El presente trabajo trata de demostrar, en primer lugar, que el enfoque “gnoseológico” de la pregunta por la ciencia defendido por Gustavo Bueno corresponde en rigor únicamente al materialismo gnoseológico, la teoría propuesta por Bueno, mientras que el adecuacionismo, el teoreticismo y el descripcionismo serían teorías de la ciencia que genuinamente adoptarían el enfoque “epistemológico”. En segundo lugar, se sostiene que los enfoques epistemológico y gnoseológico se generan en la alternativa planteada por el dualismo cartesiano alma/cuerpo, pues mientras el primero (...) concibe al sujeto que hace las ciencias como una mera mente que opera con proposiciones o conceptos “sobre las cosas”, el segundo lo entiende como un cuerpomecánico que construye las ciencias operando “con las cosas mismas”. Puesto que en Descartes es el alma la instancia que conoce, la opción por el cuerpo del materialismo gnoseológico explica su posición al margen de la cuestión del conocimiento. Por último, se examinan algunos problemas que esta noción cartesiana del sujeto conlleva para la concepción de las “ciencias humanas y etológicas” del materialismo gnoseológico.This work tries to demonstrate, in first place, that the “gnoseological” approachto the question for the science defended by Gustavo Bueno in fact only fits in thegnoseological materialism, the theory proposed by Bueno, while adequationism, theoreticism and descriptionsm would be theories of the science that genuinely would adopt the “epistemological” approach. In second place, we sustain that the epistemological and gnoseological approaches are generated in the soul/body alternative outlined by Cartesian dualism, because while the first one conceives the subject that makes the sciences as a mere mind that operates with propositions or concepts “about the things”, the second one understands it as a mechanical body that builds the sciences operating “with the things themselves”. Since in Descartes the soul is the instance that knows, the option for the body of the gnoseologicalmaterialism explains its positioning regardless of the question ofknowledge. Lastly, we examine some problems that this Cartesian notion of subject implicates for the gnoseological materialism’s conception of “human and ethological sciences”. (shrink)

This work tries to demonstrate, in first place, that the “gnoseological” approach to the question for the science defended by Gustavo Bueno in fact only fits in the gnoseological materialism, the theory proposed by Bueno, while adequationism, theoreticism and descriptionsm would be theories of the science that genuinely would adopt the “epistemological” approach. In second place, we sustain that the epistemological and gnoseological approaches are generated in the soul/body alternative outlined by Cartesian dualism, because while the first one conceives the (...) subject that makes the sciences as a mere mind that operates with propositions or concepts “about the things”, the second one understands it as a (soulless) mechanical body that builds the sciences operating “with the things themselves”. Since in Descartes the soul is the instance that knows, the option for the body of the gnoseological materialism explains its (self) positioning regardless of the question of knowledge. Lastly, we examine some problems that this Cartesian notion of subject implicates for the gnoseological materialism’s conception of “human and ethological sciences”. (shrink)

Although entrepreneurial intention has been widely studied using cognitive models, we still lack entrepreneurial vocation and, therefore, lack disruptive innovations. Entrepreneurship scholars have some understanding of the reasons underlying this weakness, although there is much room for improvement in our learning concerning how to promote entrepreneurship among university students, especially in the transformed context of digital technologies. This paper focuses on the early stages of start-up, and in particular seeks to evaluate what role social and psychological factors play in the (...) development of entrepreneurial intentions. Drawing on network theory, we consider the impact of social networks on entrepreneurial intention. Specifically, we analyze the influence of two types of social networks: face-to-face and online social networks, with the latter proving especially important in digital transformations. In addition, based on affective congruency theory, we relate affect with entrepreneurial intention. Particularly, we evaluate the influence of positive and negative dispositional affectivity on the formation of entrepreneurial intentions. Finally, since affect and emotions can also be related with social relationships, we analyze whether dispositional affectivities influence entrepreneurial intention through the mediation effect of social networks. Using structural equation modeling, we confirm the impact of both online and face-to-face social networks, as well as positive dispositional affectivity on entrepreneurial intention for 589 higher education students in Spain. However, negative dispositional affectivity is not seen to influence entrepreneurial intention. Furthermore, both face-to-face and online social networks are influenced by positive dispositional affectivity. Moreover, these two types of networks can even partially mediate the relationship between positive dispositional affectivity and entrepreneurial intention. Positive dispositional affectivity can thus influence entrepreneurial intention in two different ways: directly and indirectly through both face-to-face and online social networks. This study provides further insights and adds to the literature on affect, social networks, and entrepreneurial intention. From a broader perspective, we also contribute to the literature on disruptive innovations by explaining how the development of entrepreneurial intentions would have positive consequences for university students vis-à-vis achieving these disruptive innovations. (shrink)

¿Cuál es la mejor imagen para representar la actividad filosófica? García Morente analiza tres esculturas: Le penseur de Rodin, Il pensieroso de Miguel Ángel y la escultura de El doncel de Sigüenza que se encuentra en la catedral de esta ciudad. Esta última, afirma Morente, refleja mejor que ninguna otra la naturaleza de la filosofía. En este ensayo se rechaza esta opinión de Morente y se proponen otras dos representaciones de la actividad filosófica, en este caso pinturas, que simbolizan más (...) adecuadamente el acto de filosofar, entendido como un diálogo socrático inacabable. (shrink)

La división de los deberes morales en estrictos y amplios se corresponde con la distinción entre las dos clases de contradicción que pueden darse al universalizar las máximas. Por tanto, su omisión dificul ta una correcta interpretación del imperativo categórico.

Popper acepta que es imposible realizar una falsación práctica definitiva, pero cree que esto no afecta a la posibilidad de una falsación en sentido lógico y, por tanto, no pone en cuestión el criterio de demarcación. Frente a esta convicción aquí se propone que la imposibilidad de efectuar una falsación definitiva modifica necesariamente la noción de demarcación de Popper.

Tras caracterizar brevemente el formalismo ético que constituye el núcleo de la ética de Kant y recordar la convicción kantiana de que el imperativo categórico no es sino la aclaración del principio moral que la razón vulgar prefilosófica posee, se intenta mostrar como algunas tesis que se siguen del sistema moral de Kant entran en contradicción con certezas de ese saber moral vulgar. Estas tesis son cuatro: la no existencia de voliciones indiferentes, la carencia de auténticos preceptos positivos que expresen (...) deberes y no sólo prohibiciones, la equivalente gravedad de todo acto indebido y la no aceptación de lo meritorio, pero no obligado. (shrink)

Popper acepta que es imposible realizar una falsación práctica definitiva, pero cree que esto no afecta a la posibilidad de una falsación en sentido lógico y, por tanto, no pone en cuestión el criterio de demarcación. Frente a esta convicción aquí se propone que la imposibilidad de efectuar una falsación definitiva modifica necesariamente la noción de demarcación de Popper.

Fear generalisation, a process by which conditioned fear spreads to similar but innocuous stimuli, is key in understanding why some individuals feel unsafe in objectively non-threatening situations. Both trait neuroticism and lack of predictability about the likelihood of feared consequences are associated with negative affect in the face of ambiguity and may increase the degree to which fear generalises. Undergraduates with varying degrees of neuroticism were randomised to either high- or low-instructional predictability conditions prior to fear acquisition. A fear generalisation (...) test measured risk ratings and attentional bias on a modified dot-probe paradigm. Among individuals with higher neuroticism, providing instructional predictability did not reduce fear; these individuals reported higher risk and increased attentional bias toward ambiguous stimuli. Overall, for individuals with higher neuroticism, predictability information hurt rather than helped interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, challenging a common conceptualisation of predictability as a factor that reduces fear. (shrink)

O presente trabalho é uma exposição do pensamento de Miguel de Unamuno e José Ortega Y Gasset em que se pretende estabelecer a relação entre o seu pensamento e as circunstancias sócio-políticas da sua biografia,assim como fincar pé nas difernças de caráter de proposta.

Call ‘a substance’ a person who is at home in a relatively stable and unified sense-making framework: a social structure that to some degree specifies which categories are important for interpreting reality, which goals are worth pursing, which character traits are admirable, etc. Call ‘an accident’ a person who is not at home in one such framework. It is tempting to think that being a substance is preferable, but I present some considerations for thinking otherwise. Mexican philosophers Emilio Uranga and (...) Jorge Portilla, I argue, present notions of accidentality as decolonial tools. Uranga’s account enables Mexicans to have positive valuation of their being independently of the approving gaze of the colonizers and their standards of value. Portilla’s thought distinguishes between pernicious accidentality resulting from the disintegration of sense-making frameworks and authentic accidentality as a condition for freedom, self-creation, and ultimately for individual and communal liberation. (shrink)

Leibniz claims that for every possible substance S there is an individual concept that includes predicates describing everything that will ever happen to S, if S existed. Many commentators have thought that this leads Leibniz to think that all properties are had essentially, and thus that it is not metaphysically possible for substances to be otherwise than the way their individual concept has them as being. I argue against this common way of reading Leibniz’s views on the metaphysics of modality. (...) I develop a model in which individual concepts are innocent; that is, individual concepts are divine ideas that permit God to know everything that will ever happen to all possible substances, if created, but these individual concepts neither require that all properties are had essentially nor require that it is metaphysically necessary for substances to be the way their individual concepts have them as being. (shrink)

I argue for a substantive interpretation of Carlos Vaz Ferreira’s account of intellectual flourishing as intellectual liberation. For Vaz Ferreira, I argue, there is an inescapable master-slave dynamic between language and language users, so that flourishing intellectually essentially involves a type of mastery of language that frees up thinking from enslaving linguistic/conceptual confusions and thus facilitates the acquisition of truth. Central to this project are Vaz Ferreira’s most interesting, and radical, views on the nature of language signification and thus on (...) human’s ability to accurately describe and know reality, for failing to keep these linguistic limitations in mind, Vaz Ferreira argues, is a central way for language to enslave humans to confused thinking and thus prevent their intellectual flourishing. (shrink)

Can a person from Latin America be a Catholic, or a feminist, or a democratic socialist in an authentic way? These identities come from Europe, and given the colonial history of Latin America, it seems reasonable to think that decolonizing the Latin American mind is a condition for its authenticity. Further, it seems reasonable to think that decolonization itself requires extirpating ideas and identities originating from the colonizers, especially those used to establish the colonial order. Thus, it seems that Latin (...) Americans cannot adopt such identities; authentic decolonization demands otherwise. In this paper I argue that the thought of twentieth century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla provides a persuasive account of the nature of authentic self-creation that allows for a kind of decolonization that makes it conceptually possible for Latin Americans to be Catholics, feminists, or democratic socialists in an authentic fashion. That is, authentic decolonization of the mind, I argue, need not involve a blanket rejection of identities originating from the colonizers; instead, it can be understood as a particular kind of authentic self-creation: one that is appropriately sensitive to the colonial history of the identities freely chosen by the agent. (shrink)

Popper acepta que es imposible realizar una falsación práctica definitiva, pero cree que esto no afecta a la posibilidad de una falsación en sentido lógico y, por tanto, no pone en cuestión el criterio de demarcación. Frente a esta convicción aquí se propone que la imposibilidad de efectuar una falsación definitiva modifica necesariamente la noción de demarcación de Popper.

We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or “figures” of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C, or If C then A. (...) The experiments showed that with figures for which there was a valid conclusion, the participants more often, and more rapidly, drew the valid conclusion when it was believable than when it was unbelievable. With figures for which there were no valid conclusions, the participants tended to draw whichever of the two conclusions was believable. These results were predicted by the theory that reasoning depends on constructing mental models of the premises. (shrink)

In the following paper, I wish to examine a problem for the theist libertarian. On the one hand, libertarians insist that freedom requires possible alternatives open to the agent. On the other hand, God’s perfectly formed moral character implies that He always does the morally best. Give His moral character, then, it appears that there are no possible alternatives open to God. We thus get a dilemma for the theist libertarian: either a) God is not libertarian free – because His (...) moral character rules out possible alternatives; or b) God’s character is not perfectly formed – because libertarian freedom requires that it is possible for God to act out of character. In the present paper, I argue that Thomas Reid, a paradigmatic libertarian, has the theoretical tools to retain a robust account of libertarian freedom without compromising a robust account of perfectly formed characters. In sum, it is necessary that agents with fully formed characters always act in character (read de dicto), but it is possible that agents with fully formed characters act out of character (read de re). The former claim captures the robustness of perfectly formed moral characters and the latter claim captures the robustness of libertarian freedom. (shrink)

ponencia pronunciada por el prof. Dr. Juan A. García González en el I Simposio Jóvenes Filósofos de Málaga celebrado el 17 de abril de 2009 en el Ayto. de Alhaurín de la Torre. En este trabajo se analiza la actual crisis económica desde una perspectiva antropológica que presta atención a la persona, las relaciones interpersonales, la libertad, el futuro y otras dimensiones humanas.

The main thesis defended in this paper is that Hildebrand’s distinction between what we could call quiddities—or “quasi-essences,” endowed with chaotic and accidental unity—and genuine essences possessing an intrinsically necessary unity, grounds the radical distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge. This thesis has not been expressly emphasized by Hildebrand himself. In order to prove it, we: (1) relate the three types of unities distinguished by Hildebrand with the three kinds of judgments discriminated by Kant; (2) outline what we (...) can call the “crux of empiricism”; (3) analyze four characteristic examples of synthetic a priori judgements; and (4) elaborate a provisional typology of synthetic a priori propositions, trying to include in it Hildebrand’s favorite examples. (shrink)

The main thesis defended in this paper is that Hildebrand’s distinction between what we could call quiddities—or “quasi-essences,” endowed with chaotic and accidental unity—and genuine essences possessing an intrinsically necessary unity, grounds the radical distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge. This thesis has not been expressly emphasized by Hildebrand himself. In order to prove it, we: relate the three types of unities distinguished by Hildebrand with the three kinds of judgments discriminated by Kant; outline what we can call (...) the “crux of empiricism”; analyze four characteristic examples of synthetic a priori judgements; and elaborate a provisional typology of synthetic a priori propositions, trying to include in it Hildebrand’s favorite examples. (shrink)

Talking of «Hegel and the postbegelianism».- In this work, the author defends the position taken by Polo regarding the latter's interpretation of Hegel. The author categorizes his thesis as belonging to the group of work and philosophic trajectory of Leonardo Polo.

Expondremos el camino de interiorización a través del cual el hombre persigue su autognosis. Respetando la dualidad entre método y tema que caracteriza a la actividad intelectual, y la distinción entre esencia y acto de ser que caracteriza a las criaturas, ese camino hacia la autognosis se abre finalmente en busca de la réplica de que la persona humana carece. Se dibuja así el acceso antropológico a Dios, tal y como Polo lo ha propuesto. Desde la persona se vislumbra que (...) la identidad originaria del ser tiene también intimidad personal. (shrink)

En este escrito se recoge la relación de obras publicadas de Leonardo Polo, así como los trabajos de otros autores publicados sobre el pensamiento de Polo. Al final se ofrece una relación de obras inéditas de Polo, y se da razón de la génesis y composición del archivo poliano.

Discussion about the notion of coagent intellect.- This debate on the duality of the human intellect "ut co-actus" is an inexhaustible and fathomless topic, reserved for the transcension of human thought. It suggest that the transcendental human intellect is on par with the knowledge that God has of each person, subject to the duality that forms the understand and the be understood.

This article connects the insights of post-realist scholarship about radical indeterminacy and its consequences for the legitimacy of adjudication to the current legitimacy crisis of the international investment regime. In the past few years, numerous studies have exposed serious shortcomings in investment law and arbitration including procedural problems and the substantive asymmetry of the rights protected. These criticisms have prompted a broad consensus in favor of amending the international investment regime and multiple reform proposals have appeared that appeal to the (...) rule of law ideal as an instrument for increasing the acceptability of the international investment system. This article argues that the reliance of such proposals on jurisprudential approaches that fail to adequately accommodate the post-realist indeterminacy critique and take seriously the role of ideology in adjudication renders reform efforts unable to solve the legitimacy problems of the investment regime. The conclusions suggest the need to abandon implausible claims to depoliticization and face the methodological challenges posed by the promise of ideologically balanced assessments advanced by some rule of law theorists. The article finally points at the urgency to reform traditional approaches to doctrinal work in order to increase awareness of critical challenges and open up doctrinal methods to alternative methodological avenues. (shrink)

Una teoría iusmoralista no puede dejar de basarse en el objetivismo moral, mientras que una teoría iuspositivista puede ser defendida por objetivistas y no objetivistas. Se examinan las consecuencias que el iusmoralismo tiene para la teoría de la validez de las normas jurídicas y para su aplicabilidad en los casos concretos y se revisan las asimetrías y aporías a que conduce cualquier teoría iusmoralista. Finalmente, se subraya que los iusmoralistas discrepan entre sí radicalmente sobre los contenidos de la moral verdadera (...) y del derecho justo y que sólo un enfoque iuspositivista es compatible con el estado constitucional y democrático de derecho. (shrink)

Comparando la presencia teórica ante la inteligencia con el papel de la presencia intelectual en el actuar práctico se descubre la importancia y el valor del pasado histórico. Eso permite establecer el sentido de lo histórico en el hombre.

Se informa en este trabajo del papel del pensamiento de Kierkegaard en la filosofía de Polo. Polo acoge las descripciones kierkegaardianas de la vida estética y sus reflexiones sobre el tedio; pero percibe la insuficiencia de apelar a una raíz interior del yo, frente a su propuesta del carácter de además de la persona humana.

En este trabajo se presenta la doctrina de Polo sobre la luz física, señalando su papel esencial en el universo, especialmente en la emergencia y evolución de la vida. La luz es la analogía real y comunicación formal, algo semejante a un lenguaje físico.

En el siguiente trabajo se exploran los distintos sentidos del tiempo, distinguiendo el tiempo del universo, el tiempo de la vida y el tiempo de las personas como punto de partida para comprender la gran diferencia entre la evolución del cosmos y de las personas.

En este trabajo se examina la comprension de la libertad de Polo en todas sus dimensiones: libertad esencial y personal, extensión y comunciacion de la libertad. Proponemos que la personalización de los hábitos innatos se corresponde con los que llamamos encuentros de la libertad trascendental, lo que permite vincular la doctrina poliana con la que San Josemaría nos legó acerca de la libertad personal.

La persona humana busca hacia dentro su verdad más íntima; o bien omite esa búsqueda y se olvida generosamente de sí. Entonces encuentra: advirtiendo sin llegar a ver, y también mirando y vigilando. Es el despliegue metalógico de la libertad personal: un don que aceptamos y devolvemos buscando la aceptación divina.

La parroquia es un tema central en la exhorta-ción Evangelii Gaudium del papa Francisco. Esta pequeña célula de la Iglesia universal si quiere ser trasformada en su raíz, ha de volver a la fuente y recuperar la frescura original del Evangelio. Esto provocará que nuestras parro-quias sean comunidades más creíbles, en contacto con los lugares y con la vida del pueblo, evitando que se conviertan “en una prolija estructura separada de la gente o en un grupo de selectos que se (...) miran a sí mismos”. En el seno de la Iglesia, toda renovación debe tender a la misión como objetivo, para no caer en una especie de introversión eclesial. La misión es inseparable del discipulado, por lo cual no debe entenderse como una etapa posterior a la formación. No podemos quedarnos tranquilos en espera pasiva en nuestros templos. (shrink)

La doctrina de Polo sobre la muerte afirma que se debe al límite mental. El objetivo de este trabajo es aclarar esa afirmación exponiendo la noción de cuerpo propio como un hecho enigmático, que late bajo el límite mental; y que por ello mismo puede faltar: su falta es la muerte. La libertad personal no informa suficientemente el cuerpo, sino que lo da por hecho; y como el propio cuerpo escapa así de su completo dominio, le puede ser expropiado a (...) la persona. La falta del propio cuerpo es la muerte; y sin su propio cuerpo, la persona humana sale del mundo y deja la historia. (shrink)

La Caritas del pre-sente y del futuro tiene el desafío de poner en el centro de su acti-vidad la “primacía de Dios”. Esta primacía redescubre el orden que existe, en relación estrechísima, entre fe, servicio, liturgia y evange-lización. El ejercicio de la caridad cristiana tiene como objetivo que los pobres salgan de su pobreza. La Caritas del futuro deberá visibi-lizar el rostro de los que sufren la cultura del descarte. Caritas está especializada en la acción caritativa-social, pero no releva de (...) ese deber al resto de la comunidad. (shrink)

Se presenta una lectura existencial de la terapia de aceptación y compromiso (ATC) desde la filosofía de Ortega. El trabajo se divide en cuatro partes. En la primera parte se realiza una presentación de la terapia de aceptación y compromiso. En la segunda parte se desarrollan algunas ideas fundamentales de la filosofía de Ortega que sirven al proyecto de defender una lectura existencial de ACT. En la tercera parte se abordan las afinidades temáticas y sustantivas entre ambos enfoques. Se presta (...) especial interés al estudio de la afinidad valores/compromiso en ACT y la ética de Ortega. Se concluye con un resumen de las principales conclusiones y se anticipan las tareas pendientes a abordar en el futuro. (shrink)