Expressed emotion is a measure of the family environment that has been demonstrated to be a reliable, cross-culturally valid psychosocial predictor of relapse in patients with schizophrenia, mood disorders, and other — also somatic — illnesses. Assessed during the Camberwell Family Interview CFI, relatives are classified as being high in EE if they make more than a specified threshold number of critical comments or show any signs of hostility or marked emotional overinvolvement. In schizophrenia, the median relapse rate for patients (...) returning after hospital discharge to a high EE environment is 48%, compared with 21% in a low EE-environment. In this article, the history of EE research will be outlined, and the evidence for the association between family EE and the course of schizophrenia and mood disorders will be presented. Conclusions about the treatment of major mental disorders are discussed as well as the directions of future studies. (shrink)

Understanding risk factors for relationship dissolution and poor relationship adjustment among couples has been an active area of research in relationship science. One risk factor, non-marital cohabitation, has shown to predict higher rates of relationship dissolution and relationship instability in some samples, but the associations among German parents with children over time are less clear. In this study, we examined the links between non-marital cohabitation and 10-year outcomes in 220 German families with preschool-aged children at the initial assessment followed into (...) adolescence. Families were assessed 7 times over the 10 years and retention at the 10-year follow-up was over 92%. After accounting for multiple testing, only mother’s report of better initial interparental communication predicted whether parents were likely to stay together over the course of the 10 years. Adolescents of parents who cohabited were at higher risk for externalizing symptoms 10 years later compared to children of married parents. In addition, although there were no differences between cohabiting couples and married couples at the initial assessment in relationship adjustment, cohabiting mothers who stayed with their partner over the 10 years showed significantly greater declines in relationship adjustment over the 10 years compared to married mothers. Findings indicate the need for further research that explores family structure and dynamics over time to inform refinement of prevention programs targeting relationships and children’s mental health. (shrink)

Papers presented cover: new approaches to evolutionary epistemology, new applications, critical evaluations, and the nature of the mind. Paper edition (unseen), $25.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Ogni tentativo di ripensare le nostre categorie politiche deve muovere dalla consapevolezza che della distinzione classica fra zoé e bios, tra vita naturale ed esistenza politica (o tra l'uomo come semplice vivente e l'uomo come soggetto politico), non ne sappiamo piú nulla. Nel diritto romano arcaico homo sacer era un uomo che chiunque poteva uccidere senza commettere omicidio e che non doveva però essere messo a morte nelle forme prescritte dal rito. È la vita uccidibile e insacrificabile dell' 'uomo sacro' (...) a fornire qui la chiave per una rilettura critica della nostra tradizione politica. Quando la vita diventa la posta in gioco della politica e questa si trasforma in biopolitica, tutte le categorie fondamentali della nostra riflessione, dai diritti dell'uomo alla democrazia alla cittadinanza, entrano in un processo di svuotamento e di dislocazione il cui risultato sta oggi davanti ai nostri occhi. Seguendo il filo del rapporto costitutivo fra nuda vita e potere sovrano, da Aristotele ad Auschwitz, dall'Habeas corpus alle Dichiarazioni dei diritti, il libro di Agamben cerca di decifrare gli enigmi - prima di tutti il fascismo e il nazismo - che il nostro secolo ha proposto alla ragione storica. Fino a vedere, nel campo di concentramento, il paradigma biopolitico nascosto della modernità in cui città e casa sono diventate indiscernibili e la possibilità di distinguere tra il nostro corpo biologico e il nostro corpo politico ci è stata tolta una volta per tutte. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with two interrelated sets of problems: How can we have knowledge in a universe of processes? How can knowledge be improved, and how is scientific progress possible? ;To address the epistemological question in conjunction with the ontological is not a common approach in contemporary philosophy of science. I therefore begin the dissertation by arguing that these two areas of philosophy are intimately interrelated, and that the one-sided concentration on epistemological issues has led to an unsatisfactory account (...) of the nature of knowledge. In particular it has led to a conflation of epistemology with methodology. I argue that methodologies carry with themselves certain presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and of human beings. ;I suggest that we should attempt to construct a philosophical system within which epistemology and ontology mutually support one another. Insights derived from modern science provide us with a basis for the construction of such a system. ;I begin this task by arguing that scientific knowledge can be viewed as an extension of perception. Relying on insights derived from Gregory and Piaget I emphasize the constructive characteristics of our perceptual system and argue that they find their counterpart in the constructive nature of modern science. ;Having outlined a constructivist view of knowledge I turn to the discussion of the ontological issues. ;I propose as an alternative the adoption of a metaphysics of processes. I outline such an ontology, basing my model upon ideas derived from Prigogine's research on dissipative structures and Pattee's investigation of hierarchical organization. I explain how dissipative structures create stability in an instable world and link this insight to the constructive features of our perceptual and conceptual systems. ;The resulting model shows how knowledge is possible in the strange world of processes which we probably inhabit. It further shows how knowledge can be improved and what progress through evolution means. This issue is pursued in greater detail in the last part of the dissertation. There I expound Waddington's cybernetic model of evolutionary change and show how it finds its counterpart in cognitive evolution. (shrink)

This paper expounds the central tenets of the Austro-German school of evolutionary epistemology and points out that it conflicts in important aspects with Popper's. The conflict arises because some of the members of the above-mentioned school consider induction to be an absolutely central feature of any evolutionary epistemology. Thus the question arises if Poppers 'method of trial-and-error' is still to be considered to be the evolutionary method. The present author suggests that what is being selected for during scientific evolution is (...) our capacity to apply induction appropriately. We learn when to use induction reliably and when to resort to the most elementary of all methods, the method of trial-and-error. (shrink)

In der Geschichte der Philosophie gibt es nur wenige Namen, mit denen sich so viel Ungewohnliches, aber auch Ungereimtes, ja Paradoxes verbindet wie mit dem Namen Wittgenstein. Fur den Mann auf der StraSSe meist ein ganzlich Unbekannter, ist Wittgenstein fur viele Fachleute der Philosoph schlechthin. ER zahlt zu den meistzitierten Denkern des 20. JAhrhunderts, obwohl er in seinem Leben nur einige Dutzend Seiten veroffentlicht hat: er wurde seit seinem Tode zum Star einer neuen philosophischen Tradition, wo gerade er uns doch (...) von der traditionellen Philosophie befreien wollte. EIne vollstandige Bibliographie der Wittgenstein-Literatur wurde mehrere tausend Titel umfassen, und standig werden neue Abhandlungen uber Wittgenstein und seine Philosophie veroffentlicht. (shrink)

Foreword by Oliver Sacks Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) was already an established neuropsychologist when he emigrated from Germany to the United States in the 1930s. This book, his magnum opus and widely regarded as a modern classic in psychology and biology, grew out of his dissatisfaction with traditional natural science techniques for analyzing living beings. It offers a broad introduction to the sources and ranges of application of the "holistic" or "organismic" research program that has since become a standard part (...) of biological thought. Goldstein was especially concerned with the breakdown of organization and the failure of central controls that take place in catastrophic responses to situations such as physical or mental illness. But he was equally attuned to the amazing powers of the organism to readjust to such catastrophic losses, if only by withdrawal to a more limited range that it could manage by a redistribution of its reduced energies, thus reclaiming as much wholeness as new circumstances allowed. Goldstein's theses in The Organism have had an important impact on philosophical and psychological thought throughout the twentieth century, as evidenced in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Canguilhem, Ernst Cassirer, and Ludwig Binswanger. (shrink)

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions (...) of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a naturalistic conception of evolutionary progress. I argue that the Waddingtonian notion of adaptability can be embedded meaningfully into a framework which views living things as nonequilibrium structures. This thermodynamic interpretation places great emphasis on the dynamics of environmental change, whereas the classical conceptions are based on equilibrium conceptions of the evolutionary process. What improves in evolution is the ability of living things to stay alive in increasingly heterogeneous environments.

It is widely recognised that mainstream economics has failed to translate micro consistently into macro economics and to provide endogenous explanations for the continual changes in the economic system. Since the early 1980s, a growing number of economists have been trying to provide answers to these two key questions by applying an evolutionary approach. This new departure has yielded a rich literature with enormous variety, but the unifying principles connecting the various ideas and views presented are, as yet, not apparent. (...) This 2005 volume brings together fifteen original articles from scholars - each of whom has made a significant contribution to the field - in their common effort to reconstruct economics as an evolutionary science. Using meso economics as an analytical entity to bridge micro and macro economics as well as static and dynamic realms, a unified economic theory emerges. (shrink)

It was C.H. Waddington's contention that the Neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution ought to be amended by imbedding it in a broader theoretical framework which takes the role of the phenotype into account. Waddington's theory alleges the existence of two interlocking feedback circuits between environment and phenotype on the one hand and genotype and phenotype on the other. The resulting dynamical model of evolutionary change gives new meaning to the notion of progress in evolution. In this model natural selection acts directly (...) on the phenotype, thereby influencing the feedback relationships. Better tuning of the feedback relations, however, leads to progress in adaptability which in Waddington's theory replaces the cumbersome concept of progress in adaptation.This paper expounds Waddington's theory and places it into a broader philosophical perspective. (shrink)

In 1941 Konrad Lorenz published a paper with the title “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the light of Contemporary Biology”. This essay stands as the foundation of the Austro-German School of Evolutionary Epistemology. As indicated by the title of the paper, the Lorenzians attempt to interpret Kantian transcendentalism along biological lines.Lorenz was, however, by no means the first who attempted to biologise Kant. Philosophers and scientists such as Ernst Mach, Henri Poincare, Ludwig Boltzmann and Jean Piaget had made (...) similar points previously. Nevertheless, it remains Lorenz’s achievement to have formulated his thesis explicitly and provided ample empirical evidence in favour of it.Lorenz’s seminal paper remained largely unknown, and even his book on evolutionary epistemology published in 1973 raised little interest among philosophers, particularly in the English-speaking world. Meanwhile several other biologists and philosophers have joined Lorenz in his endeavour to elucidate epistemological issues through biological research. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)

The only way to a peaceful and just world is, rejecting old and narrow national attitudes, nihilism and anarchy, to improve the institutions we already have.

According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemologists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value by standing in certain instrumental relations—namely, by tending to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instrumental relations to fundamental value. Veritists, I believe, can and should follow suit. After (...) setting the stage in §1, I explain in §2 why Veritism should not take an Instrumentalist form. Instrumentalist Veritism faces a generalized version of the swamping problem. But this problem undermines Instrumentalism, not Veritism: granting Instrumentalism, similar problems arise for any economical epistemic axiology. I show in §3 how Veritism can take a less narrow form and solve the swamping problem. After answering some objections in §4, I consider in §5 what some would regard as a less radical alternative solution and argue that it either fails or collapses into mine. I close in §6 by taking stock and re-evaluating the overall prospects for Veritism, suggesting that it is a highly promising epistemic axiology when divorced from Instrumentalism. (shrink)

First English translation of revolutionary paper that established that even in elementary parts of arithmetic, there are propositions which cannot be proved or disproved within the system. Introduction by R. B. Braithwaite.

According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism, knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification. I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis (...) and argue that a non-normativist picture provides the best explanation of all the intuitions surrounding this thesis, favorable and unfavorable. On this picture, human knowledge is a structured non-normative complex that has as one of its parts a justification-making property, analogous in role to good-making properties like pleasurableness. After giving three arguments against EN in §3 and answering an objection in §4, I turn in §5 to further develop the positive view sketched in §2. In §6, I take stock and conclude. (shrink)

Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...) these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. (shrink)

This paper is an opinionated guide to the literature on normative epistemic reasons. After making some distinctions in §1, I begin in §2 by discussing the ontology of normative epistemic reasons, assessing arguments for and against the view that they are mental states, and concluding that they are not mental states. In §3, I examine the distinction between normative epistemic reasons there are and normative epistemic reasons we possess. I offer a novel account of this distinction and argue that we (...) in fact ought to acknowledge a threefold distinction between objective, possessed, and apparent normative epistemic reasons. In §4, I discuss the question of which normative reasons for doxastic attitudes are the epistemic ones, evaluating reasons against a simple evidentialist answer. Finally, in §5, I look at the role of reasons in epistemology, considering challenges to viewing reasons as the building blocks of epistemic normativity and maintaining that the challenges recommend a novel bi-level epistemology rather than a marginalization of reasons in epistemology. (shrink)

Previously published: Princeton University Press, 1940.