The article describes the problematic spots of the court system ordained by the temporary law during the inter-war period in Lithuania and the prolonged attempts of the authority to transform it into the permanent one. It demonstrates that there has been a constant involvement in this situation among the authority representatives and the institutions until the issue of the Judiciary Act in 1933. The new legislation has been prepared, even though not all of it has been implemented. The first (...) legislation on judiciary of an independent Lithuania was enacted in 1918 as the Temporary Act on Lithuanian Courts and their Operation. It acknowledged the weak spots such as the procedure for assigning peace judges, no provision for cassation, elimination of jury as well as no limitations of guarantees during assignment and dismissal of judges, etc. Current imperfections resulted from lack of knowledge and no possibility to have an election as well as the limited financial potential of the state. It has been intended to solve these problems in the near future. The legal regulation of the fundamental points on court organization and operation, that lacked in the Temporary Judiciary Act, has been supported by the provisions incorporated into the Constitution of Lithuania of 1922. The distinct laws have let the colegially operating courts to temporary incorporate the advocate under oath as a member of the judicial board. Also, considerably transcendent salaries of the court official workers as compared to other civil servants has been established. The bill ascertaining the court system and their operation has finally been drawn and hereafter for several years it has been refined by various legal institutions and experts. This situation ended with enactment of the new Judiciary Act in 1933. Although it retained the assignment of judges and finally eliminated the institution of the jury, it solved the majority of questions related to the court organization and operation that had not been regulated by law before. (shrink)

The second edition of H. P. Lee's The Australian Judiciary provides a timely update to this seminal text. The only definitive survey of the entire Australian judiciary, this text describes and evaluates the work, techniques, problems and the future of the different tiers of courts and judges. It discusses the role of the judiciary as the third sector of government and analyses and comments on judicial conduct, judicial independence and impartiality, the work of judges beyond the courts, (...) the accountability of judges and the dangers to judicial institutions. It is an excellent reference work which will appeal to legal scholars and practitioners throughout Australia and internationally. (shrink)

The article responds to the recent evolution in AI judiciary, especially as presented in China. The authors compare the basic methodological background of Western and Eastern legal systems, concluding that the West is rather inclined to post-positivist methodology in law, which seems incompatible with the full use of AI in legal decision-making. In China, with its more pragmatic approach, the actual process of decision-making might be closer to a new form of technological legal positivism, distinct from Western trends in (...) jurisprudence. Finally, various forms of applicability of AI in law and judiciary are pondered upon, so as to use at least some positive aspects of AI in this sector—albeit with reservations regarding the decision-making proper. (shrink)

Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be modeled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Bayesian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.

Into Jeffrey Tulis’s argument that “the rhetorical presidency signals and constitutes a fundamental transformation of American politics” he inserts parenthetically the question, “Has the rhetorical presidency now given birth to the rhetorical judiciary?” Whether the rhetorical presidency birthed or simply predated the rhetorical judiciary is open to question. The existence of the rhetorical judiciary is not. Since the publication of The Rhetorical Presidency, judges and their interlocutors have ratified one of the insights that grounded Tulis’s question, while (...) challenging another. They have borne out his fear that judges would increasingly respond to attack; his worry about the vacuity of confirmation hearings for those nominated to the Supreme Court, however, has not been similarly confirmed. (shrink)

Paltrow, Harris, and Marshall argue that the reversal of Roe will impact all pregnant persons, not only those who wish to terminate a pregnancy. I agree that these consequences ar...

Makalenin konusu Ebû Hanîfe örneğinden hareketle İslam düşüncesinde yargı-siyaset ilişkisi-dir. Ebû Hanîfe’nin yaşadığı döneme kadar karizmanın dini ve siyasi kültürde gelişimine paralel olarak yargı-siyaset ilişkileri bağlamında İslam düşüncesinde bazı formlar çoktan ortaya çık-mıştı. Burada amaç İslam’ın henüz ikinci asrında yargı-siyaset ilişkilerini Ebû Hanîfe üzerinden anlamaya çalışmak ve dolaylı olarak da meselenin bugüne yansıyan yönlerine ışık tutmaktır. Bu yüzden farklı sosyolojik düzlemlerde inşa edilmiş Şiî, Haricî, Sünnî öteki formlar çalışma dışında tutulmuştur. Araştırma Ebû Hanîfe’nin; doktrini oluşturan Kur’an, sünnet ve sahabe uygulamaları (...) ile kendi dönemindeki dini, siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel şartlar arasında nasıl bir okuma yaptığını sorunsallaştırmıştır. Çalışmada Ebû Hanîfe’nin yargı-siyaset ilişkisi bağlamın-da ortaya çıkardığı genel anlama biçiminin, işaret edilen dini ve tarihi şartlarla kendi dini top-lumsallaşma çevresindeki diyalektik bir ilişkide şekillendiği varsayılmıştır. Dolaylı gözlem yöntemi ile elde edilen veriler bir tekil olay incelemesi bağlamında fenomenolojik bir çözüm-lemeye tabi tutulmuştur. Konu bugüne kadar ilahiyat bağlamında olduğu gibi din bilimi alanın-da da dikkat çekici görülmemiştir. Makale İslam düşüncesinde yargı-siyaset ilişkisinin farklı desenleri arasında Ebû Hanîfe modelini tartışması bağlamında bir değere sahip görülebilir. Çalışmada; temel hak ve özgürlüklerin korunması noktasında sivil ve barışçıl bir muhalefetin yeterli olmadığı, iktidarın kişisel hakları tanımaktan daha çok kişisel ödevler ve mutlak itaat talebi ile siyaset yaptığı bir ortamda Ebû Hanîfe’nin soruna ahlaki bir saikle yaklaştığı ve bu bağlamda bir çözüm önerisi getirdiği görülmüştür. Ebû Hanîfe gerek otorite ve karizması ge-rekse ekonomik statüsü ve kültürel birikiminden aldığı güç ile yaşadığı dönemde üst düzey siyasal ve hukuki bir katılım gerçekleştirmiştir. Yasama erkinin özgür bir üyesi olarak Ebû Hanîfe temel haklar bağlamında hayatı boyunca hep iktidarlarla karşı karşıya gelmiş ve bu mücadele içinde iken de öldürülmüştür. Müslüman bir ailede doğmasına rağmen dönemin politik tavrı nedeniyle daha doğumuyla birlikte iktidar tarafından öteki olarak görülmüş ve ömrü boyunca bu statü ile yaşamak zorunda kalmıştır. Başlangıçta kendi ailesi içinde toplum-sallaşırken deneyimlediği mevalilik duygusu, Ebû Hanîfe’de özellikle hocasının ölümünden sonra iktidarlara karşı toplumsal bir hak arayışına dönüşmüştür. Esasen kendi özelinde bir hak arayışı olmaksızın iktidarların yasa ile sorunlu politik tavırları karşısında dini, hukuki ve top-lumsal bir tavır içinde yürüttüğü bu mücadelesi Ehl-i Beyt’i ve diğer bütün toplumsal grup ve kategorileri içine alan bir genişlikte ilerlemiştir. Ebû Hanife’nin yargı- siyaset ilişkisine dair bu yaklaşımı teorik ve pratik olarak tamamen sistematik bir çerçevede şekillenmiştir. İslam hu-kukunun dayandığı bilgi gövdeleri kapsamında o, çok kapsayıcı ve dinamik bir tarzda din ve şeriat kavramsallaştırması yapmıştır. Buna göre Ebû Hanîfe dine temel hakların dayandığı temel yasa anlamı yüklerken şeriata ise kendisinin bu dini alana veya başka bir ifadeyle yasaya göre düzenlendiği neshe açık, değişken bir alan anlamı vermiştir. Bu tevhit eksenli hiyerarşi içinde siyaset, yasaya karşı kesin sorumluluğu olan dünyevi bir alan görülmüştür. Ebû Hanîfe’nin İslam’ın ilk dönemini bir hukuk devleti nosyonu içinde değerlendirdiğinde kuşku yoktur. Buna mukabil, genel yargı-siyaset ilişkisine yaklaşımından anlaşıldığına göre yaşadığı dönemi, iktidarlar tarafından hukukun araçsallaştırıldığı bir dönem olarak görmüştür. Kurmuş olduğu akademi onun yargı-siyaset ilişkisine bakışının önemli bir pratiğidir. Bu akademiden yetişen ve daha sonra resmi ve gayri resmi olarak yasamanın bir üyesi olan öğrencilerine tav-siyeleri ve mektupları, onun bir yargı elemanı olarak siyaset kurumuna yaklaşımının sübjektif değil; bir düzen ihtiyacının ortaya çıkardığı objektif bir tavır olduğunu göstermiştir. Ebû Hanîfe teorik yaklaşımını pratik bir eylem alanı ile birleştirmek suretiyle yargı-siyaset ilişkisine bakışı konusunda oldukça net bir fotoğrafa sahiptir. (shrink)

Introducing a sociological perspective on judicial emotions, we argue that previous studies underemphasize structural and interactional dimensions. Through key concepts in the sociology of emotions we relate professional court actors’ emotion management to the emotional regime of the judiciary. Examples from the Swedish judiciary illustrate three main arguments: The idea of rational justice as nonemotional must be investigated as a joint accomplishment including collective emotion management; Judicial objectivity requires situated emotion management and empathy, orientated by emotions of pride/shame; (...) The structural dimensions of power/status mitigate feeling and display rules. The situated power of the judge is upheld by ritual deference from other court professionals. Concluding, we suggest topics to develop structural and interactional perspectives on judicial emotion. (shrink)

This article examines the role bureaucracy has in enhancing the social diversity of judiciaries. It does so by analyzing the Israeli judiciary and its reforms over the last three decades, and the interaction of these reforms with the appearance of intersectional judges—Arab women, Jewish women of Orthodox background, and Jewish women from geographic and economic peripheries—into the Israeli judiciary. Based on an original empirical study, the article shows that the career paths of intersectional judges include administrative roles in (...) the judiciary more often than non-intersectional judges. The article further demonstrates how these administrative career paths were shaped by bureaucratic-minded reforms. The Israeli case study thus shows how the bureaucratic design of the judiciary can accommodate diversity efforts, sometimes unintendedly, and discusses the merits, boundaries, and drawbacks of such bureaucratic design. (shrink)

Early in the course of undertaking empirical research on the sexual diversity of the judiciary I had to address a particular challenge. Sexuality, I was repeatedly told, is not and ought not to be a difference that is taken into account. At best it ought to be disregarded or taken out of consideration. This generated a number of challenges for my research. How do you research and make sense of sexuality as a difference that key informants assert is absent (...) or seek to make invisible and irrelevant? How do you research the operation and effects of that which is not to be spoken about? How do you research the sexual norm when its existence and operation is denied? This article explores one response. It is a project that may for some be surprising and unexpected. It is a study of judicial portraits. Drawing on the insights of queer theory and art historical scholarship on portraits I undertake a textual analysis of these images, focusing upon the aesthetic and artistic traditions used to make them. A small case study of portraits of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of New South Wales is used to explore how, if at all, sexuality figured in these portraits. (shrink)

This paper is a response to a paper by John Coggon ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession'. It argues that certain legal judgements in relation to best interests seek to change and curtail the role of the medical profession in this arena while simultaneously extending the jurisdiction of the courts. It also argues that we must guard against replacing one professional standard, that of the medical profession, with another, that of the judiciary in this (...) area. (shrink)

This article analyses jurisdiction regarding administrative proceedings (lawsuits) in Jordan and France. Moreover, it also discusses the fact that jurisdiction regulates two matters of the utmost importance: the distribution of jurisdiction between ordinary and administrative jurisdictions and the distribution of jurisdiction between administrative jurisdictions themselves in States whose jurisdiction in administrative proceedings is distributed to more than one administrative organ. Moving on, this research was conducted using several research approaches such as, the comparative and analytical approach. The research concluded with (...) a number of conclusions and recommendations, the most important of which was the establishment of an Administrative Proceedings Management Service (APMS), as did the French Administrative Judicial Code, in which attendance was compulsory. To add on, the office of the Administrative Proceedings Administration must have a judge of its own, which corresponds to the post of the judge in the French Administrative Court. The judge will handle the completion of the data regarding both lawsuit parties, and request the documents needed for the case at hand. With that being said, the Jordanian Constitutional Court must reverse its interpretative decision, stating that the administrative justice is part of the ordinary judiciary—in referral to The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, which considered the administrative judiciary as an integral part of the ordinary judiciary. Lastly, the research concluded that The French Administrative Judiciary must be taken into consideration regarding the establishment of an administrative judiciary independent from all aspects of the ordinary judiciary, and the explicit introduction of the dual judicial system. (shrink)

Through a ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ level analysis, this study focuses on elements of questioning and question design in the Senate Judiciary hearing conducted for Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. Specifically, two lines of questioning are analyzed: that of Kamala Harris, D. California, and that of Ted Cruz, R. Texas. Through an analysis that builds heavily on prior research that uses Conversation Analysis to understand the news interview, this study attempts to expand such research to institutional talk done by politicians (...) in Congress. The analysis portion of the paper investigates, on a ‘micro’ level, the linguistic elements at play in each line of questioning. In the discussion section, a ‘macro’ level analysis situates the findings of this paper within the broader US political climate among the public and in terms of the growing conservatism of the Supreme Court. (shrink)

The Article addresses some of the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of the international human rights judiciary. It lays out some aspects of a theory of legitimacy for the international human rights judiciary that seem relevant to addressing two challenges: First, it is difficult to justify the human rights judiciary by appeal to standard accounts of why states agree to subject themselves to treaties. What is the problem the international human rights judiciary is meant to help solve? (...) Second, the human rights judiciary seems undemocratic and even antidemocratic when it overrules domestic, accountable legislatures. Such international judicial review is therefore sometimes thought to be normatively illegitimate, at least regarding democracies. (shrink)

Historically, judicial enforcement of constitutional rights to health care has played a fairly limited role in enabling access to health care, a trend particularly prevalent in North America, and reflected in many other regions. This trend is due in part to judicial resistance to recognizing socioeconomic rights like health as appropriately legal, or as appropriately enforceable in light of the doctrine of separation of powers. This resistance is evident in judicial deference to social and economic policy, a reluctance to view (...) socioeconomic claims as invoking “fundamental values” that courts consider themselves authorized to protect: and a real reluctance to recognize and enforce “positive” obligations pertaining to social welfare. As a result, health has often fallen largely into the political rather than legal sphere, and domestic courts have been relatively reluctant to review health policies from a human rights perspective, given the belief that doing so would exceed the appropriate democratic function of the judiciary. (shrink)

Historically, judicial enforcement of constitutional rights to health care has played a fairly limited role in enabling access to health care, a trend particularly prevalent in North America, and reflected in many other regions. This trend is due in part to judicial resistance to recognizing socioeconomic rights like health as appropriately legal, or as appropriately enforceable in light of the doctrine of separation of powers. This resistance is evident in judicial deference to social and economic policy, a reluctance to view (...) socioeconomic claims as invoking “fundamental values” that courts consider themselves authorized to protect: and a real reluctance to recognize and enforce “positive” obligations pertaining to social welfare. As a result, health has often fallen largely into the political rather than legal sphere, and domestic courts have been relatively reluctant to review health policies from a human rights perspective, given the belief that doing so would exceed the appropriate democratic function of the judiciary. (shrink)

The judicial system in a liberal democracy is deemed to be an independent branch of government with judges free from political agendas or societal pressures. In reality, judges are often influenced by their economic and social backgrounds, gender, race, religion, and sexuality. This volume explores the representation of different identities in the judiciary in the United States. The contributors investigate the pipeline, ambition, institutional inclusion, retention, and representation of groups previously excluded from federal, state, and local judiciaries. This study (...) demonstrates how diversity on the bench improves the quality of justice, bolsters confidence in the legitimacy of the courts, and provides a vital voice in decision-making power for formerly disenfranchised populations. (shrink)

Judges in multiple US states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Florida, receive a prediction of defendants’ recidivism risk, generated by the COMPAS algorithm. If judges act on these predictions, they implicitly delegate normative decisions to proprietary software, even beyond the previously documented race and age biases. Using the ProPublica dataset, we demonstrate that COMPAS predictions favor jailing over release. COMPAS is biased against defendants. We show that this bias can largely be removed. Our proposed correction increases overall (...) accuracy, and attenuates anti-black and anti-young bias. However, it also slightly increases the risk that defendants are released who commit a new crime before tried. We argue that this normative decision should not be buried in the code. The tradeoff between the interests of innocent defendants and of future victims should not only be made transparent. The algorithm should be changed such that the legislator and the courts do make this choice. (shrink)

Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes an independent federal judiciary: federal courts constitute a separate branch of the national government, federal judges enjoy tenure during good behavior, and their salaries cannot be diminished while they hold office. The framers who drafted Article III in 1787 were not working from whole cloth. Rather, they were familiar with the preceding colonial and state practices, including those from New York. This essay provides a case study of New York's judicial history: the (...) Dutch period, 1621-1664; the Ducal proprietary period, 1664-1685; the Royal period, 1685-1776; and the early state period. As will be seen, New York—among the most significant of the original thirteen states—was a state groping towards a new ideal of judicial independence: an ideal that became a reality a decade after its own constitution was enacted in 1777 and at a different level of government. Significantly, the uncertain status of New York's judiciary had profound consequences for the ultimate expression of judicial independence, judicial review. (shrink)

The second half of the third/ninth and the fourth/tenth centuries are of particular importance for the development of the judiciary in the central lands of the Abbasid caliphate. At the end of the mihna period and the victory of Sunnism under al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861), the caliphate agreed not to interfere further within the legal sphere, thus allowing the principal schools of law to complete their development toward their classical structure. In Iraq, thanks to the growing independence of the legal (...) sphere and to the political weakness of the caliphate, the qadis increased their judicial freedom. Meanwhile, the political situation in Egypt was very different. The provincial rulers and two successive dynasties, the Tulunids (254-292/868-905) and the Ikhshidids (323-358/935-969), profited from the weakness of the caliphate, and imposed their autonomy de facto. The role played by the judiciary in this process is still unclear, as is the impact of Egyptian autonomy on the development of the local judiciary. In this paper, I discuss the evolution of the relationship between the Egyptian governors and the judiciary, from the accession of Ahmad b. Tulun in 254/868 until the arrival of the Fatimids in 358/969. Several elements are taken into consideration: (1) The institutional links between political power and the judiciary: Who appointed the qadis? How were they selected? Did the government choose to rely on local scholars or did the qadis come from outside the province? (2) The financial connection between the governors and the qadis, which was not only symbolic of the delegation of power, but could also denote the submission of the judiciary to the government. (3) The daily interactions between the qadis and the governors. (4) The judicial practice of the qadis. (5) Their reputation. I study to what extent the judiciary and its control was a political issue for the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids, and how the efforts of these two dynasties to build an Egyptian autonomy had important consequences on the structure of the legal milieu. (shrink)

The dominant image of judicial authority is emotional detachment; however, judicial work involves emotion. This presents a challenge for researchers to investigate emotions where they are disavowed. Two projects, one in Australia and another in Sweden, use multiple sociological research methods to study judicial experience, expression, and management of emotion. In both projects, observational research examines judicial officers’ display of emotion in court, while interviews investigate judicial emotional experiences. Surveys in Australia identify emotions judicial officers generally find important in their (...) work; in Sweden, shadowing allows researchers to investigate individual judicial emotion experiences and expression. Evaluating the different methods used demonstrates the limitations and effectiveness of particular research designs, the value of multiple methods and the challenges for researching emotion. (shrink)

Normative literature on the Catalan crisis is largely occupied with the conflict’s central legalistic problem: can political units like Catalonia be allowed to split off from Spain unilaterally? This article reframes the issue and asks why secessionist Catalans should ever abide by Spanish legal constraints, given that Spanish law is precisely the institution they are politically trying to get rid of. It focuses on the anti-secessionist role played by the Spanish Constitutional Court between 2010 and 2017 and studies three arguments (...) why Catalans supposedly have to accept the Court’s authority. The article contends that two arguments—the “mutual benefit argument” and the “law and democracy” argument—will not be independently persuasive to Catalan secessionists. Instead, the Constitutional Court’s authority must ultimately be grounded in a different type of argument: the “law and order argument.” Secessionist Catalans’ supposed duty to obey the orders of the Constitutional Court is ultimately not rooted in a positive service provided by the Court, but in the disruptive effects of disobeying. That exposes an explanatory defect in Joseph Raz’s influential theory of authority, which seeks to ground authority exercises in a concept in prior reason or their capacity to make our life better. That conceptualization misses the key decisionistic element to political authority: its capacity to constitute our reasons, that is, to define the terms that give meaning to our evaluations. (shrink)

Normative literature on the Catalan crisis is largely occupied with the conflict’s central legalistic problem: can political units like Catalonia be allowed to split off from Spain unilaterally? This article reframes the issue and asks why secessionist Catalans should ever abide by Spanish legal constraints, given that Spanish law is precisely the institution they are politically trying to get rid of. It focuses on the anti-secessionist role played by the Spanish Constitutional Court between 2010 and 2017 and studies three arguments (...) why Catalans supposedly have to accept the Court’s authority. The article contends that two arguments—the “mutual benefit argument” and the “law and democracy” argument—will not be independently persuasive to Catalan secessionists. Instead, the Constitutional Court’s authority must ultimately be grounded in a different type of argument: the “law and order argument.” Secessionist Catalans’ supposed duty to obey the orders of the Constitutional Court is ultimately not rooted in a positive service provided by the Court, but in the disruptive effects of disobeying. That exposes an explanatory defect in Joseph Raz’s influential theory of authority, which seeks to ground authority exercises in a concept in prior reason or their capacity to make our life better. That conceptualization misses the key decisionistic element to political authority: its capacity to constitute our reasons, that is, to define the terms that give meaning to our evaluations. (shrink)

Although the Canadian legal system has many virtues, it has at least one major weakness – its judicial appointments and promotion systems. The paper begins by identifying six key values that need to be considered in order to assess the legitimacy of a judicial appointments process – independence, impartiality, representativeness, transparency, accountability and efficiency. In the following sections, through the use of three case studies of appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the superior courts of Nova Scotia and a (...) promotion to the Federal Court of Canada, we demonstrate that Canada has failed to live up to these values. We conclude by suggesting that recent reforms to the judicial appointments processes by the current government are an improvement, but that more radical reforms are essential to enhance public confidence in the integrity of Canada’s judicial appointments and promotion systems. (shrink)

We set out by tracking the political vicissitudes of the administration of justice and their connections with a range of phenomena: the neglect by politicians; a series of events and scandals and the very curious reactions of the judicial apparatus; several parliamentary investigation commissions without much effect. Then we take a critical look at partisan politicisation of the magistrature: negative evalution of their output thrives to it; but there are also partisan appointments and promotions, even absence and refusal of training. (...) Many contextual factors hinder a normal, acceptable process of politicisation: over- and underregulation, bad legislation, misconception on contra! over the administration of justice and over judges, non-democratic decisionmaking within the organisation of the magistrature, the development of wrong relationship inside the trias politica; but also other more external conditions were not met neither. We wind up with an examination of the assesment of recent governmental proposals: an improvement of criminal and judicial inquiries; foundation of a national advisory body for the magistrature; simplification of the legislation; modernisation of the courts activities; a more objective recruitment and selection system; more easy access to justice etc. The question raises as to wether it suffices to tinker with the sy stem of the administration of justice alone... Between the Belgian and the Italian situations are similarities and relevant differences. (shrink)

The conflict between courts and medicine is best shown in the mental health cases requiring judgment of whether a person should be confined, and whether they should be medicated or left free to decide for themselves. In such cases, deprivation of liberty for noncriminal offenders is at question, but if they are released, they may be exposed to injury or injure others. “Clear and convincing” evidence is hard to prove in such cases.The TOPOFF 2 terrorism preparedness exercise was two years (...) in planning, but the courts were involved only seven days before the exercise. Judge Murphy was put in charge of the Circuit Court building and was asked to stop all court proceedings to stop people from going into a building that might have been contaminated. (shrink)

The conflict between courts and medicine is best shown in the mental health cases requiring judgment of whether a person should be confined, and whether they should be medicated or left free to decide for themselves. In such cases, deprivation of liberty for noncriminal offenders is at question, but if they are released, they may be exposed to injury or injure others. “Clear and convincing” evidence is hard to prove in such cases.The TOPOFF 2 terrorism preparedness exercise was two years (...) in planning, but the courts were involved only seven days before the exercise. Judge Murphy was put in charge of the Circuit Court building and was asked to stop all court proceedings to stop people from going into a building that might have been contaminated. (shrink)