The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special emphasis will be placed upon the function of this principle in the proofs for God's existence. The relevance of the principle in this latter context can be seen at once when it is observed that it is the key to the solution of the well known "prob (...) lem of infinite regress. " The investigation of the principle in question will be divided into two Parts. A preliminary examination of the function of the principle will be made in Part I: Domains Other Than That of Creature-God. The domains to be considered in this Part are those of accident-substance, change, and knowledge. Employing what is learned of the function of the principle in these areas of application, Part II: The Domain of Creature-God will analyze the role of the principle in the proofs for God's existence. This latter Part will constitute the greater portion of the book, since the domain of creatures in their relation to God is the most significant application of the principle in the writings of St. Thomas. In the course of this investigation, relevant analyses by St. Thomas' commentators - both classical and contemporary - will be considered. Finally, in light of the insights offered by St. (shrink)

In this paper I outline an argument for the existence of God. This argument suggests that, if an all-good supernatural agent were to exist, such as the God of Theism, then He could not perform an immoral act. From this premise alone a formal proof for the existence of God can be derived. Perhaps unsurprisingly, when this argument is examined closely it is revealed to be fallacious. However, what we find is that the fallacy involves a special type of equivocation; (...) one that illustrates the difference between non-truth-functional subjunctive conditionals and truth-functional material conditionals. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is only one proof for God’s existence in Avicenna, and only one way for establishing the proof within his metaphysical system. This metaphysical proof is essentially derived from a priori notions, among which the notion of existence has the central role. Avicenna’s proof is structured in such a way that all its concepts are either derived from the meaning of ‘existence’ or are connected with this meaning. In this sense Avicenna’s proof sets out a scenario (...) of discursive a priori knowledge established purely on considerations of fundamental ontological meanings such as ‘existence’, ‘existent’, ‘thing’, ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘impossible’, ‘one’ and ‘cause’. (shrink)

The essay collection "Kant on Proofs for God's Existence" provides a highly needed, comprehensive analysis of the radical turns of Kant's views on proofs for God's existence.— In the "Theory of Heavens" (1755), Kant intends to harmonize the Newtonian laws of motion with a physico-theological argument for the existence of God. But only a few years later, in the "Ground of Proof" essay (1763), Kant defends an ontological ('possibility' or 'modal') argument on the basis of its logical exactitude (...) while he praises the physico-theological argument for its beauty and appeal to the common sense. In the first "Critique" (1781/7), Kant replaces traditional constitutive ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological proofs with his own regulative theoretical and moral-practical religious arguments. He continues to defend a moral argument in the second "Critique" (1788). But in the third "Critique" (1790), Kant reintroduces a physico-theological besides an ethicotheological argument in order to unify the critical system of philosophy. Kant develops further moral arguments and arguments from evil in the "Theodicy" essay (1791) and the "Religion" (1793/4), and still searches for the right kind of proof for God's existence in the "Opus postumum" (1796–1804).—Part one of this volume is dedicated to an analysis of Kant's proofs for God's existence in their historical order that explains which proofs Kant favors or rejects in various periods of his thought. Part two contains a systematic classification of main kinds of proof for God's existence in Kant that outlines the argumentative structure of particular kinds of proof and discusses Kant's potential reasons for their variations and modifications. The essay collection speaks to Kant specialists, philosophers, and theologians, but introduces the topic to non-academic readers also. -/- Contributers: Uygar Abaci (Pennsylvania State University), Craig Bacon (University of South Carolina), Andrew Chignell (Princeton University), Eckart Förster (Humboldt University, Johns Hopkins University), Ina Goy (Beijing Normal University) Paul Guyer (Brown University), Graham Oppy (Monash University), Lara Ostaric (Temple University), Stephen Palmquist (Independent Scholar), Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University), Konstantin Pollok (University of Mainz), Oliver Sensen (University of Tulane), Allen Wood (Bloomington University, Stanford University). (shrink)

In his Beweisgrund (1762), Kant presents a sketch of "the only possible basis" for a proof of God's existence. In this essay, I attempt to present that proof as a valid and sound argument for the existence of God.

New Proofs for the Existence of God responds to these glaring omissions. / From universal space-time asymmetry to cosmic coincidences to the intelligibility of ...

The article examines the key elements and Aristotelian background of Maimonides' proofs for the existence of God in the Guide of the Perplexed.

The heart of Book Two of De Iibero arbitrio is devoted to a lengthy argument that concludes that God is and is truly and sovereignly. This argument rests upon two crucial principia that have been called the principles of subordination and participation. An examination of their function in the argument reveals that Augustine could hardly have thought that he had produced a demonstration of God’s existence.

Two questions concerning Anselm of Canterbury’s theistic argument provided in Proslogion Ch. 2 are asked and answered: is the argument valid? under what conditions could it be sound? In order to answer the questions the argument is formalized as a first-order theory called AP2. The argument turns out to be valid, although it contains a hidden premise. The argument is also claimed not to be ontological one, but rather an a posteriori argument. One of the premises is found to be (...) false, so the argument is claimed not to be sound and to fail to prove its conclusion. (shrink)

As a counterpoint to demonstrative proofs in metaphysics, Robert Nozick presented the case for God’s existence based on the value of personal experiences. Personal experiences shape one’s life, but this is even more evident with extraordinary experiences, such can be religious ones. In the next step, says the argument, if those experiences can be explained only by invoking the concept of the Supreme Being, then God exists. The second step mirrors scientific explanation constituting what Nozick calls the “argument to (...) the best explanation.” The argument is set against the background of Nozick’s methodology which rejects demonstrative proofs in metaphysics. Its purpose is threefold. It aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/spiritual) as a legitimate basis for the argumentation; it aims to show that it is not philosophically blasphemous to explain such experiences by introducing a concept of divinity. Finally, it seeks to showcase the non-dogmatic, investigative nature of the argument. By exploring the merits of Nozick’s proposal, I will try to elucidate all three components, which should pave the way for a broader discussion on the role of non-demonstrative arguments in metaphysics. (shrink)

We argue that Descartes’s theistic proofs in the ’Meditations’ are much simpler and straightforward than they are traditionally taken to be. In particular, we show how the causal argument of the "Third Meditation" depends on the intuitively innocent principle that nothing comes from nothing, and not on the more controversial principle that the objective reality of an idea must have a cause with at least as much formal reality. We also demonstrate that the so-called ontological "argument" of the "Fifth (...) Meditation" is best understood not as a formal proof but as an axiom, revealed as self-evident by analytic meditation. (shrink)

Edited and introduced by Robert Arp, _Revisiting Aquinas’ Proofs for the Existence of God_ is a collection of new papers written by scholars focusing on the famous Five Proofs or Ways for the existence of God put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas near the beginning of his unfinished tome, _Summa Theologica_.

Now it cannot be denied, I think, that this argument has the appearance of being sound, that is, both true in its premises and valid in its conclusion. But one surely ought to harbor suspicions concerning an argument which establishes the most momentous of all conclusions upon nothing more than a few propositions. In this paper I shall attempt to show that these suspicions are well-founded by pointing out that the above "proof" derives whatever force it has from an equivocation.

The central debate of natural theology among medieval Muslims and Jews concerned whether or not the world was eternal. Opinions divided sharply on this issue because the outcome bore directly on God's relationship with the world: eternity implies a deity bereft of will, while a world with a beginning leads to the contrasting picture of a deity possessed of will. In this exhaustive study of medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for eternity, creation, and the existence of God, Herbert Davidson provides (...) a systematic classification of the proofs, analyzes and explains them, and traces their sources in Greek philosophy. Throughout the study, Davidson tries to take into account every argument of a philosophical character, disregarding only those arguments that rest entirely on religious faith or which fall below a minimal level of plausibility. (shrink)

In this engaging introductory dialogue, Todd Moody maps the spectrum of philosophical arguments and counterarguments for the existence of God. Structuring colloquial conversations along classical lines, he presents a lively and accessible discussion of issues that are central to both theist and atheist thinking, including the burden of proof, the first cause, a necessary being, the natural order, suffering, miracles, experience as knowledge, and rationality without proof. The second edition is a significant and comprehensive revision. Moody broadens and deepens the (...) conversation by addressing additional arguments, such as the problem of animal suffering, the moral argument, intelligent design, and human exceptionalism. The discussion of the cosmological argument is updated to reflect recent work on the Kalam Cosmological Argument. A short preface explains the scope of the work and the purpose of the dialogue form. Suggested further readings of contemporary and classical sources are also included. (shrink)

This five-step metaphysical proof borrows from the metaphysical thought of Aquinas as well as from Bernard Lonergan’s proof of God in Insight. It makes several advances to proofs of God. Most importantly, by showing that an unconditioned reality must be unrestrictedly intelligible, the second step of the proof is original and lays a stronger foundation than previous proofs for the uniqueness of an unconditioned reality as well as its identification with an unrestricted act of thinking. This point strengthens (...) the argument that this unique reality is a creator of everything else in reality. In so doing, it responds to contemporary criticisms of proofs of God by Richard Dawkins and others. This proof also adapts metaphysical ideas and terms to those arising out of the contemporary scientific world view, so that it is relevant and applicable to quantum and relativity theory, quantum cosmology, and other contemporary cosmological ideas, such as a multiverse and multidimensional physical realities. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Simplicity of Descarteś Proofs and the Relation between Them The Causal Argument The Ontological Argument.

Both in the East and in the West, there is, apart from the religious approach to God, also a purely rational one. Although in India philosophical speculation on God was mostly inextricably bound to religion, there have also been purely rational developments in Indian theodicy. This is the case above all in the Nyayavaisesika system, where we find a purely rational and logical approach to the question of the existence and nature of God. It is the specific contribution of the (...) Nyayavaisesika system to have developed a purely logical and rational argument for the existence of God. My purpose here is to take this proof in its developed form, as it is found in Gasgesa, and investigate its philosophical and logical implications. (shrink)

Leading theologian Matthew Levering presents a thoroughgoing critical survey of the proofs of God's existence for readers interested in traditional Christian responses to the problem of atheism. Beginning with Tertullian and ending with Karl Barth, Levering covers twenty-one theologians and philosophers from the early church to the modern period, examining how they answered the critics of their day. He also shows the relevance of the classical arguments to contemporary debates and challenges to Christianity. In addition to students, this book (...) will appeal to readers of apologetics. (shrink)

Edited and introduced by Robert Arp, _Revisiting Aquinas’ Proofs for the Existence of God_ is a collection of new papers written by scholars focusing on the famous Five Proofs or Ways for the existence of God put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas near the beginning of his unfinished tome, _Summa Theologica_.