Health reform must include health care rationing, both for reasons of fairness and efficiency. Few politicians are willing to accept this claim, including the Clinton Administration. Brown and others have argued that enormous waste and inefficiency must be wrung out of our health care system before morally problematic cost constraining options, such as rationing, can be justifiably adopted. However, I argue that most of the policies and practices that would diminish waste and inefficiency include implicit (...) (and therefore morally problematic) rationing. Critics of rationing see as its most morally and psychologically troubling feature that an identified individual is denied potentially beneficial care. That psychic anguish may not be eliminable, and perhaps ought not be eliminated. But if rationing protocols are fairly adopted through a process of free and informed rational democratic deliberation to which all have access, the moral objections are largely overcome. Such a process is possible only if implicit rationing is recognized and rejected. Keywords: Justice, health care rationing, health reform, democratic decision-making CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Rationing in healthcare remains very much a taboo topic. Before COVID-19, it rarely received public attention, even when it occurred in everyday practices, mainly in the form of implicit rationing, as it continues to do today. There are different definitions, types and levels of healthcare rationing, according to different perspectives. With the aim of contributing to a more coherent debate on such a highly emotional healthcare issue as rationing, here are provided a number of reflections (...) from a patient advocate perspective which are specifically focused on bedside rationing, the most troublesome level, both for patients and clinicians, particularly in regard to cancer care. Oncology, with its numerous expensive therapies and increasing number of patients, is undeniably one of the main areas contributing to the increase in healthcare costs. However, the fixed budgets of today's publicly financed health systems cannot allow unlimited access to the potentially beneficial treatments to all patients. Bedside rationing constitutes the last phase of many decision-making processes occurring at different interrelated levels (macro-levels), both inside and outside healthcare systems, which implicitly and inevitably result in a bottleneck determined by the upstream decisions themselves. Shifting from implicit to explicit bedside rationing essentially means moving from a paternalistic to a citizen-before-patient approach; this implies, first of all, a cultural change. Practical bedside rationing is an ethically complex topic, but one that needs to be urgently addressed in a transparent and open debate. In this scenario, the oncological community – patients, patient advocates and clinicians – can and should play an important role. (shrink)

Several quantitative surveys have been conducted internationally to gather empirical information about physicians’ general attitudes towards health care rationing. Are physicians ready to accept and implement rationing, or are they rather reluctant? Do they prefer implicit bedside rationing that allows the physician–patient relationship broad leeway in individual decisions? Or do physicians prefer strategies that apply explicit criteria and rules?

This article focuses on rationing of expensive medical care in the Czech Republic. It distinguishes between political and clinical decision levels and reviews the debate in the Western literature on explicit and implicit rules. The contemporary situation of the Czech health care system is considered from this perspective. Rationing reoccurred in the mid 90s after the shift in health care financing from fee-for-service to prospective budgets. The lack of explicit rules is obvious. Implicit (...) forms of rationing, done by physicians at the clinical level prevail, implying uncontrolled power of the medical profession and lacking transparency for ethical considerations of equity to access. It seems to be acceptable for physicians to play the role of allocators, probably because of their experience with rationing during the socialist period. Traditional rationing stereotypes from the previous regime seem to persist despite the health care system transformation during the 90s. (shrink)

Germany has just started a public debate on priority-setting, rationing and cost-effectiveness due to the cost explosion within the German health care system. To date, the costs for German health care run at 11,6 % of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP, 278,3 billion €) that represents a significant increase from the 5,9 % levels present in 1970. In response, the German Parliament has enacted several major and minor legal reforms over the last three decades for the sake (...) of cost containment and maintaining stability of the health care system. The Statutory Health Insurance—SHI (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung—GKV) is based on the fundamental principle of solidarity and provides an ethical and legal framework for implementing equity, comprehensiveness and setting the principles and rules for financing and providing health care services and benefits. Within the SHI system, several major actors can be identified: the Federal Ministry of Health, the 16 state ministries of health, the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA), the physicians (with their associations) and the hospitals (with their organizations) on the provider side, and the sickness funds with their associations on the purchasers’ side. This article reviews the structure and complexities of the German health care system with its major players and participants. The focus will be put on relevant ethical, legal and economic aspects for prioritization, rationalization, rationing and cost-effectiveness of medical benefits and services. In conclusion, this article pleads for open discussion on the challenging subject of priority-setting instead of accepting the implicit and non-transparent rationing of medical services that currently occurs at many different levels within the health care system, as it stands today. (shrink)

Care left undone, interchangeably referred to as missed care, unfinished nursing care and task incompletion, is pervasive in contemporary healthcare systems. Care left undone can result in adverse outcomes for the patient, nurse and organization. The rhetoric that surrounds care left undone infers it is a contemporary nursing phenomenon; however, a seventeenth‐century Spanish nursing treatise, Instruccion de Enfermeros (Instructions for Nurses), challenges this assumption. Instruccion de Enfermeros was an instructional guide that was written for members (...) of the Congregation of Bernardino de Obregon who worked as nurses at the Madrid General Hospital. The treatise provides a historical commentary on the daily roles, responsibilities and working conditions of the Obregonian nurses. Its content and context suggest the Obregonian nursing resource was consistently time poor due to a confluence of internal and external stressors. Consequently, the Obregonians were under considerable role strain resulting in inferior patient care. This article explores the antecedents of care left undone through a historical lens using exemplars from the 1625 edition of Instruccion de Enfermeros. Factors contributing to care left undone in Obregonian nursing will then be examined to offer insights into the similarities between what a nurse suffered 400 years ago and what exists in contemporary nursing practice. (shrink)

As the pressure on available health care resources grows, an increasing moral challenge in intensive care is to secure a fair distribution of nursing care and medical treatment. The aim of this article is to explore how limited resources influence nursing care and medical treatment in intensive care, and to explore whether intensive care unit clinicians use national prioritization criteria in clinical deliberations. The study used a qualitative approach including participant observation and in-depth interviews (...) with intensive care unit physicians and nurses working at the bedside. Scarcity of resources regularly led to suboptimal professional standards of medical treatment and nursing care. The clinicians experienced a rising dilemma in that very ill patients with a low likelihood of survival were given advanced and expensive treatment. The clinicians rarely referred to national priority criteria as a rationale for bedside priorities. Because prioritization was carried out implicitly, and most likely partly without the clinician's conscious awareness, central patient rights such as justice and equality could be at risk. (shrink)

The latest Omicron variant of the novel coronavirus has itself created a novel situation—bringing attention to the topic of healthcare rationing among hospitalized pediatric patients. This may be the first time that many pediatricians, nurses, parents, and public health officials have been compelled to engage in uncomfortable discussions about the allocation of medical care/resources. Simply put, finite budgets, resources, and a dwindling healthcare workforce do not permit all patients to receive unlimited medical care. Triage and bedside (...) class='Hi'>rationing decisions are happening in a range of difficult everyday circumstances both implicitly and explicitly, but in ways not recognized by even the best ethically framed intentions. Clinicians and hospital administrators have largely been left on their own “to flatten the rationing curve” in hopes that resources never have to be explicitly rationed at their facility. Unfortunately, the downstream result is a misinformed and distrustful public (i.e. parents, guardians, and caregivers) filled with people who are already burdened with inflammatory pseudoscience narratives and deficits in health literacy. This paper aims to elevate a more thoughtful conversation about healthcare rationing by analyzing some existing ethical principles/framework developed for rationing decision making during previous emergency responses and drawing from the day-to-day clinical perspectives of a frontline pediatric acute care/hospitalist. (shrink)

The focus of the study is the conflict between care and concern for particular patients, versus considerations that take impartial considerations of justice to be central to moral deliberations. To examine these questions we have conducted qualitative interviews with health professionals in Norwegian hospitals. We found a value norm that implicitly seemed to overrule all others, the norm of ‘making a difference for the patients’. We will examine what such a statement implies, aiming to shed some light over moral (...) dilemmas interwoven in bedside rationing. (shrink)

Introduction Hundreds of thousands of premature neonates born in low-income countries are implicitly denied treatment each year. Studies from India show that treatment is rationed even for neonates born at 32 gestational age weeks (GAW), and multiple external factors influence treatment decisions. Is withholding of life-saving treatment for children born between 28 and 32 GAW acceptable from an ethical perspective? Method A seven-step impartial ethical analysis, including outcome analysis of four accepted priority criteria: severity of disease, treatment effect, cost effectiveness (...) and evidence for neonates born at 28 and 32 GAW. Results The ethical analysis sketches out two possibilities: (a) It is not ethically permissible to limit treatment to neonates below 32 GAW when assigning high weight to health maximisation and overall health equality. Neonates below 32 GAW score high on severity of disease and efficiency and cost-effectiveness of treatment if one gives full weight to early years of a newborn life. It is in the child's best interest to be treated. (b) It can be considered ethically permissible if high weight is assigned to reducing inequality of welfare and maximising overall welfare and/or not granting full weight to early years of newborns is considered acceptable. From an equity-motivated health and welfare perspective, we would not accept (b), as it relies on accepting the lack of proper welfare policies for the poor and disabled in India. Conclusion Explicit priority processes in India for financing neonatal care are needed. If premature neonates are perceived as worth less than other patient groups, the reasons should be explored among a broad range of stakeholders. (shrink)

This paper describes the present resource allocation problems in the Danish tax-based public health care system and presents an analysis of the two policy options put forward as a solution to these problems: (1) explicit rationing of services, and (2) the introduction of two-tiered health care. It is argued that a two-tiered system with a private second tier is unlikely to be acceptable and viable in Denmark, whereas an introduction of a second tier within the public system (...) may be more acceptable. It is further argued that present implicit rationing methods may be unethical and ought to be replaced by explicit rationing. Keywords: justice, resource allocation, two-tiered health care CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper is a response to Peter Allmark's thesis that 'there can be no "caring" ethics'. It argues that the current preoccupation in nursing to define an ethics of care is a direct result of breaking nursing tradition. Subsequent attempts to find a moral basis for care, whether from subjective experimental perspectives such as described by Noddings, or from rational and detached approaches derived from Kant, are inevitably flawed. Writers may still implicitly presuppose a concept of care (...) drawn from the Judaeo-Christian tradition but without explicit recourse to its moral basis nursing is left rudderless and potentially without purpose. The very concept of 'care' cut off from its roots becomes a meaningless term without either normative or descriptive content. (shrink)

Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the (...) content of one’s will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries. (shrink)

This paper reports a preliminary descriptive approach to the representation of the concept of love. Based on Spreading Activation Model, the word of love was presented as a stimulus to which 278 college students were asked to respond with at least 15 words/phrases that came to mind. Then top 100 love-related words/phrases with frequency above 4.3% were collected as units of analysis. Based on the interrelations among those words/phrases, a complete-linkage cluster analysis reached 5 high-order clusters, i.e. the five facets (...) of the representation of love concept: 1) ethics and responsibilities; 2) romantic experience; 3) conflict and pain; 4) rationality; 5) friendly care. The results show that word associations can fundamentally reflect some differences in cognition and culture of love. Compared with Sternberg’s triangular theory of love, the findings show differences in two clusters: “conflict and pain” and “rationality”, which are not included in the triangle of love. More importantly, this research contributes to literatures on Chinese people’s love and will also inspire future research with some meaningful results. (shrink)

Although rationing of scarce health-care resources is inevitable in clinical practice, there is still limited and scattered information about how physicians perceive and execute this bedside rationing (BSR) and how it can be performed in an ethically fair way. This review gives a systematic overview on physicians’ perspectives on influences, strategies, and consequences of health-care rationing. Relevant references as identified by systematically screening major electronic databases and manuscript references were synthesized by thematic analysis. Retrieved studies (...) focused on themes that fell under three major headings: (i) conditions and influences of BSR, (ii) strategies of BSR, and (iii) consequences of BSR. The range of themes indicates that physicians’ rationing behavior is highly variable, strongly influenced by context-related factors, and consists mainly of implicit rationing strategies. Torn between patient advocacy and the obligation to contain costs, physicians experience various role conflicts. The development of explicit rationing strategies seems necessary to avoid arbitrary BSR and allow a fair allocation of health-care resources. (shrink)

Shestov's work can be summed up under six headings. Three are sharp contrasts, three are paradoxes. (1) First there is the contrast between Shestov the person, who was moderate, competent, and calm, and Shestov the thinker, who was extreme, incandescent, and impassioned. (2) Then there is the contrast between his critique of reason, his acceptance of irrationalism, and the means by which he attacks the former and defends the latter: namely, careful rational argument. Sometimes he argues like a lawyer (after (...) all, he had a law degree from Moscow University). (3) Shestov speaks repeatedly of the "horrors and atrocities of human existence." But his examples are always drawn from history or literature, never from his own life, although we know that he experienced much horror. (4) Nietzsche is the thinker whom he invokes most frequently, and most warmly. Yet, paradoxically, Shestov completely ignores most of Nietzsche's central themes. (5) Shestov's skeptical doubts are mostly directed at rationalism; he is not skeptical about the existence or benevolence of God. Yet he is explicitly skeptical about divine omniscience and implicitly skeptical about divine omnipotence in a metaphysical sense, though not in its ethical application. (6) Shestov has a deep faith that God can undo all the horrors of life, putting an end to all suffering. At the same time he knows that this will not, and cannot, happen, since the very idea of undoing the past, erasing its horrors, is conceptually incoherent. (shrink)

Shestov’s work can be summed up under six headings. Three are sharp contrasts, three are paradoxes. First there is the contrast between Shestov the person, who was moderate, competent, and calm, and Shestov the thinker, who was extreme, incandescent, and impassioned. Then there is the contrast between his critique of reason, his acceptance of irrationalism, and the means by which he attacks the former and defends the latter: namely, careful rational argument. Sometimes he argues like a lawyer. Shestov speaks repeatedly (...) of the “horrors and atrocities of human existence.” But his examples are always drawn from history or literature, never from his own life, although we know that he experienced much horror. Nietzsche is the thinker whom he invokes most frequently, and most warmly. Yet, paradoxically, Shestov completely ignores most of Nietzsche’s central themes. Shestov’s skeptical doubts are mostly directed at rationalism; he is not skeptical about the existence or benevolence of God. Yet he is explicitly skeptical about divine omniscience and implicitly skeptical about divine omnipotence in a metaphysical sense, though not in its ethical application. Shestov has a deep faith that God can undo all the horrors of life, putting an end to all suffering. At the same time he knows that this will not, and cannot, happen, since the very idea of undoing the past, erasing its horrors, is conceptually incoherent. (shrink)

Should organ transplants be given to patients who have waited the longest, or need it most urgently, or those whose survival prospects are the best? The rationing of health care is universal and inevitable, taking place in poor and affluent countries, in publicly funded and private health care systems. Someone must budget for as well as dispense health care whilst aging populations severely stretch the availability of resources. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing is (...) a clear and much-needed introduction to this increasingly important topic, considering and assessing the major ethical problems and dilemmas about the allocation, scarcity and rationing of health care. Beginning with a helpful overview of why rationing is an ethical problem, the authors examine the following key topics: What is the value of health? How can it be measured? What does it mean that a treatment is "good value for money"? What sort of distributive principles - utilitarian, egalitarian or prioritarian - should we rely on when thinking about health care rationing? Does rationing health care unfairly discriminate against the elderly and people with disabilities? Should patients be held responsible for their health? Why does the debate on responsibility for health lead to issues about socioeconomic status and social inequality? Throughout the book, examples from the US, UK and other countries are used to illustrate the ethical issues at stake. Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and discussion questions make this an ideal starting point for students new to the subject, not only in philosophy but also in closely related fields such as politics, health economics, public health, medicine, nursing and social work. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Rationing medical health care has been debated in the industrialized Western hemisphere for at least two decades. Many factors have contributed to the fact that medical care can no longer be provided free of charge, which used to be an explicit political goal in all countries with a well-established welfare system. Considerable shortage of public financial resources is now generally accepted to pertain also to the health care system. Arguments: So far, efforts (...) have been made to rationalize various medical procedures both with regard to specific medical treatment strategies and to administrative support processes. However, these means are limited in their effects to curb medical costs at a significant level. Thus, rationing medical health care is necessary to further enable the reimbursement system to cover expensive diagnostics and treatment that would exceed the individual’s capability to pay. Rationing can occur explicitly or implicitly. Implicit rationing has to be regarded as an unfair procedure and should be rejected on ethical grounds. Conclusion: Distributive justice in medical care can only be accomplished if the reimbursement system is based on a new theoretical foundation. This entails a stronger emphasis on individual responsibility for one’s own life and health and the insight that health is an individual rather than a collective good. Nevertheless, a mutual insurance-based collective health care system should not be abolished as long as it is thoroughly reformed. As a minimum requirement, it must provide incentives to spend money on preventive health measures. (shrink)

Introductory and advanced textbooks in bioethics focus almost entirely on issues that disproportionately affect disabled people and that centrally deal with becoming or being disabled. However, such textbooks typically omit critical philosophical reflection on disability, lack engagement with decades of empirical and theoretical scholarship spanning the social sciences and humanities in the multidisciplinary field of disability studies, and avoid serious consideration of the history of disability activism in shaping social, legal, political, and medical understandings of disability over the last fifty (...) years. For example, longstanding discussions on topics such as euthanasia, physician aid-in-dying, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, prenatal testing, selective abortion, enhancement, patient autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and health care rationing all tend to be premised on shared and implicit assumptions regarding disability, especially in relation to quality of life, yet with too little recognition of the way that “disability” is itself a topic of substantial research and scholarly disagreement across multiple fields. This is not merely a concern for academic and medical education; as an applied field tied to one of the largest economic sectors of most industrialized nations, bioethics has a direct impact on healthcare education, practice, policy, and, thereby, the health outcomes of existing and future populations. It is in light of these pressing issues that the Disability Bioethics Reader is the first reader to introduce students to core bioethical issues and concepts through the lens of critical disability studies and philosophy of disability. The Disability Bioethics Reader will include over thirty-five chapters covering key areas such as: critical histories and state-of-the-field analyses of modern medicine, bioethics, disability studies, and philosophy of medicine; methods in bioethics; concerns at the edge- and end-of-life; enhancement; disability, quality of life, and well-being; prenatal testing and abortion; invisible disabilities; chronic illness; healthcare justice; genetics and genomics; intellectual disability and neurodiversity; ethics and diagnosis; and epistemic injustice in healthcare. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to re-visit how rationing is defined for a health-care context, Two reasons justify returning to this topic. First, the variability as to how rationing has been defined in the legal, medical, and philosophical literature justifies a careful examination to identify its critical features. Second, I believe that if the definitions typically employed in the literature, several of which are discussed below, are compared to those that would be offered by the American (...) public, ethically weighty dissimilarities would be apparent. Disparate characterizations are worrisome because serious “disconnections” between policymakers’ understandings, rhetoric, and priorities and those of the general public are more likely. (shrink)

This essay argues that our national efforts at health reform ought to be informed by eleven key lessons from Oregon. Specifically, we must learn that the need for health care rationing is inescapable, that any rationing process must be public and visible, and that fair rationing protocols must be self-imposed through a process of rational democratic deliberation. Part I of this essay notes that rationing is a ubiquitous feature of our health care system at (...) present, but it is mostly hidden rationing, which is presumptively unjust. Part II argues that the need for health care rationing is inescapable. Although Oregon is flawed as a model of health rationing, it gives us worthy moral lessons for health reform at the national level, which I analyze and defend in Part III. The most significant of these lessons is the importance of rational democratic deliberation in articulating fair rationing protocols for a community. In Part IV I sketch the philosophic justification for this approach and respond to some important criticisms from Daniels. Keywords: cost containment, democratic deliberation, fairness, justice, rationing CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This volume explains why, and in what ways, health care is being rationed in the late-1990s health service. It examines the ethical questions which arise from this rationing and includes personal case studies, from surgeons to geriatric advisors.

The purpose of this article is to re-visit how rationing is defined for a health-care context, Two reasons justify returning to this topic. First, the variability as to how rationing has been defined in the legal, medical, and philosophical literature justifies a careful examination to identify its critical features. Second, I believe that if the definitions typically employed in the literature, several of which are discussed below, are compared to those that would be offered by the American (...) public, ethically weighty dissimilarities would be apparent. Disparate characterizations are worrisome because serious “disconnections” between policymakers’ understandings, rhetoric, and priorities and those of the general public are more likely. (shrink)

Americans' appetite for life-prolonging therapies has led to unsustainable growth in health care costs. It is tempting to target older people for health care rationing based on their disproportionate use of health care resources and lifespan already lived, but aged-based rationing is unacceptable to many. Systems reforms can improve the efficiency of health care and may lessen pressure to ration services, but difficult choices still must be made to limit expensive, marginally beneficial interventions. In (...) the absence of agreement on principles to govern health care resource allocation, a fair, open priority-setting process should be created to allow for reasonable disagreement on principles while being seen as legitimate by all stakeholders. At the patient-care level, careful discussions about the benefits and burdens of medical intervention and support for slow medicine — a gentle, family-centered care approach for frail elders — can do much to avoid harming these patients with aggressive yet unwanted medical care while reducing wasteful spending. (shrink)

The concept of equality is subject to many different interpretations, and it is closely connected to similar concepts such as equity, justice, fairness, and human rights. As an ideal, equality entails many aspects that are untenable. For instance, genetic and social inequalities may never be extinct, but they can both be ameliorated by proper distribution of society's resources. Likewise, within the context of health care, equality can be promoted by proper rationing of health resources, amongst which nursing (...) class='Hi'>care stands out. In the field of nursing, the principle of equality presents itself in various forms of ethical and deontological mandates. However, beyond good intentions and abstract notions, there is a need to examine the ways in which nurses enforce this principle in practice, within the reality of modern health systems. Although there is scarcity of qualitative evidence in the nursing care rationing literature, existing studies suggest that fair treatment pertains to a largely intuitive sense of equality which involves subjective perceptions and judgements about rationing. Nurses’ initial predisposition is to view all patients as equal and treat them in an equal manner; yet, on an individual basis, each patient has a different starting point, different needs and different prospects that render rationing decisions complex and uncertain. Equality should be accepted with its unavoidable limitations in practice and be further examined within the context of nursing care rationing, in the hope that it can be advanced in a consistent way, despite the idealistic nature in many of its aspects. (shrink)

I agree with Professor ter Meulen that there is no need to make a forced choice between “justice” and “solidarity” when it comes to determining what should count as fair access to needed health care. But he also asserts that solidarity is more fundamental than justice. That claim needs critical assessment. Ter Meulen recognizes that the concept of solidarity has been criticized for being excessively vague. He addresses this criticism by introducing the more precise notion of “humanitarian solidarity.” However, (...) I argue that these notions are still not precise enough and are in need of behavioral translation, especially in relation to the problem of fair health care rationing. More specifically, I argue that translation ought to take the form of a well-ordered process of rational democratic deliberation, which I describe and defend in this essay. Such a process is what is required to construct a working model of just solidarity as opposed to a merely abstract idealization of just solidarity. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a “just” and “caring” society in meeting the health care needs of the terminally ill when we have only limited resources to meet virtually unlimited health care needs? That question is the focus of this essay. Put another way: relative to all the other health care needs in our society, especially the need for lifesaving or life-prolonging health care, how high a priority ought the health care needs of persons (...) who are terminally ill have? On the one hand, we might see the terminally ill as being among the “medically least well off” and therefore deserving very high priority. On the other hand, we might see them as squandering vast medical resources for marginal medical benefits, thereby denying needed resources to others who would benefit much more. We begin the essay by making a number of morally relevant distinctions with regard to the category of “being terminally ill.” We note, given contemporary medicine, that individuals may be terminally ill several times in the course of a life. Not all such circumstances make equal just claims to needed health care. We also note that our conceptions of health care justice are ultimately incapable of making very fine-grained, morally justified rationing judgments in complex medical circumstances. We conclude that we must finally rely upon fair processes of rational democratic deliberation to articulate such judgments for our own future, possibly terminally ill selves, thereby undercutting the rhetoric of “death panels.”. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts three different substantive principles of justice for making health care priority-setting or “rationing” decisions: need principles, maximising principles and egalitarian principles. The principles are compared by tracing out their implications for a hypothetical rationing decision involving four identified patients. This decision has been the subject of an empirical study of public opinion based on small-group discussions, which found that the public seem to support a pluralistic combination of all three kinds of (...) class='Hi'>rationing principle. In conclusion, it is suggested that there is room for further work by philosophers and others on the development of a coherent and pluralistic theory of health care rationing which accords with public opinions. (shrink)

Mr. M. was a 77-year-old decisionally incapacitated long-term nursing home resident with chronic schizophrenia who was admitted to the hospital with a bacterial pneumonia. His past medical history was notable for deteriorating functional status over the past 2-3 years, urinary retention requiring chronic indwelling bladder catheterization, and two recent hospitalizations for urinary tract infections leading to sepsis. He developed respiratory failure soon after admission and was intubated and placed on mechanical ventilation. Follow-up studies suggested worsening pneumonia and acute respiratory distress (...) syndrome, as well as worsening kidney function. (shrink)

In the last few years, the U.S. health care system has seemingly been gripped by “back to the nineties” fever. But there is a notable change in professional debates about how to better control health care costs. Discussion of health care rationing, which was hotly debated in the nineties, has become much more muted.Is health care rationing passé? I contend that debates about health care rationing have waned not because the need to (...) ration has dwindled nor because ethical debates about how or whether to ration have been resolved. They have declined because the word “rationing,” and unrelated concepts such as cost‐effectiveness analysis, have been replaced by terms—“parsimony,” “value,” and “CER”—that are not burdened by emotional and historical baggage.Sometimes the best way to promote healthy moral debate is to turn to new words that don't carry the burden of past debates. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a “just” and “caring” society in meeting the health care needs of the terminally ill when we have only limited resources to meet virtually unlimited health care needs? This is the question that will be the focus of this essay. Another way of asking our question would be the following: Relative to all the other health care needs in our society, especially the need for lifesaving or life-prolonging health care, how (...) high a priority ought the health care needs of persons who are terminally ill have? Should any of the health care needs of the terminally ill be assigned very low priority? Or should all their health care needs be assigned the highest priority? If we reflect a bit, we will find ourselves greatly internally conflicted. On the one hand, the “caring” side of our moral self might see terminally ill individuals as being among the “medically least well off,” and therefore, deserving virtually any medical resources that will yield any degree of good for them. (shrink)

Background:In the face of scarcity, nurses may inevitably delay or omit some nursing interventions and give priority to others. This increases the risk of adverse patient outcomes and threatens safety, quality, and dignity in care. However, it is not clear if there is an ethical element in nursing care rationing and how nurses experience the phenomenon in its ethical perspective.Objectives:The purpose was to synthesize studies that relate care rationing with the ethical perspectives of nursing, and (...) find the deeper, moral meaning of this phenomenon.Research design:A systematic review and thematic synthesis of qualitative studies was used. Searching was based on guidelines suggested by Joana Brigs Institute, while the synthesis has drawn from the methodology described. Primary studies were sought from nine electronic databases and manual searches. The explicitness of reporting was assed using consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research. Nine studies involving 167 nurse participants were included. Synthesis resulted in 35 preliminary themes, 14 descriptive themes, and four analytical themes. Discussion of relationships between themes revealed a new thematic framework.Ethical consideration:Every effort has been taken, for the thoroughness in searching and retrieving the primary studies of this synthesis, and in order for them to be treated accurately, fairly and honestly and without intentional misinterpretations of their findings.Discussion:Within limitations of scarcity, nurses face moral challenges and their decisions may jeopardize professional values, leading to role conflict, feelings of guilt, distress and difficulty in fulfilling a morally acceptable role. However, more research is needed to support certain relationships.Conclusions:Related literature is limited. The few studies found highlighted the essence of justice, equality in care and in values when prioritizing care—with little support to the ethical effects of rationing on nurses. Further research on ethical dimension of care rationing may illuminate other important aspects of this phenomenon. (shrink)

My assigned task in today’s colloquium is to review philosophers’ perspectives on the broad question of whether health care rationing ought to target the elderly. This is a revolutionary question, particularly in a society that is so sensitive to apparent discrimination, and the question must be approached carefully if it is to be successfully dealt with. Three subordinate questions attend this one and must be addressed in the course of answering it. The first such question has to do (...) with the issue of justice: how is it fair to target the elderly in achieving reductions in health care costs? Isn’t the proposal, or for that matter, isn’t targeting any age group, morally objectionable as a species of ageism, just as targeting members of a particular race or sex would be racist or sexist? The second subordinate question has to do with the issue of fittingness. Given that we can show in some way that targeting the elderly is not inherently unjust, why would limiting health care to them be a fitting thing for medicine to do? How would it fit, for example, with the traditional commitments of medicine, to sustain life, to relieve suffering, to heal and cure and restore function? And in particular, if medicine has the ability to save and relieve and restore the elderly, why should it replace that set of commitments with a different set for this particular population? The third subordinate question seems political, an arena reserved for one of my speaker colleagues today. There are, I believe, some underlying philosophical dimensions to its answer, and so I will say something about it. The philosophical/political questions is, Given that rationing health care to the elderly is not patently unjust, and given that a case can be made out that the ends of medicine are not violated by such limitation, shy should the elderly, as a group, assent to such a limitation? I want to address these subordinate questions, for I believe them to be the chief stumbling blocks for the possibility of an affirmative answer to our... (shrink)

BackgroundWhen rationing health care, a commonly held view among ethicists is that there is no ethical difference between withdrawing or withholding medical treatments. In reality, this view does not generally seem to be supported by practicians nor in legislation practices, by for example adding a ‘grandfather clause’ when rejecting a new treatment for lacking cost-effectiveness. Due to this discrepancy, our objective was to explore physicians’ and patient organization representatives’ experiences- and perceptions of withdrawing and withholding treatments in (...) class='Hi'>rationing situations of relative scarcity.MethodsFourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted in Sweden with physicians and patient organization representatives, thematic analysis was used.ResultsParticipants commonly express internally inconsistent views regarding if withdrawing or withholding medical treatments should be deemed as ethically equivalent. Participants express that in terms of patients’ need for treatment withholding and withdrawing should be deemed ethically equivalent. However, in terms of prognostic differences, and the patient-physician relation and communication, there is a clear discrepancy which carry a moral significance and ultimately makes withdrawing psychologically difficult for both physicians and patients, and politically difficult for policy makers.ConclusionsWe conclude that the distinction between withdrawing and withholding treatment as unified concepts is a simplification of a more complex situation, where different factors related differently to these two concepts. Following this, possible policy solutions are discussed for how to resolve this experienced moral difference by practitioners and ease withdrawing treatments due to health care rationing. Such solutions could be to have agreements between the physician and patient about potential future treatment withdrawals, to evaluate the treatment’s effect, and to provide guidelines on a national level. (shrink)

The paper argues against the polarisation of the health economics literature into pro- and anti-QALY camps. In particular, we suggest that a crucial distinction should be made between the QALY measure as a metric of health, and QALY maximisation as an applied social choice rule. We argue against the rule but for the measure and that the appropriate conceptualisation of health-care rationing decisions should see the main task as the integration of competing and possibly incommensurable normative claim types. (...) We identify the main types as consequences, rights, social contracts, individual votes and community values and note situations in which the contribution of each claim type is limited. We go on to show that the integration of (at least some of) these claim types can be formalised within the mathematical framework provided by non-linear programming. (shrink)

One of the most controversial issues in many health care systems is health care rationing. In essence, rationing refers to the denial of - or delay in - access to scarce goods and services in health care, despite the existence of medical need. Scarcity of financial and medical resources confronts society with painful questions. Who should decide which medicine or new treatment will be covered by social security and on which criteria such decisions must be (...) based? Can age, for example, be justified as a selection criterion? Should decision-making be left to health care policymakers, hospital administrators, or rather, to treating physicians? And finally: is there a role for individual patients? These are difficult questions that suggest the need for transparent and democratic decision-making. In reality, however, the rationing debate occurs in a sub rosa world, based on imperfect information, distorted interpretations of effectiveness, and hidden cost concerns. This book explores these and other questions from various perspectives. Each of the book's contributors analyzes the debate from a different angle, in search of fair and just rationing decisions. (shrink)

In health care systems where access to resources is limited, priorities must be set. The Canadian health care system relies on physicians as clinical or micro-level gatekeepers to health care access. Several studies have indicated that physicians do not tend to consider distributive justice concerns when making clinical-level resource allocation decisions. This is concerning, given that the normative literature on micro-level rationing has featured justice considerations as a necessary condition for fair decision-making. I will first discuss (...) the basics of bedside rationing and some studies which identify a possible justice “value deficit.” I will then analyze the relevant normative frameworks in the rationing literature to identify if and where decision-making may be falling short. Finally, I will use Beauchamp and Childress’ fifth and sixth editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics to examine whether justice in micro-level rationing is best conceptualized as a principle or a virtue. (shrink)

Most works on moral psychology direct our attention to the positive role morality plays for us as individuals, as a society, even as a species. In What's Wrong with Morality?, C. Daniel Batson takes a different approach: he looks at morality as a problem. The problem is not that it is wrong to be moral, but that our morality often fails to produce these intended results. Why? Some experts believe the answer lies in lack of character. Others say we are (...) victims of poor judgment. If we could but discern what is morally right, whether through logical analysis and discourse, through tuned intuition and a keen moral sense, or through feeling and sentiment, we would act accordingly. Implicit in these different views is the assumption that if we grow up properly, if we can think and feel as we should, and if we can keep a firm hand on the tiller through the storms of circumstance, all will be well. We can realize our moral potential. Many of our best writers of fiction are less optimistic. Astute observers of the human condition like Austen, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Eliot, Tolstoy, and Twain suggest our moral psychology is more complex. These writers encourage us to look more closely at our motives, emotions, and values, at what we really care about in the moral domain. In this volume, Batson examines this issue from a social-psychological perspective. Drawing on research suggesting our moral life is fertile ground for rationalization and deception, including self-deception, Batson offers a hard-nosed analysis of morality and its limitations in this expertly written book. (shrink)

There is a gap between health economic evaluation methods and the value judgments of coverage decision makers, at least in Germany. Measuring preference satisfaction has been claimed to be inappropriate for allocating health care resources, e.g. because it disregards medical need. The existing methods oriented at medical need have been claimed to disregard non-consequentialist fairness concerns. The aim of this article is to propose a new, contractarian argument for justifying needs-based economic evaluation. It is based on consent rather than (...) maximization of some impersonal unit of value to accommodate the fairness concerns. This conceptual paper draws upon contractarian ethics and constitution economics to show how economic evaluation can be viewed as an institution to overcome societal conflicts in the allocation of scarce health care resources. For this, the problem of allocating scarce health care resources in a society is reconstructed as a social dilemma. Both disadvantaged patients and affluent healthy individuals can be argued to share interests in a societal contract to provide technologies which ameliorate medical need, based on progressive funding. The use of needs-based economic evaluation methods for coverage determination can be interpreted as institutions for conflict resolution as far as they use consented criteria to ensure the social contract’s sustainability and avoid implicit rationing or unaffordable contribution rates. This justifies the use of needs-based evaluation methods by Pareto-superiority and consent. The view of economic evaluation presented here may help account for fairness concerns in the further development of evaluation methods. This is because it directs the attention away from determining some unit of value to be maximized towards determining those persons who are most likely not to consent and meeting their concerns. Following this direction in methods development is likely to increase the acceptability of health economic evaluation by decision makers. (shrink)

: Bioethical discussion of justice in health care has been much enlivened in recent years by new developments in the theory of rationing and by the emergence of a strong communitarian voice. Unfortunately, these developments have not enjoyed much in the way of close engagement with feminist-inspired reflections on power, privilege, and justice. I hope here to promote interchange between "mainstream" treatments of justice in health care and feminist thought.

Rationing is the allocation of a good under conditions of scarcity, which necessarily implies that some who want and could be benefitted by that good will not receive it. One reflection of our ambivalence towards health care rationing is reflected in our resistance to having it distributed in a market like most other goods—most Americans reject ability to pay as the basis for distributing health care. They do not view health care as just another commodity (...) to be distributed by markets. Despite this widespread view, we are the only developed country without some form of universal health insurance, and so for the 46 million Americans without health insurance their access to health care often does depend on their ability to pay for it. Rationing largely remains a topic that the public, their elected leaders, and many health care professionals prefer to avoid. Ever-growing costs of health care will increasingly force the practice and issue of health care resource prioritization and rationing into the open for public, professional, and political attention. This paper explores some of the features of those practices and issues that make them especially ethically and politically difficult. Those issues will not be easily resolved, but avoiding them will not avoid the need or reality of rationing, it will only mean that it will go on covertly and unexamined. That will lead neither to better or more legitimate prioritization and rationing decisions. (shrink)

Bioethicists are increasingly commenting on health care resource allocation, and sometimes suggest ways to solve various rationing dilemmas ethically. I argue that both because of the assumptions bioethicists make about social reality, and because of the methods of argument they use, they cannot possibly make a useful contribution to the debate. Bioethicists who want to make a practical difference should either approach health care resource allocation as if the matter hinged upon tribal competition (which is essentially what (...) it does), or they should do political philosophy in the traditional sense, and examine the health system from the outside. (shrink)

A common analysis of current U.S. politics identifies the main problem as ideological polarization leading to government dysfunction, and moderation as the main solution. But drawing from Martin Luther King Jr., I contend that the main problem is sectarianism or us-them thinking, leading to injustice, and the main solution a social movement of love and justice. Notably, while many call for deemphasizing ideas, my solution calls for more emphasis on ideas. The purpose of government is justice. The moderation solution, although (...) superficially value-free, implicitly values the status quo or gradualism over justice, reflecting King’s “white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice.” Sectarianism is bad for involving animosity toward outgroup members and undermining critical thinking, resulting in decision-making based on group power rather than rationality and justice. The moderation solution resembles sectarianism in encourag­ing decision-making based not on substance but relative to where others stand. Moreover, responding to injustice with moderation often involves capitulation to it. Counteracting sectarianism requires caring across group lines and making political decisions based on justice. A social movement, appealing to high ideals and broad solidarity—like King’s “extremism” for love and justice—is necessary to transform policies and our political culture. (shrink)