This paper explores the theory and illustrates the managerial implications of complete and incomplete markets for corporate strategy and corporate socialresponsibility. Market imperfections including externalities, asymmetric information or compromised competition motivate corporate social responsibility. At the same time, traditional approaches to corporate strategy based on industry analysis may imply exploiting or sustaining market imperfections. Assuming markets are complete complicates finding a theoretical basis for happily uniting CSR and above average profits. Assuming markets are incomplete undermines (...) traditional industry analysis or resource-based approaches to corporate strategy because incomplete markets hinder accurate calculation of the net present value of different resource commitments. Cases illustrate how theories of firm performance based on incomplete markets provide a new managerial framework to guide strategy and improve social welfare. (shrink)

This article seeks to illustrate egg donation's incompletely commodified status through an analysis of two cases of first impression, highlighting the tensions that arise from attempts to reconcile egg donation's reality as a robust commercial industry with the nonmarket norms that traditionally underlie reproduction. Antitrust and taxation litigation may seem unlikely sources for guidance in navigating the tensions in egg donation's uncertain place between the worlds of gift and market exchange. Nonetheless, this litigation forces an explicit consideration of how egg (...) donation is perceived, talked about, and operationalized, and where along the gift-market spectrum it fits. These cases also engage familiar questions of commodification, coercion, and exploitation, which are surprisingly central litigation issues. (shrink)

If market transactions are optimal, why do so many transactions occur within firms themselves? Ronald H. Coase explains this phenomenon by arguing that market transaction costs differ from intra-company transaction costs and that clear intra-intra-firm property rights have the effect of reducing transaction costs. But what exactly are the relevant transaction costs, and what factors determine them? Oliver Hart argues that market contracts are incomplete, and that the key to improving efficiency is putting the power to deal with these (...) unspecified circumstances into the hands of owners within the same entity.In this paper, I argued that, the development of the theory and practice of business ethics as well as China’s innovative practice in recent decades provide a new perspective, one that is especially relevant to the issues raised by Case and Hart and that bear directly on the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises. (shrink)

This article draws on key models of monitoring and blockholding articulated in the incomplete contracts theory of the firm. Under incomplete contracts theory, different governance systems have incentive structures that entail different tradeoffs—tradeoffs between ownership concentration and liquidity, between monitoring and management initiative, and between private rent-seeking and activity benefiting shareholders as a group. The tradeoffs delimit opportunities for productive cross-reference. More specifically, blockholder systems, such as those in Europe, subsidize monitoring by permitting blockholders to reap private benefits (...) of control through self-dealing and insider trading. Market systems, such as those in the United States and Britain, regulate such private rent-seeking toward the end of maintaining an institutional framework that supports diffuse share ownership and liquid trading markets. It follows that a legal framework conducive to blockholding may be ill-equipped to foster dispersed equity ownership and thick trading markets and that a legal framework conducive to liquid trading markets may have properties that discourage blockholding. This gives rise to questions for law reform agendas on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, proponents ask for deregulation of controls on institutional investors, looking to encourage blockholding and more effective monitoring. In Europe, proponents ask for stronger securities regulation, looking to encourage deeper trading markets. This article suggests that each reform program may lead to disappointing results because neither assures conforming adjustments to the pertinent actors’ incentives. Alternatively, strict reforms that materially change prevailing incentive patterns could perversely destabilize workable arrangements without assuring the appearance of more effective alternatives. (shrink)

Innovations in web technologies, data warehousing and data mining enable Internet marketers to collect, process and analyze personal data gathered from web users browsing and online purchase habits on a much greater scale as it is now quicker and more economical to do so. Recent surveys indicate that consumers are not comfortable with these practices, especially when the data is collected or sold without their consent. The resulting conflict of interest demands a solution. In this paper, a framework of (...) class='Hi'>incomplete markets, property rights and transaction costs is used to analyze the problem and propose some preliminary solutions. (shrink)

We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the profit they might garner from future trades. In this paper, we analyze non-myopic strategies and examine what information structures lead to truthful betting by traders. (...) Specifically, we analyze the behavior of risk-neutral traders with incomplete information playing in a dynamic game. We consider finite-stage and infinite-stage game models. For each model, we study the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) with two different information structures: conditionally independent signals and (unconditionally) independent signals. In the finite-stage model, when signals of traders are independent conditional on the state of the world, truthful betting is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Moreover, it is the unique Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the game. In contrast, when signals of traders are unconditionally independent, truthful betting is not a WPBE. In the infinite-stage model with unconditionally independent signals, there does not exist an equilibrium in which all information is revealed in a finite amount of time. We propose a simple discounted market scoring rule that reduces the opportunity for bluffing strategies. We show that in any WPBE for.. (shrink)

The article considers several working anarchies in the networked environment, and whether they offer a model for improving on the persistent imperfections of markets and states. I explore whether these efforts of peer mutualism in fact offer a sufficient range of capabilities to present a meaningful degree of freedom to those who rely on the capabilities it affords, and whether these practices in fact remain sufficiently nonhierarchical to offer a meaningful space of noncoercive interactions. The real utopias I observe (...) here are perfect on neither dimension. Internally, hierarchy and power reappear, to some extent and in some projects, although they are quite different than the hierarchy of government or corporate organization. Externally, there are some spectacular successes, some failures to thrive, and many ambiguous successes. In all, present experience supports neither triumphalism nor defeatism in the utopian project. Peer models do work, and they do provide a degree of freedom in the capabilities they provide. But there is no inexorable path to greater freedom through voluntary open collaboration. There is a good deal of uncertainty and muddling through. The last part of the article suggests a theory of freedom that supports the significance of even these obviously imperfect peer systems with incomplete coverage of necessary human capabilities, and explains why expanding the domain of mutualism improves freedom and well-being under conditions of persistent market imperfection and an inevitably fallible state. Peer mutualism doesn’t have to be perfect; it merely needs to offer a new dimension or sufficient diversity in how it instantiates capabilities and transmits power to offer us, who inhabit the systems that these peer systems perturb, a degree of freedom. (shrink)

The optimal investment problem is studied for a continuous time incomplete market model. It is assumed that the risk-free rate, the appreciation rates, and the volatility of the stocks are all random; they are independent from the driving Brownian motion, and they are currently observable. It is shown that some weakened version of Mutual Fund Theorem holds for this market for general class of utilities. It is shown that the supremum of expected utilities can be achieved on a sequence (...) of strategies with a certain distribution of risky assets that does not depend on risk preferences described by different utilities. (shrink)

Feminist Care Ethics has much to offer in an analysis of the international migration of care workers. This paper argues, however, that Joan Tronto’s analysis of this international care regime is incomplete insofar as it overlooks the ways in which the current global care market is progressive for the workers and the significant harms this market is inflicting on care receivers in source countries. In order for Feminist Care Ethics to fulfill its potential, it must be developed beyond a (...) visionary tool for revaluing care—it must also produce analytic tools for evaluating real alternatives under pressing, real-time constraints. (shrink)

Jacob Sparks has developed a semiotic critique of markets that is based on the fact that “market exchanges express preferences.” He argues that some market transactions will reveal that the purchaser of a market good inappropriately prefers it to a similar non-market good. This avoids Brennan and Jaworski’s criticism that semiotic objections to markets fail as the meaning of market transactions are contingent social facts. I argue that Sparks’ argument is both incomplete and doomed to fail. It (...) can only show that some preferences are morally problematic, not that the transactions that they lead to are immoral. (shrink)

A new history of liberalism which argues that liberalism has been predicated on definite morality and should be viewed as an attempt to encompass both fear and hope. Liberalism, argues Alan Kahan, is the search for a society in which people need not be afraid. Freedom from fear is the most basic freedom. If we are afraid, we are not free. These insights, found in Montesquieu and Judith Shklar, are the foundation of liberalism. What liberals fear has changed over time (...) (revolution, reaction, totalitarianism, religious fanaticism, poverty, and now populism) but the great majority of liberal thinkers have relied on three pillars to ward off their fears and to limit the concentrated power that causes fear: freedom, markets, and morals, or, to put it another way, politics, economics, and religion or morality. Most liberal thinkers emphasize one or two pillars more than another, but it is typical of liberalism down to the Second World War to rely on all three, although there were always minority voices who preferred to stand on only one leg. After WWII, "thin" procedural/market liberals, who wanted to strip any moral or religious basis or purpose from liberalism, dominated "thick" liberal moralists, who thought liberalism needed a moral basis and/or goal. It is the political contention of this book that liberalism is most convincing as program, language, and social analysis when it relies on all three pillars, and that the relative weakness of liberalism at the end of the twentieth century had much to do with neglect of the moral pillar of liberalism. Its historical contention is that for much of the past two centuries it did rely on all three pillars. But Kahan also argues that liberalism is not only a party of fear. It is also a party of hope, or the party of progress. Many of the contradictions typical of liberalism derive from the seemingly contradictory effort to encompass both hope and fear. If in case of conflict fear often trumps hope for liberals (loss aversion applies in politics as much as in economics), and utopia is subject to indefinite postponement, progress in personal autonomy and development has always been at the heart of liberalism. Liberals typically support their hopes on the same three pillars of freedom, markets, and morals which they use to ward off their fears. Nevertheless, in one respect those historians and political theorists who identify liberalism with laissez-faire economics are not wrong. It is characteristic of liberalism then that it bases its hopes not on the state but on civil society, which for liberals is the common source of a free politics, a free market, and of morals. Alan S. Kahan is Professor of History at the Université de Versailles. His previous books include Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for Democratic Souls (Oxford 2015), Alexis de Tocqueville (Continuum Books) and Mind vs Money: The War Between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishing, 2010). (shrink)

In this article, I query whether participation in the labour market can hinder neo-republican freedom as non-domination. I briefly present the view of Philip Pettit on the topic, based on the distinction between offering a reward and threatening a punishment. I compare it to the analysis of labour republicans, recently reconstructed by Alex Gourevitch, according to whom, the exclusion of a group of individuals from the control of productive assets represents a form of structural domination. Then, I explain why I (...) take a position that is different from both. I hold that capitalist structural domination leads only to exploitation, not interpersonal domination. In doing this, I consider two objections that might be raised against my argument. The first one is based on incomplete contracts and on a possible ideal benchmark for job offers. The second one challenges the supposed arbitrariness of unequal property relations within the capitalist social system. (shrink)

The best studies on the relationship between pharmaceutical corporations and medicine have recognized that it is an ambiguous one. Yet most scholarship has pursued a simpler, more saleable narrative in which pharma is a scheming villain and medicine its maidenly victim. In this article, I argue that such crude moral framing blunts understanding of the murky realities of medicine's relationship with pharma and, in consequence, holds back reform. My goal is to put matters right in respect to one critical area (...) of scholarly interest, the medical journal publication.Pharma relies on peer advocacy to sell its wares to prescribing doctors. This is an arrangement in which clinicians’ qualified colleagues, including “key opinion leaders,” are recruited by pharmaceutical corporations and marketing agencies to deliver commercially expedient content to their professional fellows. Precisely how this practice works in the setting of publications is not well understood because ethicists studying the problem have made too much of the narrative of corporate villainy and medical victimhood. Accordingly, criticism of industry publications has been preoccupied with the crudely dishonest practices of ghostwriting, ghost authorship, and “ghost management,” vices condemned as “dirty little secrets” perpetrated from “behind the scenes” with the connivance of academic “shills” or “guest authors,” in contempt of standards set by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors. This account is appealing, and yet it is wrong or, at the very least, seriously incomplete, with only limited relevance to the actualities of contemporary industry practices. In truth, many commercial publications are not developed in secret but fashioned within a culture of open collaboration, where academic authors make substantial, independent contributions; pharmaceutical companies are showcased rather than hidden; and medicine's editorial standards assist rather than impede the workings of commerce. (shrink)

Despite creating vast inequalities and propping up reactionary world regimes, capitalism has many passionate defenders—but not because of what it withholds from some and gives to others. Capitalism dominates, Todd McGowan argues, because it mimics the structure of our desire while hiding the trauma that the system inflicts upon it. People from all backgrounds enjoy what capitalism provides, but at the same time are told more and better is yet to come. Capitalism traps us through an incomplete satisfaction that (...) compels us after the new, the better, and the more. Capitalism's parasitic relationship to our desires gives it the illusion of corresponding to our natural impulses, which is how capitalism's defenders characterize it. By understanding this psychic strategy, McGowan hopes to divest us of our addiction to capitalist enrichment and help us rediscover enjoyment as we actually experienced it. By locating it in the present, McGowan frees us from our attachment to a better future and the belief that capitalism is an essential outgrowth of human nature. From this perspective, our economic, social, and political worlds open up to real political change. Eloquent and enlivened by examples from film, television, consumer culture, and everyday life, Capitalism and Desire brings a new, psychoanalytically grounded approach to political and social theory. (shrink)

Control of the market microstructure theory of corporate governance perspective on the traditional theory of the firm as a deepening of the study, the use of information economics and game theory tools to the mainstream economic analysis framework for the development, the market for corporate control transactions, configuring and tuning the details of the process accurately describes the shares of companies in the separation of ownership and control of internal control case shareholders, tender offers, takeover bids and other governance mechanisms (...) different from the actual control and operation of, the existence of incomplete information and transaction costs under control conditions to analyze market transactions , from the perspective of market microstructure control to clarify the shareholders of the managers to implement effective control mechanisms, policies and conditions. Share control over the behavior of financial market issues, equity market and environmental factors control the interaction between the control and equity issues in the legal protection and market control policy design issues will be the future theoretical research in this field focus. Corporate governance theory based on corporate control market microstructure focuses on trading, allocating and adjusting process of the corporate control market, applying the information economic approach and game instrument to expand the mainstream economic analysis framework. It accurately describes the factual operation of different corporation control and governance mechanism such as corporation owner's internal control, tender offer, takeover bid and negotiating transfer, deepening the traditional firm theory. Moreover it analyzes the corporate control market transactions on the case of incomplete information and positive transaction cost, examines the effective mechanism, strategies and condition by which the owner control and monitor the management based on corporate control market microstructure perspective. Those are the future research topics in this field that behavior finance, interaction with environments and legislation protect and regulation policy designations. (shrink)

This book presents startling evidence that state monopolies can produce better outcomes than the free market. It provides an empirical comparison of the property insurance market in five European countries: Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The market and cost structures of insurers in each country are described, and particular features of each market and the outcomes for customers examined. The regulatory frameworks vary widely from country to country and so do the market outcomes, both in terms of premium level (...) and in terms of available insurance cover.In view of the increase in major floods and other forms of natural damage over the last decades, the non-availability of insurance cover in many competitive insurance systems is likely to become a major political issue. This book shows that state monopoly is an adequate policy response. Competitive insurance systems are shown to provide incomplete cover at a substantially higher cost. In mixed systems, where the private sector can obtain reinsurance from the state the state tends to end up paying most of the costs while the private insurance companies keep most of the premium income.The book will be of interest to academic economists interested in privatization, regulation, the theory of the firm, and insurance; Policy-makers concerned with regulation and privatization; Insurance companies, regulators, and analysts. (shrink)

ArgumentWhen Pasteur and Chamberland hastily set up their small biological industry to meet the agricultural demand for the anthrax vaccine, their methods for preparation and production had not yet been stabilized. The process of learning how to standardize biological products was accelerated in 1882 when vaccination accidents required the revision of production norms as the first hypotheses on fixity, inalterability, and transportability of vaccines were invalidated and replaced by procedures for continuous monitoring of the calibration of vaccines and the renewal (...) of vaccine strains. Initially, the incompleteness and ongoing development of production standards justified Pasteur's monopoly on the production of the anthrax vaccine under his immediate supervision. Later on, the Pasteur Institute maintained control of these standards in the framework of a commercial monopoly that it established on the veterinary vaccines first sent and then cultivated abroad by the Société de Vulgarisation du Vaccin Charbonneux Pasteur, founded in 1886. (shrink)

El gran edificio de la moral kantiana, construido sobre una sólida concepción de la naturaleza de lo ético, deja con todo un margen a la perplejidad: no acaba de convencer. Estudiadas las líneas maestras de su arquitectónica, la investigación que busca hallar la raíz de esta insatisfacción, termina por centrarse en el concepto kantiano de "razón práctica". En él se descubre el uso del modelo jurídico, que tiene como consecuencia una concepción de la ley moral que encaja más en el (...) orden del derecho que en el ético. (shrink)

This article is devoted to examine two theories on the origin of cognition. The first of them is a neurobiological theory by de authors V. Mountcastle and J. Hawkins working separately. The second one is a theory from the Cognitive Psychology by D. Gentner. It is interesting to check that exists a strong congruence between both of them despite they have absolutely different methodologies. Two different ways lead to postulate the analogy and their mechanisms as the main element of cognition. (...) The present article gives reasons for embracing the analogy as being the main cause of the origin of knowledge in the infant. Besides, it explains why language is the main cause of adult human intelligence and it also denies the need of existence of any innate lexicon or vocabulary. (shrink)

The article analizes the several times of Proclus‘s reception by Nicholas of Cusa’s thought. The direct reading of Proclus can be established because Expositio in Parmenidem Platonis –Cod.Cus. 186– and Elementatio theological –Cod.Cus.195– (Moerbeke’s translation) and De theologia Platonis Libri VI –Cod.Cus.185– (Petrus Balbus’s translation) are in his Library in Bernkastel-Kues with his marginalia. The assimilation of doctrines can be considered assuming that the implicits and explicits references to Plato’s Diadochus, especially in the last works.

El autor intenta hacer comprensible cómo el punto de partida de Fichte, siendo de originaria y sincera filiación kantiana, ocultaba in nuce una ruptura -ni intencional ni deseada, peroinevitable- con el criticismo. Primero, se recuerda la temprana desviación fichteana de importantes tesis kantianas, queeran incompatibles con su atención al Yo (no al Yo pienso), y que ya le planteaban el problema del acceso a su ser. Posteriormente, se emprende una deducción transcendental ontológica del acceso al Yo, que puede esclarecer exposiciones (...) más tardías (especialmente de la Doctrina de la Ciencia de 1805). Como conclusión, se interpreta la tarea de Fichte como el intento fundamental de volver al problema del ser, mas bajo su única forma posible: la del Yo. (shrink)

Se editan los textos centrales de la conferencia pronunciada en 1860 por K. E. y. Baer, según la rara edición que hizo de la misma en ¡862. Su mostración imaginativa de lo diferente que sería nuestra representación de la realidad natural con el USO de otros cánones espacio-temporales, puede volver a interesar hoy, sobre todo, al llamado Constructivismo,Zentrale Texte des Vortrages von 1860, den It E. y. Baer lii Petesbrug hielt, nach der seltenen Ausgabe von 1862, sowie ibre spanische Ubersetzung (...) sind hier herausgegeben. Seine imaginative Darstellung der ganz verschiedenen Auffasung der Natur nach der Veránderung des Raum-Zeit-Mai3stabes gelten jinmer noch als Anregung ciner fruchtbaren Reflexion, tiberhaupt in Zeiten des sogenannten Konstruktivismus. (shrink)