Narration in judiciary fact-finding: a probabilistic explication

Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (4):345-376 (2018)
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Abstract

Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be modeled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Bayesian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.

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10.1007/s10506-018-9219-z

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Rafal Urbaniak
University of Gdansk

Citations of this work

Analyzing the Simonshaven Case With and Without Probabilities.Bart Verheij - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1175-1199.

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References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
Studies in subjective probability.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1964 - Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger. Edited by Howard Edward Smokler.

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