Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise (...) the quasi-realist reading of Hume on causation by showing how quasi-realism does not speak to inductive scepticism. I also offer evidence that Hume takes inductive scepticism to result from his theory of causation, and that his scepticism is tied to his rejection of metaphysical causal realism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Inductive Scepticism and Experimental Reasoning in Moral Subjects in Hume's Philosophy Anne Jaap Jacobson According to its title page, Hume's Treatise Concerning HumanNature is An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental Method ofReasoning INTO MORAL SUBJECTS."1 And from the first section onwards, Hume makes statements about the human mind which are given an unqualified generality;An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding is marked by a similar assurance that much about human (...) understanding can be known. Because of this, exegesis which attributes to Hume an unrestrained scepticism about the experimental method appears to attribute to him inconsistency on such a scale as to render the interpretation itselfquestionable. Nonetheless, there is, atleast on the face ofit, considerable justification for ascribing to Hume just such a scepticism. In this paper I explore sceptical features, some ofthem important but little noticed, in Hume's treatment of causality and our beliefs about the unobserved. Though I end by suggestinghow to avoidviewing Hume in this area as simply lamentably inconsistent, Hume's use of the experimental method doesremain problematic, as, I suggest, Hume himselfthought. The first three of the following sections in this paper treat connected themes in Hume's philosophy which, when taken together, present us with a very sceptical view of experimental reasoning. I. Necessity as projected impression Hume holds that our beliefs about causality in the objects are in large part the result of a projection of an internal impression of (some kind of) necessity. The thesis ofprojection is not entirely straightforward; to see this, let us ask the question, is the impression which is projected semantically simple or complex? There are excellentreasonsforregarding the impression as simple as Hume conceives of "simple" in this context. Hume himselfappears to sayitis simple (E 64, n. 1). Andmuch of Hume's discussion ofnecessity is driven by the principle that there can be no idea without a preceding impression, and this principle applies only to simple ideas. But the consequent reading is far from satisfactory. To see the problem, let us look at what seems to be the Volume XV Number 2 325 ANNE JAAP JACOBSON most entrenched understanding ofHume, one perhaps amark ofKemp Smith's influence. This is the view that Hume is saying that the impression source of our idea of necessity is a feeling of anticipation. The problem is this: ifa feeling ofanticipation is a simple impression, it is not at all clear that the impression can do the job Hume has for it. Remember that if the impression is in content itselfrelational, then it is not a simple impression on Hume's own account, since ideas of relations are for him complex (T 13). Hence, we might take the impression to be of the sort described by Stroud, according to whom the impression yielding our idea of necessity is semantically unrelated to the elements of the relation. But such a reading robs Hume of the explanatory position he so clearly thinks he has. If we have a semantically simple impression it becomes a mystery why the spreading has the effects that it does: when we transfer the determination ofthe thought to external objects, andsuppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them. (T 168, my emphasis) Why does spreading some simple, indefinable feeling result in our supposing there is a real intelligible connection between the objects on which the mind has spread? To get this result it looks as though the mind will have tomake two mistakes: thefirstmistake is the spreading, and the second mistake consists in the mind's inferring from the experience of the impression as spread that somehow the causal inference itself is also out there in nature as an intelligible connection. But, while Hume does sometimes seem to suggest we make this sort of two-step error (T 223, for example), such a picture makes it seem that the impression spread is not really the semantic source of (that is, wholly determinate of the content of) our idea ofnecessity. Rather, on the two-step error model, our belief that there are connections enters as a result of an inference following upon the spreading; however, for Hume, an inference is not the way an impression ofX gives rise to an idea ofX... (shrink)

This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Hume's argument that induction must be (...) either deductively valid or circular because based on experience neglects the possibility that it is an argument of non-deductive logic (logical probability, in the sense of Keynes). (shrink)

Viewing moral scepticism as the rejection of objective desirabilities, inductive scepticism may be seen as the rejection of objective believabilities. Moral scepticism leads naturally to amoralism rather than subjectivism, and inductive scepticism undermines not our practices of induction but only a view about justification. The two scepticisms together amount to the adoption of a defensibly narrow, formal view of reason.

In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the (...) contexts relevant to the inductive sceptic's argument, and (pace Okasha) are not at all remote from actual scientific practice. I discuss several scientific examples involving such contexts. (shrink)

Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the (...) opposite is true: if anything, Huemer’s use of the principle of indifference supports the rationality of inductive scepticism. (shrink)

In mathematics we have demonstrably insoluble problems, one example being that of trisecting an arbitrary angle in elementary geometry. Every now and then, we encounter engineers and others who offer solutions of the insoluble and make some stir. To those who feel convinced of the demonstration of insolubility, these claimed solutions do not seem to deserve any serious considerations. In fact, such solutions have long since ceased to attract attention from mathematicians.The situation in philosophy seems different. Here we do not (...) possess demonstrations as clear and distinct as in mathematics. For example, it has been a fashion among philosophers for two centuries or so to answer Hume's scepticism concerning induction. Although, presumably, there never has been any answer or solution which is as widely accepted among philosophers as Hume's sceptical argument, yet philosophers continue to enjoy elaborating arguments for and against Hume's scepticism. And people who feel convinced by Hume's resaoning often find it difficult to understand why philosophers persist in trying to contradict Hume flatly instead of seeking for some more devious way out. (shrink)

The argument of this article is that the use of general terms, And in particular the general term 'generalizations established inductively', Is possible only on the basis of at least weak inductive reasoning. In consequence, Total scepticism concerning induction, The proposition that "no inductive generalization, Of any kind, Is justifiable", Is one of those propositions which are incoherent because their assertion is possible only on the basis of their own falsehood.

RÉSUMÉDans l’esprit du scepticisme modal, Peter Hawke propose une épistémologie modale, la théorie de l’explication sûre, qui adopte la forme de l’empirisme modal. Avec la SET, il essaie de défendre l’induction énumérative : on croit raisonnablement que tout X est F sur la base d’un échantillon suffisamment grand dans lequel tout X est F. Dans cet article, je soutiens que l’argmentation de Hawke échoue. De plus, je signale un problème avec la SET, lequel cause cet échec : la SET est (...) trop stricte pour expliquer certaines affirmations possibles que nous avons le droit de croire. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans l’esprit du scepticisme modal, Peter Hawke propose une épistémologie modale, la théorie de l’explication sûre, qui adopte la forme de l’empirisme modal. Avec la SET, il essaie de défendre l’induction énumérative : on croit raisonnablement que tout X est F sur la base d’un échantillon suffisamment grand dans lequel tout X est F. Dans cet article, je soutiens que l’argmentation de Hawke échoue. De plus, je signale un problème avec la SET, lequel cause cet échec : la SET est (...) trop stricte pour expliquer certaines affirmations possibles que nous avons le droit de croire. (shrink)

Stove defends his book, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism, and claims his critics have "irished", or changed the question.

The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of (...) things, which are characterized as such by the essential properties which all members of a kind necessarily possess in common. The proposed response to inductive scepticism combines the insights of epistemic naturalism with a metaphysical outlook that is due to s cientific realism. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and (...) ontological relativism. An argument from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is presented, and is contrasted with three other arguments for epistemic relativism. It is argued that the argument from the criterion is the most fundamental argument for epistemic relativism. Finally, it is noted how the argument of the present paper fits with the author’s previous suggestion that a particularist response to the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be combined with a naturalistic view of epistemic warrant to meet the challenge of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

This article considers two arguments that purport to show that inductive reasoning is unjustified: the argument adduced by Sextus Empiricus and the (better known and more formidable) argument given by Hume in the Treatise. While Sextus’ argument can quite easily be rebutted, a close examination of the premises of Hume’s argument shows that they are seemingly cogent. Because the sceptical claim is very unintuitive, the sceptical argument constitutes a paradox. And since attributions of justification are theoretical, and the claim (...) that they are never (or seldom) true isn’t preposterous, the correct response to the paradox may well be to admit that the sceptic has exposed our error in making them. (shrink)