ABSTRACT“Trust” can describe many different positive features of our social relationships with others. In this exploratory paper, we reflect on some of the ways in which people orient themselves toward others in the context of a psychological crisis, a time when trust may be threatened or eroded. We draw upon qualitative data extracts from two previously reported studies, in order to illustrate and develop some observations about the dynamics of relational trust during such periods of acute distress. We show how (...) these dynamics arise out of particular contexts and have particular consequences for psychological health. We discuss how, in a relationship mediated by trust, it can sometimes be an act of care – toward self, or toward others – to filter and limit the extent of what one entrusts to another. We suggest that further consideration by philosophers can be very helpful to the mental health field here, if we are to understand the negotiation of interpersonal trust in the context of mental health crises. We note that it would be extremely helpful to understand more about how to create the kinds of environments which afford trust. (shrink)

Erdelyi's unified theory of repression offers a significant advance in understanding the disparate findings related to repression. However, the theory de-emphasizes the role of motive in repression, and it is argued here that motive is critical to the understanding of repression as it occurs in the mental life of individuals.

In this review, we describe some of the central philosophical issues facing origins-of-life research and provide a targeted history of the developments that have led to the multidisciplinary field of origins-of-life studies. We outline these issues and developments to guide researchers and students from all fields. With respect to philosophy, we provide brief summaries of debates with respect to (1) definitions (or theories) of life, what life is and how research should be conducted in the absence of an accepted theory (...) of life, (2) the distinctions between synthetic, historical, and universal projects in origins-of-life studies, issues with strategies for inferring the origins of life, such as (3) the nature of the first living entities (the “bottom up” approach) and (4) how to infer the nature of the last universal common ancestor (the “top down” approach), and (5) the status of origins of life as a science. Each of these debates influences the others. Although there are clusters of researchers that agree on some answers to these issues, each of these debates is still open. With respect to history, we outline several independent paths that have led to some of the approaches now prevalent in origins-of-life studies. These include one path from early views of life through the scientific revolutions brought about by Linnaeus (von Linn.), Wöhler, Miller, and others. In this approach, new theories, tools, and evidence guide new thoughts about the nature of life and its origin.We also describe another family of paths motivated by a” circularity” approach to life, which is guided by such thinkers as Maturana & Varela, Gánti, Rosen, and others. These views echo ideas developed by Kant and Aristotle, though they do so using modern science in ways that produce exciting avenues of investigation. By exploring the history of these ideas, we can see how many of the issues that currently interest us have been guided by the contexts in which the ideas were developed. The disciplinary backgrounds of each of these scholars has influenced the questions they sought to answer, the experiments they envisioned, and the kinds of data they collected. We conclude by encouraging scientists and scholars in the humanities and social sciences to explore ways in which they can interact to provide a deeper understanding of the conceptual assumptions, structure, and history of origins-of-life research. This may be useful to help frame future research agendas and bring awareness to the multifaceted issues facing this challenging scientific question. (shrink)

While cancer survivors commonly experience fear and anxiety, a substantial minority experience an enduring and debilitating fear that their cancer will return; a condition commonly referred to as fear of cancer recurrence. Despite recent advances in this area, little is known about FCR among people from Indigenous or other ethnic and racial minority populations. Given the high prevalence and poor outcomes of cancer among people from these populations, a robust understanding of FCR among people from these groups is critical. The (...) current review identified and aggregated existing literature on FCR amongst adult cancer survivors from Indigenous and minority populations. The protocol of this review was registered with PROSPERO in July 2020. A systematic search of bibliographic databases was conducted for relevant articles published from 1997 to November 2019. Data from eligible articles were extracted and appraised for quality by two independent reviewers. Nineteen articles from four countries met the inclusion criteria, including 14 quantitative, 4 qualitative and 1 mixed-methods study. Only one article reported on an Indigenous population. Few studies reported on FCR prevalence or severity. While the variation in tools used to measure FCR hindered a robust estimate of severity, results suggested some differences in FCR severity between minority and dominant populations, although these may have been due to study metholodological differences. Few factors were reported as being associated with FCR in minorities across multiple studies. The qualitative synthesis found five themes associated with the lived experience of FCR: variations in the lived experience of FCR; spirituality and worldview impacting on FCR; the importance of staying positive; complexities around support; and increasing cancer knowledge. The findings of this review highlight differences in FCR across cultures and contexts, which reinforces the need for culturally-specific approaches to this condition. The dearth of research in this area is of concern given the significant burden of cancer in these populations. A deeper understanding of this condition among Indigenous and minority populations is critical to developing and delivering appropriate and effective psychosocial care for cancer survivors from these groups. Systematic Review Registration: identifier [CRD42020161655]. (shrink)

Was für eine Art von Beziehung ist die Erkenntnisbeziehung? Ihre geläufige Konzeption im Sinne einer linearen Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung bildet so etwas wie den Boden, bzw. das logische Rückgrat der Erkenntnistheorie. Von ihr leiten sich weitestgehend die Annahmen, Vorstellungen und Begriffe her, in denen wir über Erkenntnis (als Tätigkeit und als Produkt) kommunizieren. Und insofern ist sie auf informelle oder explizite Weise auch ein Kernelement unserer Auffassung von Wissenschaft. Die Bezeichnung als 'logisches Rückgrat' der Erkenntnistheorie verweist dabei zugleich auf ihren heuristisch-funktionalen (...) Zusammenhang mit der zentralen Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie, nämlich der rationalen Rekonstruktion der Beziehung zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Es ist diese Aufgabe, die den meta-wissenschaftlichen Status und Anspruch der Erkenntnistheorie begründet. Die genannte Konzeption widerspricht aber zugleich ganz grundlegend unserem Selbstverständnis als 'Teil der Natur' (d.h. als natürlicher Gegenstand unter den anderen Gegenständen der Erkenntnis), von dem auch die 'naturalistischen' Erkenntnistheorien ausgehen. Demnach ist der reale Boden der Erkenntnisreflexion grundsätzlich nicht als lineare Beziehung, sondern als holistische Situation zu begreifen. Das eröffnet einen Spielraum der Reflexion und Kritik, die letztlich zwingend zu einer Re-Konzeption der Erkenntnisbeziehung als eine holistische Erkenntnissituation führt, mit umfassenden logischen und konzeptuellen Konsequenzen für das Grundverständnis des Erkenntnisvorgangs, und in weiterer Folge auch für das Verständnis von Wissenschaft. (shrink)

Review of: Margaret A. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, 2 vols, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, xlvii+1631, cloth $225, ISBN 0-19-924144-9. - Mind as Machine is Margaret Boden’s opus magnum. For one thing, it comes in two massive volumes of nearly 1700 pages, ... But it is not just the opus magnum in simple terms of size, but also a truly crowning achievement of half a century’s career in cognitive science.

This paper deals with visual constructions of Christian, clerical and monastic identities via images of triumph over representatives of pagan or heretical beliefs. The main interest lies in the tension and symbiosis between a central dominating figure and a marginalized figure, powerless but still visible, embodying anxieties about inner Christian conflicts and changes of belief and knowledge.

Crispin Wright hat die bislang beste Rekonstruktion von Putnams Beweis gegen die skeptische Hypothese vom Gehirn im Tank vorgelegt. Aber selbst in Wrights Fassung hat der Beweis einen Mangel: Er wird mithilfe eines Prädikates wie z.B. "Tiger" geführt und funktioniert nur, wenn man sich darauf verlassen kann, dass es Tiger wirklich gibt. Aber die Skeptikerin bestreitet, über die Existenz von Tigern bescheid zu wissen. Das Problem lässt sich dadurch beheben, dass man den Beweis – statt mit dem extensionalen Begriff der (...) Referenz (wie bei Wright) – mit Intensionen führt. Zudem sollte der Beweis transzendental laufen, also einzig und allein auf den sprachlichen Voraussetzungen beruhen, die auch die Skeptikerin zur Formulierung ihrer Tank-Hypothese benötigt. (shrink)

Crispin Wright hat die bislang beste Rekonstruktion von Putnams Beweis gegen die skeptische Hypothese vom Gehirn im Tank vorgelegt. Aber selbst in Wrights Fassung hat der Beweis einen Mangel: Er wird mithilfe eines Prädikates wie z.B. "Tiger" geführt und funktioniert nur, wenn man sich darauf verlassen kann, dass es Tiger wirklich gibt. Aber die Skeptikerin bestreitet, über die Existenz von Tigern bescheid zu wissen. Das Problem lässt sich dadurch beheben, dass man den Beweis – statt mit dem extensionalen Begriff der (...) Referenz (wie bei Wright) – mit Intensionen führt. Zudem sollte der Beweis transzendental laufen, also einzig und allein auf den sprachlichen Voraussetzungen beruhen, die auch die Skeptikerin zur Formulierung ihrer Tank-Hypothese benötigt. -/- The best reconstruction of Putnam's brain-in-a-vat argument is due to Crispin Wright. But even Wright's version of the argument is not convincing. It employs predicates such as 'tiger' and reaches the conclusion only if we can rely upon the existence of tigers; and the skeptic disputes our knowledge regarding tigers. The problem is not insuperable: The argument must be run, not with the extensionalistic notion of reference (as in Wright's version), but with intensions. Furthermore, the argument should have a transcendental form; it should exclusively rely on conditions that are needed by the skeptic for formulating her own position. (shrink)

It's an exciting story, no doubt, and I hate to be a spoilsport. But there are a few problems. One is that virtually every reference to me or to co-workers around the world, and to the areas in which we work, is fanciful, sometimes even bringing to mind Pauli 's famous observation "not even wrong." I'll review what seems to be a fair sample.

[Book review article for Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise by Boden, Margaret A, no abstract is available.].

[Book review article for Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise by Boden, Margaret A, no abstract is available.].

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

This paper explores the relation between philosophy and politics in Being and Time (1927) starting from Heidegger’s suggestion that we can understand some of the linguistic and conceptual difficulties in his investigation by comparing Thucydides’ narrative prose with two texts by Plato and Aristotle. Far from simply signalling Heidegger’s proximity to Plato and Aristotle and an apolitical disdain for human affairs, carrying out and contextualizing this exercise within his interpretations of ancient philosophy shows the difficulties lie in formulating an ontology (...) of historical, political existence. I then argue that Heidegger’s reference in Plato’s Sophist (1924-5) to a political speech in Thucydides elucidates the kind of existentiell situations underlying his understanding of authentic historicality. Situating this reference within Heidegger’s discussions of the possibilities of political speech reveals marked similarities to both phenomena thematized existentially in Being and Time and the most violent expressions of his völkisch politics in the 1930s. (shrink)