Following Dirac's generalized canonical formalism, we develop a quantization scheme for theN-dimensional system described by the Lagrangian $L_0 (\dot y,y) = \frac{1}{2}h_{ij} (y)\dot y^i \dot y^j + b_i (y)\dot y^i - w(y)$ which is supposed to be invariant under the gauge transformation $y^i \to y\prime ^i = y^i + (\rho ^i _\alpha + \sigma ^i _{\alpha j} \dot y^j )\delta \Lambda ^\alpha + \tau ^i _\alpha \delta \dot \Lambda ^\alpha$ . The gauge invariance necessarily implies that the Lagrangian is singular. (...) The identities imposed by the gauge invariance are enumerated and reduced to simpler forms. There are primary and secondary constraints, both of which are of first class. The reduced identities are solved explicitly for the case where the secondary constraints constitute the generators of the groupSO(M), and thus an explicit expression for the manifestly gauge-invariant Lagrangian is obtained. By fixing the gauge appropriately, the unphysical variables are eliminated and a quantization is achieved using only physical variables. Our formulation is covariant under an arbitrary point transformation of physical variables. The problem of formulating a quantum action principle is also commented on briefly. (shrink)

Schwinger's action principle is formulated for the quantum system which corresponds to the classical system described by the LagrangianL c( $\dot x$ , x)=(M/2)gij(x) $\dot x$ i $\dot x$ j−v(x). It is sufficient for the purpose of deriving the laws of quantum mechanics to consider onlyc-number variations of coordinates and time. The Euler-Lagrange equation, the canonical commutation relations, and the canonical equations of motion are derived from this principle in a consistent manner. Further, it is shown that an arbitrary point (...) transformation leaves the forms of the fundamental equations invariant. The judicious choice of the quantal Lagrangian is essential in our formulation. A quantum mechanical analog of Noether's theorem, which relates the invariance of the quantal action with a conservation law, is established. The ambiguities in the quantal Lagrangian are also discussed and it is pointed out that the requirement of invariance is not sufficient to determine uniquely the quantal Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian. (shrink)

Studies with primates in sequence production tasks reveal that chimpanzees make action plans before initiating responses and making on-line adjustments to spatially exchanged stimuli, whereas such planning isn't evident in monkeys. Although planning may rely on phylogenetically newer regions in the inferior parietal lobe – along with the frontal lobes and basal ganglia – it dates back to as far as five million years ago.

Transplantation is a medically successful and cost-effective way to treat people whose organs have failed--but not enough organs are available to meet demand. T. M. Wilkinson explores the major ethical problems raised by policies for acquiring organs. Key topics include the rights of the dead, the role of the family, and the sale of organs.

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it (...) does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I (...) distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject. (shrink)

Neuroscience cannot and should not be allowed to replace normative questions with scientific onesOver the past few years considerable attention has been paid to a variety of issues that are now placed collectively under the heading of “Neuroethics”. In both the academic and the popular press there have been discussions about the possibilities and problems offered by cognitive enhancement and neuroimaging as well as debate about the implications of these emerging “neurotechnologies” for morality and the law. This issue of the (...) journal contains eight papers that discuss a broad range of important topics in neuroethics, from cognitive enhancement and the moral status of animals and cyborgs, to the challenges of neurological consults in end of life cases. As these papers demonstrate, advances in neuroscience raise a number of important ethical questions, but can neuroscience help provide any answers?FACT AND VALUEAccording to the received philosophical wisdom, there is a fundamental distinction between fact and value—between how things are and how they ought to be. On the basis of this distinction one cannot draw normative conclusions from descriptive premises because there is nothing in the premises that would warrant such conclusions: from the fact that happiness is desired it does not follow that it ought to be. This received wisdom applies to neuroethics in the following way: whereas neuroscience might be able to identify the neurophysical correlates for evaluative notions such as preferences and attitudes,1,2 lying,3 and the distinction between in control and out of control behaviour,4 neuroscience cannot, in and by itself, provide the basis for their evaluation. The reason for this is that, in the absence of factors external to these neurophysical states, one neurophysical state is no better or worse than another—internal neurophysical states are logically …. (shrink)

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...) exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Classical text on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; with Āloka Sanskrit commentary.

Critical edition with eight commentaries, on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Classical work on the basic concepts and terminology of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy; includes Phakkikā commentary by Kṣamākalyāṇagaṇi, 18th cent.

Aphoristic work on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes Sanskrit commentary with Hindi translation.

Aphoristic work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes two Sanskrit commentaries.

Discourses on the Bhagavadgītā, Bhakti, and Hindu ethics.

Contributed research papers on Indic philosophy.