen beteiligt, aber gleichzeitig sind immer weniger Akteure fur ihre Handlungsfolgen allein verantwortlich. Die Beitrage des Heftes diskutieren die Folgen dieser Dilemmata sowohl in ihren theoretischen Konsequenzen als auch empirisch anhand verschiedener Felder lokaler, nationaler und internationaler Politik. Der Band versammelt Expertinnen und Experten aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen: von der Politikwissenschaft uber die Rechtswissenschaft bis hin zur Soziologie und Philosophie. (shrink)

I argue for a teleological account of events in progress. Details aside, the proposal is that events in progress are teleological processes. It follows from this proposal that final causes are ubiquitous: anything happening at any time is an event with a telos.

The notion of singular (or de re) thought has become central in philosophy of mind and language, yet there is still little consensus concerning the best way to think about the nature of singular thought. Coinciding with recognition of the need for more clarity about the notion, there has been a surge of interest in the concept of a mental file as a way to understand what is distinctive about singular thought. What isn't always clear, however, is what mental files (...) are meant to be, and why we should believe that thoughts that employ them are singular as opposed to descriptive. This volume brings together original chapters by leading scholars which aim to examine and evaluate the viability of the mental files framework for theorizing about singular thought. (shrink)

Aggleton & Brown argue that a hippocampal-anterior thalamic system supports the “recollection” of contextual information about previous events, and that a separate perirhinal-medial dorsal thalamic system supports detection of stimulus “familiarity.” Although there is a growing body of human literature that is in agreement with these claims, when recollection and familiarity have been examined in amnesics using the process dissociation or the remember/know procedures, the results do not seem to provide consistent support. We reexamine these studies and describe the results (...) of an additional experiment using a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) technique. The results of the reanalysis and the ROC experiment are consistent with Aggleton & Brown's proposal. Patients with damage to both regions exhibit severe deficits in recollection and smaller, but consistent, deficits in familiarity. (shrink)

The problem of indistinguishable participants is a well-known problem for D-type theories of donkey pronouns. Recently, Paul Elbourne has offered a D-type theory that purports to dissolve the problem of indistinguishable participants. I argue against Elboune’s solution.

Szabó (Philos Rev 120(2):247–283, 2011) and Santorio (Philos Stud 164(1):41–59, 2013) have revived the case for Fodor’s (The linguistic description of opaque contexts, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970) _specific yet opaque_ readings of determiner phrases in intensional constructions. Szabó claims that the existence of such readings gives reason to abandon standard theories of movement. Santorio claims that such readings imply that a quantification analysis of indefinites is false. I’m not so sure. To make my case, I supply a (...) situation semantics for these readings that both respects standard theories of movement and a quantificational analysis of indefinites. (shrink)

I offer a novel account of temporal passage. According to this account, time passes in virtue of there being events in progress. I argue that such an account of temporal passage can explain the direction and whoosh of temporal passage. I also consider two prominent accounts of temporal passage and argue that they amount to special versions of the thesis that time passes in virtue of there being events in progress.

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 3 Heft: 1 Seiten: 209-241.

In this manuscript we describe Proteogenomics Viewer, a web‐based tool that collects MS peptide identification, indexes to genomic sequence and structure, assigns exon usage, reports the identified protein isoforms with genomic alignments and, most importantly, allows the inspection of MS2 information for proper peptide identification. It also provides all performed indexing to facilitate global analysis of the data. The relevance of such tool is that there has been an increase in the number of proteogenomic efforts to improve the annotation of (...) both genomics and proteomics data, culminating with the release of the two human proteome drafts. It is now clear that mass spectrometry‐based peptide identification of uncharacterized sequences, such as those resulting from unpredicted exon joints or non‐coding regions, is still prone to a higher than expected false discovery rate. Therefore, proper visualization of the raw data and the corresponding genome alignments are fundamental for further data validation and interpretation. (shrink)

Seit dem 2. Nachchristlichen Jahrhundert werden die Schriften von Aristoteles kommentiert. DIese Ausgabe enthalt griechische Kommentare zu seinem Werk vom 3. Bis 8. JAhrhundert n. CHr., u. A. Von Alexander von Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. PHiloponus, Simplicius in griechischer Sprache.